(Note: This is in response to Mr. Buhlers's comments in TEN 2 ("Exchange," page 7). Since Mr. Buhler speaks only in the context of FitE, I am assuming his comments are made based on that title's time frame, rules, and Orders of Battle rather than Scorched Earth's. My commentary is made from this perspective.)

The "Soviets hold in the south but lose the north" phenomenon described by Mr. Buhler in TEN 2 can evolve "naturally" from two major influences: (1) allowing the demography of troop availability to dictate the flow of the game, and (2) shortsighted strategy induced by the FitE "End of the World" syndrome. Let's examine these further.

Soviet initial forces in the south are extremely potent. Even after the ravages of the Surprise Turn, many Kiev and Odessa MID c/m units will be intact along with numerous infantry and other forces. The southern MDs will supply a steady flow of replacements and reinforcements as the 1941 campaign unfolds. Mark Sturdivant, the Axis C-in-C in my current SE postal match, refers to the Kiev MID as "The Bank of the Soviet Union," and I find the analogy quite discerning.

In contrast, Arkhangelsk and Leningrad MDs are rather frail; they do not generate abundant new forces. Leningrad MID does field a respectable array of initial forces, but these may be called away to defend Moskva or Murmansk and its supply lifelines. Other times they are frittered away in a 1941 offensive against Finland. In addition to this natural troop deficiency the Axis can complicate life further by interdicting the vulnerable rails into both Leningrad and Murmansk. This can choke off the arrival of units from other MDs

Most initial German strength is concentrated in the north and center in Greater Germany. Beyond the Soviet frontier forces north of the Pripyet, large empty tracts of land beckon the panzers forward! AGS starts strong but is diluted as it fans out from its initially narrow frontage and encounters the "Kiev Krushers."

Turning to the Axis Allies, Rumania is roundly scorned as the "Weak Sister of the South." The panzerless Eleventh Army and the mere handful of cadred Rumanian formations pack only a modest wallop. The Hungarian Army is almost invisible. At the other end of the front Finland, though no powerhouse, is blessed with sturdy units, interior lines, and excellent defensive terrain.

Netting this out, we find a general situation where the Soviets are strongest where the Axis are weakest and vice versa.

Then there are the "typical" FitE strategies encouraged by Rule 37 and made feasible by the artificial ending on March II 1942.

FitE Rule 37 decrees that winning the game is primarily a function of cities the Axis captures. It matters not that the Soviet Armed Forces may end the game decimated. No benefits accrue if the Axis hold key communications junctions like Bryansk and the VaIdai. There are no penalties for leaving wide tracts of land unprotected. So long as the Axis are denied enough major cities, the Soviets "win." Thus the "Hold at All Costs" approach will usually secure a victory for J. V. Stalin and is often adopted as a strategy of choice.

Given these parameters let's look at what happens when FitE is allowed to .Play itself."

Occasionally Leningrad and more frequently Murmansk will fall if the Axis are exceptionally determined and/or clever. Properly cordoned off and defended only by the troops readily at hand, each of these objectives is obtainable. The Arctic is, after all, a sideshow; the 1 victory point at stake if the Axis capture Murmansk will seldom decide the game. The Soviets don't worry too much about the consequences to their Lend- Lease flow within the time frame of FitE, so the Arctic often goes begging when things get tough elsewhere. (There is even a school of thought that advocates the north should not be defended at all; the Soviets should fall back to the stop line as soon as possible with a minimum loss of life and then forget about this sector.)

At Leningrad the Soviets often invite complications by attacking Finland. While such an invasion is seldom a good idea and rarely successful, they resort to this as a release for the frustration of being unable to attack elsewhere. The usual outcome of such adventures is unnecessary casualties and lost ground in front of the "Cradle of Bolshevism."

The south doesn't bode as well for the Wehrmacht. With their plethora of resources the Soviets can accept high losses and slow the Axis advance to a crawl. An inexperienced (or unreinforced) Rumanian can get his clock cleaned. The Axis may dismiss the Ukraine as a lost cause. Failing to make a telling breakthrough and stymied by trench warfare the Axis are wont to place their emphasis on the north, reasoning only there can a Rule 37 victory be achieved. All the time this is going on the Soviets are sustaining atrocious losses by defending long lines in the open, but filling the ranks with the .endless" supply of new units.

Thus a "typical" game of FitE sees the Reds hold strong in the south and ward off the panzers from Moscow with the help of weather and supply. The Winter Offensive leads to a stalemate and 9 the Germans have not already seized their geographical objectives they "lose." Even if Leningrad and Murmansk fall the Germans still probably do no better than a draw. Buying time and holding cities at the cost of huge piles of dead units assures the Soviets no worse than a stalemate and there really isn't much the Axis can do about it.

Theory

There's my theory behind the trend Mr. Buhler described. Fortunately, there are two powerful agents working to alter this course of events.

The first is the publication of SE, which in and of itself makes many changes that affect the flow of a "typical" game. Extending play into the summer of 1942 exposes some of the strategies described above as bad habits that can lead to the direst of consequences. Read on!

First the balance of force has shifted. For instance, in the south four Red tank divisions have been devalued -- 17. attack strength points worth. Soviet troop strength is down overall from FitE; many Eastern MID formations simply don't appear, tank brigades that were free must now be built, and fragile divisions are a doomed species. In summary, the supply of Soviet forces is hardly endless and a wise team will recognize this and react accordingly.

If the Soviets adopt the FitE "Standfast" plan they may still be able to accomplish the results outlined above, but woe to them when June 1942 rolls around! If by holding the Axis short of their 1941 historical gains Ivan allows himself to be bled white, his force levels will reach critical mass and his armies dissolve during the 1942 Campaign.

Furthermore, the rules of SE have improved Axis chances all around. Railroad engineers now regauge about 50% faster. Admin movement is up 33% allowing Axis infantry to keep better pace with the panzers. The weather in zones C and D is slightly improved. These and other gifts from the Swiss arbiter, Mr. Astell, will no doubt be used to full Axis advantage and lead both sides to rethink their approach to the game.

A second circumstance also argues for change. This is simply that thoughtful players will recognize the perils discussed above and take proactive measures to improve their lot (especially if they have lost Murmansk six times in a row!).

For example, after a disaster in 1942 the Soviets will start to evaluate the wisdom of giving ground in the south (and elsewhere) more quickly during 1941. They will want to conserve strength by falling back from river line to river line and opting for cost efficient delaying tactics instead of the non-overrunable double line.

They will take note of the vulnerability of Leningrad and Murmansk and focus attention on their defense as a first priority. This entails keeping the Leningrad forces at home and taking a lower profile against the Finns. Sizable or even massive early reinforcement emphasis will be given to this sector. A large percent of the Soviet rail capacity will be used during the critical early turns to move forces in before the rails are interdicted and to contest the Axis advance as far from the two objectives as possible.

Larger Image (slow 120K)

Where will these forces come from? But of course -- from withdrawals out of the "Bank of the Soviet Union"! During June II and July I the prudent Ivan will send mountain divisions and other elite troops north to the Arctic. Infantry will rail into Narva, Leningrad, Dno, Pskov, and Velikie Luki. C/m divisions will head north to defend Moskva and allow the Leningrad armor to defend their MD. The VVS will be supporting the northern front in strength. (Notice that this requires players to become flexible in sharing resources. A Kiev MD commander must accept the fact that his units are needed elsewhere. Selfish impulses to hoard one's forces must be set aside for the common good.)

Also, emphasis should be given to preserving strength for a stronger counterattack in the winter of 1941. This allows the Soviets to inflict more damage on the Axis and helps ensure that they will have a stronger force base in 1942. The Axis will be enticed to spread thin and move further out of supply.

All this does not come without a price.

With fewer troops in the south the Soviets will not be able to wage as determined a defense except maybe at the major portion of the Dnepr and a few hero cities. To stretch the Axis lines and supply, ground and, yes, CITIES must be relinquished.

Meanwhile, the Axis, tired of seeing Rumania drubbed and AGS bogged down in the Ukraine may give more attention to the south. A couple of c/m divisions which would be lost in the shuffle up north can be shifted to AGS giving them more early punch and exploit ability. They in turn can dispatch a panzer division to Rumania and along with heavy reinforcements from the June II and July I new arrivals (and decent Luftwaffe supportl) transform the Rumanian Army into a lean, mean killing machine.

The net effect of all these things is to see a more historical evolution in a full length game of SE. Leningrad and Murmansk are more likely to be saved to the Soviets. The German advance in the south (and center) can approach a gallop compared to the FitE trot. The Soviet Army, deserting their "Hold at All Costs' stance will be better poised to counterattack in 1941 and survive 1942. The longer I play SE (and it has become a permanent fixation), the more historical my games Perhaps Mr. Buhler will experience the same in time.

Now, I've got two questions: Why is Minsk impossible to capture on the June II turn against a competent Soviet deployment [Minsk fell to the Germans on Jun, 28] and why isn't the initial setup mandat ed as in Case White? (Are these really the same question?) [Anyone care to discuss this? I'd like to see a more detailed setup if only for optional use.]

Letter to Editor: Response