Geir Aaslid, Norway

Our group had a discussion recently regarding the use of artillery replacements for the Germans. The Russians use artillery replacements for every artillery unit replaced. In FitE/SE, as well as in Second Front (as per the first draft rules) the Germans do not. Instead, the Germans use infantry RPs, but are bound by a 1 artillery RE per month limit. I assume that Germany will sometime later get factories producing armour replacements and possibly artillery replacements as well.

One of the points discussed was the 1 RE limit on artillery replacement each month. German artillery regiments vary between 1 and 8 attack strength points. The amount of manpower is the same as for an infantry regiment, which is roughly 2 infantry replacement points. In one month you can replace a 1-2-8 Mot Art III or a 8-6-8 (or whatever) Art Ill. The manpower is the same, but the equipment is obviously different. The problem is that the latter unit which is 1 RE in size is swallowing up enough infantry RPs to replace 4 infantry regiments (or two divisions from cadre to full strength).

With the armour replacement system, the divisions comprise almost the correct amounts of manpower. A 6-10 Mot XX is two regiments of infantry (4 inf RPs) plus 1 point of armour for each regiment, representing transport. Unlike the infantry divisions, no strength points are lost when the unit breaks down, possibly because these division headquarters had less artillery and other support (correct me if I am wrong).

For the armoured divisions, the armour replacements obviously also contains the manpower in the armour regiment in addition to the hardware, as the infantry points seem to belong only to the motorized infantry regiments in the divisions. For the infantry divisions, they all lose 1 strength point in breakdown, and I assume this is because they are less efficient in this mode. They can be (1) 3 supported regiments and no HQ, or (2) 3 unsupported regiments and a HQ representing the artillery. Another point here: the HQ should be replaced with 1 artillery RP, and a division being fully rebuilt to full strength should require 1 art RP, with the remainder being inf RPs.

Is it not better for the game system to introduce German artillery replacement points as the Soviets have them (at half the rate of armour replacements)? They could be linked to German factory production, or just be given on the replacement chart. Why not tie both armour, air and artillery RPs to factories that must be defended or taken in Second Front? As it is, the Ruhr area can be taken by the Allies without these replacements being affected!

As German armour production was very low early in the war, the effect on the play balance is slight until the later years. Also in FitE/SE, in the 1942 and 1943 scenarios, there are a lot of artillery, flak artillery and anti-tank units (the so-called motorized ants). In actual play, most of these tend to be lost at a much faster rate, much because they are used in play to exploit holes in a front line and wreak havoc destroying airfields, bridges and rails. Requiring these to be rebuilt with artillery RPs (in FitE there will only be 3 each month in 1941) will remove the abuse without adding fancy rules, or defining and constricting these units.

As the Germans historically used most of their artillery produced during the war for rebuilding shattered units, or continually raising new formations, the artillery replacement rate could be lowered to show this, or it could cost 1 art RP to receive reformed units rebuilt out of theater (the free replacement of the divisions lost at Stalingrad comes to mind).

My experience with games starting from the 1942 or 1943 scenarios on the east front, running into 1944 (6-7 games played) is that the Germans are collapsing faster than historically while not committing the same no-retreat- stand-and-die mistakes as were done in the real war. Introduction of these artillery RPs could give a little compensation for this late in the war.

As there are no factory production or campaign rules for Germany as compared to the detailed Soviet production and replacement system, I do not know what is intended. For example, do the German Wehrkreise each produce 1 inf RP each month, which is divided between the theaters? Would it not make sense to fit some of this into SF, as it is obviously covering 1945 to the end of the war?

If you think some of this makes sense, why don't you put it in the next SF playtest letter? This seems the ideal place to discuss design matters such as this. You must have most of the really experienced Europa players playtesting SF, and I would guess many would have comments on this.

Rich Velay, British Columbia

With eager hands shaking with anticipation, you tear off the plastic shrink wrap and delve into your new copy of Second Front. Your eyes scan the rules, play aids and then fall upon those counters. Hordes of them! The colours, the symbols, the strengths, what bliss. But what is this? The vaunted 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions rated as air landing troops? All of their breakdown regiments sporting the glider infantry symbol? How could this be?

Well, of course, it isn't true. But based upon a design change affecting one unit in Balkan Front, they "should" be treated thusly. Included among the German units in BF is one representing the most elite, best trained and most experienced reinforced parachute regiment of the Luftwaffe. The Assault or "Sturm" Regiment of the 7th Flieger Division. Four battalions of specially picked troops, paratroopers slated to spearhead the attack upon Crete.

And how is this unit depicted in BF? As a 3-5 Glider Infantry regiment! How is it that these troops end up looking less jump-capable than a Soviet parachuteinfantry brigade? At least the Soviet para-infantry can make a parachute jump, albeit with a hefty adverse disruption modifier, but "Sturm" is denied the ability to parachute at all.

Now what has this to do with the 82nd and 101st? Well, the only reason I can think of for the drastic downgrading in "Sturm's" abilities is the fact that one battalion (out of four) used gliders to arrive on Crete. And if one quarter of a unit's paratroops being dropped by gliders warrants a change from Airborne status to Glider Infantry status, then all Allied airborne regiments should be similarly degraded. Yes, paratroops were landed by gliders during the Normandy, "Market-Garden" and Wessel drops. And if the Germans are going to be penalized for choosing to use gliders, then so should the Allies.

But since I don't expect a lot of support from Americans for this attempt at redressing historical inaccuracy by downgrading American units, perhaps the answer is to return "Sturm's" gull wings? It was, after all, a Parachute regiment, albeit one intended for glider assault missions. But the fact that the Germans recognized the benefits of employing gliders and intended that their "assault" regiment so use them does not change the fact that "Sturm" was a Parachute unit. To "call" it Glider- infantry, based upon one battalion's use of gliders on Crete, is both insulting and mysterious.

I recognize that I do not have access to much of the historical information used by the designer and developers of the Europa series, but I know that I have never seen anything indicating that "Sturm" was incapable of a parachute drop. Indeed, everything in the "popular" sources that I have read would indicate just the opposite. As an amateur "historian" and avid reader of works on WW II, I for one would be most interested in the design rationale and historical justification for so demeaning "Sturm's" abilities. Surely, it can not be because of I/Sturm battalion having used gliders on Crete.

Now I don't know about anyone else, but until I see some compelling evidence to the contrary I am going to go with the books I have read and treat "Sturm" as an airborne unit. And in the interests of historical accuracy, I recommend other players of Balkan Front do so as well. Sheesh, it is bad enough that 22nd Air Landing Division is allowed to air assault with gliders (see TEM #27)...

Ivan Kolesic, Arizona

Our group is getting tired of hearing the moans and groans from the older gamers out there (at least what's printed in the Europa magazine). If you believed them, every Europa player is receiving Social Security. Not true! There are many young Europa players. I think the problem is that we are just not as highly visible as the oldsters. I read an article in which the author complained that the only people at a past Europa convention were in their late thirties or older. Well, surprise--maybe that's because most of them already have careers and the financial wherewithal to fly across the country and spend a weekend gaming (plus hotels, food, etc). It's simply out of the question on our budgets.

Furthermore, most of us younger folks don't submit scads of articles in the Europa magazine. While we love to read them, most of us just don't have the experience or impressive credentials of a Shelby Stanton to write authoritative articles, so you don't hear from us often. Call us the "silent majority" if you will, but we are definitely out here. So don't let the naysayers get you down. Europa is dynamic and growing, and we back you guys 100%. Keep up the great work.

Flavio Carrillo, California

I just received TEM issues #26-27--double the pleasure, double the fun! I want to clear some possible misinterpretations of the VP system Jason Long and I designed for Balkan Front.

First of all, the final score is a relative one: if the Axis, after all calculations gains 30 points and the Allies have -9, this is equivalent to an overall score of 39. Secondly, the Axis player scores points for Athens on the turn it's captured, but not thereafter, something not explicitly stated on the table. Under the first table for Axis Territorial Awards, drop the part about "or the evacuation of the Greek Government": later inspection found that the Allies could cheaply deny VPs by evacuating immediately after the Germans intervene. With this change the Axis collects VPs every turn until Athens falls, and if the Greeks evacuate early the Axis will continue to gain VPs until they march into Athens.

Jason and I forgot to include the costs for a German lack of withdrawal so add the following to the Political Awards and Penalties table: for every RE by which the Germans fail to meet their withdrawal requirements subtract 1/2 VP per turn, with air and c/m units counting 1 VP per RE. Also note that the +10 for an Axis Yugoslavia and no German intervention is in addition to the +20 for German non- intervention. This of course virtually guarantees a strategic or miracle Axis victory, but hey: what else would you call an Axis allied Yugoslavia and no German intervention? Of course, these circumstances will occur only in a minority of Balkan Front games.

Finally, the loss/assistance penalties tracks losses and assistance only. That is, German forces entering as a result of full scale intervention, not aid, do not incur penalties under the table. All Commonwealth forces do count for assistance under the table. Losses to any applicable forces also count, regardless of whether the forces enter as assistance or as a result of full scale German intervention.

On another subject, Victor Hauser's editorial in TEM #26 intrigued me. After playing FitE/SE many times, the German surprise turn does become stereotyped, and I too believe that between two equally capable opponents the Soviet player will inevitably win. Where I differ with Victor is in his appraisal of this inevitability. I belong to the school of thought that regards a German victory in the East as a highly improbable event, say, perhaps a 10% chance with maybe another 15% chance of stalemating the Eastern Front. I simply don't believe the Wehrmacht possessed the necessary forces or logistical capability to even precipitate a political collapse of the Soviet Union, much less an outright military victory (which I define as reaching the Arkhangelsk- Astrakhan line.)

Let's examine Stolfi's thesis, upon which Victor relies. Firstly the idea that one panzer corps, no matter how vigorously led by von Manstein, could storm Leningrad by itself is utterly fantastic. The comparisons with Guderian in France do not hold water because Russia ain't France. The logistical requirements behind the pincer movement surrounding the Allies do not in any way relate to those necessary to drive all the way from Memel to Leningrad, a movement nearly three times as long (600 miles) as the dash to the channel. Moreover, reaching the channel coast unopposed is an entirely different kind of combat situation than assaulting a large (and occupied) city with armor at the end of a long and tenuous supply line and no infantry support. Manstein couldn't "drag" the rest of AGN with him because the foot soldiers where already moving as fast as they could, and any assault on Leningrad depended upon the Landser to succeed, even assuming that Manstein's supply situation would have allowed him to breach the Luga line and reach Leningrad's outskirts. If Manstein did do as Stolfi proposes, I will boldly state that the more likely result in terms of historical analogies would be a Soviet Battle of the Marne, with Leningrad in the place of Paris sprouting troops in a fanatical defense pressing the overextended Germans backwards.

[I think that Flavio has misinterpreted me here. I was not advocating or necessarily supporting Stolfi in my editorial in TEM #26. I was simply trying to present Stolfi's thesis as best I could in relation to Europa. However, I do believe that "perfect" play by both sides should result in a "stalemate" situation on the Eastern Front, not a crushing Soviet victory, and which is not currently the case in FitE/SE (perfect play by both sides will result in a crushing Soviet victory using the present rules as written). By "perfect" I mean no major operational or strategic blunders, and by "stalemate" I mean a stable line on or about Riga-Minsk-Kiev-Odessa.

Also, referring to the Manstein issue, "dragging" refers to a decisive move by Manstein which would have by force altered the mindset of the AGN commanders, who wanted to pause (thereby giving the Soviets time to regroup and recover from the paralysis and shock of the invasion, which is what historically happened), and instead make them throw the weight of their command processes and support behind him immediately.

In the actual event, the Germans effectively isolated Leningrad by the end of the Sep II 41 turn, at which point Hitler gave the order to starve rather than storm the city. Admittedly, the requirements of other sectors played a part here, but the fact remains that if the higher German headquarters (ie., the German AGN player) hadn't wasted the equivalent of a Europa turn fooling around in Latvia, and had followed Manstein's advice, they might very well have been able to take Leningrad by arriving a turn earlier (with all that implies concerning the historical Soviet reinforcements and replacements). My point is that in the game as we know it, no amount of German effort can even get to Leningrad in 1941 against competent Soviet play. This is due in large part to the offensive-stopping effects of double lines, which is addressed elsewhere in this issue (especially message #25 on page 32).-VAH]

The old Guderian shibboleth about advancing to Moscow in July which Stolfi resurrects also fails on logistical grounds. Consider that the Battle for Smolensk didn't really end until the end of August, and while the pocket in Smolensk resisted with every last ounce of strength, the Soviets launched a series of rather ineffectual counterattacks that nevertheless attrited the Germans. AGC's armor would first have to contend with all this before considering a further advance. I will concede that they could have done this fairly quickly, but even so, the Panzers, would then need to rest and refit before contemplating another offensive.

Consider also that even upon the historical resumption of the Moscow offensive at the end of September, AGC still operated on a logistical shoestring. Thus, in late July it was logistically far easier to move laterally on the front than further eastwards, especially since such moves entailed relatively little combat. Moreover, had the Germans pressed forward in the center, their flanks would have failed to keep up. Kiev, for example, may have actually held out, and even if it didn't, the Soviets would have an extra 600,000 soldiers to draw upon for the winter counterattack on AGC's thin flank since any attempt to pocket the Southwestern Front depended upon a turning maneuver by AGC's armor. As for Leningrad, well, without AGC's armor, crossing the Volkhov would have been a difficult proposition at best and Leningrad may not have been isolated.

Indeed, let's assume that the Germans actually manage to get to Moscow during the summer. I don't believe they could have actually logistically supported a double envelopment to surround Moscow and bag it in a cheap coup de main-rather, it would have been a brutish, man-to-man struggle through blown out buildings much like (that's right) Stalingrad! And like Stalingrad, the likely concentration of forces to assault Moscow would require a dangerous thinning of the flanks...

Of course, even if Moscow and Leningrad fell by, say, early September (!) this doesn't in any way guarantee a political collapse of the Soviet Union. The history of Russia doesn't suggest that the Russians will overthrow their native despot (even if Stalin was a Georgian) and replace him with a foreign one, as Napoleon found out.

Totalitarian dictators, I might add, are not only as nasty as cockroaches, but even harder to exterminate. Relying on coups to topple these fellows has a rather poor record: look at Hitler and Saddam Hussein. And Stalin possessed a far greater measure of control over his army and party than Hitler ever did (although not Hussein). The idea that the thoroughly cowed Red Army and the gutted Communist party could rise up against Stalin invites great skepticism, and a revolution from below, in my opinion, is even less likely, especially given the Germans rather (ahem) unenlightened treatment of Slavs.

Still, if the Germans actually did take Leningrad and Moscow by early autumn a shaken Stalin might have entered into negotiations for a compromise peace--but I suspect that Hitler would probably have thrown this chance away and sought (and failed to achieve) a total victory.

Yet, for all this, Victor does have a point. It's very difficult even to replicate the historical German achievement. How many of you, for example, manage to even isolate Leningrad? I've never done it or have had it done to me. This can be partially explained by the fact that we play smarter than Stalin. But even so, Soviet failures in 1941 can't be solely blamed on Stalin and, in my opinion, the game doesn't go far enough in reflecting Soviet deficiencies at the operational and tactical level in the early period of the war.

Here's a few ideas on how to solve this problem. First, the Soviets must use the historical set up given by Charles Sharp in TEM #21 and #22. To compensate, give the Soviets a special reaction phase between the German surprise and regular turn consisting of a movement and combat phase in the Baltic, Western, and Kiev MDs with no rail movement. Secondly, the game allows the Soviets to mass their armor in ways they simply couldn't do historically.

I'd like a rule limiting Soviet stacking of c/m units in a hex to 3 REs until they receive the HQs for their six Tank armies, at which point they can stack normally, but only in up to six places. Something also absolutely needs to be done about the VVS, as it becomes absurdly powerful all too soon. I'm no air expert, and I know much work in this area is already being done, so I'll assume a solution to this is forthcoming. I do know that Soviet competence in the air in no way matched Soviet numbers, and therein lies the problem: our air system doesn't account for command/control failures. For later in the war I suggest preventing advance after combat by artillery divisions-these units didn't exactly rush forth into the breach!

Victor's other point regarding the lack of political rules also strikes me as being relevant, despite my stated belief that a political collapse of Stalin's regime is unlikely. I believe I possess the solution for this problem-i ncorpo rate the political costs of certain actions into the victory point system. That's what Jason and I did (or tried to do) with BF. By doing so you'll insure that Soviet players who abandon Murmansk and execute marathon-like runaways will pay a steep cost. If German VPs reach a certain total within a time period, perhaps this can have effects on, for example, diminishing replacements or reinforcements due to a growing lack of enthusiasm for a lost cause.

Of course the problem with merging political concerns into the VP system is that different people interpret the political realities differently. Undoubtedly some players out there will either argue that there shouldn't be a political cost to a runaway defense, or that such concerns shouldn't affect Europa, which should only be a military simulation. To those of you out there professing such a narrow view, need I remind you of Clausewitz's dictum that war is the pursuit of political goals by other means?

Finally, I'd like to make a few comments on Second Front. Based on my experience with mountain fighting in BF, I'd say halving air power in mountain terrain is a must, especially given the presumably powerful Allied air force. Of course, I may just be whistling in the dark, not having playtested SF. As for Allied landing within air cover, I favor the idea since there's no way the Allies would execute a large landing otherwise given their doctrine, but this opens up a new can of worms: wily Germans parking all their units in those areas within air range. Thus, to make the idea work, minimum garrisons must be established on all areas of the map. Such garrisons, I might add, should also include a certain number of armor or c/m REs, so that the German player doesn't place all his construction units and siege artillery in these places in the way the Soviets do with the Turkish and Iranian garrisons.

Furthermore, I'd require the Germans to maintain those garrisons (because of fears of follow up landings) until the Allies make certain territorial gains. All this may be too restrictive for most Europa players, but it's worth considering. As for the logistical aspects of the Western Front, I fear no easy solution exists. The most accurate system I've seen involves landing and counting REs of supply and then transporting them to the front via the local road/rail network: great for a computer, but who wants to spend an hour or more a turn doing staff work? I look forward to hearing more on SFs progress and welcome GR/D's newfound determination in putting other projects on hold until they complete SF, a sentiment, I'm sure, shared by all Europadom.

Brian Adams, Canada

I feel that Europa and all its various manifestations (GR/D, the magazine, etc.) are really a class act. If there is one aspect of the overall operation that I would really like to see improved, however, it would be the magazine's publication schedule. It is not uncommon for me, sitting on the fringe of the continent as I am, to sometimes have to wait 4-6 months between issues. I feel some guilt in even making this statement, since I know all you guys have "real" jobs, families, etc., but this is the one area that I think you really need to work on.

As a parting shot, let me once again, as I usually do, put in a plug for Europa East Africa, or whatever you want to call it, as well as Arthur Goodwin's Far Eastern Theatre. I hope that both these proposals are still alive, even if in a state of suspended animation.

Arvi Sniill, Finland

A Winter War is very good, but why are the rules supplied in a book form, instead of an album with loose- leaves which could be easily updated by throwing away the old page and inserting a new one? This might be handy if one tries to collect the whole Europa series, in which case one would have one album of rules, instead of 17 different books. Anyhow, my best regards to the game's designers.

Ralf Schulz, New York

I would like to comment on three aspects of FitE/SE that I consider unsatisfactory.

First, it is clear to me that the fortification rules do not reflect the actual stopping power of real (i.e., historical) fortifications. Many other games double the attacker's losses when attacking fortifications to represent their enormous defensive power. As far as I can tell, not only does FitE/SE unduly favor the attacker, but forts only negate AEC and modify the combat die roll by -1, which can be easily nullified by combat engineers. And for this meager benefit I have to spend a resource point and tie up my construction units. The result is that, in all my games, neither the Russians nor the Germans build many forts except in special circumstances.

What do fortifications actually do? They protect troops from artillery fire through the use of deep trenches and shelters, and they protect crew-served weapons with hardened emplacements. They also hinder and channel enemy movement by using mines, wire, obstacles, antitank ditches, etc. My recommendation is that forts be given a -2 combat modifier and that non-siege artillery be halved when attacking. Forts built in cities would only be given a -1 combat modifier since city hexes already offer hardened shelters and obstacles which can be improved to only a limited extent compared to non-city terrain.

Second, I do not believe that many German SS units are accurately represented in FitE/SE. To me, their large combat factors are not enough to fully simulate their other characteristics (a combination of Soviet Guards and NKVD political troops). I recommend that eligible SS units be allowed to roll again when attacking and the result is AS or AR if they compose 1/2 or more of the REs in the attack.

When defending, these units would entitle their stack to ignore all retreats and to treat DR results as EX at the German player's option provided the stack was composed of 1/2 or more REs of eligible SS units. To offset (and make more realistic) these characteristics, required losses would be mandated when these SS units are involved in battle. These characteristics apply only to the 1st through 12th, the 16th, and the 17th SS divisions, and to the "numbered" non- divisional units (e.g., 1 SS Mot Brigade), but not the many "named" non-divisionals (e.g., 1 Lett Brigade) and police units. The other SS units were either composed largely of non-Germans and were SS in name only, or were not used as front-line combat units.

My third comment is a strategic one. As a student of history, I do not believe that Turkey's role in Europa is adequately represented. Indeed, as far as I can tell, it is hardly represented at all. Looking back, it amazes me that Turkey did not join with Germany, as it did in WW I, to recover the territories taken from her by the British in 1918. Turkey would be a superpower today and one of the world's richest nations given the area encompassed by her pre-WW I borders.

In 1942 the British, acting on ULTRA information, appear to have fully expected Turkey to enter the war. It also appears that this was the real reason behind the British invasion of Iraq in 1941, behind the strange invasion of Syria in 1941, behind the large garrisons sent to Cyprus and Palestine, and the wasting of an entire army in Mesopotamia whose lack led to the British defeat at Tobruk in the summer of 1942. The German arrangement with Turkey was apparently that the Turks would enter the war when the Germans reached the Caucasus on a broad front. It's hard to make sense out of Hitler's strange invasion of the Caucasus in 1942 in any other terms.

In the event, the Germans reached the Caucasus too late and in too small strength to inspire Turkish entry on the Axis side. And the Allied landings in North Africa ended all chance of Turkey becoming part of the Axis. However, note that Turkey resisted Allied pressure to enter the war on their side until threatened by a Soviet invasion in 1944. Even then, they notified Hitler, who promptly withdrew from the region leaving the Turks with no enemy to fight!

Right now, without the Turks, FitE/SE and WitD are unbalanced. In FitE/SE there is no real reason for the Germans to take the Crimea or for the Russians to hold it. Hitler repeatedly said that the Crimea had to be taken and held because of the impact on Turkey. The whole 1942 campaign in the Caucasus becomes meaningless without Turkey, as does the Kuban bridgehead later on.

Under what circumstances would Turkey enter the war? In 1941-42, it would clearly enter to secure its former lands in the Caucasus if the Soviets collapsed. One way to define "collapse" would be the German capture of Moscow combined with a strong presence in the Caucasus. Thus, the German player would have to do noticeably better than his historical counterparts to have a chance to bring in the Turks. I suggest Turkish Entry as follows:

1941: Moscow, Sevastopol, and Rostov must all be Axis owned. At the start of any Axis initial phase in which these conditions are met, the Axis player rolls a die. On a roll of 1-3, Turkey remains neutral. On a roll of 4-6, Turkey joins the war as an Axis Ally.

1942 (through the Oct II turn): In addition to the above, if Moscow is not German owned the Turks may still enter the war provided that Soviet rail communications are cut between the Caucasus (west of the Caspian Sea) and the rest of the USSR to the north, and at least one German division has entered the Transcaucasus MD.

After Oct II 42: Turkey may not enter the war on the Axis side.

Upon activation, the Turkish Army would mobilize and attack the USSR at the Axis player's option with 1/2 its army. Another 1/4 of the Army would advance into Syria, and the last 1/4 into Iraq. The Turkish armored division and most of the cavalry would have to be used in Iraq and Syria.

I find the Turkish OB and replacement rate, as given in The Near East, to be far too low. When compared to Greece (which the Turks defeated in 1920-23) Turkey has four times the population. Thus, it should have 3-4 times Greece's replacement rate. Also, unlike Greece, Turkey manufactured its own ammunition and some of its artillery. Turkey also had a small aircraft, motor-vehicle, and railway manufacturing capacity. Its rail capacity should be 15-20 REs per turn. However, as with other "minor" German allies, modern aircraft, armor, and equipment would have to be German supplied.

I mention these things for your consideration in designing the "collector series". You have done excellent work as shown in A Winter War.

Charles Sharp, Washington

I have several comments on TEM issues #26 and #27.

Concerning Stolfi's Hitler's Panzers East, I want to give you all a quick lesson in how to read a history book. First, open to the back of the book and read the bibliography. That will give you a clue as to whether there is any sense in reading further, or whether to treat what you have as thinly disguised fiction. Out of 77 published sources listed in Stolfi's bibliography only 7 are by Soviet authors (one a geography text, one by a defector, none in Russian, and not a single one pertaining to the events of June-August 1941 which are the primary subject of his book).

All his archive and unpublished sources are from German military archives. His basic thesis is that the only reason the Germans did not conquer the USSR in 1941 was that Hitler made the incorrect decision to stop the direct drive on Moscow-that the German Army was so operationally competent that the Soviets could not have stopped them. How does he know the Germans were that good? Why the German records say so, of course! How does he know the Germans could reach not just Moscow, but Gorkiy, by September, and keep themselves supplied out there? Why, the German records show their plans for doing so, and keeping themselves supplied...

Never mind that in the event those plans proved hopelessly inadequate to supply the German Army west of Moscow, let alone hundreds of miles to the east. Never mind that by September 1st, without an assault on Moscow, and without a further advance to Gorkiy, the Panzer Groups in Army Group Center were at 50% tank strength and the average infantry division had already lost 33-45% of its infantry. Never mind that German intelligence for the entire first year of the war, until the summer of 1942, produced some of the best-written fantasy put on paper before Tolkien in its estimates of Soviet reserves and capabilities.

Is Stolfi's thesis completely incorrect? Maybe. I can't honestly tell, and neither can anyone else from reading his book, because he did not do his homework. His thesis is flat unproven, at least until German capabilities are compared to realistic Soviet capabilities-which, I always thought, was one of the things historical games like the Europa series was supposed to allow us gamers to do...

There are some definite questions related to the whole subject that need to be looked at in detail:

1. Popular morale in the USSR.

Could continued German successes "break" the Soviet population and cause resistance to collapse? The available evidence is contradictory and uncertain. On the one hand, the unexpected advance on Moscow in October did cause a panic-stricken flight of government offices and personnel from Moscow on 18-20 October, but there is no evidence of any morale break among the military or militia units actually doing the fighting.

In the German southern advance in the summer of 1942 there was evidence of shaky Soviet military morale, but again it lasted only a few weeks and bounced back dramatically in front of Stalingrad and the Caucasus. On the other hand, the local Party offices and apparatus so permeated Soviet life, and Stalin turned the war into a "patriotic" rather than a Communist fight so early, that in the first 3 weeks of the war over 5,500,000 men volunteered for military duty, above and beyond those who were called up from the reserves. One reason 1941 saw so many rifle brigades and militia divisions in action was, simply, that there were more Soviet citizens that wanted to fight Germans than there were regular Soviet military organizations to accommodate them.

2. Surprise.

As FitE/SE recognizes, the initial German attack was a tremendous shock to the entire Soviet military system. One of Stolfi's problems is that he assumes that German successes resulting from this surprise could be repeated at will, and that is a very suspicious assumption. There is good evidence, from existing Soviet published archive material, memoirs, and campaign histories, that neither the Northwestern nor the Western Front commands had any real control over their own forces from June 22nd to about July 10th, the first 2+ weeks of the war. Not only could they not give meaningful orders to corps and divisions, they had only the vaguest idea where their units were, or if they even existed. In contrast, a recent (1991) history of the Ukraine in 1941 makes it plain that the Southwestern and Southern Front commands did have control, and were able to effectively react and counter-act Axis moves.

The dramatic difference in actions on these different fronts in June-July might reflect this difference in "command shock" as much as any differences in force structures. This shock that affected the northern half of the front was a direct result of units, and the local chain of command, trying to go from a peace-time existence, without any pause, directly to full wartime actions while under attack. This shock was never repeated. Even the Typhoon offensive against Moscow and the Kiev cauldron did not produce the same extensive and complete breakdown in command and control.

Which brings us back to the real questions as Victor Hauser formulated them in his editorial on Stolfi in TEM #26: shock and politics.

Europa is not a political game system, it is an operational game of ground combat in WWII. It deals relatively effectively with ground combat at the corps/army level, less effectively with combat at the theater level, and is almost completely unrealistic at either the national or the regiment/battalion level because the system is not designed for those levels of action. This is a problem which has already reared its head in dealing with minor allies and neutrals, and with various unruly partisan groups. It's going to get worse. Without political input, many of the military decisions in WWII (or any other war) simply do not make any sense. WWII adds to this problem since many of the political leaders making the decisions are not, by any definition, rational people-and if you think I'm referring only to Hitler and Stalin, I suggest you study the decision processes of DeGaulle, Churchill, or the interservice infighting between the US Army and US Navy.

Grand Europa is not a realistic option without political rules. Once political rules are introduced, though, someone in the design process has to face the fact that the Europa system is now spreading beyond its original design limits- from operational to grand-strategy level.

Command and control is related to the game-system problem in another way. Right now, the player is usually controlling an army-group level of forces. There are some two- player games of FitEISE, but the norm that I've seen is a group of players per side, each with 30-60 divisions under command. Yet the Europa OBs give you every individual unit down to regiment, and even battalion, level. This is technically corps or army command (i.e., 1-2 levels below the player). Because the player is making all the decisions for all these lower HQs, we have an "Europa Anomaly". That is, German, US, Soviet, Italian, Rumanian, British, and French headquarters are all equally efficient in Europa!

[Actually, they are each as efficient as the player controlling them. Which, of course, brings about its own nasty problem. Namely, if a Soviet player in FitE/SE understands the Europa system better than his German opponent, then his "inexperienced", Soviet pre-war forces will operate more efficiently than the supposedly battle-tested, combatexperienced, German invaders.-VAH]

If there is anybody out there who thinks that all these HQs were actually equally efficient, please stop reading now because you won't see that there is a problem.

There is a problem. The problem is that the Soviet/German/British/French/etc. player can react to his opponent's move from the army-group level with the same efficiency regardless of the very real differences that existed below that level in each army. In other words, while Europa goes to great lengths to reflect every change in the internal composition of battalions, regiments, and divisions to the point of having a half-dozen counters or more for the same unit in some cases, the system does absolutely nothing to reflect any differences above that level.

The Soviet commander in June 1941 can direct his surviving forces with the same efficiency as his German opponent, or (for that matter) with the same efficiency as his army of 1943-44 after its command structure has been rebuilt and retrained!

I claim that we badly need some reflection of the very real differences in "junior" controlling HQs, between the player and the counter, just as we need some reflection of the "senior" controls, the political, that affect the player's actions. These areas need discussion, and I'll second Victor's question from TEM #26: Any ideas? More pertinent to my discussion, any specific ideas for rules or mechanisms that recreate command difficulties, restrictions, or, as in Russia during June-July 1941, complete breakdowns?

Steve Grover, Connecticut

The Ghost of TEM #8 is Fritz Kuhn, leader of the German-American Bund during the 1930s. Born in Germany, he was a veteran of Kaiser Wilhelm's Army and emigrated to the USA in 1923, where he worked as a chemist for the Ford Motor Company (Detroit was a relative hotbed of Bund activities). He appeared before the House Committee on Un- American Activities in 1939 while free on bail pending his trial for misuse of Bund funds. For this, he was later jailed and subsequently removed as Bundesfuhrer. I know nothing concerning his ultimate fate-he seems to have disappeared from the pages of history following his conviction.

Interestingly, his successor, Gerhard Wilhelm Kunze, had a much more eventful (though short) career as a Nazi conspirator. He was convicted (in 1942, 1 believe) of conspiracy charges along with several others in a trial here in Hartford, and sentenced to 15 years in prison. The prosecutor in that trial (which may very well have been a set- up job) was future Connecticut Senator Thomas Dodd (who in the 1960s was censured for ethics violations, father of the present US Senator Chris Dodd.

[Finally! After years we have a correct answer (and an interesting one, too) to the nefarious Ghost of TEM #8. Congratulations, Steve.-VAH]