James Broshot, Missouri

Re the proposed War in the Desert upgrade, I heartily concur with the suggestions I have seen in print so far. This has been my favorite Europa game. The maps will be updated to conform to the new Europa symbols. I have seen the Bardia-to-Palestine draft upgrade and this certainly would change some of the strategies (fewer airfields because of the downgrading of cities like Bardia and El Alamein). I would also like to see my pet Europa chrome: 5th Light Division appearing with 2nd and 8th Machine Gun Battalions, instead of the 200th Rifle Regiment.

More proposed War in the Desert chrome: Give the Germans a 15th Rifle Brigade counter to allow for the combination of smaller units into a Europa-size kampfgruppe. 15th Rifle Brigade headquarters was part of the 15th Panzer Division, but was used as a headquarters unit for independent kampfgruppen, most notably during Gazala and Alamein. At Alamein, it was composed of the three German reconnaissance battalions and covered the southern front, where it faced its British counterpart, the so-called 4th Light Armoured Brigade (for which there is a special counter in War in the Desert).

Finally, I note that the War in the Desert scenarios that you have run will have to be modified (or the game system altered) before they can be included in the upgrade. Some of them (as I recall) have a lot of special rules.

Cory S. Manka, Oklahoma

The following are suggested rules for inclusion in the remake of War in the Desert and the games it will encompass. Most are simple and easy to implement. The proposal on General Supply will without a doubt be the most contentious.

1. The governments of New Zealand, Australia, and South Africa were adamant that their troops enter combat under their own commanders. In few instances can I find reference to brigades of these nations operating under other than their own division commands (the South Africans did so but once).

Recommendation: New Zealand, Australian, and South African brigades may not operate west of the Nile Delta unless accompanied by a division headquarters of the appropriate nationality. The brigades may operate freely in any territory to the east. Each headquarters may control no more than three brigades.

2. Weather is a major factor in combat operations. Europa reflects this in its weather rules. However, there are instances that the rules do not cover. The January 1943 storm that damaged Benghazi is an example.

Recommendation: Due to storm damage, Benghazi may not function as a port or a source of general supply from Jan 143 through Feb 143. Whoever controls the port may ground 3 divisions, 2 infantry or armor brigades and 1 artillery brigade within 3 hexes of the port, their truck assets being used to move additional supplies forward from Tobruk or Tripoli. If this is done, trace general supply to Benghazi's port as normal.

3. Vichy France granted Germany use of the port of Bizerte on 27 March 1941, but procrastinated in putting the agreement into effect. The British invasion of the Levant caused the French to withdraw this permission.

Recommendation: If the British fail to invade the Levant by Jun 141, Germany may use Rule 331 without penalty.

4. Based on my reading of British accounts of operations in Egypt and Libya, virtually all unit replacements of a significant nature occurred in the Nile Delta. Divisions and brigades would be sent to the Nile Operating Base to refit.

Recommendation: To receive replacement points, a Commonwealth cadre must be in the Nile Delta, Palestine, the Levant, or a friendly supply terminal.

5. War in the Desert uses two types of supply, General and Attack. General Supply stems from a supply terminal or a supply counter. It provides water, food, fuel, and ammunition to conduct full strength defensive and half strength offensive operations of unlimited duration. It is available at any distance from a supply terminal so long as a unit can trace a limited path to a road, then along that road to the terminal.

Attack supply provides units the ability to conduct full strength offensive operations.

I think it is a problem that a supply counter can provide general supply capabilities when it normally only provides the ammunition to conduct offensive combat operations at full strength. One would have to argue that the expenditure of a supply counter to provide general supply represents the emptying of forward supply depots.

However, nothing in the current supply rules creates the situation that existed in Sep-Oct 1942, when Axis forces before El Alamein had only two days supply of fuel and fuel tankers. True, we have the Malta interdiction rules and their effect on supply counters, but nothing directly affects general supply.

Recommendation: There are one or two methods that can be used to overcome this shortcoming. One is to create General Supply points along with Supply Movement points or trucks for their transport. The GSPs would need to be shipped to Africa just as any other unit is (in fact, however, some could be generated in Libya from the resources on hand there naturally). They would be moved forward to supply depots from which they are expended each turn (or as the players desire) to provide general supply. Tracing supply to a supply terminal will no longer be required, as the supply depot fills this function.

Additionally, Attack Supply counters may only be used to provide attack supply, or to allow a force that is cut off to defend at full strength.

A second method is to create a General Supply capacity for a supply terminal that decreases in ability to keep units in general supply as the supply line lengthens.

a. General supply from a supply terminal is equal to the current port capacity x 5. Example: Suez: 8 REs x 5 = 40 REs. Damage to a port is considered in this calculation.

b. General supply radiates from a supply terminal by road and rail.

i. Supply by rail is equal to 10 times the current rail RE capacity. Example: Egypt rail capacity is 10 REs; therefore, 10 REs x 10 = 100 REs of general supply. Capture of rail centers reduces this capacity.

ii. The capacity along a road is 40 REs out to a distance of 40 road hexes from a supply terminal or railhead (excluding the 7 hexes used to trace unit supply overland). Each hex beyond this range reduces the capacity by one RE.

c. The intent of this revision is to limit the number of units that may be maintained in general supply at great distances from their supply bases, since the transportation assets to maintain the supply lines were inadequate at best. For the Axis to seize Alexandria they must open Benghazi as a supply terminal to provide their units with general supply. Conversely, the British will need to open Tripoli as a supply terminal to continue their offensive into Tunisia.

I have playtested the second proposal on several occasions and aside from a bit of record-keeping at long ranges, it seems to work well. Of the two proposals, the first will lend itself to standardization in Europa supply rules. The second is an abstract. Both have advantages and disadvantages. The bottom line is that the supply rules as written do not lend themselves to realistically recreating the supply nightmare that both sides had to face in one degree or another.

6. The British surprise attack doesn't work quite right.

Recommendation: The movement allowance for the first turn surprise move should be halved to limit ahistorical play. Either that or establish historical attack positions from which the British launch their offensive without movement being allowed.

That's my two cents worth. I believe that War in the Desert is a superb game, extremely playable and quite historically accurate. Hopefully, some of my proposals may serve to make it even better, and will find their way into the revision.

CPT Mark Yanaway, Connecticut

While attending the Command and General Staff College class of 92/93 I had occasion to speak with a number of authorities on The Great Patriotic War. These included COL David Glantz of the Foreign Military Studies Office, Dr. Jacob Kipp, Dr. Robert Baumann and the first Russian, Ukrainian, and various other former Warsaw Pact members to attend the college.

This letter depends heavily on my experience and conversations there and concerns Soviet mobilization and the use of railways in FitE/SE/TU during the Soviet initial turns. The Soviets had incompletely regauged the lines into Poland. The effect on their mobilization was to halve the daily capacity in trains from 800 to 400. The movement of units by rail into the standard gauge portion of the Soviet rail net should cost double the number of REs in addition to other gauge limitations to replicate the limitation on trains-per-day.

Ron Mazurkiewiez, Wisconsin

I just got my copy of TEM #36 and was disappointed to find that the printing job on this magazine was worse than ever. I have noticed for a while that you tend to have fade- outs in the text; what steps are you taking to correct this?

Winston and I have had several discussions about this and are taking some actions we think will help. Back in issue #30 we changed fonts to Times and went to 600 DPI printing (which gives more condensed, and therefore, cleaner copy). We thought this was a step forward. Well, as with many wed intended plans, this one went astray. The Times font is narrower than most fonts, and in combination with 600 DPI, the print comes out very fine. If the ink distribution isn't just right, you get fading. Also, shading becomes very problematic. It looks great when it comes off the printer, but the printing press actually reproduces coarser, dotgenerated shading better than solid, high-density shading.

So, we have gone back to 300 DPI printing for this issue. We hope that solves the problem. If it doesn't, we will took at changing fonts again or whatever it takes to sustain a high quality level of printing. -- Rick

Joe Czerwinski, New York

Rick Gayler's suggestion in TEM #35 to treat HQs as artillery units for replacement purposes in Fit&SE raises a number of questions:

1. Does it follow that all Soviet divisions and cadres would require one artillery RP (or more?!) to be rebuilt? And how would the artillery requirement be incorporated into replacing divisions/cadres on the German side? Or should we be willing to accept for game reasons the inconsistency that artillery replacements are not required to rebuild divisional units, yet are required to rebuild HQs? (This inconsistency bothers me, although I admit that given the limited number of breakdowns available to each player, I doubt that it would have much impact on the game.)

2. Would changing the replacement rules for HQs necessitate alterations to the Soviet artillery replacement rate/German artillery replacement limitation?

3. Would a separate limitation on replacing units that contain HQs be a better solution? This would allow the artillery replacement rules to stand as they are. The limits on how many of these units can be replaced could be varied by nationality and/or time period to reflect the ability of the different countries to produce divisional staffs and their attendant specialists. After all, these units include, in addition to artillery, "expensive, skilled, specialty troops" (to steal a phrase from Frank Watson's discussion of the subject).

Some time ago, Mark Pitcavage wrote that the replacement system was one of Europa's most neglected areas. Just looking at the ramifications of this "simple" change illustrates why. Yet in GE, with the addition of production and economics to the replacement system, the difficulties will multiply exponentially.

The intent per my suggestion was that the rates would not change, there would just be more units (HQs) falling under the rate/limitation. Second Front handles HQs by establishing a replacement unit of one divisiond HQ per month per side. The rules makes it clear this applies to HQs only, and not divisional units in general. --Rick

On another topic, I very much enjoyed reading Rich Velay's piece on Soviet mountain divisions. However, I would like to add that these units can often be employed effectively in the High Arctic in the rough terrain and mountain range outside Murmansk, not so much for stacking and combat, but for their movement advantages. The German player often has mountain divisions in the area, where in rough terrain a German mountain division can move four hexes in good weather, compared to only one hex for an ordinary Soviet rifle division, and three for a Soviet mountain rifle division.

Also, it's likely that Rich overstated the number of these units likely to be available to the Soviet player. As he points out, several of them begin the game in the border MDs, and we all know what happens to those units during the Surprise and Jun II turns.

Actually, Mr. Velay states that there will only be "a likely maximum usable total of 34 PE's' of mountain units available for the first Soviet winter counteroffensive. This amounts to eleven divisions, plus the replaceable mountain brigade. This sounds about right to me. -- Rick

On the other hand, how many games of Fire in the East/Scorched Earth progress to the point where Soviet troops are advancing into the Carpathians (barring brief, meaningless forays during the opening turns)? One of the reasons that players tend to use the mountain troops for their winterization benefits during the first winter is probably the fact that very few games are actually played into 1944. Hopefully, if Sudden Storm proves successful and is extended to cover a longer time period, more players will be able to discover the utility of these underappreciated units.

Sudden Storm appears to be very popular. Many players have suggested that Europa-Lite be extended beyond Mar II 42, and a few of the most enthusiastic have even offered to work on it as playtesters. --Rick

Jay Kaufnian, Minnesota

There are already several hypothetical units present in existing Europa games, and with the advent of Grand Europa, there promise to be many more. Perhaps it would be beneficial to mark such units with an asterisk next to their unit designations? Secondly, small units which historically existed are often represented in Europa by assembling them into larger "composite units," which did not often exist as genuinely integrated formations. Such units could be indicated by enclosing their unit designations in brackets or parentheses.

Speaking of Grand Europa, some thought should be given to how to handle the collapse of the major Allied powers. For example, the Soviets did not plan to surrender if Moscow fell. So what's to prevent the USSR from fighting until German and Japanese forces link up at Chita? A special rule mandating Soviet surrender when Moscow falls, or Moscow and Leningrad, or some other combination of cities doesn't seem satisfactory.

Of course, Barbarossa anticipated a Soviet collapse due to the violence of the campaign about the time Smolensk fell. Certainly the Soviets were tremendously shaken by the 1941 campaign. There should be some possibility for a Soviet morale collapse to occur (per the German's flawed plan), but also a stronger possibility that the Soviets will fight on deep into the Urals if necessary.

What will make the USA sue for peace? The US intended to fight on even if Britain fell. In 1940, after France was occupied and it seemed likely that Britain would soon fall as well (a recurring prediction of then ambassador Joe Kennedy), the USAAF began design work for a heavy bomber (which eventually became the B-29), which required a range sufficient to hit targets in Germany from bases in the Middle East. This gives some idea of what lengths the US was prepared to go.

Churchill was prepared to retreat to Canada and continue the war from there. A requirement for the Western Allies to surrender even if the entire Europa mapboard is Axis- owned clearly would not be realistic. Some mechanism rigidly defining such a forced surrender due to lost territory won't work by itself, but equally, some mechanism needs to be present to force an Allied surrender under severe enough circumstances. Britain might have surrendered, for example, if the U-Boats had been quite a bit more successful; this was Churchill's greatest fear and the closest Germany came to winning in the west.

John P. Sokol, Pennsylvania

As discussed in TEM # 31, p. 47, I see the Finns in A Winter War not being able to really hold the Soviets back for even a few turns. If the Soviets start the 8th and 9th Armies out very close together, you can begin to invade Finland with an outof-supply force that is still fairly strong and can keep moving (but slowly) to the rear of the main Finnish defenses. This force is large enough that it is also difficult to isolate.

Almost all the at-start Finnish forces are needed to prevent 3:1 attacks on the southern Finnish fort hexes. This is because I interpret the rules to give the Finns an advantage for winterization and woodsmanship only for an attack.

The optional rule 36A does redress this somewhat, but the lack of effects of winterization for the defense strikes me as a "gamey" decision made when it was decided that the Finns were too strong. A discussion of Finnish and Soviet strategies for A Winter War in TEM by experienced players would be very interesting since I see this as one of the best games in the series, especially for those of us with smaller tables.

No defensive winterization effects was not a decision made to balance any perceived Finnish advantage. This has been standard Europa winterization treatment since the inception of the series with Drang Nach Osten in 1973. We do recognize there are advantages to the defender in snow weather, and this is built into the Combat Results Table in the form of an overall -1 die roll modifier on all attacks.

Are the Finns hopelessly overmatched with no chance of winning? As one of the game's playtesters, I remain unconvinced that there is a dramatic imbalance. Sometimes it just takes a while for one side or the other to evolve a successful strategy. For example, the pendulum. of opinion has swung wildly over the years concerning play balance in FitE/SE. Perhaps players are forfeiting the Finn's considerable attack advantages because they feel they should only defend. Are Finnish players too conservative?

To your point, we do need someone to explain how the Finns go about winning. Perhaps a game can be arranged where I play the Finns against one of those who proclaim that the Soviets can't lose. If it can be demonstrated that my Finns can not hold back the Soviets for "even a few turns,' then I would take the play balance rumors seriously. --Rick

Michael Lintner, North Carolina

The purpose of this letter is to address several issues that are currently in discussion about Europa and where it is headed. I read every issue cover-to-cover. In doing so, I have developed some concerns regarding the schools of thought which are at present spearheading the advance of this game towards its primary objective: Completion!

I don't pretend to have answers to all of the issues. I would, however, like to offer some guidance for a few.

Victory Conditions: For the individual games taking a relatively short period of time to play, I can live with the standard point system. As long as I know what I have to accomplish to declare myself the victor, I'm happy. In Grand Europa, the victory situation will be much more complex, given the opportunities a player will have to step outside of the historical course of events.

Most games will never reach actual completion, but will end with one opponent conceding to the other. My advice, therefore, is to follow the philosophy of another famous "monster game," War in Europe, which stated [67.3]: "...Normally play will result in one player defeated with the other two players as various shades of winners. Ideally, several hundred hours of sweat, toil and trouble should result in utter frustration as no player finishes a winner. Indeed, War in Europe is designed not to be won, but to be played."

Navies: Here I would suggest that the naval system used in WWII ETO might be a good system to incorporate into Europa. It offers ease of play, but allows for such occurrances as the Italian fleet obliterating the British fleet in the Mediterranean Sea.

NODLs: It seems from TEM # 33, p.39, that I am not the only person who feels that NODLs and initial Soviet flexibility in deployment are damaging to FitE/SE. Mr Sharp presents some very strong arguments in support of my position.

In terms of "real time" movement, combat and overruns are all occurring at the same time. In other words, while 357th Infantry Division is attacking Kiev, 10th Panzer is advancing on Smolensk, while 4th Panzer is overrunning a unit further north. Just by breaking down the game sequence into a movement phase and a separate combat phase, a problem is created in trying to simulate the struggles of any two armies. Overrun rules rid the game of some of the problem, but not all of the problem.

I'm not suggesting the game system be overhauled. I am suggesting that Mr. Sharp is correct that overruns should be allowed at lower odds, with correlating results. I've played Napoleonic warfare games which allow overruns at odds as low as 4:1. I can't figure out what a bunch of guys with muskets have over a bunch of guys in tanks.

Consider this: If 1,500 bare-fisted Poles are attacked by 18,000 bare-fisted Nazis, the odds are 12:1. Goodbye Poles, no Nazi casualties, and less 1 MP. If the same Poles are attacked by 15,000 Nazis, the odds are 10:1. Goodbye Poles, no Nazi casualties, and less 2 MPs.

Why stop here? What happens when our abused Poles meet 13,500 Nazis at 9:1 odds? Well, in game terms its usually goodbye Poles, no Nazi casualties, but then the Nazis don't get to move any further. What happened? Nine guys beat up on one guy, and the one guy lost bad, but then what? Did he fight so hard he tired out his nine opponents? Do they have to stop and rest? ... eat? ... what?

Mr. Sharp was kind enough to conclude this line of logic, so I'll make my point. Lower- odds overruns would produce more uncertainty in the game. Most likely, such overruns would put an end to discussions regarding NODLs. They might also be the ticket to avoid a "reserve/reaction phase." And they might even increase attacker casualties, another much- maligned aspect of Europa. It is my opinion that all of these things would make for a better game.

Steven Phillips, Oregon

Allow me to sound off about a few things that have been on my mind:

• I have found that of all the wargamer groups, the Europaphiles are the least cliquish, least priggish bunch currently in existence.
• I think Mark Pitcavage is almost always way off, but I like his prose.
• Flavio Carrillo is a great asset to the whole Europa project.
• Jason Long's "Counterbattery" says everything else for me.

Douglas Ferguson, Virginia

I am writing this brief note to accompany my resubscription to the Europa magazine in order to express my great appreciation for the job you and your associates have done with the Europa Association. I must admit that it has been years since I have actually played a Europa game, but I have many fond memories of the many games I did play (starting with DNO as soon as it was released), and your magazine does an excellent job of keeping those memories alive, especially reminding me of what a great group of people Europa has attracted over the years.

In short, I hope that you continue to provide your unique service to a small but devoted audience, and that the future brings you health, happiness, and success.

As complimentary as this fetter is, it leaves me sad. Why is it that Douglas and many other gamers no longer play Europa., but only wistfully remember the fun they used to have?

Speaking for myself, I don't have much time to play Europa (or any other game for that matter). It's work, work work...how about you? -- Rick

Anthony J. Hanford, Texas

The GEnie discussion on Eastern Front tactics in issue #29 compiled by Roy Lane addressed some interesting aspects affecting more than just Fire in the East. While I have only played in a portion of one game of FitE as the Luftwaffe commander, some aspects of the ground action were predictable from playing

The Russian Campaign and Third Reich. First and foremost is a ready willingness on the part of the Soviet player to trade territory for time, usually well before he is forced into this action by military considerations. The idea is to not attack at all, fall back gradually exposing as few forces as possible, and wait until the Nazi player exhausts himself and/or your own reinforcements allow you to take and hold the offensive initiative so you can steamroll the Red Army into Berlin sometime in late 1944 or early 1945.

While not exciting, this type of patient Soviet approach is often successful. However, such an approach ignores the political repercussions of willingly ceding territory to an invading army without a fight. It may be a "reasonable" plan when viewed by the Supreme Soviet in Moscow, but the peasants in the western portions of the Soviet Union, and any soldiers raised from those districts, would not accept Nazi occupation unless the Red Army was literally driven from the field.

Thus, while the fade-back defense is militarily a great option, considering the real position of the Red Army in mid-1941, it ignores the political reality of the situation.

As Charles Sharp mentions, Europa really does not address the political realities that were so important in defining grand strategy. As a quick fix for FitE, I would recommend the idea advanced by Flavio Carrillo. Points for control of objectives should be awarded more often than just at the end of the game (Mar II 42). Western Desert awards points for objectives once every six months to try and influence both sides to do more than just sit and amass an overwhelming force to drive the other from the map. In FitE, this concept could also be used, tying Soviet recruitment to the level of German objective points amassed.

If the Nazis are allowed to amass points too quickly, the Soviets lose some of their "scheduled" replacement points. Hopefully, this will realistically entice the Soviets to walk the fine line between defending real estate and retreating to preserve their forces.

Mr. Sharp also points out that Europa tends to allow command structures to operate as efficiently as the controlling player, whether he commands German, Soviet, British, or French troops. To provide more differentiation here, we could assign non-divisional, non-artillery units to a parent division. This could be implemented by stacking an assigned unit immediately beneath the parent division. These non-divisional units would then be required to stay with their parent division throughout the turn or suffer a movement penalty for being assigned to another division. Because many of the specialty regiments and battalions were indeed assigned in this fashion for specific missions, this would be realistic. Further, the rule could be suspended in theaters where independent operations by smaller units were common, such as in the Arctic or the desert.

Supported regiments and divisional breakdowns should also be exempted from this restriction, as they were organized to operate independently. Further, the severity of the movement penalty could be used to reflect differences in the quality and flexibility of a nationality's command structure.

Mr. Lane and his GEnie friends dwelt on "problems" with the current overrun rules and what the Soviets do to prevent German breakthroughs. I tend to agree that the current overr un rules are out of date. The biggest problem is that the current rules do not differentiate between targets. I find it somewhat strange that a 10-10 armored division can as easily overrun two 1-10 antitank battalions in wooded rough as it can overrun a supported 1-6 infantry regiment in clear terrain. I propose computing the odds for an overrun the same as for an attack on the CRT, including the standard modifiers. For each -1 DRM, shift the odds one odds ratio to the left, and for each +1 DRM, shift the odds one odds ratio to the right.

If, after modification, the overrun odds are 10:1 or higher, the player may conduct the overrun. In the example above, the armored division would be stopped by the AT guns hidden in the wooded rough, as the overrun odds would be reduced to 7: 1. On the other hand, armor would cream infantry in the open, being able to overrun at odds as low as 7:1 if a +3 modifier can be obtained.

In poor weather overruns would be harder to perform, something that the current rules do not model well. While this "adjusted" rule may not be perfect, it does tend to have a feel closer to the expected historical outcome than the current rule.

One possible criticism of the preceding is that it makes overruns far too easy, as the bulk of any army in Europa tends to be infantry, which must frequently defend open terrain. The vulnerability of the infantry is compounded by the fact that players have far too much information available about the opponent's troop dispositions. Historically, even the Western Allies, with their access to ULTRA, did not have as much information about troop dispositions and strengths as a wargamer. As such, a bit of fog on the Europa map would help.

To counter the more lenient overrun rules, and add the fog of war, allow players to inspect an opposing stack at the start of their movement phase only if they have units adjacent or the hex between their units and the opposing stack is not occupied. To prevent poorer units from screening better units, the best (divisional) unit must be placed at the top of every stack. Also, when using corps marker, an opponent must tell a player bow many counters are in the stack as well as the values of the best unit.

Thus, a player coming across a non-overrunable double line will be able to punch the first line rather efficiently, provided he has attempted to maintain contact, but may be in for some surprises as he tries to punch the second line. In truth, this is not only more exciting, but more realistic, too.

As a closing thought: Place a stun marker on any division reduced to cadre. The marker would be removed at the end of the current player turn. The effects of stun would be to reduce the unit's movement and combat values by some fraction to reflect the immediate trauma and disorganization of high combat losses on the remainder of the unit. This would form some temporary "soft spots" in a line which an attacker might take advantage of if he was aggressive.