Ian Trout, Australia

I have a few suggestions to help overcome some nagging problems I have with FitE/SE.

1. I don't believe that there is any historical basis for allowing one side to cut another's supply without any chance for reaction by the other side given Europa's fortnightly turns. In my experience, there is a huge amount of brain energy wasted by all players in guarding against potentially lethal air drops and/or single-unit penetrations behind the lines. It is ridiculous to me that a single unit (even a division) can occupy a single rail line at the end of its exploitation phase and cause whole armies to go unsupplied for the next two weeks.

I propose that each side checks supply only once per game turn, and that this supply check occur not during an initial phase, but at the end of each friendly exploitation phase.

The main impact of this change will be the need to use strong forces to form pockets. Weak forces or single units which attempt to cut off enemy supplies will be brushed aside-which is how I think it should be. Reserves will become more valuable and the current importance of presenting a uniformly strong front will be lessened to more historical levels.

During normal play our group found no problems with this change, although we did make a modification to the start of the 1941 Scenario where we required the Soviet side to check supply at the end of the Axis Jun II 41 turn (along with the Axis).

I highly recommend including this change as an optional rule in future Europa games. We think that you will be surprised at the number of players who'll prefer this alternative.

2. It seems to me that there is a fundamental difference between air attacks on rail lines and the damage a ground unit can do to a rail line. Ground units do more actual physical damage whereas air units serve more to inhibit and delay train movement. So what am I on about? During play, it is not uncommon to see a string of engineers protecting a vital rail line. No matter how many aircraft are sent to bomb such a line, the presence of the engineers will prevent the aircraft from doing any damage since the engineers will repair the line and then the ground units will rail over the freshly repaired track. The other extreme is where a single hit on a rail line will prevent all rail movement if no engineer is at hand.

A better approach is already available in the rules. Consider air attacks against rail lines to be a form of interdiction. Resolve and mark hits in the usual way and, at the end of the friendly exploitation phase, remove all enemy rail hits except those in city hexes or adjacent to rivers. These hits require repair by engineers per the normal rules. Allow only 1 interdiction hit to be applied to a single rail hex unless the hex contains a city. Major cities can take 5 hits; dot and reference cities can take 3 hits.

When a unit using rail movement enters a hex with a rail-hit marker, it must spend 1 additional MP to leave that hex by rail. This 1 MP is subtracted from the unit's normal MP allowance. If it cannot spend this additional MP, it must cease its move in that hex. There is no added penalty for moving through multiple-hit hexes, it just takes longer to fix them.

As with #1 above, it is not necessary to make this a standard rules change, but I believe that it would make an excellent optional rule.

[As far as I can tell, what Ian is really describing here is a modification to the current harassment rules. And, in this case, I can find no advantage in using his suggestion over those rules. Harassment never needs to roll on the bombing table, up to 2 harassment hits can be placed per hex, and no amount of engineers can influence harassment. Most players I know with air supremacy in an area will usually choose harassing over bombing a rail line for the above reasons when they really want to shut it down-VAH.]

3. Fortnightly game turns at 16 miles per hex combine to produce the problem of immense air concentrations over a given hex without representing the enormous coordination difficulties such operations would have entailed. It is not uncommon to see upwards of 20 bomber units concentrate to support a single attack. That's 800 bombers over a single hex! I'm convinced that it never happened that way--and probably couldn't have happened that way. What can be done?

I propose that 1 resource point be expended for each 5 (or fraction thereof) air units, after the first 5, supporting a given hex. For instance, a stack of 17 air units flying ground support in the same hex would spend 3 RPs. The RP expenditure would be prior to air combat and AA fire. If the RPs aren't available, then the concentration is not allowed. We do not place restrictions on the location on the RPs to be expended, so long as they are in play somewhere. Perhaps this could be another optional ruIe ?

[Expending resource points for a command/control problem seems artificial to me. See Cory Manka's letter below for a more elegant (in my opinion) concept-VAH.]

Maj. Cory Manka, New York

While playing WitD with a fellow artilleryman, we came to the conclusion that the rules for tactical air support are too restrictive. I'm convinced that limiting the number of tactical bombing points providing air support to the printed factors of the unit(s) being supported is unrealistic.

Real tactical air-support is not based on the strength of a ground unit, but on the ground unit's ability to control the numbers of aircraft assigned to support it. The level of specialized personnel and equipment provided (as well as their ability) within any ground unit to do this varied tremendously from army to army and over the course of the war. It evolved as the war progressed. In my opinion, the most realistic way to model this should be to assign air units to support ground units based on the ability of those ground units (as a function of unit size, doctrine, specialized personnel and equipment, training, and experience) to effectively coordinate and control its air support.

What I propose is that, in general, each RE of eligible ground units be able to receive tactical air support from one air unit. All ground units qualify for this except: artillery, antiaircraft, construction (only, not combat/assault), border, security, police, and partisan units. This general case is modified by a ground unit's period, nationality, and function over the course of the war. In TFH, an air unit is described as having 40-60 airplanes.

[Western nations are rated at 40, minor nations at 60, and the Soviets at 60 planes per air unit.- VAH]

This hasn't changed for any Europa game. Using this, and the current tactical support rules, I've provided some examples showing why I believe the current system is flawed.

May II 40: The British 44th Inf XX (7-8) is defending in France. The Allied player provides the unit with maximum tactical support, 7 factors, using three Bien 4s and two Battles (200 planes).

Aug I 42: The British 44th Inf XX (7-8) is defending in Egypt. The Allied player provides the unit with maximum tactical support, 7 factors, using one A-30, one DB-713, and one P-40D (120 planes). If another air unit is added to the 44th's defense in Egypt, its bombing strength is ignored, even though it raises the total number of planes to only 160 (against the 200 planes controlled 27 months earlier). When comparing the situation from May 40 to Aug 42, it becomes clear that there is a regression in the ability of the 44th to control aircraft as the war goes on.

Thus, Europa is saying that ground units decline in their ability to control tactical support in terms of planes employed, even though the capabilites of the aircraft have increased. In military terms, as an air- ground controller I become less efficient in terms of the number of aircraft I can control as the game goes on. This is contrary to history and common sense. The fact that bomb and rocket loads increased (along with higher accuracy) has nothing to do with the number of planes employed.

[Taken to a different extreme, under the existing rules a Soviet 5-6 Rifle XX can control five SB-2s (300 planes) in 1941 even though they had no radios to do so, while a German 6-10 Motorized XX cannot even fully control two Ju 87 units (less than 80 planes) that they were supposedly trained to cooperate with.-VAH]

I believe that the changes I propose more historically reflect the capability of air units to provide tactical support and of ground units to control it.

[Of interest, Cory's concept has been suggested independently by others around the country during the past year or so. Cory provided a table of his suggested air- support to ground-unit relationships that I chose not to include both for space limitations and because actual playtest experience from players who have tried this concept provided different conclusions.

If you like this idea as much as I do, try this: One air unit may contribute tactical support for each RE, rounding fractions over 112 up and dropping fractions of 112 or less, of German or Western Allied (including those equipped by the Americans or British) ground units involved in a combat. One air unit may contribute tactical support for each 2 REs, rounding as above, of other non-Soviet ground units involved in a combat. One air unit may contribute tactical support for each 3 REs, rounding as above, of Soviet ground units involved in a combat. However, one air unit may contribute tactical support for each 2 REs, rounding as above, of Soviet c1m ground units involved in a combat on or after the Jul 1 43 turn. For tactical-support purposes, all units listed above by Cory as unqualified count as 112 their normal RE size except for partisans, which may not be given tactical air support. Air units in excess of this (after air combat and AA fire) are ignored.-VAH]

Howard Christie, Alaska

This discussion should explain why the 4-8 Italian Alpine Divisions have cadres. The divisions alpina were recruited from the mountainous regions in Italy.

First created in 1872, these mountaineers were distinguished by a long black feather in a traditional hat. Their flexible organization was necessary because of the difficulty of employing large units in mountains, and was made possible by the existence of independent supply and transport services within all units including companies. The division was an administrative headquarters, but an organic relationship with its component units was usually maintained. The Alpine Regiments assigned to Alpine Divisions were self-contained with detachments of artillery, engineers, and auxiliaries. This made the Alpine Regiments self- supporting and capable of independent action for a considerable period. An Alpine Division was therefore conceptually different from the typical Italian infantry division during WW II.

The Alpine Division, being specifically adapted for mountain warfare, was further decentralized from regiments to battalions and companies, which might be detached from their parent units and regrouped with artillery units into raggruppamenti. This was facilitated by the existence of independent transport down to the company level.

All replacements came directly from depots without allowance for replacement battalions. Given the Alpine Division's organization, this allowed for a cadre to exist before total destruction of the unit in combat. Thus, organized with individual units trained to fight on their own (and self-supporting), I believe that the Italian Alpine Divisions are fully justified in having a cadre.

Lynn Ray Stolpa, Idaho

I've been a wargamer for nearly 25 years. During my travels over the past ten years, I've met many wargamers around the country. This is the first letter I've ever written to a wargame magazine, and I would like to share a summary of some of the discussions I've had with fellow wargamers concerning the Europa system, as well as a few ideas of my own. First, Grand Europa.

I think that GRD might be in a situation where it can't see the forest for the trees. Admittedly, the task of designing and developing GE is daunting, but given comments I've read in past issues of TEM, it seems to me that the folks at GRD are thinking in a "bottom-up" rather than "top-down" manner.

For example, let's examine Germany's decision to expand her panzer forces from five to ten divisions in late 1939. That expansion was carried out fairly rapidly. Thus, to me, GE should have a built-in flexibility based on each nation's historical conditions and limitations. In this instance, the German player would make the decision in Oct 1939, and have his ten panzer divisions in Apr 1940. This would be possible due to the existing pre-programming within German industry. If, instead, the German player had decided to double the size of the German Navy, then such expansion would take much longer and take away resources from the Army and Air Force. But GE should allow for these kinds of possibilities.

I believe that GE should assign resource-cost and production-time values to each kind of unit being produced (ground, naval, or air) based on historical national capabilities. Thus, Germany would be able to build and deploy ground and air units more quickly than naval units, while England would be able to build and deploy her naval units more quickly than ground or air units (relatively speaking). Also, while I believe that players, as national leaders, should be able to control that nation's production, I do not think that ahistorical abilities should be allowed.

[I would add that the concept that any single individual, even a totalitarian dictator, can exercise total control over a nation's industries is, in my opinion, a quantum leap of speculation.-VAH]

Since GE players would take over their countries in 1939, their initial industrial programs are already firmly in place, and any changes to those programs will take time. This means, for instance, that the French are not going to field ten armored divisions by May 1940 due to their industrial preprogramming. However, as the war progresses, highly ahistorical variants become possible. A good example of this is the Luftwaffe. If I were directing German war production, I would not demand that the He 177A have dive- bomber capability, the Me 262A be configured as an attack bomber, the Me 109 have priority over the FW 190, or that the He 219 be limited because I don't like Professor Heinkel. Thus my Luftwaffe would be much stronger by 1943 than its historical counterpart.

I do not believe that examples like those above would unbalance the game in any way. I say this because of my personal experience as the Axis player in FITE/SE. By 1943/44, the Soviets are nearly unstoppable since nobody I've ever played against makes the mistakes their historical counterparts did. Please remember that everyone who plays the game has access to hindsight.

To summarize, GE should not attempt to emulate history. Instead it should provide a sound framework for the players to create viable alternative histories.

[My problem with Lynn's reasoning in the above is that he is setting himself up as the director of the German war economy, the strategic and operational leader of each of his numerous military forces, the political leader, and the 1990's hindsight historian all rolled into one (and with total control over the outcomes of all his decisions). This seems to me to be a very dangerous premise upon which to base a system design as challenging as GE.-VAH]

On another subject, I believe that the basic Europa play sequence (you move, I move) is beginning to show its age. The state of the art has advanced greatly in the 20 years since Europa was conceived. Specifically, if a "reaction" phase were inserted into each exploitation phase, more realistic results would be possible.

For instance, if an exploiting unit enters the ZOC of an enemy unit, then a "special reaction combat" could take place and, depending on the result, phasing units could resume exploiting. Such reaction combat would occur every time an exploiting unit/stack entered enemy ZOCs. This creates a "billiard-bail" effect, thus more accurately reflecting the uncertain nature of armored breakthroughs. A side effect is that such a mechanism would minimize the effects of "ants" in the rear areas. I think that this concept would make c/m units more powerful in the game since the higher overall casualty rate it causes would increase battlefield fluidity.

[This is not the first "reaction-phase" proposal I've seen. I find Lynn's idea interesting, but it, too, fails to resolve what I call the Flexibility Problem. It is a proven fact that both air and naval forces are far more capable of responding quickly and over greater distances than ground units. Thus, any "reaction" concept that does not account for this is, in my opinion, fatally flawed. However, I want to add that I've yet to see a playable solution (including my own) to this problem.- VAH]

My last topic is the Europa air system. To begin with, I believe that the air system should remain operational, and all forms of strategic air warfare be abstracted and covered in GE. Next, I don't know how to incorporate it into the system, but the early-war psychological effects of dive bombing were truly terrorizing and devastating and should be modeled somehow. I've read numerous accounts of air units (without any ground assistance), especially early-war dive-bombers, eliminating ground units in Europa terms. Perhaps an odds-shift or other combat modifier could be used here. Whatever, I feel that this aspect of the air system deserves attention.

[Another possibility might be to allow air units to "fight combat" against ground units during the air phase. In this case, the ground units would get to fire AA and the surviving air units would get to "attack", comparing tactical bombing strength to ground defense factors, using the ground CRT. But before you get any ideas, this is strictly an off-the-cuff idea (I'm making it up as I type along here). So don't write in thinking this has a chance of becoming an official part of the Europa system.-VAH]

My final comment on the air system concerns limited intelligence and air superiority. For example, during the first few turns of FITE/SE, there is effectively no Soviet air force. So why is it that the Soviets can freely examine all the Axis stacks? Do the Soviets have stealth reconnaissance aircraft?

In closing, I want to complement GRD on a truly one- of-a-kind game system. I think it really is the best game on the market and I hope that the above will be taken constructively. Please send me an order form and information on Europa products. I live in Idaho and nobody around here knows or plays Europa that I can find.

Mark Swenholt, Texas

One of the more common deviations from history that occurs in FITE/SE is the Soviet player's treatment of his pre-war tank, motorized, and mechanized divisions. historically, by the end of 1941 most of them were either destroyed by the Germans or disbanded by the Soviets themselves due to both their inherent limitations as well as their need for experienced commanders to lead newly-raised formations.

In FITE/SE, however, Soviet players generally tend to keep these divisions in play since they represent a significant combat potential even with their mobility and fragility restrictions. Given the weakness of the early Soviet tank corps, the pre-war c/m divisions often play a major role throughout the 1942 campaign, and even into 1943/44.

At this point, the game presents the unlikely situation where Soviet divisional-sized formations are based on two greatly different TO/Es. Once the tank corps organization had proven itself, it is reasonable to suppose that any surviving pre-war c/m divisions would have been either reorganized to the new standard or finally disbanded. Fortunately, FitEISE provides a vehicle for doing this within the existing countermix, as illustrated below:

Oct I 42
Reorganize: 3x Tank XX (any) to: 3x 6-4-8 Tank XXX
Note: Use the 6-4-8s corresponding to the three 9-7- 8 Tank XXX that converted to Mech XXX this turn.

Nov I 42
Reorganize: 1x Tank XX (any) to: 1x 6-4-8 Tank XXX
Note: Use the 6-4-8 corresponding to the 9-7-8 Tank XXX that converted to Mech XXX this turn.

Dec I 42
Reorganize: 3x Tank XX (any) to: 3x 6-4-8 Tank XXX
Note: Use the 6-4-8s corresponding to the three 9-7- 8 Tank XXX that converted to Mech XXX and Guards Tank XXX this turn.

Jan I 43
Reorganize: 3x Tank XX (any) to: 3x 6-4-8 Tank XXX
Note: Use the 6-4-8s corresponding to the three 9-7- 8 Tank XXX that converted to Guards Tank XXX this turn.
Reorganize: 2x Mot or Mech XX (any) to: 2x 11-8 Mech XXX
Note: Use the 11-8s corresponding to the two 11-8 Mech XXX that converted to Guards Mech XXX this turn.
Disband: All remaining Tank, Mot, and Mech XX except Guards Mot XX

As with reorganizing German Infantry XX, RPs may be gained or lost through these reorganizations. The difference in the printed attack factors between the division being reorganized and the corps it reorganizes to is the number of armored RPs gained or required.

In a full campaign game, the Germans don't often suffer a Stalingrad in 1942. This, plus the fact that c/m units tend to get top priority on replacements, means that the German armored withdrawals called for by the OB often don't result in those units actually going away. 1943 campaigns with the Germans enjoying use of an extra 8 or more c/m divisions are quite possible. This option allows the Soviet player to also "be smart", and balances the 1943 campaign season for games with relatively low losses.

[As is my nature, I take issue with some of the above. First, if there have been relatively low losses in the game up to 1943, the Soviets will already possess an enormous strength advantage over the Germans. So much for the need to "balance" things for the Soviets further. The real trouble is in what Mark touched on concerning the need for commanders to lead their new c1m formations. Europa does not the require expenditure of "maintenance" points to keep units operating. It is assumed to be built into the replacement system.

However, the pre-war c/m formations got no replacements, no spare parts, no nothing. All new production went into raising new formations in 1941. So, even if the pre-war c/m formations just sat around and did nothing, their equipment would have rusted away within a few months. The true problem was that after the purges in the late 1930s, there were very few officers capable of handling c/m units. Such as there were were in desperate demand. It was reasoned (correctly) that since the existing pre-war c/m divisions either already were or soon would be piles of junk (and their commanders incapable of coordinating them in battle even if they weren't) the only possible way to get any use out of them was to disband them and use their commanders to lead the new brigades then forming (and which were more easily led). Thus I would be absolutely more restrictive than Mark and require the disbandment of all pre-war c/m divisions by the end of 1941 to build brigades. Alternatively, for every pre-war c/m division or cadre still in play I would prohibit the Soviet player from raising a tank corps in 1942.

A further option that I'm growing increasingly fond of is to simply give Soviet pre-war tank and mechanized divisions and cadres the same AEC and ATEC capabilities as Axis-Allied units (i.e., Full AECA (tank) or 1/2 AECA (mech), 1/2 AECD (both), and 1/2 ATEC (both)). I believe that this would not only encourage Soviet players to disband them as soon as possible, but it would more accurately portray these units' actual capabilities in combat (i.e., they would still remain potent when in an offensive posture, but not as effective defensively, which seems to better reflect the accounts I've read recently as well as historical results).-VAH]

Eric Pierce, California

As with many of you, I'm addicted to Europa. Little did I know when a friend introduced me to DNO that I would become hooked, and thereafter be a devoted supporter of what I think is the greatest game system ever designed. With all its detail, assorted colors, and beautiful maps, it has become my primary boardgame. And, like every Europa gamer I know, I've added my own chrome.

I've always been troubled by German AECA inferiority against Soviet and Allied ATEC (perhaps many of you feel the same way). Regardless of the "proving-ground" results of the quality of AT gun vs. tank, I think it is ahistorical to give a defender using "full" ATEC an across-the-board advantage (all periods and nationalities)-namely, a -1 net die-roll modifier for full AECA (+3) versus full ATEC (-4). 1 strongly believe that Gerrn3n combined-arms doctrine and tactical ability was superior to all of their enemies during the early part of the war, and remained superior to most even up to the very end. And it is this superiority that I feel is more important than statistical weapons-performance comparisons. So here is my solution: give all nationalities except the Germans a -3 rather than -4 modifier for full ATEC throughout most of the war. However, at some time (which may vary by nationality), allow some armies to increase their full-ATEC modifier to -4.

[Eric did not include his thoughts as to when, or if, the shift from a -3 full-ATEC modifier should become a -4. But if I follow Eric's reasoning, my guess would be that this would happen sometime around May or June 1943 for most armies.-VAH]

This change will provide the Germans with a measure of tactical superiority, giving them a correspondingly greater chance of operational success, especially in the early-war years against inexperienced enemies. After all, it took some time for the Allies and Soviets to learn the harsh lessons of war from the Germans, and even then, they never learned them to the degree of their teachers.

Some time ago, I had one of my important airbases overrun and all three bombers were destroyed. Oh no! I proclaimed. Then I had an idea. Since air units in air combat have results of eliminated, aborted, and returned, why not add a "returned" result into the air-unit escape table? I thought this was a good idea and have used the following ever since: Escaped 1-2; Aborted 3-4; Destroyed 5-6.

[I have two problems with this "solution". First, from a gaming perspective I think that giving players a break for making operational mistakes (i.e., giving players a die-roll chance to minimize the effects of their errors after the enemy has broken through) does little to discourage such play to begin with. Second, historically air units were indeed overrun with some regularity by enemy ground units with devastating results. It turns out that air units in the rear relied on communications from ground units at the front. If those ground units were smashed or disorganized, the message often did not make it back to the air units, frequently resulting in a very nasty surprise situation for said air units.

Further, even in those cases where the air units did manage to fly their planes (and occasionally some of their ground crews) out of danger, the rest of the air unit's ground-support structure was destroyed by the overrunning forces. Thus, even in the best cases, no air unit got away "clean" from an airbase overrun.-VAH]

On another subject, consider the following. Rommel has broken through into the Near East and is approaching Baghdad. In desperation, the British cast about for immediate assistance. Who do they call? The Reds, who are right next door policing the Iranians. So, in come the Russians to save the day, thus creating the following dilemma--which supply rules do I now use for tracing supply?

Well, for me, the only solution is to produce a supply rule that works for every theater and under every condition. This I did, and it has answered all the supply questions that I ever asked. It even represents the supply situations faced by the Western Allies in Second Front.

Because my solution is quite detailed (in the interests of being thorough), I've included only a few conceptual tidbits here to stimulate interest. Should anyone be interested in the entire package, I would be happy to share it. Basically my logistics system:

• uses HQ units to control attacks
• completely defines supply sources, terminals, and special supply
• changes the way trucks are used (as well as their capabilities)

For me, this logistics system has resolved the supply ambiguities I've experienced in Europa, especially at the juncture of the Near East and FITE/SE.

[Why don't you send it in and give the rest of us a chance to see it?-VAH]

Russ Wynne, Australia

I believe that the following provides an easy way to use ZOC and APZOC considerations -to resolve what I perceive as one of Europa's faults-that of the terrain effects on armies. By this, I mean the seeming lack of impact some geographical features have upon invading armies. I believe that mountains, forests, swamps, wooded-rough, major rivers, etc. are still too easy to march through/across.

ZOCs were introduced in DNO/UNT and seem to have remained unchanged ever since. As far as I can tell, they were a mechanism for representing a unit's influence throughout a larger area than that in which the actual counter resided on the map and, as such, remain relatively unsophisticated. I think that Europa deserves better.

If we accept that a ZOC is a measure of control a unit exerts over surrounding terrain, then this control must consist of patrols, observation, and limited occupation in some combination. It will be easier to accomplish this in certain types of terrain and by certain units (i.e., those having more men, better equipment, and/or superior tactical proficiency).

Since Europa units have their combat values derived from the above parameters, I suggest that we relate a unit's attack strength to its ability to project a ZOC into specific terrain. To do this, simply compare the modified (due to weather, supply, support, etc.) attack strength of the unit(s) in question to the "ZOC resistance value" of the hex in question. If the attack value of the testing unit(s) is at least the value of the terrain, then a ZOC may be exerted into that hex. For APZOCs, units would always use their printed attack factors. The following is a list of terrain types and their effects on ZOCs and APZOCs using the format (AF, ZOC value, APZOC value) where AF is the attack value of the testing units, ZOC value is the number needed to be matched by the AF of the testing unit(s), and APZOC value is the number needed to be matched by the AF of the testing unit(s).

Hexes:

Clear (AF, 4,1); Rough (AF,8,2); Woods (AF,6,2); Wooded-Rough (AF,14,4); Forest (AF,12,3); Mountain (AF,P,P); Swamp (AF,8,3); Bocage (AF,10,2); Int. Lake (AF,6,2); Glacier (AF,P,P); Full City (AF,P,P); Part City (AF,16,4); Sand (AF,12,2); Salt Marsh (AF,P,P)

Hexsides:

River/Canal(AF,+4,+0); Maj. River (AF,+8,+1); Mountain (AF,P,P); High Mtn. (AF,P,P); Karst (AF,P,P); Escarpment (AF,+8,+l); Imp. Escarp. (AF,P,P); Wadi (AF,+2,+O); Sebkha/Solchk. (AF,P,P)

Features:

Dot City (AF,+8,+1); Ref. City (AF,+4,+O); Fort (AF+2,+0,+0); Fortress (AF+4,+0,+0), Road/RaiI road (AF+ 1,+0,+0)

Weather Effects:

Non-clear weather increases all terrain values: frost +1; snow +2; and mud +3.

Example.

On a clear-weather turn, an unfortified and supplied Soviet 5-6 Rifle XX (AF of 5) could project a ZOC into a clear hex (ZOC value of 4), and into a woods or int. lake hex (ZOC values of 6 each) along a road (AF of 5, +1 along a road, = 6). If the same 5-6 was in a fort (AF of 5, +2 for the fort, =7), it could project a ZOC into clear, woods, and int. lake hexes, and also into rough or swamp hexes along a road (as above).

The basis of the ZOC values is the Soviet 3-6 Rifle XX, which I believe could not adequately project a ZOC into even clear terrain due to its poor equipment and training. Also, even though many terrain types (like mountain and full-city) are accessible to almost every unit during normal movement, the terrain difficulty of these hexes means that all passage into or through must be along transport lines. Further, moving units should either lose their ZOCs or have them reduced while moving.

I hope that you will be inspired by the above to consider the current Europa ZOC rules in the hope that my suggestions might be used as an alternative.

[My concerns with Russ's suggestions are many, but my main complaint is that without the help of a computer to sort out all the overlapping possibilities, the amount of time needed to keep track of all those ZOC calculations could be prohibitive (to say nothing of the increased chances for clerical error or miscounting values).

Also, given Europa's half-month scale, I'm not certain that Russ's suggested level of detail is needed. Further, I think that his suggestions actually raise more problems than they solve. What about differences between the Arctic and the rest of the Eastern Front? What about big stacks of ants with a single artillery unit to provide support? Where and how do reduced ZOCs fit in? What about specialist troops, like mountaineers, in the terrain they are trained to operate in? Why can a German 8-6 Inf XX exert a ZOC into a swamp hex but not a 7-6? And on and on. If Russ wanted to make the game more fluid and/or limit the ZOC capabilities of certain classes of units (like 3-6 Rif XX), I think that there are simpler (contrary to his opening sentence) ways to go about it.-VAH]

Joe Wilkerson, Kansas & Norman Setchfield, Florida

Although we have extensive experience with other large games, and other Europa games (one of us has played DNO/UNT), this is being written to briefly describe our first full campaign game of FITE/SE.

The first 3 turns were "blitz as expected", and the end of summer operations found the Axis along the line running from Narva-Novgorod-Kalinin-KalugaPoltava-Kherson. The 1941/42 winter campaign saw little change. Each time the Soviets pushed the Axis back, local Axis counterattacks (facilitated by "shuffling" their winterized assets) regained the lost territory. The Axis were able to push into the Crimea and towards Melitopol as well as continue their regauging efforts.

The 1942 campaign was very different from what the Axis expected. A strong Axis attack broke through in the Kursk sector and exploited SE of Belgorod, while another thrust NE from the Melitopol sector linked up to pocket the entire Soviet force from Kursk to Dnepropetrovsk. This, plus an extended frost season, allowed the Axis to clear the region including Voronezh-StaIingrad-Rostov.

Meanwhile, weaknesses in the Moscow sector allowed several hexes of the city to be taken. This event occupied Soviet attentions perhaps to the detriment of other sectors, although the Germans were ejected from the city by the end of the year.

1943 was rather dull except that the Axis were able to drive the length of the Black-Sea coast to Batumi, using the SS Panzer Corps, destroying the Black Sea Fleet as a result. Elsewhere, armored forces "sniped" at opposing infantry in the Don bend, and the rest of the front remained fairly static. The Germans suffered heavy losses in the Valdai Hills just to isolate Leningrad for a turn. And the Soviets sent massive forces to southern Finland, overrunning it entirely by the end of the summer.

1944 began with the front along the line Narva-Novgorod-Vishniy Volochek-Kalinin-Rzhev-Tula-Orel-Voronezh-Rostov. By the autumn mud, the Germans had been pushed back to a line Riga-Kharkov-Dnepropetrovsk-Sevastopol. And the end of the game saw the final Axis line Siauliai-Minsk-Kiev-Dnepropetrovsk-Sevastopol.

The VP count was 19 points for an Axis marginal victory. The combat ratio on the map was about 2:1 in favor of the Soviets (not enough to shift the victory level).

[As with most campaign reports I've seen, it is very difficult to draw meaningful conclusions (although I wonder at how the Axis player was able to get away with some of the operations described). However, it has been my experience that most "first games" of FITE/SE that are played without the benefits of somebody who already knows the rules and system mechanics are filled with mistaken rules interpretations and operational errors. For instance, when that big pocket was formed in 1942, could the Soviets have invoked the "3-cities" supply rule (maybe Kharkov, Dnepropetrovsk, Stalino, and/or Zaporozhe)?-VAH]

We used the standard rules with the following modifications:

• the DNO scramble rule
• "historical" Finland
• simplified partisans (not Rule 40)
• advanced Rules A-H
• optional rules B, D1-D11, E1-E2, F2, G1-G2, H-J
• the Axis were allowed to alter the deployment zone (within Greater Germany) of any one Panzergruppe at the start of the game (this was used to shift 3rd PG's front 1 hex to the SE)
• fighters carrying bombs were fired upon as fighter-bombers before being allowed to "jettison"
• all attacks were formally announced, sequenced, and committed to before any were resolved, and once announced, an attack could not be cancelled, even if unfavorable results from previous battles rendered an attack unattractive.

  [Allowing a Panzergruppe to redeploy would seem to favor a more powerful Axis surprise attack. I'm not sure why Joe and Norman wanted to discourage the use of fighter- bombers. I'm also not sure what the effect of "locking" players into their attacks would be, although my guess is that it would make combat phases bloodier, which, in turn, might make players more cautious. It might also explain why the Soviets couldn't make full use of their 2:1 strength superiority to drive the Axis off the map in 1944.- VAH]

After the game, we came up with a list of questions.

[Normally, I would let Rick and/or John handle these since that is their specialty. However, since they are both hard at work on Second Front right now, I don't want to disturb them. So, I'm going to take a stab at answering them myself What this means is that my answers are entirely and strictly my own and should be taken as absolutely unofficial (although I think that Pl/ be very close, if not right on, most of the time).-VAH]

1. There seems to be a problem with airborne troops. Since they are unsupported when conducting an air drop, they are almost always used on suicide missions attempting to put large masses of the enemy out of supply rather than in support of ground operations. This doesn't seem to be realistic, hence our claim that there seems to be a problem here. Are there any alternatives?

[There sure are. GRD's release, The Urals, includes a new set of rules that address (and correct) the exact problem you had with your airborne units. Further, Balkan Front, has a rule that treats airborne units as supported during their drop, which (although not actually intended for FITE/SE) can easily be adapted for the East Front.-VAH]

2. As we read the rule, we discovered that the Soviet RR artillery would be counted as winterized. Is this really correct?

[Well. . . yeah. But if this troubles you, you can easily change that rule to not count RR artillery of either side when determining RE proportions for winterization.- VAH]

3. How are you supposed to remember which artillery divisions have moved and which haven't?

[A protocol that I have used for 20 years is to orient all my counters as I move them facing the same way at the end of each phase (this works best if you clip your counters' corners so they fit better in the hex). That way, I can always tell at a glance which units have and haven't moved. It is a simple matter to orient special units 1800 from the others for further clarity.-VAH]

4. Perhaps the inoperative air-repair rules are too lenient, especially in poor weather (where we found that we rarely had inoperative air units).

[This is a tough call, depending on the intensity level of your air war. I've seen games where the bulk of each side's air units were regularly inoperative or eliminated. However, several people, including me, are working on a different approach altogether for handling this. Perhaps you might see the results of our work in the months ahead.-VAH]

5. We had trouble with Rule 34-Replacements and Reinforcements. What if a panzer cadre must be withdrawn, but the panzer XX is at full strength. I took the excess as RPs. Was this wrong? What if a unit to be replaced is already at full strength? Again I took the difference in RPs, which I couldn't find described anywhere in the rules. Also, we didn't find out until 20 or so turns into the game that conversions and upgrades must be performed in cities and not in an enemy ZOC. When we finally figured it out, we decided to ignore the rule altogether since there was no way we could back-track 20 turns and fix those units which had already converted/reorganized. In any event, it seems to us that in keeping with our role as CinC, we shouldn't have to concern ourselves with that sort of detail to begin with. There must be a better way. How will this work in Grand Europa?

[You were correct to take the excess differences in RPs. Further, if you were required to remove a panzer XX from the replacement pool that never entered the replacement pool, not only could it remain in play, but if it "returns" (listed as "return" in the OB) you would get RPs for it as well. It is a matter of debate as to just what a player's "role" is in a Europa game. I claim that if we are going to move individual battalions to chase small bands of partisans, then it is consistent to require players to perform their own conversions and upgrades. As far as I know, this mechanic is not going to change in future Europa games.- VAH]

6. How many commando attacks can succeed against a given hex in one combat phase?

[Only one. This was discussed at some length in Rules Court in TEM #7.- VAH]

7. There seems to be nothing that the Finnish player can do to prevent the Soviets from overrunning southern Finland. Something prevented the Soviets from wiping out Finland historically, but whatever it was doesn't seem to be present in the game.

[My belief is that the main issue was political, and since Europa currently has very limited political rules (at best), it may be some time before the issue is fully resolved in Finland's case. However, both TEM #24 and #26 had rather detailed discussions of goings on in Finland as well as some unofficial suggestions.- VAH]

8. Is it correct that only the KIVI commando can conduct amphibious operations for the Axis during the game?

[Yes.-VAH]

9. Is it also correct that since German transports may not end a turn at sea, then they may not disembark forces at a beach hex?

[Yes.-VAH]

10. What happens if the number of REs of code-T air units equals or exceeds the number of REs of infantry?

[Treat as Full ATEC if the ground units are Full ATEC or ATEC neutral, otherwise treat as 112 ATEC ignoring excess code-T REs.-VAH]

Correction [from # 30]

1. On page 35 of TEM #28, I gave an incorrect answer to question #10 concerning code T aircraft. The correct answer is that if the REs of code T air units (at 3 REs per air unit) equals or exceeds of the defending REs they are supporting (regardless of unit type), then the ATEC proportion is always considered to be Full. -- VAH

11. Do the U-5, U-6, and U-7 markers have a special purpose?

[No.-VAH]

12. Should the rail be connected between 2A:3607 and 2A:3609?

[Yes.-VAH]

13. We had problems understanding what's going on when aircraft fly from one weather zone to another, or when the weather changes while they are still airborne flying DAS or naval-air patrol.

[For me, the easiest way to explain this is in terms of the weather itself. The reason bombing strengths are halved in poor weather is because the poor weather is minimizing the number of sorties flown as well as increasing the difficulty in finding the target. I believe that Europa has chosen the simplest methodology here by only considering the weather at the target. To consider the weather at the take-off airbase, the weather at the target, and the weather at the landing airbase could get extremely complicated. And I believe that all that fuss would have very little effect other than increased frustration. I much prefer Europa's simplified approach in this particular instance.-VAH]

14. The massed effect of German RR artillery seems too powerful. Are there, or should there be, restrictions on the use of RR artillery?

[I don't agree with your assessment. Both Leningrad and Sevastopol were severely pounded historically by German RR artillery. I do believe that the Germans historically tended to spread their RR guns out among the various Army Groups, but I see no reason to require players to do it. The Soviets are quite capable in their own right of developing effective countermeasures to German RR artillery.-VAH]

15. The Axis always get to go first when the weather changes, which seems to favor them. Is there any way to mitigate this?

[Yes, it does favor the Axis-a lot. But it has been my experience that between two well-matched opponents, the Axis needs all the help it can get (that doesn't necessarily make it right, but given the sequence of play, somebody has to move first and in Europa that is the Germans). Further, I've seen more games won or lost due to weather rolls than from any other cause. Maybe in a future issue PH tell you what we here in Austin have done to minimize the balance-shifting effects of weather rolls.-VAH]

16. We propose that any hex containing a division gets (non-additive) 1 AA point.

[This is a level of detail that would seem to have little impact on the game (which might explain why it wasn't included in the original design). What's more, I find it a little hard to justify a Soviet 2-4 militia XX having an intrinsic AA point when it is alone in a hex. Where do you draw the line?- VAH]

17. What happens to factory upgrades when a factory is captured (as happened in our game at Stalingrad)?

[Since no Soviet factory can be upgraded beyond a multiple of 2, any upgrade called for by the OB that has no factory to apply it to would be ignored (i.e., lost).-VAH]

18. Does the -1 per 5-hex rule apply to Soviet transports while staging?

[No. Staging is a separate mission. Further, for those of you who might not already know it, since staging is its own mission (and therefore separate from all other missions), it is not an air- transport mission. This means that you may not carry cargo while staging. That would be an air-transport mission, and staging is a staging mission, not an air-transport mission.- VAH]

19. Why do the Soviets get only three c/m divisions with a movement allowance of 10? And what do those divisions have that the Soviets can never again put into the field?

[More trucks maybe? To be honest, I simply don't know. However, in conversations with Charles Sharp during the past year or so, he indicates that he can find no justification for any 10-factor movement allowances among Soviet units. So, it is conceivable that when the FITE/SE revision is done, those 5-10s will become 5-8s.-VAH]

Alan B. Conrad, Illinois

I would like to present my perspective on the magazine and the Europa system as I and others in this area see it. We believe that Michael Tonks's letter in TEM#17 has some validity to it. This is because we see some truths there that you might not be fully aware of.

Now, I am not referring to his inane charges of quick buck" or that GDW/GRD "owes" anybody. Those of us who know you knows that none of that has any shred of truth. The history of Europa and the need to republish games doesn't bother most of us. It also seems clear that Mike doesn't know any of you, the game's history, or even SPI for that matter (since it was not quick-buck but bad organization that did them in). But that is another story. No, what I want to address is this: we want Second Front, we want it done right, and we want it done as soon as possible.

The points Winston made in his rebuttal are not lost on us. The role BF played in getting GRD "on line" might have been crucial. But 1, for one, have been afraid that these smaller projects might be stealing capital away from the larger projects. Also, I find Winston's claim that smaller games are needed because their smaller size and price could attract new gamers to Europa is not necessarily true. If a new player starts with BF, or FTF, will that turn him on to the system? I claim it won't because those are not "fun" (i.e., well-balanced) games. Walking over the Poles or Yugoslavs may not get players excited about getting into the Europa system. Remember that the start of the Europa series was DNO. We started big, not little.

We recognize that the holes in the maps have to be filled, and when there are valid games to go along that's fine. Even Near East was acceptable because we knew that the maps and counters were needed for the long haul. What we need and what we want now, though, is SF. We need the other side of Europe to balance against the East to gain perspective on the whole picture. We fear that all the effort put into Finland and Spain just delayed the needed work. Here, we fear that SF won't make it out for Origins-again.

And remember that we were expecting it to be available last Christmas, and last Origins, and so on all the way back to Christmas 1989. I remember John Astell telling us at previous conventions that that was when we should expect it. I am not really interested with whatever reasons (good or poor) that made those predictions false. But I, and others, hope that at this point further side projects don't hold up what we want. As always, the usual "do it right" still holds. But please do it.

Eventually, all the old games must be re-issued, or many players won't have a Europe to play on. But please focus on the necessary problems and fill in the little ones later. The Spanish Civil War may never fit into Europa, and the Czech-38 game can only have validity after Grand Europa is done considering all the political rules that will be needed. If small games are needed to attract beginners, then I suggest that Narvik would be best to fill that need. Already a good game, and it does need to be reprinted doesn't it?

Lastly, I want to comment on the magazine. I look forward to every issue, but I'm concerned about the amount of "filler" that shows up so much. Examples: several pages of charts where the most important ones are misprinted; page after page of Facts Behind the Counters (are folks really interested in this stuff?); and then there was Supermarina. That was potentially valuable, but 32 pages worth of material that was nearly impossible to figure out? Was it worth putting into the magazine in this fashion? I could continue, but my diatribe has gone on long enough. Let's save it for another time.

[Well, Alan, I can only say that I hope the more recent issues have been more to your liking. I would be out of line if / commented on matters of GRD game-publishing policy. Hopefully, you'll find the answers to your concerns about SF elsewhere in this issue.-VAH]

Michael Tonks, Australia

In 1981, I came across a game called Western Desert. The box art didn't impress me, but it was a game I was interested in. The company that made it was Game Designers Workshop. That name conjured visions of a keen group of men working feverishly on wargames; flashy box art didn't matter, it was what was inside the box that counted. I bought the game.

Within hours after opening it up, I knew I had what I wanted, and Wow!, there were other titles available using the same scale and rules system. What's more, these guys were going to do all of WW II in Europe and link it all up into one massive game. I was elated.

As I started to build my Europa collection, I was comforted by GDW's claim that planned obsolescence was not their style. However, small changes were necessary for the system to grow. That's fine, I thought, they're not changing the maps or counters, just minor changes to suit each particular game.

When I bought FitE, I changed from an avid Europa player to a fanatic. Europa was my #1 game. SE fueled my fire. S&P and NE were not real games they said, just more material for GE. Great, I thought, these guys are really serious (what a sucker).

By 1989, I owned every Europa game except TFH and Narvik. Then I heard that GDW was giving up on Europa. To me, that was a shattering letdown. But then I heard that another company, GRD, was going to take Europa and finish the series. I was greatly relieved.

I then became a member of the Pacific Europa Players and subscribed to TEM. For me, this was great because I discovered others out there just as faithful to the system as I was, some even more so.

I hope this explains why I'm so hostile towards GDW. It does not matter what excuses you make for them, the fact is that they sold me games under a false pretense. They lied and I seriously doubt if I will ever buy another GDW game.

Mr. Hamilton, I did appreciate your reply to my first letter and it did pacify me somewhat. But not completely. You are correct when you say that GRD doesn't owe me anything, they don't. But you are wrong when you say that my complaint was a baseless complaint.

You pointed out that you've poured thousands of dollars into the system. My hat's off to you. I certainly couldn't afford to do that. However, my investment in Europa is more than several hundred dollars. Considering that games here in Australia are more expensive than in the USA, the fact that I've had all my maps laminated and a custom table built to play on, and the 50 or so tackle boxes I've bought to store all my counters in, my investment comes to over $1,000. This might not seem like a lot to you, but it is to me.

You claim that you are not holding SF hostage until you sell your smaller games. But if we examine this closely, we may find that SF is indeed being held hostage by GRD's lack of capital. You claimed that if your updated titles sold well enough, then your ongoing projects could be funded (by this I hope you meant SF and GE). Surely you are not working on Pacific games before completing SF, are you?!

Thus, from what I can see, GRD is indeed after quick money, although the cause is a good one. So why didn't you just tell me this in the first place? Although I understand your situation, I will not buy updated Europa games until you assure me that I won't have to buy them again after GE is done. I would rather wait for SF, or even pay for SF in advance if you are so financially stricken.

Finally, thank you for your reply to my letter. I really do appreciate what you are doing. I just want to say I believe that some day you are going to have to say "that's it, the rules are complete", because GE is like a giant puzzle with lots of pieces and they all have to fit together eventually.

[I'm troubled by some of Michael's wording. Someone once said (and I paraphrase) that the source of most human conflict centers on questions of semantics. In his letter, Michael makes several statements in the name of fact: that GDW sold games under false pretense and lied, and that GRD is holding SF "hostage" I claim that these are not facts, but are instead opinions.

Further, even as opinions they are not logically sound. If a company has a good idea but, through a series of managerial/personnel changes, cannot (or will not) complete a project as conceived, I claim that this is not premeditated deception, but just life in the real world. I believe as strongly as Michael, but in the opposite direction-namely, that GDW really did intend, in good faith, to do exactly what they set out to do. I believe that they were serious in their desire to produce GE, but for one reason or another (as so often happens in the real world) it just didn't work out that way.

I also believe that if Michael wants to believe that he was somehow on the receiving end of some deliberate conspiracy of deception and lies, then he certainly can. But to state such beliefs as facts can only lead to conflict and confusion.

As for SF being a "hostage", I claim that Michael's argument makes no logical sense. SF is, in many ways, the most complicated undertaking I'm aware of that has ever been attempted in the wargaming industry. So many major combatants, so many conflicting accounts and data to be sorted through, the extraordinarily intricate interplay between ground, air, and naval forces on a continental scale, and all of this to be put into a single comprehensive package that won't fall apart when you play it. And it has to be done in fragments by various people all over the country on a part- time basis (none of us at GRD makes any money to speak of on Europa, we all need day jobs to survive), then coordinated through John Astell (again, on a part-time basis).

So, the scenario is this: I come home after working all day, often tired, often mentally drained; I then rest a bit and get a bite to eat; then I go to work on Europa; and I can't forget about my friends and loved ones either. If anyone's a hostage, it's we fools who would dearly love to get SF completed and off our backs. We are fully aware that SF is taking an immense amount of time and effort to complete because we're the ones expending it. If I could work full time on Europa, I would (and I think many others on the GRD staff would, too). What possible motive could I have in holding SF hostage? Would I make more money? Hell, I make next to nothing on Europa as it is. Is it in GRD's interest to continue having the Europa community concerned over the delays we've experienced in producing SF? If you think that it might be, then I suggest that you don't know much about wise business practices.

In the final analysis, however, all I can do is say that I believe that we are doing the best we can and as quickly as we can. It's up to you to decide whether you believe me (or Winston, or John, or Rick, etc.), and what you'll do once you've made your decision.-VAH]

Chuck Minshew, Texas

While reading TEM #14, I concluded that John Astell's comments concerning construction units and heavy equipment were somewhat contradictory (for instance, compared to his comments about motorcycle troops). Did other countries really air transport their construction units (which is the real point to all this heavy-equipment commentary to begin with)? And if they did, was it the norm or the exception?

As an Army veteran, I clearly recall the large numbers of vehicles our divisional engineers had. I remember talking with a lieutenant of engineers and was amazed to learn that his company had more vehicles than my entire artillery battalion. This led me to investigate American engineering forces during WW II.

My sources were limited, so I focused on the Tunisian campaign since Torch was the only Europa game containing American Army units. What were the corps- and army-level US engineering assets doing in that campaign? My research indicated that they built, maintained, and repaired roads, airfields, railroads, and bases. By bases, I mean ports, warehouses, waterpoints, fuel storage facilities, and pipelines needed to move and store the logistics apparatus of a modern army.

Now, aside from repairing enemy bomb damage, and building forts and airfields, what do Europa engineers do? Europa has no provision (i.e., need) for road maintenance or base construction. (Anyone who has seen the damage an armored division does to even an improved road should understand how important this work is. More, I doubt that even undamaged ports are capable of immediately operating at full capacity without extensive engineering improvements.)

[Your comments about the non-existence of crucial engineering tasks like road and base maintenance are well taken. However, I wonder if the American way was the only way. I believe that Europa does take these aspects into account by giving the Americans longer supply lines and other little perks that ease their way considerably compared to their less-mechanized brethren. I further believe that Europa factors such rear-area assets directly into the system without having to show actual counters. In my few discussions with John on the subject, he's told me that a large number of German engineering assets don't show up on the East Front precisely because they are already factored into the game at the background level doing the sorts of background jobs you discussed.-VAH]

Anybody who has played Torch more than once knows the answer to the above question. All excess engineers are used in combat. Why? Because in Europa terms they make excellent infantry and there is no requirement for them to perform their engineering functions. Is this historical?

First, my research indicates that they were not the excellent infantry they are in Europa (remember that we are talking about high-level engineering assets). The US Official History states that they were 11 underarmed and improperly trained infantry." Evidently, this was a widely held opinion because only the 19th Engineers were used in combat in Tunisia, and then only during the emergency at Kasserine (in Europa terms, about 1/3 of a turn). II Corps later got the 20th and 175th Engineers, but road maintenance seems to have been their only duty. Aside from organic, divisional combatengineers, no other engineers were at or near the front in Tunisia. So where were all the others? The 36th and 540th remained in Morocco, the 345th built a pipeline from Casablanca to Marrakech, and others built and maintained bases and airfields in Algeria.

[I know as little as you concerning the reasons behind Europa combat-engineer ratings, but I will hazard some speculation. First, I do believe that Europa does properly distinguish between combat and construction units. Pure construction units have zero attack factors regardless of their size. Combat engineers have relatively large attack factors, but are unsupported. I believe that their ratings are due as much to specialized combat equipment like flamethrowers and explosives as anything else. Also, some combat engineers, like the Soviets, have small attack factors. Further, it has been my experience (on the East Front and the SF playtest) that even combat engineers spend much of their time in the rear building facilities. The limitations on replacing these specialists also regularly affect decisions to expend these troops in combat. Further, the actual combat factors of these units is not what makes them useful in battle, rather it's their ability to influence combat die rolls. Even the "little" 1-2-6 Soviet engineers are formidable when used to assault the forts and cities that they were trained to.-VAH]

I've been unable to find any evidence supporting the amazing airmobility Europa engineers are given. In North Africa, the US Army experimented with airmobile engineer companies, but found that the equipment available was unable to do their assigned mission of forward-airfield preparation, so the idea was dropped. Even in airborne operations in the ETO, the glider-borne engineer battalions had limited repair, and virtually no construction, capability with their bantam-weight machinery. Permanent tasks had to be done using standard construction machinery brought overland after linkup.

Next, I don't agree with John's assessment that no construction of consequence can be performed without skilled construction troops to oversee the work. Without heavy equipment, engineers can do no more than anyone else using hand tools. As an infantryman and artilleryman, I have emplaced mines, dug fighting positions, strung concertina, filled sandbags, and used explosives to create and remove obstacles. This work was rarely done under the supervision of anyone from Division engineers, and never (as I recall) from Corps.

And aside from these activities, I don't know what construction (not combat/assault) functions engineers could perform without their earth-moving equipment and tons of supplies. If one accepts the argument that little permanent construction can be done without specialized heavy equipment, then it follows that such construction units should not be airmobile.

[After re-reading John's comments in TEM #14, it seemed to me that he was fairly clear as to why he didn't give construction units heavy equipment. You've stated that American engineers had all sorts of heavy machinery that they were dependent on when building permanent facilities like forts and airfields.

But, here again, I wonder if the American way was the only way. I doubt if the Russians or the Chinese had access to the same scale of heavy machinery to build the Kursk fortifications or B-29 airfields. The Japanese built bunkers out of coconut trees and sand that withstood 16" battleship shells. I think what it comes down to is an issue of function. If a facility can perform its function to some nominal standard, then (as far as I can tell) it is included at the Europa scale, regardless as to exactly how it got built.

Is there a functional difference between using 50,000 women and children to build antitank ditches outside Moscow (with engineers as supervisors) and 2,000 American construction engineers performing the same mission using bulldozers and concrete mixers? I believe that just because Americans are so attached to all their wonderful toys, it doesn't prevent them from performing their mission if local resources are available.

Such local resources usually take the form of volunteer manpower and material drawn from the surrounding countryside. In the desert, I conjecture that such manpower (and maybe local material) was scarce-hence the need for specialized equipment and materials from the rear. So, although maybe the Americans were more efficient when they had all their machinery I think that's one reason American construction units are given more movement points to work with than other nations), I believe that John's concept that engineering skill and expertise is air- transportable remains valid.

Further, I agree with your comments on the ability of units to perform certain engineering tasks without engineering assistance. However, I believe that Europa already accounts for this within the basic structure of the ground CRT. By this, I mean that a certain level of defensive preparation is already assumed by the CRT. I think that it is the extra level of preparation (hardened weapon positions, bunkers, antitank defenses, etc.) that Europa engineers are needed to provide.-VAH]

I've experimented with a number of rules to give engineers their historical abilities (as I see them), and would be willing to share them if any of you want to see them. However, house rules aren't official. Perhaps in a future issue John will explain why he's chosen to do Europa engineers the way he has. Maybe we can also get Danny Parker to discuss why he rates engineer regiments as weaker than reduced infantry battalions in Hitler's Last Gamble, whereas these same engineer regiments are often given the combat strength of entire infantry regiments in Europa.

[I would like to see your ideas. On the other hand, I'm not so sure what purpose comparing Hitler's Last Gamble to Europa would serve. Whatever Danny's reasons for rating his engineers the way he did, I would wager that his system mechanics and interrelationships had a lot to do with them. Further, his game deals with the equivalent of one Europa game turn, whereas Europa deals with many Europa game turns. What I mean by all this is that it is possible that Danny's ratings could be exactly right for his game, and maybe Europa's engineer ratings could be right for Europa.- VAH]

Kevin Harris, Canada

After 11 years of mostly solitaire Europa, I finally joined the Europa Association. When I received TEM #14-18, I read them cover to cover before bedtime. I remained awake for hours afterwards simply thinking about what I'd read. I'd never been hit by so many gaming concepts at once. Jay Kaufman was right when he said, "Europa benefits from being in the hands of frothing-at-the-mouth fanatics. For God's sake, keep frothing.

However, I have a request-improve your distribution system! As far as I can tell, when GRD took over from GDW, the stores in my local area couldn't get GRD's material through their wholesalers (and if they have to special mail order, I might as well do it myself). So, unless and until the situation changes, I'll have to mail order through the EPAC in Calgary, Alberta (twice as far from me as Grinnell, Iowa).

[I can't speak for Winston, but at least he has now read about your situation.-VAH]

Anyway, playing solitaire may have blinded me to the possibilities inherent in the rules, but it strikes me that many "slick/sick" tricks are based on unreasonable attitudes of the players using them. Zero-defense artillery receiving a strength 1?! Soviets regauging to standard gauge?! Cases like these really turn me off from the idea of face-to-face play.

[Venturing into the dangerous waters of philosophy, I believe that it is the nature of competition that might be troubling you. Frisbee and "hacky-sack" are two of the only "cooperative" games I know. When people compete, it seems to me that each competitor seeks to gain an edge. Alas, all too often I believe that they look to the rules, rather than improving their actual playing technique, as an "easy" way to give them what they want-a chance to show off how skilledl/clever they are. With that in mind, thd fires of competition often inspire leaps of creativity that (even if, as I believe, are generally intended selfishly) usually never occur to the solitaire gamer. Thus, in my experience, veteran face- to-face gamers will almost always outperform solitaire gamers when in direct competition. However, in my opinion Europa lends itself to solitaire study rather well. I say this because a sizeable portion of the Europa community seems happy as solitaire gamers. So, I guess the point of all this is that you appear to have plenty of company in your opinion.- VAH]

As for the trick based on Rule 7A1, when it says,

... an enemy ZOC is negated for operational rail movement purposes (only) . . . ", I've assumed that what is negated is the stricture on entering or leaving hexes in enemy ZOCs, not the entirety of rule 6A. Have I really been reading this wrong?

[By "entirety" I'm guessing that you mean the MP cost to rail out of or through hexes in enemy ZOCs. As I indicated above, rules "lawyers" are always looking for a loophole. John Astell has spent years going over each of Europa's rules word by word in an attempt to minimize those loopholes. In this case, I am as certain as I can be that "negated" means negated in every sense. So, yes, you have been interpreting this rule incorrectly. MP costs do not have to be paid by units op-railing out of or through enemy ZOCs.- VAH]

Also, using position AA to cover such rail movement is pretty sick to me. It makes more sense to me to allow only units with defense strengths greater than zero to do this (e.g., small units are unlikely to prevent a panzer corps from interfering with the entraining procedure). As a suggestion, replace "friendly unit" in Rule 7A1, para 2, sentence 2 with "sufficient friendly forces". Then insert the sentence: "Friendly forces are considered sufficient if no adjacent enemy stack can generate overrun odds against it. (Oh well, too complex I suppose ... )

[First, some definitions. "Sick" means illegal, "slick" means legal (as well as creatively clever), and "slimy" means a rule that is legal but feels illegal. This is one of those rules that definitely qualifies as slimy. Even people who use this trick (and I've done it, too) seem to have a guilty feeling when doing it, almost as if they're getting away with something underhanded. It also seems to be unanimously unpopular. Indeed, I'm not aware of any player who likes this rule as written. So, far from being too complex, I think that many groups around the country have already adopted house rules similar to the one you propose, precisely due to the slimy feel of the rule as written. And, in fact, this situation was officially remedied in First to Fight and A Winter War.-VAH]

Concerning the addition of the "'I" column to the bombing table, sorry, but I don't like it. It seems to me that it will mostly help 0-TBF fighters bomb air units and 1-TBF air units bomb anything. Should they really have this capability? It doesn't seem right to me.

[With the "24" column, there is a 33% chance of getting a hit. It has been argued for years that there should be an intermediate result (ie., 16% chance). The only way to do this was to introduce a "1" column since reducing the hit probability on the "24" column not only seemed too drastic, but would also probably entail re-rating many air units' bombing strengths.

As for the question, "should" low-strength air units have this capability, I can only say that, yes, in my opinion they should.-VAH]

As far as I'm concerned, Grand Europa should start in 1939 (perhaps as early as 1938, but certainly not later than 1939). Yes, include scenarios for later years, but they will be, by their very nature, battle scenarios with relatively little political impact. By starting GE in 1940, or later, we will lose the fun of playing the smaller nations-and thus, a big part of Europa's appeal and flavor (to me, at least).

The political game could easily add an exciting element of uncertainty to the battle games, at least on the strategic level, but only if starting early. Starting later only gives more options to the East Front fanatics.

[Being one of those East Front fanatics, I take a little (but only a little) offense. As I understand it, the reason GE is going to start in July 1943 is because that seems to be the best time to link the basic core Europa rules package between East and West. As more complicated political, economic, and strategic modules are completed, the start date of GE will be progressively back-dated. As far as I know, GE is intended (in its final form) to begin in 1939 as you desire.-VAH]

Again, thanks. Keep up the good work! And last, I ask you to not take Michael Tonks too seriously. I've waited this long for Second Front, I can afford to wait a little longer.

James Snyder, Ohio

Conversations I've read on GEnie indicate that most programmers only hope for a version of play-by-electronic- mail, or PBEM. My concern is that Europa has been built on the premise that it is the best game available. I would consider doing less in computerizing the game as High Treason!

What is needed is not discussions on whether to do a game or a PBEM aid, but what the standards for both should be. Even if we start small and discuss the smaller games and what should be done to put them on computer, standards are where we should begin. I propose to write the standards and then the programs to computerize Europa.

The first issue is quality. If we maintain the position that Europa is the best of the monster games, the computer versions should support that position. We physically cannot have high enough quality graphics to label units and also to have it run on low-end machines. I also cannot imagine Europa as generic units without unit designations and the full array of counter types. For marketing purposes, we would love to see everyone's PC capable of running the software, but by default, this project will take years of careful programming and requires a lot of memory and graphics ability, anyway. By the time these programs hit the market, technology will have advanced and the systems capable of doing something of this quality will be more affordable.

I propose to use 32 bit addresses, which would limit this to what are considered 'high-end machines' right now, the Macintosh lici and Power PC, and the IBM clones using the true 80386, 80486, and 90586 buses. The graphics would be the last part of the programs done and would utilize the highest resolution available at release time.

The second issue is portability. I propose to have files from the programs be exchangeable between a networked server on UNIX (like GEnie), IBM clones, and Macintosh computers. As a true artificialintelligence system is worked out, it could be retro-fitted to this program by acting as the receiver of the files. If a player wanted to run concurrent games representing regions or fronts, units could be passed from one game to the next using conventional transportation rules in files that would be opened when you opened the next game. This would help automate reinforcement arrivals and reserve transfers. Also, designing the game to run on the Power PC platform will open abilities for most newer PCs.

The third issue is content, or "what is computer Europa?" One of the abilities I would like to see would be the copying of files being currently used in an active game for the purpose of 'what-iffing'. Since the computer could randomly generate numbers, a player could play each side in turn to work out speculative plans. Since this amounts to the 'home team' advantage that a Europa board game host currently has, it helps level the playing field.

I also would like to see sound and graphics effects introduced. If a bridge is being bombed, you should be able to enjoy the whistling of bombs and the crump of explosions. Blown bridges, sunk ships and air-to-air combat could have small animated sequences as cameos.

If anyone has played Stratego by Accolade, they will understand what I mean when I talk about an automatic return from an illegal move. Even an Europa illiterate could move units and fight if the mechanics were transparent and the written rules were for intelligent play. Paths a particular unit follows could be traced by a dotted arrow in gray while the unit was actively selected. If a unit was reselected after being moved, a pop-up balloon would offer the option to totally redo that unit's move.

To check a stack for contents, one could double-click a mouse or enter a command, and spread the counters of a stack across the screen. Clicking on one counter would activate it for moving or commands. Double-clicking that unit would bring up a window detailing available options.

Attacks would have a small window pop up with the odds, terrain and weather effects, AEC, etc., and the choice to attach air, naval support, etc. Defenders would be offered the same options with the new rules for area defensive support. As air was committed, escorts and interceptors would be assigned per battle, slightly different from the board game.

Since the file would not be built and sent until the entire side was done moving, no one result could affect movement or commitment of forces for another. A process of file building would take place with multiple transfers of the same file between players. Each air mission would require sequential air commitment from the defensive player. Ground or sea combats could be sequenced to take advantage of expected victories.

When a game between two players was initiated, the computer would assign an identifying number to each game, each half-turn file, and each log-on. To continue playing a game started at another sitting, the computer would test for matching identifiers before commencing. Files could be saved when each computer logged off and the same game recommenced by opening that file instead of the game. In multiple player games run on GEnie, a missing player file could be rebuilt and reassigned to a new player if a player failed to continue at the proper time. Unique passwords for each player could prevent side-switching.

I admit that I have been rambling, but I am proposing this to elicit responses of what others dream of including in a computer Europa program. I am defining what can be eventually established as standards for multiple computer games representing the smaller games, pieces of the Eastern Front, or networked Grand Europa on GEnie or other servers. I am challenging everyone to dare to dream. We will address problems once a dream is firmly established, but not before.

[It might turn out that actually playing Grand Europa will be most easily done using teams linked throughout the country (world?) electronically. In that event, computerizing Europa would be necessary. The question then becomes, who has the time, expertise, and Europa experience to put Europa on computer within the next 5-10 years? James, could it be you? -VAH]

Alan Phillson, Scotland

I never saw John Astell's name mentioned in the development of Supermarina. Has he delegated naval-system development to "others", and, if so, what is his opinion concerning the current state of the Europa naval system? FTF and BF naval units still use the original system. Are they destined for the scrap heap without ever having been used? I would personally like to see the same level of discussion about the naval system as is given to the air system in the pages of TEM.

[Once again I head into dangerous waters. Supermarina was an independent project and John was not involved in any part of it. As for his opinion, I would be way out of line to speak for him, but our opinion is that he recognizes the need for an official naval system, but has been unable to direct his full attention to it because of other pressing demands on his time. As for your current naval counters, don't toss them out yet! They are almost certainly not destined for the scrap heap. One of the reasons the air system has been getting more print lately is because it currently has a higher development priority for Second Front. When John focuses on naval matters, I can assure you that naval discussions will not be neglected in the magazine.- VAH]

I received TEM #21-23 last May and noticed that since Supermarina was published in TEM #17 and #20, very little space has been devoted to its problems or possible solutions. If this situation continues, it seems likely to me that all future Europa games will be published with abstracted naval systems.

[Here again, my guess is that naval systems will probably tend to be abstracted in Europa games until John can concentrate fully on the final form of Europa's naval system.-VAH]

As I see it, at present we have naval rules: as published in TFH; by A.E. Goodwin in ETO #34; presented in David Berry's Bro Rules; and Supermarina and Son of Supermarina. All of them relate broadly to each other and none of them appear to be acceptable to the majority of Europa players since none of them (except the system in TFH) have found their way into an official Europa game. The problem as I see it, is that most players are land oriented and object to additional playing time being taken up by a "complete" naval phase. Existing naval systems are seen as too tactical and do not blend well with either the established sequence of play or the air system. Nor does the .. add-on module" idea work very well in a game where naval operations were originally highly abstracted (DNOIUNT).

The solution seems to me to be a blend of the various systems mentioned above, along with a quick, "simple" system written into the basic rules.

[The most elegant (and most popular) solution I've seen to date was that presented by Dean Brooks in his article on sea zones in TEM #25.-VAH]

On another subject, I've occasionally read comments in TEM about prices being too high. Please spare a thought for we Europa poor relations abroad who, by the time retailers and carriers have added their costs, pay up to 40- 50% more, and in general are treated as second-class Europa citizens (i.e., can't join the Association, don't qualify for freebies, and are behind in current Europa events).

[Sorry, but I have no idea how to respond to you here. Maybe Winston will.-VAH]

Jess L. Hanson, South Dakota

Thank you for turning on the light. For many years I have enjoyed the Europa series, but only recently did I learn that there was an entire society devoted to it. So, as one of the newest Europa Association members, I have a few questions.

1. What is the difference between GDW's Scorched Earth and GRD's Scorched Earth 1.5?

[Both versions use the exact same maps, charts, and rules. GRD's version 1.5 uses counters produced by a different company that corrected mistakes in the earlier version. However, it has been suggested that the version 1.5 counters don't look as good.-VAH]

2. What is The Urals and how can it enhance FITE/SE?

[The Urals provides two additional maps covering the Urals Military District. It also contains an updated Soviet OB, and several rules changes from FITE/SE; the most important of which changes the way airdropped units affects supply lines. I personally think that the best feature of The Urals is the 1943 Scenario.-VAH]

3. What are all these Europa Play Aids kits for, anyway?

[For me, the main reason to own these kits is the set of photo-reduced maps that come with each kit. These reduced maps are great for making copies used for planning purposes. I've found them invaluable over the years. So much so that I would say they are a must for the serious East Front gamer. Unfortunately, most are out of print! -VAH]

4. Is your Fire in the East reprint any different from my GDW version?

[No, they are exactly the same.-VAH]

5. Can I get replacement counters for my old Europa counters or do I have to buy a complete new game?

[Hopefully, you've seen the ad for the GRD parts clearance in TEM #27. As far as I know, that's your last chance to get parts separate from Europa games.-VAH]

6. I should mention that I'm something of a naval buff. Can I get complete naval OBs for Germany, Britain, the USSR, and the USA?

[My guess is that somebody out there can help you with this, but I don't know who or where they are. Perhaps somebody will submit the fruits of their research for publication in a future issue of TEM.-VAH]

Charles Jehlen, Texas

The view from my observation bunker is that ants and air units are taking over Europa. After attending Europafest II, talking to playtesters involved with SF, following the controversies and comments in print (no magazine surpasses yours), and continuing to play many Europa games, I present the following proposals designed to streamline several aspects of the Europa system.

Goal #1 - reduce the amount of time it takes to play the air system while maintaining the flavor of the original. First the AA Table. I see it as highly desirable to have a single AA dice roll resolve the AA fire against an entire air stack in a given hex. Table 1 on page 42 illustrates what I have in mind. The table results are applied from left to right: killed, aborted, returned. To use existing AA modifiers, roll for affected units separately placing all +1s together, all +2s together, etc.

When implementing results, players must use printed bombing strengths and the minimum number of units to achieve the losses in bombing factors. If there is a remainder of extra losses, then carry it over to the next result to the right (ignoring excess return losses). Players alternate choosing affected units with the owning player choosing first. Example: Bombing a German port containing 17 AA points are two IL-4s (4 SBFs each), two Pe-2s (3 TBFs each), one Pe-8 (8 SBF), and two IL-2s (3 TBF each), for a total of 28 bombing factors. The German player rolls a 3 with his AA dice roll, for a "6, 33, 31" result which means 6% killed, 33% aborted, and 31% returned for the IL-2s and Pe-2s; and is modified to a 4 (+1 vs. type B) for a "0, 33, 31" result against the Pe-8 and IL-4s.

Starting with the Pe-2s and IL-2s: 6% of 12 TBFs rounds to 1, 33% of 12 TBFs is 4, and 31% of 12 TBFs rounds to 4. Since 1 is less than the TBF of either a Pe-2 or IL-2 (3 each) no kill is taken and the remainder is carried to the aborts (now 5). Since 5 is greater than the TBF of either type, the owning (Soviet) player chooses first and aborts an IL-2, which leaves a remainder of 2 to be carried to the returns (now 6) since it is less than the TBF of either type.

The German player chooses next, and returns a Pe-2 leaving a remainder of 3 which means that the Soviet player must return either the last Pe-2 or IL-2, he chooses the IL-2, which leaves a remainder of 0. Moving on to the bombers, 33% of 16 SBFs rounds to 5, and 31% of 16 SBFs rounds to 5. The Soviet player chooses first and must abort an IL-4 (SBF of 4) which leaves a remainder of 1 to be carried over to the return result (now 6). The German player then returns the other IL-4 and the remaining 2 return losses are ignored since they are less than the SBF of the Pe-8. The AA fire is resolved quickly (one IL-2 and one IL-4 aborted, and one IL-4, one Pe-2, and one IL-2 returned, leaving one Pe-8 and one Pe-2 to carry out the port attack) and play moves on.

Now, the Bombing Table. I propose that this table be done away with entirely. Instead, one hit is automatically achieved for each 6 bombing strength points delivered at the target. Type D air units have their bomb strengths doubled and type HB have theirs halved for this procedure. Roll one die for all remaining factors (combined), where each such factor has a cumulative 1/6 chance for an additional hit. Example: Several HBs deliver 34 strategic bombing factors against a port. This is halved to 17 due to HBs. Thus, the port suffers 2 automatic hits and a 5/6 chance for a third.

Next, there must be some way to simplify air combat along the lines suggested above to end the time-consuming amount of air-combat die rolling (i.e., somehow total attacking air-combat factors and determine efficiency of K, A, R by a die roll as was done with my proposed AA Table). Perhaps applying this idea to the air game would be the solution to the micro airgame overwhelming macro Europa.

[it turns out that Charles's complaints concerning the AA, bombing, and air-combat tables are being seriously looked into by the Europa development team. There is a distinct possibility that some form of "minimum dice-roll" tables could be included in Second Front as options for those players inclined to use them.-VAH]

Goal #2 - to restore the scope of Europa to division- level operations by emphasizing the relationship between support- and combat-arms units. I suggest that the word "combat" be removed from "combat/motorized" on the Unit Identification Chart. The word "motorized" would continue to refer to units with exploitation ability under the rules as written. The word "combat" would then specifically refer to units of the combat arms-those that have the ability to take and control ground. Combat units (all types not described below as support arms). Combat units could accept support from any of the four support arms. The four support arms would be: artillery (as currently listed on the UIC), engineer (all types with the word "engineer" in their name as well as flame/engineer tanks), anti-aircraft (light or heavy, but not position AA), anti-tank (all types containing the symbol).

One RE of combat units is required to gain control (ownership) of a hex. One RE of combat units can take support from one RE of each of the four support types above. All support units in excess of this 1-to-1 ratio (combat-to- support) have a combat strength of 1/2 per RE.

Using this proposal still permits the formation of task forces to take advantage of special situations, but they must be based on the combat arm. A 1945 panzer cadre can accept full support from one RE each of artillery, engineers, antitank, and antiaircraft units to form a "mini-division" with a lot of punch, but no ZOC. Also, my proposal avoids cases where single support units put entire army groups out of supply, or where a 2-3-8 artillery III stacked with a 1-8 AA III has the same combat power as a small division. Using my idea, that stack would defend with a defense strength of 1 rather than 4. 1 claim that without a combat unit to protect them, support forces should be in trouble.

[Two themes are becoming apparent to me the more letters I read. First, it appears that many of you are not satisfied with the way Europa handles logistics (especially the way supply lines are traced and cut).

Second, it seems that some of you want rules that more "realistically" reflect the concept of "combined arms". I believe that Europa has traditionally stressed simplicity and playability. More detailed logistics rules will take more time to play. Also, many players don't want to be bothered with detailed logistics and would be turned off by such a system. However, perhaps a more detailed logistics system could be developed as an option for those players inclined to use it.

Adding more detail to unit functions and capabilities could also result in increased time overhead. More, defining just what those capabilities and interrelationships would be might be an additional source of controversy and disagreement. For instance, where in your proposal do police, security, border, punitive, etc. units fit in?

All in all, however, your ideas appeal to me, but I'm one of those players that prefers a little extra detail as long as it provides a more authentic "feel" (I also sometimes believe that my position is the minority position).-VAH]

Goal #3 - to fill in some gaps concerning unit abilities and encourage adoption of some new concepts. First, I propose giving combat engineers special abilities for river assaults. I would treat them as self-supported and give them a +1 modifier when the RE ratio is 1/7 or more (like attacking forts or major cities). I would also allow engineers to assist other units across rivers. In this case, for each engineer that spends its entire movement allowance adjacent to the crossing (and not next to an enemy combat unit) deduct 1 MP from the crossing cost for other units, up to a maximum of 2 MPs reduced. Thus, even a major river could be "tamed" by the work of 2 engineer REs spending their turn building and maintaining pontoon/treadway bridges or ferries.

Also, in Torch (or other games requiring port usage), require that 1 engineer RE spend its turn in port to fully use the port's capacity. This would reflect the effort needed to maintain the logistics infrastructure in a battle zone.

[I wonder if you know Chuck Minshew. Anyway, one of the things I like about Europa is the ease with which it lends itself to personal customization. Here again, although your ideas appeal to me, I'm not sure how popular they might be to the rest of the Europa community. What do the rest of you think?-VAH]

Adopt Duane Romfoe's movement rules with the proviso that non-motorized units may not advance after combat (to prevent march-rate anomalies).

[My main complaint against Duane's movement rules is that they do not take Europa's logistics rules into account. I do not believe that your logistics base should be allowed to advance at the rate Duane's movement rates would allow territory to be oaptured.-VAH]

Tie the movement-point costs to destroy facilities to the RE size, as well as any special abilities, of the destroying unit.

[This concept was adopted as an optional rule in A Winter War. Maybe it will extend to other Europa games as well.-VAH]

The above proposals are intended to stimulate discussion and critical thinking. With the air and ant situation stretching the bounds of playability in SF, it might be time to reconsider these two specific aspects and their overall relationships in Europa. Based on bomb tonnage, I believe that one B-17 unit should hit harder than two Baltimores. Yet since Europa currently allows the two Baltimores two separate bombing rolls, the Baltimores have the possibility of hitting twice as hard as the B-17.

My proposal would base bombing results on total bombing strength delivered rather than on units (i.e., rolls) involved. I favor reducing the amount of die-rolling that tends to make mountains out of molehills (especially in terms of playing time consumed versus the relative importance of the result). I believe that playing skill, and not a hot hand, should determine the results of games. Let's think more and roll less-one hex, one combat, one roll should be our goal.

Lastly, I applaud the scenarios published in your magazine as the best way to attract new players to Europa. Let's take advantage of the SF design process to develop an overall Europa structure that works at both the micro and macro level and can be played in my lifetime. Otherwise, I predict we will become a bunch of greying old men arguing about the relative merits of the FW 190 against the P-51.

Thank you for this opportunity to express my opinions and share my ideas.

Charles Sharp, Washington

There are two major ways to look at the waging of war, which I've divided into the "German" and the "American" schools. The German school looks upon War as a Contest of Wills, the ultimate province of Uncertainty in which, ". . . only that which is simple can succeed, because even the simplest things are very difficult" (von Clauswitz). In other words, War as Art. On the other hand, the American school sees war as a production line, in which if you control all the input of raw materials, you can completely control (and predict) the outcome-victory.

I see several interesting distinctions between these ultimately opposing viewpoints. First, the American School is shared in its essential characteristics by the Soviets, with the result that it has (at least for the last 45 years) been the dominant, and war-winning, school of thought. Second, it is equally the case that the German School has produced some of the most effective military forces, man-for-man, in all of history. Third, these viewpoints relate directly to modern wargaming. It is no accident that the traditional German "Kriegspiel" relied on an expert umpire's judgement for almost all outcomes, whereas the first US version ("The American Kriegspiel" of 1890) provided copious tables of statistics in an effort to predict outcomes mathematically.

Our amateur and commercial wargaming is, naturally, almost entirely based on the American model: we rely on various forms of numerical formulae (combat results tables, attack and defense factors, etc.) to judge the outcomes of military events. Sometimes, I fear, we forget that these are all manufactured and artificial predictors.

There are no attack factors on the battlefield. No general has ever been able to look at his forces and predict precisely how they would fare in combat. It is that deadly uncertainty that makes War the riskiest of all risky businesses. I also believe that's why all but one of all the predictions of the Gulf War in Kuwait were totally inaccurate in degree or kind. Predicting war is not a sure thing.

This presents a very real problem for the wargamer. Assuming that we are at all concerned about recreating historical events (which, to my mind, is the only functional difference between fantasy and other types of wargaming) we must also concern ourselves with how accurate (i.e., useful, sound, applicable, etc.) the mathematical constructs we build our games with are.

Specifically, I want to focus the remainder of my discussion on ground-unit combat factors. On the surface, formulating these factors looks like the easiest part of the equation. After all, isn't the combat effectiveness of a military unit directly related to the numbers of weapons and men in it? Well, no, it isn't. In fact, if you study the accounts of all the major battles fought over the last 150 years, you'll find that the loser actually outnumbered the winner in over half of them. Indeed, if numbers of men and weapons were the only criteria, neither the United States nor Israel would exist as separate nations today--and Iraq would still be occupying Kuwait.

It seems clear that there must be some numerical way to account for the varying effectiveness of men and weapons, and it is here that we enter a labyrinth of numbers, formulae, and opinion. The reason is simple: whatever else it is, War is waged by people, and people are not easily described by mathematics. Thus, we are stuck with a less-than-satisfactory tool, but one for which there is no current substitute (unless, of course, you have an all-knowing, expert umpire handy at all times).

I doubt if there is a wargamer anywhere who has not sat down to make up his own wargame, or variant, and hasn't found himself making up some sort of algorithm to determine Combat Factors. The problem is that, no matter how many variables and input parameters he considers, he cannot be certain that any algorithm is producing usable results for these "combat factors". And the only way currently known to test them is by trial and error (i.e., playtesting them), which, in the case of a game as large and complex as, say, Europa, might leave many of all the myriad input parameters untested or unchecked. The good news is that there is a set of algorithms that can, with minor adjustments, produce unit combat factors for Europa. Also, these algorithms have already been tested in the most exacting way possible-they have been used to accurately predict the outcome of a real conflict.

If you recall, I mentioned above that all but one of the predictions concerning the outcome in Kuwait were totally inaccurate. That one accurate prediction came from Col. T. N. Dupuy (Ret.), of the Historical Evaluation and Research Organization (HERO), who used his Quantified Judgement Model to predict both the outcome and duration (within 24 hours) of the Kuwait war. To me, Col. Dupuy's methodology obviously merited looking into.

Basically, Col. Dupuy and his associates have developed a set of formulas, based on historical data largely taken from WW II, with which they can mathematically determine the outcome of any military conflict. It seems to me that this is precisely what we are trying to do in our wargames. His system is certainly not perfect, there is continual ongoing refinement (gee, much like Europa itself), and many of the factors introduced for airpower, armor effects, weather, and terrain are, frankly, "fudge factors" to match outcomes that don't conform to the formulas. However, Dupuy's algorithms that determine combat factors (his Total Lethality Index) are quite complete, and can be used without direct reference to his other formulas for weather, terrain, etc. They even include parameters that account for the overall superior small-unit effectiveness of the Germans against the British, Americans, and Soviets in 1939-45.

When I began my experiment of producing Europa combat factors using Dupuy's TLI calculations, I was not looking to completely revise all of Europa's unit factors. After all, years of playing and playtesting have shown that, over- all, Europa's factors and game system work very well together. What I wanted was a verified, quantifiable system to provide relative factors for the myriad units in our games. In particular, I had a variety of questions concerning certain Soviet units:

• Do the independent heavy tank regiments of 1942-43 deserve separate counters?
• Are the relative factors of howitzer, Corps, cannon, rocket, mortar, and heavy mortar artillery units correct?
• What are the real combat factors of the pre-war tank divisions in 1941, now that the actual strengths of most of them are available?

I'll come back to these questions later. For now, the TLI formulas account for such factors as: rates of fire, projectile effectiveness, effective range, accuracy, reliability, battlefield mobility, ability to absorb punishment, ammunition supply, speed of fire, and fire control. For the Historical Judgements that the HERO group makes, these are only a small part of the algorithms that include factors for terrain vs. weapons, weather vs. weapons, seasonal and Special factors, and air support. But I didn't have to consider those factors because those are separate aspects of Europa (and I am not seeking to change the terrain effects, AEC, or combat results tables here).

In any event, after figuring up individual weapons factors for all German and Soviet weapons, based either on proving-ground data or "worst-case" data from post-war accounts, I calculated TLIs for various German and Soviet ground units using Tables of Organization or actual strength figures from my sources.

The HERO figure for the relative effectiveness of German over Soviet units was 2.6. That is, a German unit of 100 men was able to inflict the same amount of damage as a Soviet unit of 260 men given the same weapons and equipment. Using this figure without modification would result in 8-6 German infantry divisions facing 3-6 pre-war Soviet rifle divisions, and 1942 Soviet rifle divisions in the 1-6 to 2-6 range. These results did not please me, and are probably not playable except by masochistic Soviets. Europa, specifically the hexographic map representation, provides a "standard" battlefield situation in which units in 2 hexes attack a single hex. Thus, all other things being equal, the basic Europa attack is 2:1. Using this approach, I discovered that when I used a correction factor of 1.3 (half the 2.6 HERO effectiveness factor), the relative German and Soviet factors fell remarkably into line.

[I'm highly suspicious of the across-the-board "minor adjustment" Charles is making here to Dupuy's formulas.-VAH]

First, I used a final and arbitrary divisor of 3,000 to bring TLIs like 19,619 down to a more usable combat factor for a unit. Second, I used the relative TI-Is of crew-served weapons and armor to provide clues as to when a unit's attack and defense factors should be unequal. As a rule, I considered tanks to be twice as good when attacking than when defending, while a unit in which over half a unit's men were manning heavy support weapons no heavier than medium mortars was downgraded on the attack. Cavalry and airborne troops provided two more special cases.

Both unit types are very light in firepower compared to "regular" infantry or motorized forces. Their combat effectiveness is based, rather, on their "shock effect" derived from superior battlefield mobility (cavalry) or their high morale and assault training (airborne). In both cases I chose to add a point to their attack factors to reflect the fact that these troops can, as a rule, assault better than they can defend.

Finally, after about 50 hours with my calculator and reference sources, I came up with combat factors for the most important German units as well as the majority of Soviet units organized during the war. I also came up with answers to those questions I'd asked previously:

• No. The independent heavy tank regiments don't deserve separate counters. They only have 2877 TLI, which reduces to an attack factor of 1. The only way to justify separate counters would be to make them 1-6 heavy-tank battalions, since each "regiment" had only 300 men and 21 tanks. But who wants to add 40+ 1-6 battalion counters to the mix when they were never used independently? I think they are better used by factoring them into the chronically understrength Soviet rifle divisions, which allows them to stay at 3-6 or 4-6 strength rather than quickly dropping after a turn or two of combat.
• Yes. The relative strengths of the various Soviet artillery units are largely correct, except that the 76mm-gun light- artillery units deserve full ATEC. They were counted among the AT units in 1942, and, with 72 guns per brigade, they had more firepower than a "Fighter" Anti-Tank Brigade in 1942-43. Also, the heavy 160mm mortars are underrated and the BM-8 light rockets are overrated in the amount of firepower they can project. Finally, the pre-war RVGK and Corps artillery regiments are each, at 36-48 guns, the size of the later artillery brigades, and so have the same factors. I'd love to see all of them as separate counters, as long as everybody knows that when they are brought back later, their organization is as a brigade.

  [I disagree with Charles's recommendation that light- artillery units should be Full ATEC capable. Even though the gun is the same, I remain skeptical that light-artillery units had the same training, doctrine, and employment as dedicated AT units (regardless of "official" 1942 nomenclature). Further, I also wonder what kind of ammunition the light-artillery units received (and in what proportion) compared to dedicated AT units. In my opinion, at the very best I would rate light artillery as 112 ATEC, and even that might be too high.-VAH]

• Based on the information available at the time, Europa rated the pre-war c/m divisions very well. However, with more accurate data available now, these pre-war formations rate differently from a few years ago. (Based on current data, there are now some entire Mechanized Corps in 1941 with only 4 combat factors total.)

I don't have the space here to present all my unit ratings, but if you are interested, the algorithms and explanations of the Quantified Judgement Model of the HERO group is included in Col. Dupuy's book, Numbers, Predictions, and War (HERO books, 1985).

Christopher Diamantoukos, New Jersey

I've wanted for some time to discuss what I see as an inconsistency in Europa's ground CRT. I'd hoped that this would eventually be addressed, but the latest CRTs I've seen (First to Fight and A Winter War) have not done so.

John Astell, in "An Experimental 2D6 CRT" that appeared in ETO #40, stated that, "DIVIs require the results to be stacked in order ('worst' to 'best', or vice versa), otherwise the results are meaningless" (DMs refer to die-roll modifiers). Rick Gayler, in TEM #16 described how the "sequence of results on the ground CRT now reflects a more logical progression" (describing the Balkan Front CRT). By this, I'm assuming that Rick meant the adjustment which switched the locations of the AS and EX results.

If we assume that the most recent Europa CRTs intend for positive DMs and higher rolls to favor the attacker (and I think that's a correct assumption), then I applaud this recent adjustment. It is logical and in keeping with the above intention, every player I know will invariably choose an EX over an AS when attacking. Thus, I conclude that an EX is indeed the "better" result for the attacker. Indeed, this single adjustment is significant and leads to the elimination of the abuse of the EX result on the - 1 row when using the older CRTs.

However, inspection of the 1:1 and 1.51 odds columns shows that there are remaining inconsistencies to be dealt with in relation to the higher odds columns. In both of those columns, the HX result appears at a higher number than the DR result, thus implying that an HX is a better result than a DR. I think that the HX is indeed the better result for the attacker, hence my claims of remaining CRT inconsistency.

[To me, this is trickier than it appears. I believe that in most cases and at most odds Christopher is right (ie., most attackers would prefer an HX over a DR, making the HX the "better" result). The problem is that this isn't always the case. If I have the defender surrounded, then I want the DR result.

Or, if I cannot afford to take casualties, but I need to take (or re-take) a hex, then here again I would prefer the DR. However, with that said, I do believe that there are cases where the probability approaches 100% that attackers would prefer the HX I claim that for the Soviets, the HX is almost always the preferred result. I say this because they have a harder time getting the defender surrounded (and even when they do, the defenders are often German c/m units), and they can better afford to take casualties than the Axis-most especially when they can kill twice as many Axis as they lose themselves. So, the bottom line is that "usually" Christopher is correct, at the lower odds under most circumstances most attackers would prefer an HX to a DR (especially the Soviets), thus making an HX the "better" result. So, what does it all mean?

Since I believe that the Soviets seek to attrit the Axis at every opportunity, then the CRT tends to favor them because they can attack at low odds and with negative DMs and still get HX results which are frequently disastrous to the troop-starved Axis. (I sometimes wonder how the Soviets are allowed to achieve an HX against anybody, but that's another story.) Anyway, I support Christopher on his crusade here, but I also claim that he doesn't go far enough. I would extend his argument to the 3.1 and 4:1 (and maybe even 6.1) odds columns since those are the columns that the Soviets most frequently use when attacking. Indeed, I lobbied John at Origins last year to adopt a similar proposal (put all HXs higher on the CRT than all DRs).-VAH]

In the 1.51 column, a DE result appears, omitting the DH result that appears in adjacent columns. Thus my claim in this case that this is also an inconsistency.

The practical effect of these inconsistencies are differing trade-offs between favorable and less-favorable results when positive DMs are applicable. The following shows the result dropped H and the result added W when progressing from a 0 to a +1 DM, and then from a +1 to a +2 DM:

Although the possible results improve with each DM increase, there are inconsistent trade-offs in neighboring columns. For instance, at 1.51 going from +1 to +2 trades an AR for a DE, while at 2:1 going from 0 to +1 trades an AR for a DH.

My suggested corrections (denoted by a "*") the CRT are as follows:

The 1:2 and 1:1 odds columns are somewhat problematic since it is not always certain whose force will be smaller for exchange calculations. However, I've included some parenthetical results on the 1:1 column for your consideration if you believe that the attacker will generally be the larger force in a given combat. These parenthetical results also have the advantage that in cases like Tobruk (where a garrison force is surrounded on all sides) the defenders have a better chance to take some attackers with them in the event of an unfavorable result. With the current CRT, a lucky W will DR (and thus totally eliminate) the defenders at Tobruk without loss to the attackers.

Let me close by saying that I am not the first to notice these inconsistencies in the CRT. However, I do believe that correcting them will be worthwhile. Although these odds might not be employed very often, they are important to the internal logic of the CRT as well as the effectiveness of low- odds attacks or a series of attrition attacks.

Robert Korpanty, Virginia

Here are some of my thoughts regarding rail movement along isolated/cut-off sections of rail. I believe that the rail capacity of any cut-off section of rail should be dependent on three factors:

• its supply status
• the number of friendly marshalling yards it is connected to
• its linkage to a source of naval supply

Using these criteria, I recommend the following procedure for determining the amount of rail capacity that can be used along any given section of isolated/cut-off rail.

1) Each city (not counting point cities) or fortress on the cut-off section counts as +5.

2) Each turn the cut-off section is out of regular supply, starting with the second turn, counts as -10.

3) If the cut-off section is also isolated, then divide all totals by 2.

4) If a ship or river flotilla has been designated to supply the cut-off section, +10.

5) If 1 resource point (or 2 if in a major city) on the cut- off section is expended during the initial phase, +10 each.

Example: Leningrad has been isolated for three turns. Therefore, 6 city hexes times 5 each = 30 base railcap, minus 20 for having been out of supply two turns after the first = 10, and divided by 2 for being isolated = 5. This railcap of 5 could be increased to 15 if a river flotilla (for instance) was assigned to rail supply (perform as per the naval supply rules, except that no supply points are delivered). It could be further increased temporarily that turn to 25 if a resource point was expended on the rail in the initial phase.

[This seems like an awful lot of effort to handle a situation that doesn't come up very often. The great thing about Europa is that once you've bought the game, you can pretty much play by whatever rules you want. I've noticed, however, that when somebody takes the trouble to write in, he usually is interested in seeing his idea gain some level of "official" support. Although I don't speak for John, Rick, or anybody else at GRD, I would guess that Robert's idea here needs substantial polishing and simplifying.-VAH]

On another subject, I've played War in the Pacific and I prefer their air system, especially the "Bounce". I think that the bounce could be used to replace the -1 modifier German air units receive for fighter-pilot superiority.

[The Europa air system is quite different from the air system in War in the Pacific (I know, I've played them both). I suggest that it is extremely difficult to lift a rule or concept (even if it's a good one) and transplant it (like dog livers in cat bodies). For what it's worth, however, I have indeed tried during the past year to do exactly what Robert is proposing. We here in Austin experimented at some length with the idea of a "bounce" table. We discovered that it was more trouble than it was worth (we had to add so many modifiers to handle so many different situations that the resulting chart got very confusing) and shelved the idea.

Finally, I do appreciate all of you who send your thoughts our way. Even if your ideas never end up as "official" Europa, they might inspire something that does. See you next year.-VAH]