The last two years have seen unimaginable changes in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union teeters between fragmentation and reaction. The Balkans bubble with nationalist rivalries, while the northeastern corner of Europe makes the painful transition from dictatorship to democracy, and from poverty to (they hope) prosperity.

So far, these political and social upheavals have proceeded without the redrawing of national boundaries, with the exception of the dissolution of the interGerman frontier. This cannot last. The map of Europe is a patchwork quilt of nations, with boundaries between them that often reflect the military and strategic balance prevailing at the time they were drawn, rather than any cultural, linguistic, or historical frontier.

Poland, for example, was moved about 100 miles westward at the conclusion of World War II, when both of its borders were felt to be strategically inadequate. At the same time, the territory of East Prussia was split north- south between Poland and the Soviet Union. Originally, these were military occupation zones of a defeated Germany. With time and the resettlement of populations, they have become integral parts of those countries. Until 1989, there was no reason to believe that things would ever change.

Then came Perestroika and the reemergence of Baltic nationalism. Suddenly, the rules have been changed, and the question that heads this article has become more than hypothetical.

One of the major consequences of the Treaty of Versailles was the creation of Poland from territory previously held by Russia, Germany and Austria. East Prussia was separated from the rest of Germany by the Polish "Corridor," a slice of territory awarded to the Poles as an outlet to the Baltic Sea at Danzig (a Free Port) and Gdynia. Lithuania, also created out of the Russian Empire, was awarded about a thousand square miles of German territory on the north bank of the River Nemen, including the city of Memel. This was originally under French administration, but in 1923 Lithuanian troops occupied the region and forced the French garrison to withdraw. This illegal act was rationalized in 1924, when Memel was annexed to Lithuania as an autonomous territory.

The rise of Nazism in Germany during the 1930s was mirrored by the states of Eastern Europe. Both Poland, Lithuania, and the other Baltic republics became increasingly authoritarian and repressive. The demands of Hitler for the return of territories lost at Versailles should not therefore be seen as entirely black and white: both the Polish Corridor and the Memel region were German by history and by language.

On those rare occasions when the inhabitants of those regions were allowed to vote (such as in Danzig in 1933), the Nazi party received large majorities. On March 23rd, 1939, one week after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Germans occupied and annexed Memel. It was to be the last territorial gain that Hitler would make without igniting World War II.

As much as the Soviets hated the Nazis, they seemed content with the frontiers agreed to with them. The present Soviet/Polish border is little different from the line that Molotov and Ribbentrop agreed to in 1939. Memel, now renamed Klaipeda, was returned to Lithuania. Lithuania, however, was not returned to the Lithuanians. The remainder of East Prussia was one of the most completely devastated areas of the Third Reich. Most of the old capital of Konigsberg was destroyed. The German inhabitants of East Prussia who survived the war either fled west or were deported by the Soviets. Russian immigration has transformed the former home of the Prussian Junker aristocracy into the Kaliningrad Oblast of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic.

Now, you can sec the problem.

Lithuania, now that the Soviet Union has begun to implode, would like to be independent again. A reunified Germany is presently preoccupied with internal matters, but may soon take an interest in the East. Chancellor Kohl had to be pressured into stating that a unified Germany would not seek any territorial adjustments at the expense of Poland or anyone else. Poland, though struggling economically, is experiencing an upsurge of nationalism, which sometimes manifests itself in the same kind of anti- Semitism which Poles expressed in the 1930s. After the events which we have witnessed in the last two years, it would be naive to think that the region will remain peaceful. So, what will happen to the old German territories of East Prussia? Who gets Konigsberg? Who gets Memel?

If the Russians keep their present territory, the Kaliningrad Oblast will be separated from the remainder of the Soviet Union by Poland and Lithuania. The Poles and Lithuanians have no particular reason to allow transit through their territory to this enclave, although this could be made a condition of secession from the Soviet Union.

The Germans might demand the return of East Prussia, or at least that part of it held by the Soviets, and then what happens to its Russian inhabitants? Will they, in turn, be deported to Russia? After all, the Germans have by far the strongest historical claim to the area: Konigsberg/Kaliningrad was founded by the Teutonic Knights in 1255. And if the Germans should regain East Prussia, what of Memel/Klaipeda?

The ultimate irony in all of this is in the very name of the region under discussion. When we think of "Prussia," we think of strutting officers with monocles and pickelhauben. But Prussia, the heartland of Bismarck's and the Kaiser's German Empire, owes its name to the Borussi, or Prus, a non-German Baltic tribe. And where are they now? Well, the Germans, or at least the Teutonic Knights, killed or scattered them, and then took their land and their name. So, what next? The winds of change blow without regard for individual lives. All we can hope for is that we remember the past, before we act.

Memeland, for those Europanuts who aren't sure of its location, is on Map 1B, hexes 2224, 2325, 2424, and 2524.

Memel 2: A Post-Coup Postscript

When I first heard the news of the Soviet coup, my initial reac- tion was severe depression. But only a day later, when opposition started to crystallize around Boris Yeltsin, I announced to a friend that the coup leaders 'wouldn't survive the winter.'

In fact, they didn't survive the week. In hindsight, we can confidently say NO coup could have succeeded: the momentum for democratic reform is too advanced, the economic collapse is too profound and the coup plotters were just too old. Successful coups are made by young men: the colonels, not the generals.

Even if they had been less squeamish about shooting their opponents, they would ultimately have failed, since successful plotters rarely make successful economists and managers. Come the winter, with unrest in the streets, uncertain loyalties in the military, and no western grain, the coup leaders would have been forced from power.

Historians will debate the events of August 1991 for generations; there is ample support for both the "great mann and "tide of history" interpreta- tions. What if Yeltsin HAD been arrested? What if a couple of tac- tical nuclear warheads had been used? Real life is better scripted than any Tom Clancy novel.

Now What?

Independence for the Baltic states, and many other republics, seems assured. It is difficult to imagine Kirghizia (population about 4.3 million, only half of whom are ethnic Kirghiz) becoming an independent state, but don't forget the example of Europe: independence within an economic union makes possible such entities as Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, and (in the near future, barring some military upheaval) Slovenia.

This is not going to be an easy process, but the negative examples of China and Yugoslavia may serve to remind the Russian leaders of the less- palatable alternatives. Paradoxically, it may turn out that the old, centrally- planned Soviet economy will actually make for an easier transition to an "economic community of the republics", or whatever they decide to call it.

Although a united Europe has succeeded beyond the wildest dreams of De Gaulle, it still has not found a solution to such economic problems as protective tariffs, subsidies, and overproduction. With the exception of state subsidies, these do not exist in what was the USSR, and overproduction of agricultural goods is the least of their worries.

In the short run we can expect more conflict: in Georgia, in the Caucasus, and in the Russian Republic. Moldavia will probably edge towards some sort of union with Romania, and this will provoke the Russian minority there. In the five Moslem republics of central Asia, the stresses of nationalism, religious fundamentalism, and resentment of Russian domination are complicated by the presence of large numbers of nuclear warheads. If Kazahkstan took control of those nuclear forces within its borders, it would suddenly become the world's third superpower!

In the long run the world seems headed for two great changes: the first of these is towards a multi- polar "new world order", which Paul Kennedy describes in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers.

The bipolar world of the Cold War was perhaps unique in history: never before had only two powers dominated the world, both militarily and ideologically. The great thaw has begun, and the ice is already moving downstream. The currents of history, frozen for two generations, are free to move again.

The second great change is, I believe, even more important. For the first time in history, it is now accepted that there are strict limitations on the sovereignty of states. Iraq is forced to accept LIN inspectors poking around their nuclear research centers. Coup plotters in Russia and Haiti are censured, and action against them, even military action, is considered. States that allow excess pollution of the environment are likewise censured and brought to task for their actions. Oppressed minorities are no longer the private concern of a national government. True, the tangible advantage of this may not be apparent to an Iraqi Kurd, or an Ethiopian, or a Croat, but the principle has been established. And why? The silicon microchip.

The communications revolution did much more than make it possible to direct-dial another continent. During the Russian coup, resistance was organized by messages sent on FAX machines. During the Gulf War, CNN broadcast live from Baghdad via its own satellite dish. In Croatia, video cassettes are smuggled out of Serbia n- occupied towns in time to make the 9:00 news in North America. The world has become a smaller place, McLuhan's "global village", and in the village we are all neighbors. The spread of western values by televisions built in Japan has created a global culture, and common standards of conduct. It is expected that states conduct themselves according to democratic norms. It is not clear how long the USA will care to, or be able to, act as the world's policeman. At some point the sheriff's badge must be worn collectively, instead of being pinned on Uncle Sam's shirt alone.

Last week, George Bush took the momentous step of standing down the Strategic Air Command's nuclear bombers. The Cold War really is over, and no coup, successful or not, can change that. We now enter a brave new multi-polar, and safer world. Nuclear missiles still sleep in silos, or lurk in the depths of the oceans, but the probability of their use, by accident or design, has become remote. Future rivalries will be over trade and resources, instead of megatons and ideologies.