One of the advantages of working for a large research library is that many new books cross my desk. R.H.S. Stolfi's Hitler's Panzers East is one that definitely grabbed my attention. In a nutshell, Stolfi argues that not only could the Germans have won World War II, but that they should have.

Indeed, he goes so far as to claim that they had to actually take active measures to lose it, so great was their probability of winning in August 1941.

To those of us who've been offered a steady stream of directly contradictory literature in recent years, such as John Ellis's Brute Force , this comes as a big surprise. And in fact, the reactions of most of my local gaming group were along the lines of, "that's ridiculous, who's he trying to kid?".

Well, evidently Stolfi's serious. After all, he is a professor of history, and I don't think he'd put his professional credibility on the line for the sake of whimsy. So I decided to take what he had to say as seriously as I thought he intended it.

Premise

His premise rests on the foundation that the Germans had absolutely no intentions of the war against the USSR lasting more than 10 weeks of serious fighting and another 7 weeks of mopping up. Period. When the war did, in fact, continue beyond that time the Germans were in big trouble. Even Stolfi himself believes that the Germans could not win the war after September 1941. However, he claims that most historians have concentrated on the 195 weeks when the war was already lost instead of on the crucial 10 weeks when the Germans had the war won, only to let it slip away. His scenario goes roughly like this:

• von Manstein presses forward from his Dvina bridgehead immediately on 28 June 41 (rather than waiting until 4 July) thus saving 7 days and maintaining the shock effect of the German advance. Further, Manstein's advance would have dragged the 4th Panzergruppe along behind it, then Army Group North behind that, thus taking Leningrad by August. He makes the comparison with Guderian and the Meuse River in 1940. If Guderian hadn't taken matters into his own hands, driving single- mindedly to the channel coast (and dragging the rest of his Army behind him), the Germans would have almost certainly paused--thus giving the French time to regain their balance, possibly to decisive effect.

• The Soviets chose to fight a forward defense. Not only did this mean that the Soviets would be fighting on terms most favorable to the Germans, but also that Stalin was sending a political message to his people that the Red Army was indeed capable of stopping the Nazis. Thus, Stalin was putting his political eggs into one basket.

• Army Group Center does not divert its panzers to Leningrad and Kiev in August, but drives instead straight for Moscow, capturing it by the end of August and, thus, bringing about the collapse of the Stalinist Government. Which, in turn, would render the Red Army even more helpless than it already was therefore allowing the 7-week mop-up and consolidation period to go forward as planned before the autumn rains.

Baloney, you say? Maybe. I'll leave it to you to read the book. However, three points struck me while I read it that I felt had direct relevance to FitE/SE.

Relevence

First, since Europa has no political rules, we cannot explore the possibility of a Stalinist collapse. (in the light of recent political events in Russia, this becomes more problematical.) Anyway, we are left to resolve the war on a purely military basis. I think this makes things much more difficult for the Germans.

Second, there are many players today that believe that the Germans have little-to-no chance of winning FitE/SE as we currently know it, myself included.

By this I mean that if I were going to play against myself, I would always want to play the Soviets. Some would go so far as to say that it's right and realistic for the Germans to always be crushed by the Soviet juggernaut. I do disagree with that opinion, however. The historical Germans knew that for them to have a chance of winning the Soviets would have to fight a forward defense. How many Soviet players fight a hold-at-all costs forward defense these days. I know that I sure don't. There's no military reason, and there are no political incentives either.

My point is that as an experienced FitE/SE player I've seen (and performed myself) so many German surprise attacks that I know their capabilities and am no longer surprised by much of anything they do or try. Thus, the surprise attack is no longer a surprise attack. I've gamed it out so many times that the only surprises are when the Germans don't actually achieve what my experience has taught me to expect. Which, of course, only increases my chances of victory as the Soviets. It also takes me to my third point.

The shock of the Axis invasion caused a chaotic breakdown of the Soviet command structure. Nowadays, the only time that I can simulate those effects is when I play against a novice Soviet side. I almost always win those games as the Axis before the first winter. Gee, maybe Stolfi has something here. Maybe the most experienced Army in the world really did have a chance against the inexperienced and confused Soviets...

Now, however, I don't know how to recreate the shock of the Axis invasion when neither player is surprised by the German surprise attack anymore. In other words, when the Soviet player becomes so adept at deploying and receiving the invasion that anything less than a perfect German first turn only increases the severity of Soviet victory, the game loses some of its challenge. To me, at least. What do the rest of you think? Any ideas?