Introduction

In TEM #19, Mark Pitcavage questioned the realities of Grand Europa: what can be done and what we should expect. I am less pessimistic than Mark and believe that a true Grand Europa (GE) can be produced and even played. I believe that the most important factor for making GE successful is that the designer(s) look very carefully as to what rules should and should not be included. To me, the temptation to include everything, regardless of its effect on the game and on historical events, is the greatest threat to GE.

We all know some military "buff" out there who will insist that the supply of left-handed wing nuts for use in the assembly of gun sights for the Me 262 jet fighter must be included. He (or she) will describe how they were hand-made by a little old Swiss watchmaker and smuggled into Germany by couriers disguised as nuns. "We must have a die roll to determine if OSS agents in Switzerland find out about this and 'expose' the 'nuns' for what they are," it will be declared. It is this kind of nonsense that we must guard against if we are to make GE a reality.

[It should be noted that, to date, John Astell has established a strong record of barring "creeping complexity" from the rules-VAH.]

GE's designers/developers must be willing to say "No." to those who propose and insist on the inclusion of their superfluous "critical factors" in the game. But enough of the generalities. Let's turn now to some specifics addressed in Mark's article.

Units

Mark asks about changes in unit quality over time. We already have that. What about increases and decreases in combat value with experience and attrition? We already have that, too. Check out the Scorched Earth Order of Battle Booklet, page 5. "Upgrade 2x 12-10 Pz XX to 2x 14-10 Pz XX". What's going on here? An increase in combat value with experience, and maybe some new tanks? And you get this upgrade even if none of your 12-10's have ever taken part in battle. Page 16 of the same booklet lists the German Reorganization Chart which shows how one can go about turning a 7-6 infantry division into a 5-7-6 infantry division.

What's going on here?

Because of attrition on the Russian Front, the Germans had to do some reorganizing to keep enough units in the line, sacrificing offensive power by spreading out remaining resources among many units. This option arises because of the extensive losses on the Eastern Front and the need for units to hold the line. Making the availability of such changes dependent on the number of casualties suffered by the Wehrmacht, or any other nation, should present few problems in GE.

Mark is also concerned with pilot quality and the gradual deterioration of Luftwaffe training as a result of fuel shortages. "Shouldn't (GE) somehow reflect that," he asks? Sure. So how can we do it? By using a complicated system for the gradual reduction in the attack and defense factors of the German fighters?

No. That is far too subjective, and susceptible to the prejudices of designers and "experts". A decrease in Group Allowance (and hence the number of active fighters) would be better. Perhaps the Group Allowance could be reduced in proportion to air-unit losses and Reich oil production. Recording the number of air units destroyed is the easiest way to keep track of the wear and tear on your pilot supply. Maybe separate Group Allowances for fighters and bombers could be added, and the effects of losses determined by aircraft class. This requires a slight increase in complexity, but no major rules changes. Best of all, it is easily implemented.

Politics

GE will have to assume a Hitler. Too much of the war's background is based on his personality and ambitions not to. Most of the political alignments, grand strategy of the Reich, character of the military forces, and most importantly, the timing of the war are a direct result of the Fuhrer's existence. However, given free rein, no reasonable German player is going to start the war in 1939, start a two front war, or declare war on America right after Pearl Harbor.

Therefore, some of the key events of the war will just have to happen more or less historically. Some latitude to the actual date is a good idea, but big happenings simply must happen historically. Examples: The Beginning of German Aggression: Fall 1939; German attack on Russia: Summer 1941; Pearl Harbor: Winter 1941.

Many major political effects will have to be dictated, and some of the long-shot events tempered with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight. Example: Franco joins the Axis--when Hell freezes over.

Many of the tiny events of the war will just have to be ignored. Not every diplomatic tiff, border incursion, lost airplane, or caught spy leads to a declaration of war. The internal politics of nations will have to be simplified, with specific actions likely only under historically based conditions. For instance, Italy surrenders when the Allied armies come to call.

Mark says that "The number of possible political events that must somehow be taken into account..." is huge. Oh really? And just why must they be taken into account? A real heavy dose of common sense is needed here, along with a good knowledge of history. Just because it was possible doesn't establish an event's likelihood.

ULTRA

Mark considers the ULTRA codebreaking success as something that must be woven into the game at every turn. Well, just how did ULTRA affect the war from the Allied side? Well, in Europa terms the Allies got to examine all the German's stacks. But this is what already goes on under the rules as written. Writing truly complete ULTRA rules would mean having to figure out when and how it influenced every action taken by the Allies.

Since we don't know this, and never will, why not just take advantage of 20/20 hindsight and ignore the whole thing. Europa players already know more about German strategy, strengths, and weaknesses than Eisenhower ever did. For the effect of ULTRA on the Battle of the Atlantic, just roll dice.

The effect won't be historical, but it will be unpredictable, just like ULTRA was. It might be helpful to keep asking, "How is this shown in Europa terms?" when thinking about system changes.

Economics

The extent to which GE incorporates economics will have a major effect on how closely the game resembles history. The least complicated option is to use historical orders of arrival and aircraft availability. Unfortunately, this is GE's least satisfactory option for several reasons.

Each nation's historical aircraftproduction schedule was the result of the posture in which it found itself. For instance, during 1939-42, the Luftwaffe needed bombers to support the Wehrmacht. But when the Russian Front stalemated, and the Western-Allied strategic-bombing effort intensified, the Luftwaffe needed more fighters to defend the Reich.

In 1945, German bomber production finally ground to a halt-all aircraft-production resources then being concentrated on fighter production. However, if the strategic situation had been different (e.g., Britain or the USSR defeated), then bomber production would undoubtedly have continued. Different situation, different aircraft produced.

The next-to-worst solution would be to let the players build whatever they want. There are all sorts of compromise systems that might be put together to allow the players to develop and build varying amounts of Europa aircraft types. Give each nation a number of aircraft "Design Bureaus" that can develop new aircraft types, roll dice to see how well they do, assign some aircraft "factories" to build the new planes. Easy!

Otherwise, you get the potential for nightmare scenarios: B-29's over Berlin in 1943, escorted by P-80's; The Blitz against London led by fleets of He-177's with top cover by Me262's. Such scenarios are likely if the system can be "fiddled with" by rules lawyers or if a die-roll system is used without proper control. The worst possible system would be one where one side can get stuff real early and the other gets its stuff real late.

I do predict the final system will result in stuff being available earlier than it was historically since everybody will want their Albert Speers starting in 1936.

Similar considerations impact the composition of all nations' ground forces. As mentioned earlier, the German 5-7-6 infantry divisions resulted from the need for more units to hold the Eastern Front at a time when German manpower was dwindling.

In any event, given the choice between having historical availability of units or nightmare scenarios, I believe most players will choose the historical option. This is the foundation upon which all systems must be based. Variation is fine, but it must be regulated.

In conclusion, I believe that while economic systems for GE are likely to be complicated, they are distinctly possible. GE could be played using the exact historical availability. Perhaps at first it should be played that way.