Charles Sharp

I recently read retired Colonel Dupuy's book on Numbers, Predictions, and War, after he was the only person who accurately predicted the course of the Gulf War of all the various pundits interviewed on the "Idiot Box". I figured up his Total Lethality Indexes for all the German and Soviet weapons, and then figured up firepower/combat ratings for the Soviet units and some German units for comparison. Considering that Europa has not used a very scientific algorithm for unit factors in the past (I believe it amounted to something like "50 105mm guns equals 1 pt" or some such) I found some interesting results...

The basic German infantry division and panzer division of 1941 came out almost dead-on: 8-6 and 11-10 to 9-10 factors, once the superior German tactical operations were taken into effect (Dupuy even gives a figure for that!). The full- strength pre-war Soviet units came out as follows:

Rifle Division with tank battalion 7-6
Rifle Division without tanks 6-6
Tank Division 12-7-8
Mechanized Division 9-6-8
Cavalry Division 4-3-8
Mountain Rifle Division 4-5-7
7/41 Rifle Division 3-6
Wartime Cavalry Division (1941) 2-1-8
Tank Corps 1942: 7-4-8
Tank Corps after 8/43 (w/SPFA) 13-9-8
Tank Corps after 2/44 (T-34/85 tanks) 18-14-8
Mech Corps after 2/44 19-8
Tank Brigade after 2/44 (65 T-34/85s) 4-2-8

In addition to figures for all of the various Soviet units during the war, like 11 different kinds of artillery regiments and brigades, 8 different tank regiments and brigades, and 12 different tank or mechanized corps organizations, I have a lot of exact strength figures now for units at the beginning of the war. What has been especially interesting to me has been the very precise figures that are now becoming available for the Soviet tank and motorized forces at the beginning of the war.

FitE/SE was very close to the over-all range, when compared to figures using Dupuy's TLI calculations: the best tank divisions, like the 4th, 7th, 8th, and 10th (for all of which I have exact tank strength figures now) are 11-6-8 units, while at the other end there are several entire mechanized corps whose total strength is 4 points. There are also a LOT more motorcycle regiments around in 1941: 18 to 26 total, so the number of official Soviet "ant-like" units may be going up!

I am also working very hard on the Soviet Reserve, NKVD, and Schools systems. If Germany in Second Front can fill the Wehrkreise with training and security units, the Soviet Union should be even more full of such. On the one hand, I am trying to keep the counter numbers down, but on the other hand, there were large numbers of militia, reserve (training) and formal schools, as well as NKVD units, all in the regiment-brigade-division size behind the Soviet lines which joined the front lines whenever the Germans got to them, or provided the basis for a lot of the units which did appear at the front. Just for instance, I have already identified 6 naval and 3 Latvian regiments in Leningrad and the Black Sea areas which, among them, provided the basis for 2 rifle divisions and 3 rifle brigades.

Finally, by next spring I hope to have the updated Fire in the East/Scorched Earth OB complete, including the air and naval OBs. Right now it looks like a lot more weak units and weaker armor at the start of the war for the Soviets, but their pre-war rifle troops will be somewhat stronger (more 5-6 rifle XX in the frontiers, and more 6-6 and 7-6 rifle XX from the Far East in the fall).

Throughout 1942 they will continue to have weaker armor (most early tank brigades are 2-1-8). During 1943 the worm turns, and by early 1944 they can form 5-6 and 6-6 rifle divisions by adding SPFA and MRLs to them (70 divisions got their own SPFA units by the end of the war) and the artillery and armor support gets frightening.

From preliminary work, I am coming to the conclusion that Soviet armor and infantry replacement rates in 1944-45 may be only about 1/2 of what they should be: this implies a VERY imbalanced end-of-war scenario!

I really like the idea of smaller scenarios for the games, such as the Leningrad: 1941 scenario. I've already done OBs, both in game terms and academic, for Kursk 1943, June 1944, and the "Race to the Dnepr" in August- October 1943, and as soon as I get it in the mail, I'll send John Astell the complete Soviet OB for the Crimea from December 1941 to June 1942 so he can do the Crimean scenario he was talking about some time ago (when he finds the time!). For another "mid-game" scenario, if someone will do the German/Axis OB, I'll put together the Soviet OB for "Turning Point: 19 November 1942".

Now I've set enough projects to keep me busy for another year without stopping! I'm retiring from the army this spring, with the firm intention of doing absolutely nothing for about a year afterwards, just so I can catch up with all the various writing and research projects that I keep thinking up for myself. I might also get all the notes and data put together for a book on the Soviet military forces in WWII, if I can keep the monster down to one volume!

Gary Dickson

With the opening of the exSoviet Union, in a few years there could be a renaissance of historical work on the eastern front as western historians gain access to Soviet military archives. In contrast to other WWII fronts, the eastern is virgin territory.

For example, I talked to Dr. Hardesty on the phone today. He's the author of Red Phoenix, a book on the Soviet Air Force in WWII. On the issue of Soviet radar, he said that it is very difficult to pinpoint when the Soviets started using radar tactically, if they ever did, so one can't say if they had it at Kursk, or whenever.

You can go by what they were producing themselves or what sets they received via LendLease, but at present one can not determine when they actually began using radar operationally.

He also said that because the VVS was controlled by the Front commanders, it served the ground forces' immediate needs almost exclusively in the "flying artillery" mode. It very rarely flew missions deep in the German rear, and as a result the Luftwaffe in the east was able to remain operational long after they had lost any hope of operating thus in the west. In fact, Stukas were operating on the eastern front even into 1945! This in itself would seem to argue for greater restrictions on the Soviet intercept/patrol radius.

So how does this translate into Europa cardboard?

I suppose there are two schools of thought on restricting the air forces (or other types of units) in Europa. You can factor in the technical and operational realities that caused air forces to behave in certain ways, leaving it to the players to use their units as they see fit, even if their historical counterparts didn't do it that way; or you could write strict rules, some might say "idiot rules", that force the players to behave as the real air forces did.

An example of the former would be to restrict patrol/intercept radii, institute air stacking, or require the Soviets to plan large air concentrations a turn in advance, all to reflect command and control realities.

An example of the latter would be to say that Soviet planes can't fly farther than 3 hexes across the front lines or that bombers and attack planes are restricted in the main to flying only ground support (GS) or defensive air support (DAS) missions. Perhaps these aren't the best examples, but you get the idea.

In fact, the most common Europa air mission flown is GS. This means that perhaps without realizing it players are closely simulating Soviet and post-'41 Luftwaffe air support practices. The game system encourages this by making the alternate missions relatively weak; examples are the pre-Balkan Front air base attack mission, the current harassment mission, the interception system, the terribly restrictive DAS mission, and the over-effectiveness of B-type units in the GS role.

The air base attack mission has been improved with the publication of BF, but it could still be improved, perhaps by making it either a strategic or tactical mission like the port mission in Scorched Earth, thus giving B-type units something else worthwhile to do besides GS.

Harassment is too weak. I'd at least double the harassment movement penalty for c/m units and eliminate AA fire on harassers (they can't kill you, so you shouldn't be able to kill them).

The DAS mission has long been recognized as being too restrictive. The current flex-DAS system presented in Leningrad: 1941 is an improvement, but still not enough. What we really need is a truly flexible system in which designated bombers stay at their bases until needed in DAS. This would incidentally allow air units to be suppressed by airbase attack missions and not allow the currently popular practice of flying DAS or harassment missions just to avoid airbase attacks against them.

As far as B-type bombers go, in GS/DAS missions they are too effective. The minimum that should be done with them is eliminate their +1 on the AA table and maybe even make it a -1 for those two missions, since in order to achieve decent tactical bombing accuracy the planes have to fly at low altitude, where they are very vulnerable due to their size, lack of maneuverability, and slow speed.

Other types of planes A D, H, HB, F) would not be affected. This change alone should cut down on the use of B's for GS missions, whereas now they, not the more realistic D's, A's, or F's, are the units of choice in GS due to their favorable AA modifier.

The interception system encourages mega-stacks in the face of even a mediocre interceptor force; changing that is a tall order. Any ideas out there?

Finally, I read with interest the "Rules Court" dispute in TEM #23. I agree with the defender that once the die is rolled, an attack cannot be taken back. It's tough luck if the attacker wouldn't have made the attack if he'd known the real odds. Next time he should check. It's also too late to shoot the AA once the combat die is rolled, although the defender might want to remind the attacker about the AA if he remembers. With all the disagreement over the battle, I think the two players should keep the original AR result.

The Rostov attack struck a nerve with many readers. Could it be that we have all been in the shoes of the Axis or Soviet player at one time or another? Read on for more opinions. -RG

Alan Tibbetts

The AR should stand. I suggest that BOTH players pay more attention to how many factors and which modifiers are to be used. In all cases, the defender need only count AFTER the attacker declares an attack. He is under NO compulsion to point out the attacker's mistakes. Does the attacker have to point out to the defender any blunders (Old chap, did you really intend to leave that 5-point stack in the middle of your line for me to overrun)? I say no.

If the attacker has miscounted, it is HIS TOUGH LUCK.

Fred Helfferich

Obviously, this is not a rules dispute that can be settled by the Law of the Land. It is a matter of convention between players how they want to play, but regrettably these two seem not to have arrived at some guidelines in this respect before starting. An arbitration must therefore try to make the best of a messy situation by arriving at a ruling that is fair to both sides. In the case at hand that seems not too difficult to do.

Two rather strict procedures often used are:

(a) Any errors discovered after a respective die roll for resolution are ignored. (This may require players to agree not to roll until the opponent says he is satisfied); or

(b) all errors discovered later (but, say, within the same player turn or phase) are corrected, regardless of who finds them and who benefits, and the die rolls stand.

Players as gentlemen usually warn opponents of any mistakes that would be truly disastrous, or allow the correction of a quite obvious slip. However, any procedure allowing die rolls to be repeated or combats to be scrapped opens a can of worms and is usually avoided by experienced players.

Under alternative (a), the AR result stands. Under alternative (b) the odds are 3:1 (-2), for a result of AH, obviously much worse for the Axis player.

Both players seem willing to play by somewhat less strict procedures. Pro and con of what to allow and not allow in any given case can then be argued endlessly. The arbitrator therefore must examine the opponents' briefs and look for a fair settlement.

The Soviet player's argument is straightforward. He accepted the (erroneous) engineers and AA at face value, warned the Axis player against a dangerous risk, but refuses to reverse the combat result once it had been rolled under those premises.

The Axis player argues the result should be negated because he would not have made the attack if he had known what the real odds (after error correction) were. But he rolled with reasonable expectation of the adjusted odds being 3:1 (-1) after engineers and AA (the probability of the adjusted odds being raised to 4:1 (-1) by 2 AA and the percentile roll are about 1 in 70 by my calculation). So he willingly risked the 1-in-6 chance of an AR result. He therefore has no excuse not to accept that result as upsetting "his entire strategy.

He could make a case against alternative (b) above, giving him an AH result after all due corrections. It is fair and equitable that he be let off this hook. But he cannot claim the AR result should be negated, a result he had to expect as a possibility when he started rolling for combat.

I would deny the Axis player's petition. He should accept his setback in good grace and learn from it: You can always take risks, but never, ever take them if failure can spell disaster. And, after all, his overall situation with Moscow in the bag seems strong enough that he can live with it even if he should now lose some RR guns and aircraft in addition to the (quite modest) losses of the actual failed Rostov attack.

Robin D. Roberts

I play with the attitude that courtesy should always be extended so long as it isn't abused. But the most important principle is that play should be consistent. I believe it very unsportsmanlike to change the standard of play [i.e., become more strict or less strict than earlier in a particular game] when it becomes advantageous to do so. And that is how I believe the Rostov controversy should be judged-on the sportsmanship issue.

I am not fond of either player's position in this dispute, but I believe that the gentlemanly thing was for the Axis player to acknowledge the "AR" result as the best means of resolving the dispute, take his lumps, shrug his shoulders, and get on with the rest of the game.