Europa-On-Line (EOL) is not part of an orchestra, nor does it speak with one voice. EOL is a group of individuals who are dedicated to the Europa system. In fact, the EOL participants are so dedicated to Europa they are willing to absorb the costs of being on GEnie, the costs of phone bills, the costs of running their computer systems, and of course their time just to provide player feedback on the dynamics of the Europa system. EOL has generated the most prolific exchange of Europa ideas since DNO's release in 1974. EOL is neither edited nor censored. EOL is confrontational and alive with ideas and timely responses.

Putting an idea on-line is exciting and fun because of the instant feedback generated. Europa's evolutionary nature over the past twenty years can be credited to three reasons: designers such as John Astell, whose dedication is seldom appreciated in full; new research on materials previously not available; AND PLAYER FEEDBACK! Without player feedback on how the rules are interpreted and interact, we're back to Drang Nach Osten.

The NODL subject was one of the hottest topics on-line for months. Only the Air Rules topic generated more messages. For my GEnie column in the staid TEM I present subjects that contribute to the evolutionary aspects of Europa. The last two GEnie EXchange articles may have succeeded in achieving awareness for the isolated Europa r:ayer on how the game is actually played as opposed to how it is thought to be played. As long as Europa is played and continues to evolve, there will be discussion by players on how the rules interact with player strategies.

John Astell's labeling of the EOL NODL discussion as "harping" seems inappropriate since much of the NODL commentary supported Rules- as-Written. Given John's negative comments directed at the EOL group in general and the NODL subject in particular, I was surprised that he then went on to propose suggestions for fixing the "problem." The NODL problem for me was simply that on Jun II 41 the Soviets were able to deploy a NODL across the board, thereby stuffing the Axis.

The rules suggestions by JMA to alleviate this situation were in the right direction. However, changing the acronym to OPL from NODL indicates to me that John missed the point on the true essence of the NODL argument. An OPL is an overrun-proof line.

No one in the Europa community has a problem with a well-defended overrun-proof line. The argument is about the seemingly endless barely non-overrunable double lines which have become the trademark of competent East front play. The key to the problem is the double line aspect, where ALL panzer drives are limited to advances of one hex per turn... hardly a representation of the dynamics involved 50 years ago on the Eastern front.

Europa play does not reward the concentrations of armored fists to punch through enemy lines, because a NODL prevents any breakthrough. Instead the game rewards a fanning out assets in order to wear down the enemy on a broad front. Hmmm, sounds like WWI to me. Is the NODL the fault of the system? Maybe. However, the problem could be the countless replays of the 1941 campaign where state-of-the-art play has found ways to exploit the system.

This issue's topic is Victory Points. After reading JMA's response to Flavio's article on the same subject I was at first reluctant to use this material. However, victory points was and continues to be another EOL hot topic. And since the NODL article prompted an overworked John Astell to briefly turn his attention from Second Front to offer some very evolutionary ideas, I again step into the breach with the latest hot topic.

R.Lane:

Do Balkan Front victory conditions tend to favor the Greeks? In Fall of France is the soundest strategy for the French to abandon their country in order to gain appropriate victory points? In SE why should the Soviets receive a Decisive Victory for doing what was done historically? On the Eastern front few players ever actually count victory points in Dec 44, as player morale is the usual deciding factor.

1) What is the historical victory point total for each campaign?
2) Should losses be more directly factored into the Eastern front victory points?
3) How does each Europa game stack up victory point wise to history?
4) Should players conduct strategy based on victory points or history?

How often have you actually totalled up victory points after playing a Europa game? In all the years I've played Europa not once have I totaled victory points! Nor have I played toward victory points.

With GE and SF coming soon, victory points will be rather important. Since a victory in SF means the destruction of Germany, how does one quantify that victory. The Allies had overwhelming force, however the British, under that dashing and daring Muntgomery, weren't willing to sacrifice British lives. So for the Brits, losses do mean something. As long in coming as Second Front has been, I doubt that delivery of the game will wait for the victory conditions to be refined.

Dealing with victory points on a Grand Europa scale is a little premature, given the present dismal state of victory points in each Europa game. Politics and economics will eventually be intertwined on a GE scale (hopefully) to reflect cause and effect problem solving. But presently on the Eastern front, only military necessity has a bearing on play.

G.Dickson:

BF victory points may indeed favor the Greeks, but its a simple thing to change them via errata. If the game- winning strategy in FoF is to abandon the country, then a little errata is needed there too.

I think that as a general principle the historical outcome should either be a draw or at most a marginal victory for the side that won historically. The players' performances should be judged based on history. I guess that means that in a free setup of FoF the Allies are guaranteed a decisive victory! So perhaps there should be some modifier for that.

Losses should probably be factored into FitE to prevent ahistorically wasteful attacks since that game ends in early '42. But in SE losses should not be factored in since excessive losses means losing the war faster.

If victory points are crafted to reflect historical factors, then it shouldn't matter whether you play for victory points or history.

R.Roberts: Gary,

I think the victory point counts in Balkan Front favor the Greeks [but mostly because as the Greek player you won ;-) I but worse yet, I think they prevent the Axis from trying to get the job done either without attacking Yugoslavia [look at the mess I had when the Yugo's stayed out of the game] or by choosing to use only an Italian commitment stiffened by Germans [i.e., a game where the Italian player got some German reinforcements, but not a full-fledged German intervention and a victory point bonus for not affecting Barbarossa].

R.Gayler:

Rule 37-Victory is usually the weakest rule in the Europa stable. The reasons for this became very clear to me as I developed First to Fight. The victory conditions are the VERY LAST thing to be finalized in any Europa game and so it was with FtF as well. This is necessary so that all last minute playtest results can be taken into consideration, and there is tinkering with the victory point chart and levels of victory right down to the wire.

But the honest truth is that with Europa games it is difficult to get in enough playing time with the final rules and components prior to publication to obtain a concrete victory picture. I had a lot of input into the victory table in FtF and feel that it is reasonable and competitive, but only numerous playings by resourceful players and enough time for thoroughly tested plans to gel will prove whether it is "right" or not.

This situation mushrooms with a game like Scorched Earth. The game takes eons to play and it may be years before individual play strategies are fully developed, and more time before they are honed to a sharp edge.

A game like Balkan Front that uses the same victory point table for all scenarios carries its own inherent problem, as all scenarios aren't created equal.

It would be worthwhile to review all Europa victory point schedules and tables and incorporate the results of years of actual play experience into them. It would also be beneficial to create intermediate victory conditions for long games such as SE, so that a victor could be determined if play halted prematurely (say on the Aug 141 turn).

F.Carrillo:

Apparently most Europa players feel that victory points aren't a topic worth consideration. The victory point schedule is THE way to prevent ahistorical play like the Arctic runaway and other such abuses.

The political costs of certain actions must be incorporated: the historical commanders didn't have nearly as much freedom to do things as most Europa players because they didn't make their decisions in a political vacuum. For those Europa players out there who feel that such "straightjackets" shouldn't exist, I'd like to point out the Clausewitz's dictum that war is simply politics by another means, thus the political results of certain actions must be accounted for.

A.Tibbetts:

Victory points should be used to discourage ahistorical play. The RULES shouldn't. The RULES shouldn't force players to do things like invade France in Summer of 1940. The victory conditions might indicate that it would be a good idea, but not an absolute requirement.

R.Kanarr:

Now is the time to start agitating for more comprehensive, 'realistic' victory point schedules, rather than waiting for some nebulous point in the future, when GRAND EUROPA (ta da!!!) makes a debut. Shouldn't some thought be given to this subject before Second Front arrives?

To give but one silly (or is it?) example, the U.S. should be given at least one victory point for invading the Bavarian Alps after crossing the border into Germany. Why? Because, in addition to the infamous 'Gold of the Reichsbank,' the largest concentration of German (and Nazi) scientists were in this area at the end of the war, and the U.S. was definitely aimed at grabbing as many of these people as possible. Eisenhower had more than the 'Alpine Fortress' in mind, as many of the Peenemunde facilities were relocated to the vicinity of Garmisch-Partenkirchen after the British bombed their butts on the Baltic. A variety of U.S. (and British, and presumably Soviet) special operations were carried out for the express purpose of gathering in German technology (and scientists), which would lead them unerringly in this direction.

However, back to victory conditions: I am concerned that, in order to appeal to the widest audience, Europa games have always short-changed those of us who are in for the long haul, by establishing victory conditions (through victory points) that are simply applicable to the unit-and-hex conditions at some point in time. I do feel that articles like the Fortress Holland scenario, which goes more in-depth into the conditions for Dutch collapse, is a step in the right direction.

Is the Yalta agreement the framework within which the end period of the war is to be modeled (in Europa terms, from Feb I 45 to whenever)? What if, in Grand Europa, the war takes a different course?

What if, in April 1940, the Axis turns East instead of West, and attacks the Soviet Union? I think that in terms of historical context, it is much less likely that the British and French would make common cause with the Soviets, given the then recent events in Finland, and the fact that they had plans to bomb the Caucasus oil fields.

I think that a central point that must be addressed is: what do the victory points represent, and why? Other than as a somewhat arbitrary competitive measure (and they may not even be a realistic consideration in that sense, as most players, based on either their own assessment of the situation intuitively, or on some number-crunched assessment of a critical implosive (on their force's part) or explosive (on the part of their opponent's force) mass, will concede a game, rather than play it out to the last turn, just because there is a last turn to play to), are victory point schedules constructed with an eye (a) to the historical objectives of those nations involved, and (b) within the context of the war as a whole, rather than just a single campaign?

Think of it in these terms: Countries like Switzerland and Sweden should get big- time victory points for staying out of the war (in fact, both nations wheeled and dealed with both sides throughout the war, to a greater or lesser extent, and both came out of the war significantly better, in many ways, than any of the participants); the U.S. should get big-time victory points for every turn that the war ends before the historical date, as that has always been a high priority of the U.S., to get on with a war and get it over as soon as possible.

As I indicated, the U.S. should also get victory points for taking certain cities or areas, based on either their historical significance, in terms of being centers of German research, or the German player should be given a number of ,research center' game counters, which can be bombed by anyone for victory points, and captured by the U.S. or Soviets for victory points. Great Britain should get victory points for capturing naval research centers, as these were a priority for the British (note the rush to the Baltic coast to beat the Soviets to Kiel, and the British assault on Hamburg and Wilhelmshaven). I think that my point here is that victory point schedules cannot be created for each game in a vacuum, without consideration for overall national objectives.

It's not always reasonable to state that the victory points should only reward a player for doing better than the historical result. This is because the historical result may have depended upon a poor choice or a restriction not present in the game itself. In other words, it may be that equal players making equally reasonable decisions will not average out to the historical result.

In fact I can think of only a few Europa games where the average expected result is "historical."

R.Lane:

When deciding what constitutes a victory in a particular game you would also have to decide the political/military level of the players. How many players in SE would like to start the campaign two weeks early, and with the forces committed to the Balkans available from the start? Or to forgo any transfers out of theater to Italy?

Basing VPs on national objectives does seem to be the correct course. However, if the Axis does go East it will still be through Poland, which commits the British and French to the war.

I believe we will soon have a GE campaign under way, so why not get the ideas flowing now. What other game system relies so heavily on player feedback as Europa? Europa is second to none when it comes to a well devised set of rules based on extensive playtesting. Except, of course, until it comes to the victory point schedules...

G.LeSauvage:

I'd like to cast a vote with the political over the historical bloc on this topic. It has been pointed out in TEM that WitD has probably the best victory conditions in Europa and I've found they definitely push players toward following national policy. This should be the first priority of victory points, especially because it avoids idiot rules.

Why not compromise, and use political victory points, but include listings of historical levels and/or playtest levels, to indicate play balance? (Historical conditions alone miss one point-some historical 'players' were worse than others. It's a bit much to demand German victory over France to equal the actual event.)

M.Pitcavage:

I always count victory points in games I play. But I agree with Rick that all of the existing victory point schedules and tables need to be revisited, including, alas, BF.

Well, Alan, if Grand Europa had victory points in the same way that the individual games do, I would argue that it would be incredibly "gamey," with people doing things just to get the odd victory point. And it would be very difficult to come up with any sort of reasonable system that wasn't a bizarre mishmash. For Grand Europa, we're going to have to come up with some determinant of victory other than victory points.

I would argue that each country should have victory levels, based primarily on capturing or holding Geographical Objectives. You could change these victory levels for different scenarios, and more than one country could "win."

Most of the objectives would be cities, although I could see other types of Geographical Objectives as well. World War II, in its grandest scope was, after all, a war about geography and who would control it.

Moreover, there are usually two ways of determining victory in wargames--comparing performance to historical performance, or comparing performance to historical goals. A geographical model would work in either instance. Moreover, I think it might help to create some of the tensions and strategic decisions that actually existed in the reality.

For instance, let's say that to win, the Soviet player needs 'X' number of Geographical Objectives by June 1945. The rules could state that, say, holding Kiev until (picking a date) October 1941 would count as one of those Geographical Objectives. Thus, no ahistorical runaway defense.

Alternatively, the Germans could be given similar objectives that might at least make the German player think about keeping East Prussia, the Crimea, etc.

If you were to have a system like this, you could have several different versions of it. One might be a "wide-open" system to allow players as much flexibility as possible: essentially a system where to win a player must at the end of the game possess certain Geographical Objectives.

You could then expand from that, though, and add "historical objectives" such as the examples I explained above. If the German player will get the chance to achieve one (or more than one) of his required minimum objectives to win by holding Riga (or Kiev, or Odessa, or ... ) by date 'X,' 1941, this might be more of an impetus for him to attack the Soviet Union. You could have several different victory objective systems, each one adding more of a historical constraint. The final version would more or less be a straitjacket, forcing players to make the same grand strategic decisions that people did historically-which would allow players to concentrate on operational concepts.

This would allow players the opportunity to choose the victory system that has just the right amount of historical detail and flexibility that they prefer.

D.Powell:

Mark, your geographical conditions make sense, but need some amplification. There are really two conditions here: a minimum need for survival and then a more straight-forward level to achieve victory.

For instance, your Kiev example would fall under the minimum survival conditions, those needed to be held by the USSR to avoid sudden-death collapse. Berlin might be the USSR's decisive victory objective, and conversely the sudden-death minimum for our jackbooted pals. Adjusted properly, this concept should provide the necessary merger of historicity and game victory.

Victory points might still have a place in this system, to provide minor adjustment to the broad-based conditions. They might make the difference between an A and an A+ in performance between the USSR and the Western Allies, for instance, as they fight over the corpse of Germany.

M.Pitcavage:

Dave, the Kiev example could be used for a sudden-death option, but not necessarily. After all, the war didn't end in 1942. This would force the Soviets to do some real thinking: they need 'X' Geographical Objectives in order to win. It is late summer 1941, and they aren't in too bad shape so far.

Do they risk trying to hold Kiev long enough to pick up a Geographical Objective, or do they decide to conserve forces, and pick up an additional Geographical Objective later?

D.Powell.

Pitman, I see your point. I do think, however, that a number of cities in the USSR should be listed as "must-holds" and if the German player captures enough of these critical objectives soon enough, he forces a political collapse. This could be compressed over time-for instance, say the German player only has to capture three critical cities by the end of the 1st turn of the war with the USSR, but six by the end of turn 2, etc.

Forcing a political collapse of the French 3rd Republic, on the other hand, should be a lot easier. In short, I advocate this two- tiered structure for all major combatants in Europa.

The other aspect of your concept is extremely sound: force the players to make discerning choices as to when and where to fight.

Just from the tone of your post, I think we're pursuing related but divergent tracks. I'm interested in precluding ahistorical strategies (such as a runaway by the USSR) by forcing the Soviet player to meet certain historically valid criteria necessary to ensure his nation's minimum survival, while you're looking ahead to ultimate victory. (Kiev, of course, is just an example plucked from the air.) There is a need for both structures.

G.Stephens:

David, Mark, I am following your discussion with interest. I like the idea of ,'must hold" cities for Grand Europa, as a political collapse was probably the only way the Germans could have beaten the Soviets in the war. Which cities would you consider for this honor, besides Moscow?

M.Pitcavage:

I tend to think that political collapse, should it occur, should be simulated, rather than somehow ending the game suddenly. Replacement rates would dip, and other conditions would arise. The problem with "sudden death" is that it forces "gamey" decisions that would not have occurred in "real life," simply because players would know what would cause this sort of thing.

Again, my suggestion, while aimed at ultimate victory conditions, would prevent things like the runaway defense, because of the Historical Geographical Objectives. If the Soviet player ran away too soon, then he would have to do extremely well later on in order to get his required Geographical Objectives--and quite possibly could not do that well. This forces the Soviet player to consider the risks: losing territory vs. losing armies. This is something not currently considered.

D.Powell:

Considering that in the historical Barbarossa situation the Germans didn't force a collapse, any German would have to do extremely well to trigger such conditions. Hence, I think few 'gamey' situations will arise, since a trigger would already require virtually decisive German success.

You could leave the much-reduced USSR in the game, and simply slam it with a variety of restrictions, but why bother? Any collapse would shatter the Soviet war effort, if it were accurate. Since I think a German player left free to face the West alone is virtually unbeatable, why bother finishing several years of a game the German has already won?

Must-hold cities? Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Kharkov, Dnepropetrovsk, Odessa, Minsk, Stalingrad, Rostov, Voronezh, Stalino, Smolensk. I'm just doing this off the top of my head. This just occurred to me: use the replacement value already given in FitE/SE/TU, and force the German to capture a given number of points by set time to force collapse. That way, the cities would carry proper weight relative to each other as well. Maybe the Germans would need 8 points on the first turn of Invasion, 12 by turn 2, etc.

Mark, I see your point, but, from a designer's point of view, your 'single use' conditions would be much harder to render effectively. I think that a Soviet Player can lose vast areas in 1941-42, and still build an unstoppable horde by 44-45, to retake all he has lost. As such, I don't think he needs to worry much in the early years about holding ground that he knows he can take back in the late-war period.

By extrapolation then, your conditions might require adjustment to the Soviet replacement systems, etc. That is verging on a much more fundamental level of tinkering, which is a much bigger pain in the ass. Also, The collapse condition can be tested much more efficiently, since one need only play the opening months to determine if it will work or what levels need to be set.

Your method will require a complete game played out before determining success or failure. A lot more games will be tested if only taken through the first year of the war, say, than if played to the bitter end.

T.Statler:

Dave, unfortunately I found that if you don't play a game out to the bitter end you get the wrong impression of the game balance. A case in point are the people who think that the Germans are too strong in FitE/SE but never play past the first year.

D.Powell:

I agree, Tim, that's why I feel that there wouldn't be any pressure on a Soviet player to defend forward in 1941-2, since he can take it all back in 1944-45 anyway.

M.Pitcavage:

Dave, you misunderstand what I'm talking about. There would be considerable pressure for the Soviet player to defend forward in 1941-42, because taking it back in 1944-45 would not constitute a Geographical Objective. Do you see what I'm talking about?

Suppose the Geographical Objectives for the Soviet Union are Warsaw, Budapest, Danzig, Riga, and Kiev/October 41. This would mean that Soviet possession of Warsaw at the end of the game would constitute a Geographical Objective. So would Soviet possession of Kiev in October 41. However, Soviet possession of Kiev in 1945 would not count as a Geographical Objective, meaning that the Soviet player would have to capture an additional Geographical Objective (maybe a hard-to-get one, like Frankfurt) in order to make up for the deficit. I'm not concerned about one-year scenarios, because what I'm thinking forward to is Grand Europa.

D.Powell:

Mark, I see. We are, in effect, arguing different sides of the same coin, albeit I have included a much more severe penalty for not meeting the condition.

Speaking from the design aspect, however, your method will be very difficult to test. Few testers will have the will and skill to complete the test all the way into '45. This means that most of the balancing will get done in "post production testing." (Translation: "Errata.")

GE will be difficult enough to manage, and ways need to be found to streamline the development process if we ever want to see it finished at all.

T.Statler:

I like the idea of victory points tied to time/geography. Say the Soviets get 5 victory points if they hold Minsk in Oct 41 and the Germans gain 5 victory points if they capture it on Jun 11 41. That way you have a running numerical comparison on how both sides are doing throughout the game.

G.Johansen:

I like the concepts behind these victory point proposals. This is definitely worth turning into an article. One thing I would do though is to make a player hold a victory point city for a complete turn or two to stop those gamey paratroop drops or lightning raids just to gain a point. This would force an adjustment of the timetable. Rather than needing 'X' victory points on June 11, they would not be needed until July 1, since cities would have to be held for a complete turn.

If geographical areas are the objectives, I would adjust the conditions so only the majority of the area must be held. For example, if the Kharkov MD was worth 1 victory point by a certain date, then rather than having to take every city in the MD, the German might only have to take all the major cities and two of the minor cities. This would hopefully stop the situation where a player is holding the last city in an area for no valid reason other than to prevent the victory point.

R.Lane:

Another wrinkle to the victory point situation is Yalta. While Winston Churchill and Stalin were looking PAST the defeat of Germany quite early, the Americans were ONLY concerned with defeating Germany as FAST as possible.

The main theme of the previous messages is a time-based Geographical Objective system. That is, it is WHEN a Geographical Objective falls that matters. Since the political/economic model is still incomplete, designing a Geographical Objective based timetable will be difficult. The quickest way to start testing a time- based Geographical Objective system is to use the historical based timetable. Sure, it's a straitjacket, but GE is so far in the future this may be the best way to start.

The victory point/geographical objective system should be flexible. It is improbable that the Soviet Union would just collapse. In other words, as the victory point/geographical objective conditions are met or exceeded, the effects should begin to take effect.

Command and control loss could be simulated, patrol and intercept radii can be reduced, motorized units could begin to lose MPs, overall combat modifiers could be applied. Sure some of the defeated WWII countries fell quickly. But the effects of the stranglehold on Germany grew as the conquered territories were stripped away. Losing conquered countries reduced the slave labor for the German war effort.

M.Pitcavage:

It might well be possible to have several alternate sets of Geographical Objectives, and have players choose from among them at the beginning of 1939, and switch to another in 1941 or 42.

G.LeSauvage:

The Geographical Objective scheme probably should be the basis for victory points, but Roy is right about the effects being gradual. I'd add probable, as well: rather than a cut-and-dried VP count, a die-roll should also be involved, like Iran's surrender in WitD/NE.

Also, losses should be taken into account, at least for the Western Allies (they need armies for the expected invasion of Japan). Finally, the Brits should be helped by limited Soviet gains, while the U.S. shouldn't.

The point (well attended in the discussion so far) is that, so far as possible, victory points should replace idiot rules in forcing players into politically realistic strategies.

R.Lane:

George is correct in adding losses to the victory point/geographical objective system. While the Soviets were losing millions of men during the summer of 1941, the Allies were debating sending Lend- Lease equipment. Double the Soviet losses during that summer and I'm sure the Allies would have dragged their collective feet putting the logistics together for the Arctic convoys.

So while it makes sense to tic victory point/geographical objectives to a historic timetable, the relative losses should also be considered, and appropriate penalties/delays should be tied to them.

After discussing some of these ideas with Rick Gayler, he correctly pointed out that we are tied to the historic OB/OA. So any victory point/geographical objective system would have to work within those boundaries.

G.LeSauvage:

Roy, the OB/OA limits are real, but isn't there a little give here, at least in terms of timing, without flying off into fantasy? An example is the German infantry reorganization...

And Mark, your ideas go beyond anything else I've seen. They seem to work on 3 levels: conventional victory conditions (who gets to say "I won" in 1945), defeat/collapse conditions for various nations during the game and the effects of failure on the different nations. Its really 3 articles in 1. I love the time-graded Geographical Objectives. (Britain gets many points for a continental presence early, but fewer later-when the US gets them. Beautiful, an incentive for Greece AND dragging your feet on Overlord!)

And the interplay of these levels could solve a lot: say Britain needs a certain number of positive victory points, independent of actual harm to Germany-hence the bombing campaign (Geographical Objectives should be the primary, not exclusive factor). The worst problem would be testing them, an impossible task. The best that could be done would be to set political goals (discoverable, at least) and work on the tough questions:

1.) What does it mean when Germany defeats one of the Allies that didn't fall? (How "beaten" is Russia without Stalin? Does Canada surrender because London falls? Vladivostok and Canberra are an awful long way from Stalingrad and El Alamein.)

2.) And how to balance the extent to which success/failure to win political goals actually affects the conduct of the war?

I don't believe this can be worked out for a final Grand Europa release, but then, does this matter? We've lived with 20+ years of evolution so far. Any published version would have to be flexible, as many of you have already said.

F.Skog:

Reality dictates not knowing just exactly what the enemy objectives are. This might be handled with several schedules of points that the players would each choose at random.

In one the Germans might score big for grabbing Norway early, but in another set the payoff might be very small. The whole thing could be handled something like the Finland card in SE.

G.LeSauvage:

A certain amount of uncertainty for both sides would be helpful. The timing for checking Geographical Objectives might be random-roll each initial phase, tally on a 10+ for major, 12 for all Geographical Objectives. Or something like that. Just rein in the "attack Tobruk on June II" impulse.

Making the timing unpredictable would encourage strategies revolving around real campaigns, and purely tactical moves would be made for tactical reasons. And graded Geographical Objectives would mean that subsidiary theaters would still help your cause and not be pure feints.

My point about the bombing campaign (and Roy's on Lend-Lease) is that the use of certain kinds of victory points could be converted, wholly or partly, from end-of-game tallies to in-game influences. There's something distasteful about an otherwise beaten side winning on maximum terror bombing points; an abstraction of the impact on neutrals, allies, and home morale is better, and more consistent with the use of Geographical Objectives. (This approach might even encourage a try like Dieppe.)

G.LeSauvage:

The question is how best to show the effect of Allied Strategic Bombing. Ideally you show the harm done the enemy. But who wants to count ball bearings? Too much economic detail, and the Supermarina syndrome arises: even if its done right, no one will play it. (Anyway, does anyone really believe governments COULD run their economies effectively?)

What I'm arguing is that offensive action (and losses, and probably other things) can have an effect on the attacking side. I'm not just talking ordinary morale effects, though that is part of it, but actual influences on the game. E.g., by taking offensive actions (bombing, raids) without suffering disasters, you might free more units from home or other garrison duty; failure might increase this burden.

Or, using Roy's ideas, losses (and other evidence of ability to fight) could affect Lend-Lease, or other allies' or neutrals' levels of help. OK, you're counting points, but on an intermediate level, not as straight victory points. I think we agree on the end here, its a question of means.

R.Lane:

Without the economic/political model completed it is impossible to work out a victory point/geographical objective system. An example is how hard the Axis fought for what was left of Hungary. The loss of the few oil fields in Hungary was something Hitler was very fearful of.

What we all agree on so far is that the loss of Ploesti in early 1943 should have some effect on Germany. SE models this in the case of the Caucasus oil fields for the Soviets. Also the movement or loss of factories will reduce armor/artillery replacements. So since we are stuck with a rigid OB/OA what we must control then is replacements of all types.

A reduction in oil availability/refinement capability should have a gradually worsening effect on unit effectiveness. Witness the poor quality of the Luftwaffe late in the war due to a lack of air training time.

G.LeSauvage:

Victory points currently do many different things on the way to telling who won. They not only reflect national goals, but constrain/impel the means used. On one level this is good; it's better than absolutely forbidding or compelling players' actions. But building this effect into the game, rather than counting it at the end, is even better.

The problem is that some things have to be abstracted. One big item is the whole 'other war on the other side of the world.' But strategic bombing and the U-boat campaign will have to be so handled, too. At least I can't see playing the former--or, assuming a naval system, the latter-- on anything like the current scale. Ergo, use victory points.

But instead of putting VPs in the bank until the end, use them to set conditions in play (like the addition of Bulgaria to BF-better than M- M's Metaxas rule). Then Geographical Objectives can be the dominant factor in victory. (Not the only one, I fear. For instance, if the Italian Fleet were wiped out early, the repercussions for the Pacific would have to be considered. Still, if kept few in number, they could be accommodated.)

M.Pitcavage:

As far as allies are concerned, it is possible to have negative Geographical Objectives. For instance, British possession of Tripoli could be a negative Geographical Objective for the Germans. So could British possession of Malta, Athens, Foggia, etc. Put some of these in, and you can bet the Germans will help those damn Italians out!

This is historical--puts pressures on the Germans to do certain things--but is still very flexible. If the German player is doing very well in Russia, he may neglect the Med. Alternatively, he may emphasize the Balkans, but not North Africa. Or whatever he chooses.

T.Statler:

George has a good point. Rumania was originally a British ally (sort of). After the fall of Greece, Rumania couldn't get help from Britain. Germany and Russia pressured Rumania to give up territory to Hungary and the Soviet Union. (I think I'm off a little on the timetable here.)

Later Hitler approached the Rumanians with the deal that if they declared war on Russia and helped Germany they could have back the territory they lost from Russia. This pressuring a client state is also what happened to the Baltic states.

M.Pitcavage:

As far as what we should call 'winning'--if Germany survives intact, I'd say it won. What we're looking to call victory will depend on a number of things--as I think I suggested somewhere above, it should be possible for more than one player to win, strange as this may seem. I can envision circumstances where the Germans and the Soviets both come out relatively strong, but the Western Allies--Britain and France--take a big beating.

Each player should have clear goals to determine what constitutes "winning," chosen by the player himself.

G.LeSauvage:

I agree about player choice and multiple winners. But I think an extremely conservative German strategy should be strongly discouraged. In the games so far, this has been no problem: they have to smash the enemy (early games), or survive overwhelming forces (later). But in GE, they have more freedom. It would be most ahistorical if Germany doesn't go for brokeHitler would have demanded it.

The biggest time problem is the Barbarossa date. A long-lived France could kill the schedule. And I assume that 'Britain First' in 1941 would be allowed as an option.

As to cautious Germans, in WitD I've seen them sit back and stockpile RPs and supplies, advancing just into Egypt, then slowly withdrawing. Can get dull.

Losses (remember, there's a Pacific War going on, which as late as VE day) was expected to be a bloodbath. Anything reducing the forces available to be sent East after it's over should hurt the Western Allies.

Also, there were a lot of people around who weren't thrilled about being bled to fight German or British wars. This attitude even applied to the Commonwealth.

And there has to be a point at which a country would be bled white. In the West the memory of WWI was very strong-I doubt the French, even if they could stop the initial assault, would have sustained the attrition sure to follow. Of course, if morale can do the job, fine. Also, I suggested in another Topic, tying

British ZOC-retreats to losses. Perhaps this could be extended: high losses cost in efficiency. I'm leery of economic solutions they may be sound in theory, but at this point we should work with historical force levels, as Roy has argued.

R.Lane:

One example of a Geographical Objective for the East might be the Crimea. The early loss of Sevastopol could force the Soviets to increase their Turkish garrison. The late fall of Sevastopol could reduce the Turkish garrison and the Black Sea Fleet could have greater or lesser freedom in the Black Sea.

In the far North the loss of Murmansk could eliminate all northern Lend-Lease during summer months and increase the likelihood of interdiction during winter.

The capture of Leningrad releases the Finns from their historical areas to some degree. Adding the loss of Murmansk and Belomorsk should allow the Finns to be used offensively toward Arkhangelsk.

The capture of a Geographical Objective should have a consequence. The loss of the Caucasus oil fields and the loss of the coal fields too early has an effect on Soviet production. Some rules are already in place, there just aren't enough of them.

G.LeSauvage:

True, but to the extent they have in-game consequences, Geographical Objectives become means to victory as well as victory conditions. There's no reason a Geographical Objective cannot ALSO have an effect on play-that's just not what makes it a Geographical Objective.

M.Pitcavage:

Geographical Objectives, should not, in general, reflect in- game consequences, but rather criterion for victory. I am all for the capture or retention of the Crimea to have consequences, that only makes sense. But the Crimea should only be a Geographical Objective if its possession at the end of the game is crucial.

So if Sevastopol is to be a Geographical Objective, then it is a Geographical Objective. Period. Any "consequences" should be entirely separate from its Geographical Objective status.

Geographical Objectives should be purely a way to measure victory, not to measure economics, production, politics--except insofar as those are worthy of measure for postgame victory status.

For instance, German possession of the Ruhr at the end of the game would definitely be a Geographical Objective. But that would have nothing to do with what its loss might mean to Germany in game-terms. That is something that should be handled separately.

G.LeSauvage:

Isn't 'crucial' too strong a criterion? There'd have to be levels of intermediate success/failure. And there's always the difference between the perception and the reality of any objective's importance (call it the Verdun factor). In my opinion the best thing any victory conditions can do is push players, hindsight and all, into dealing with the broadest strategic goals and constraints of the historical nations. T.Statler:

Geographical Objectives can also affect the status of neutrals. Take the example of the Crimea. If the Germans can take the Crimea, then it would effect the chances that Turkey would enter the war on the Axis side. Hence the need to strengthen the Soviet garrison on the Turkish border.

Another example would be a Soviet offensive against the Finns. If the Soviets reach a certain spot, then the likelihood that Sweden would declare war on Russia (only) would increase dramatically (from none to pretty damn good). These are only a couple of examples, but I think you can see what I mean.

G.LeSauvage:

> I see three possible treatments available to us:

1) Victory conditions are different in kind from in-game factors, however strategic in character, and should be kept separate. Failure to separate them destroys the simplicity essential to the Geographical Objective idea.

2) Since some end-game and in-game factors are the same, or very nearly so, there are limited conditions in which Geographical Objectives may be defined for secondary reasons, or have secondary effects.

3) The rigid line between end- and in- game conditions is artificial and somewhat gamey. If something is a Geographical Objective, it is so for some reason, and this SHOULD be reflected in play.

I say shoot for #1, handle #3 with separate but parallel provisions and accept the need for #2 only where unavoidable.

But mightn't a country's degree of success or failure in achieving its war aims have an ingame effect? If at a given point someone looks like an ultimate loser, this would affect neutral attitudes, home morale and future policy. Wouldn't progress toward victory itself have effects on play?

Another problem to deal with, involving victory conditions and possibly Geographical Objectives is the question of the temporary losers, like France. Maybe, some players would have to take a succession of small countries to stay active; it's going to be tough to find someone to play the French, only to be told "you can go home now, we'll call you at TORCH-time."

G.Quick:

Temporary losers- just have France and Russia add victory points together. That would give a larger incentive for the French player to hurt the Germans as much as possible (to help Russia). Then French player could also be another Russian player.

Or, have same player play US and France.

G.LeSauvage:

That works for shuttling players and play balance, but opens a horrible breach in any structure of political plausibility. The incentive would be to hurt Germany, not help France or Poland. What's needed is a way to make a meaningful "win" for a doomed nation-something to induce the Poles to fight for Poland, not Britain, not France, not Russia.

One thing might help: players not knowing what country they get next. I was also wondering what to do with the plethora of minor powers-in-exile in the British contingent. Should they be ignored for victory purposes?

G.Johansen:

Much as I love this discussion and think some very valid points are being made, I think we are forgetting one thing. How are we ever going to playtest it? What if the Geographical Objectives set at the start of a game are completely out of sync with reality two years later?

Even in Scorched Earth it is a huge investment in time to keep restarting if you sense that there is something wrong with the way the Geographical Objectives are working. I really don't know of any solution except this sort of interaction between people who have played a lot of the games in general and just have a feel for what seems right.

Rather than using Geographical Objectives on the East front, what about using penalties for the Soviet to stop the runaway defence? If you used the historical dates that cities fell as a guideline you could impose a penalty for their early fall or a bonus for their holding out for longer than historical.

There could be a replacement point penalty for major cities equal to the amount they would normally generate if the city falls earlier than normal. Up to one month early would be the basic penalty, 1-2 months early could be a double penalty, 2-3 months early could be triple, etc. Minor cities could have some small penalty as well so that the defence would not merely try to hold major cities. There should be a corresponding benefit for doing better than historical-maybe half as large.

This would only apply during the first year; after that it would limit the choices of the players too much as they would be forced into a completely historical axis of attack. Since the benefit is a constant effect it would get rid of the all or nothing defence.

For example, if the Soviets lost a city to an early German breakthrough but had overwhelming strength in the area, they would be able to recapture the city and prevent any future RP losses.

G.LeSauvage:

Gord, the question is what was the real effect of loss of those cities? This should be handled as an in- game effect, separate from Geographical Objectives, which are solely used for victory determination. This isn't a question of an alternative to Geographical Objectives, but whether a particular goal should be so as a Geographical Objective or for some other reason.

And again, there's no objection to a particular Geographical Objective having other, nonvictory effects; but this is incidental to its status as a Geographical Objective.

Skog's remark shows another reason playtesting of GE cannot really occur: any victory, collapse or effect-on-other-countries rules, when applied to events which never happened, are nothing more than somebody's best guess of how things would go. Sure, some guesses are more plausible than others, but the bottom line is we just don't know how taking London (or Moscow) would effect the war.

Inevitably, different games will be based on different assumptions. (This is already happening, vide Fortress Holland.) We'll just have to live with it, and develop a framework to accommodate it.

Another thing: straitjackets or idiot rules are at their most justifiable when they represent the purely political constraints on nations. E.g., from a purely military angle, I, as the Brits, would love to take Ireland in 1940 (or earlier) for the air/ASW bases alone. But of course the US reaction would make the cost of this impossible.

M.Pitcavage:

The best way to playtest GE will be to play it with a desire to replicate historical events. Thus, the first question will be can it replay World War 11?

If it can, then the next step is just to play it a lot of times. Are the divergences from reality occurring for realistic or game-related reasons? Do the divergences seem historically plausible, or are they a result of problems in the game? Only the latter need to be fixed. In a game so complex, no one in their right mind should think a GE game will naturally fall close to replicating World War II.

R.Kanarr:

In terms of political effects (vs. the strictly military, which is what we generally deal with in our gaming, outside the context of reality), France was not 'conquered,' it achieved an 'armistice,' resulting in a semiautonomous unoccupied region, an occupied region under foreign military control and essentially self-governing overseas colonies.

The Axis were able to conserve those troops which were later used to occupy Southern France for 2 years (resulting, in Geographical Objective terms, in a positive result for NOT occupying territory), as well as not having to garrison French North African colonies (until the Allies had already invaded same).

In terms of points for France, it would be indicated that simply surviving as a nation in some fashion should generate points for the French player. I basically agree with this way of dealing with the historic neutrals of Europe, though I feel that there should be die mods for a variety of different effects, such as the fact that at some point, a US occupation of some Eire ports would certainly go down easier than a British one.

What is the historical basis for the statement that the British capitulate on the fall of London? Plans existed for the continuation of the war (both conventional and unconventional) from a number of stop lines 'behind' London, as well as from as far away as Canada. And in any event, the war is then only in abeyance until 12/11/41, when Hitter and Mussolini declare war on the US.

F.Skog:

Ray the K: "What is the historical basis for the statement that the British capitulate on the fall of London? Plans existed for the continuation of the war (both conventional and unconventional) from a number of stop lines 'behind' London, as well as from as far away as Canada."

They might even have had a plan to fight from Mars. So what? If you want to continue after London falls, it will be two turns tops before a few of the panzers slide into the sea in the north of Scotland because they were slow hitting the brakes.

Given the seemingly free naval movement of massive quantities of supply, the U.S. invasion could just as well come in Greece. And the slavish adherence to historical OBs means the only thing that capturing the Brit fighter factories will probably do is spread the German defense.

R.Lane:

It would seem as if the victory point argument has gone full circle. The victory points should be tied to the economics of maintaining a war footing. If a nation can no longer keep its army in the field, then it loses.

End of Transmission

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Happy Hunting, Roy