Dave Powell

As I paged through my latest copy of Europa (#14), I noticed the question concerning paratroops and air drops, and also John Astell's rather extensive reply. It seems that the question of an airdrop limit has emerged before.

Personally, I agree with John's reasoning that arbitrary limits hardly provide an effective solution to, the "sky gangster" problem. On the other hand, sacrificing an entire airborne division in some vertical-insertion forlorn hope verges on silly. Paratroopers of all nations represented an elite that were maintained at the expense of frontline forces, draining the best manpower from the regulars. To continue to throw away these troops on suicide missions would have triggered storms of protest from all quarters (not the least of which would have been from the jumpers themselves). Hence, some means for inducing restraint would seem to be in order.

The solution I've always preferred is to simply up the ante. Why not double or triple the replacement point cost for each para unit which is eliminated while isolated? Usually when a unit is destroyed, there is a small cadre of survivors, returning wounded, etc. around which to rebuild the force, even if it has no Europa cadre. This is the idea behind special replacements and normal replacement costs.

Here is the simple, yet effective rule I propose: if a para unit is eliminated while isolated (per Scorched Earth isolation rule 31), the para will cost 2 times the standard replacement cost to bebuild. This rule should force the owning player to consider carefully his airdrops, and cause the reckless commander to spend a lot of extra replacement points.

Of course, there's always the question, "is another special rule worth it?" I believe that this decision is up to the individual player, and is easily ignored if too burdensome. But after all, there is a time limit on para replacement in SE already. And personally, I believe this limit is not representative enough of the special costs in elite manpower that airborne forces required.

Now for a question. In Scorched Earth, the German is forced to remove destroyed divisions from his replacement pool as the game progresses. I assume that such removals are the result of historical German East Front losses, and represent the manpower crunch the Nazis found themselves in. Their response was to deactivate some of these units that they never could reconstitute.

But what if you, the German player, have avoided such losses? Perhaps you have managed your army with a minimum of loss. So why not just leave these troops in the pool? If the player has enough points to replace them all, then fine. If not, I guess they were de facto deactivated anyway, if not de jure. Either way, I would appreciate some design input as to the actual intent of these removals, so I can draw my own conclusions.

Steven Phillips

I was curious about how far Grand Europa has come. Are there provisions for things like the Germans not invading, say, Belgium or Holland, or putting together the ME-264, or even the JU-89? I work for a company that does a PBIVI WW2 game. In the games we do, the teams have latitude to do pretty much as they please within the boundaries of reality. I was wondering just how much fun armchair Grand Strategists will be able to have with Grand Europa. Is Franco-German detente out of the question? Will the Germans be allowed to refuse to declare war on America? In light of how the Germans are performing in our game of Scorched Earth at the time of the Dec I 41 turn, war with the U.S. would certainly be a bad idea!

I guess the real question is, will players of Grand Europa be able to make the momentous decisions of the national leadership, or just those of the, General Staff?

Related to this, I saw in the #11 issue that the U.S. countermix for Second Front includes an atom bomb M. Well, do the Germans get to retaliate with nerve gas? In Grand Europa, will the Germans have an honest shot at getting atom bombs themselves? A bazillion questions... Hopefully, your excellent magazine will answer all of them.

In due time, Steven, in due time. Meanwhile most of what I know about the current plan for developing Grand Europa is covered in this issue's "Situation Report." As for me, I have a personal dream that the political and production aspects of GE may be handled via computerization. I think mere tables of possible results may be too restricting. Wouldn't it be great if there were a computer program which could assimilate the current political and industrial situation and determine the results of one's military and/or production moves? Using the probable outcome based on history as much as possible, but throwing in a small percentage of randomness, a computer might be just the vehicle to ride herd on the many permutations which GE in its purest form will generate. Food for thought... -RG

Jim Burnett

The Europa Ghost from issue #14 is, of course, "Little David," the largest calibre weapon of the war. For some reason the United States decided that busting the Siegfried Line or discouraging deeply dug-in Japanese would require massive artillery. "Little David" was a 36" rifled muzzle loader developed from a bombtesting howitzer used in the islands off Florida by the navy.

This configuration raised some eyebrows as the question of the ultimate ammunition was never solved. A deep penetrator would have benefitted from the stabilization provided by rifling, but the short barrel gave more of an indication of large high explosive rounds. Only one was built, and the war ended before it could be shipped to an active theater. Perhaps the use of this weapon would have ended up somewhat like the "Paris Gun" of World War I which was impressive, but required more resources in manpower and material than the results ever justified.

On another note, thanks for your promotion of ORIGINS '91 in the latest issue. As you know, I am one of the principals in GEMCO, the organizer of the convention. We are certainly looking forward to the emphasis on Europa next year. As of the last talk with Tom Johnson, we are hoping for a North African Front centerpiece game at the con. We hope that this game, which will be a "fifty years ago" demonstration of the game system and the state of the war, will not only promote Europa, but wargaming in general. The efforts of your magazine will go a long way towards attracting the quality players necessary to have a successful con and enjoyable sessions in the play of Europa.

So we hope, Jim - so we hope. Meanwhile, think Second Front! - RG

David Shearer

I enjoy TEM, especially the fact that to a large extent the information and articles are determined by direct input from your subscribers. I've been fascinated with the game system for about four years now. What has hooked me on Europa is its potential for a comprehensive treatment of the Second World War in Europe, reflecting especially the effects of Grand Strategy, industrial policy and political events. I am especially excited about the prospect of Grand Europa becoming a reality, and would like to offer some suggestions.

On the question of when to start Grand Europa, I have come to this conclusion: July 1940.

Why, you ask? The sequence of events up to this point don't really recommend themselves to tampering on a Grand Strategic level. For one thing, giving the Polish or French the ability to halt the tide of events would mean the assumption of policy changes going back far beyond the start of the war in September 1939. This would open up a real can of worms - playing about with this is, in general, totally in the realm of speculation. From the invasion of Poland to the defeat of France the major decisions were, in general, forced by events and follow a logical flow.

In July 1940, however, both sides were at a crossroads. The British were trying to find a way to carry the fight to their enemy, protect their far- flung interests, and protect vulnerable communications with inadequate resources. The Axis had to try and determine the best way to proceed: How to get at Britain?; could Russia be trusted?; what about the U.S.? On all sides, lots of interesting possibilities.

Another thing -. in order for the Axis to have any chance at all, they need all the help they can get. Basically, the Axis ended up in the same dismal position as the Southern States in the Civil War, the Boers in the Anglo-Boer War, and the Central Powers in the First World War. They ended up facing forces possessing resources of such power that all they had to do was refuse to give up to ensure victory.

On another topic: The largest artillery piece. "Little David" was the largest in bore diameter, but the largest in any other terms (shell weight, dimensions, deployed weight, crew size, and destructive capability) was, is, and always shall be the incredible 80cm Dora. This monster railroad artillery gun required a special double set of tracks to fire from, 4-5 trains (not cars, trains) to transport it, was served by over 1400 men commanded by a major general, and fired a shell that weighted over seven tons!

[It also required special rule 39D9 in Scorched Earth. -RG ]

At Sevastopol, one of these shells destroyed an ammo depot buried over 200 feet in the ground.

Incidentally, some of the bombards in use in the Middle Ages to flatten castles had bores well in excess of 36 inches.

Jason Long

Potpourri: I thought #14 was an excellent issue aside from your mistaking the 188th Reserve Mountain Division for a reserve fortress division. Hmm...reserve fortress, that would be two vertical lines and two horizontal ones; it would look like a checkerboard, wouldn't it? Does Winston know about this?

[Everyone's a comic. -RG]

The ghost this month is the American mortar "Little David" that, in my opinion, needs to disappear from Second Front. And I, too, am mystified why 4-8 Italian mountain divisions have cadres, elite troops or not. I think I can tell you why a 9-8 Pz X doesn't have a cadre. The division is about three times the size of the brigade, but lacks the Panthers that give the brigade its punch.

Ralph Sunley

Firstly, I would like to compliment you on your excellent magazine. I have been an Europa gamer for six years (since the age of 12), but your publication has added a whole new dimension to my gaming.

. Secondly, there are a number of questions which I have to ask. I realize that you are limited for space in your magazine, but perhaps you could answer a couple of them for me. Here we go:

(1) What do the brackets that enclose a unit's size mean, e.g. Greek 15th DF Static [II]?

(2) In Jason Long's article on the Yugoslav Royal Air Force from TEM #11, he mentioned the DO-22, yet I have been unable to find any reference to it anywhere. What sort of plane is it?

(3) About two years ago I heard of a proposal for a game about a hypothetical German invasion of Czechoslovakia. Has anything become of this? I'm sure it would have been a good fight and I think most gamers would agree that it would make an interesting game.

(4) Has Dennis J. Dubberley decided to pursue his Soviet Asia project?

(5) Does Europa have a naval system yet? If so, where are all the ships that are still needed to accompany my oft-idle French and British navies?

(6) Grand Europa - I feel that there are a couple of problems looming for what will undoubtedly be the largest game of all time. The first of these is in fact its size - how is anyone expected to play it without 20-30 people who all have several months of spare time, 7* arms to reach the centre of the board, and access to an empty warehouse? Logistically, this game appears to be a nightmare! (Kind of like WW2 itself, I guess.) Secondly, Mark Pitcavage had some extremely valid points in his article about strategy in TEM #12. Realistically, Grand Europa will have to encompass national policy- making, force pools, etc. if it intends to be a game about World War Two. I think that Grand Europa needs to define itself and its aims more precisely to clear the air over these questions. Finally, keeping the above in mind, just how soon (in years) can we expect to see GE? Will the year 2000 be upon us before Sep 1 39, the German invasion turn of Poland in the first game of GE?

I hope that someone in that vast nation of yours can answer some of my queries, but in the meantime keep up the good work.

[Ralph is Yuppie Aussie from Yangebup. -RG]

Thanks for the kind words about TEM and your interest in Europa. It's encouraging to see young players in the ranks, and I try to keep the potential recruit in mind when editing the magazine. I will try to answer your questions as best I can:

(1) Brackets around a unit's size indicate that the unit is of nonstandard size, but most closely appoximates the unit size shown in the brackets.

For example, the LSSAH Motorized "Division" in Balkan Front is in reality a "divisional grouping." This symbology has been revised in Balkan Front so that the unit size is enclosed in a box rather than brackets, as shown here:

The unit you cite appears in Marita-Merkur. The 15th DF was split into detachments roughly equivalent to battalions.

(2) Jason Long advises that the DO-22 was a modified DOtype aircraft with pontoons, used as a naval reconnaissance plane. It was produced in very limited quantities and never saw service in the Luftwaffe.

(3) Speaking of Jason, he is the fellow developing the "Czech '38" module for GRID. As mentioned elsewhere in this issue, there was some playtesting of the module going on at Europafest this summer.

(4) I'm quite sure Dennis is willing to pursue his Soviet Asia project, but other projects have crowded it out of the schedule. Even the previously proposed Map 32 has been shelved for future consideration while the production of Balkan Front and other games, most notably Second Front, consume all GRID's energies and resources.

(5) The Europa naval system reached its height of development in Their Finest Hour, and has Iaguished somewhat since. John Astell emphasizes that while the "Med" module would concentrate on development of the naval system, this is still far down the road. When published, any necessary "missing" naval counters will be provided.

(6) Grand Europa is being approached in a logical and forthright manner as outlined in my editorial column in this issue. As to the practical issues you raise for just how one would go about eating this elephant, schemes have already been presented for setting up the maps. These usually suggest separating the maps into three "theaters". The East Front, the West Front, and North Africa. I personally believe computerization can play a role in making GE work and that the postal environment may be the one most conducive to successful play. Some sort of multi-layered approach would seem in order. Unfortunately, I can't go into all the details here, but I foresee the need for a gamemaster and some sort of command hierarchy which would allocate various teams to the commands of the different theaters. The "Big Picture" could be communicated through some sort of reporting process. Hey, it won't be easy, but where there is a will there is a way.

Timing for GE ? Phase One should be possible within two years, and from there we'll just have to see. - RG

Forrest Opper

Just received TEM #14 yesterday and greedily devoured it. TEM is as close as I've gotten to Europa, or to any wargame, for that matter. I particularly enjoyed Winston's GR/D Briefing, Rick's Tricks, "Inside Europa," Roy Lane's article, "EXchange," and especially the "SF Newsletter #1."

While looking through the back issues of TENITEM recently I ran across a few items on which you might care to shed some light:

(1) Back in TEN #5 a counter errata sheet was mentioned.

Since some counters were misprinted for BF (and possibly there will be others for First to Fight, the remake of Narvik, and Second Front), perhaps when enough misprinted counters are identified a counter errata sheet can be offered, either as a freebie, or for some price.

(2) Shelby Stanton has not finished his article on German assault gun units from TEN #6. I for one am still looking forward to the conclusion with anticipation.

(3) In TEN #9 the possibility of producing 50% reductions of the fronts of existing Europa counter sheets was proposed. I'd like to see that and believe it would be useful in keeping track of the tremendous amount of counters in Grand Europa.

(1) The counter errata sheet proposal is still under consideration. The hold-up is the exorbitant cost and difficulty of printing all the correction counters in the proper colors. Given that there are no more than a few counters for each country, what would be required is a veritable polyglot of colors exceeding anything ever seen on one countersheet before! Nonetheless, other Association members have expressed similar interest, and plans are being considered. Stay tuned.

(2) Noted.

(3) The proposal to print 50% reductions of the countersheets in the magazine did not generate enough public support to justify such an undertaking. -RG

James Broshot

First: Your ghost from TEM #14 is the 914mm Mortar, "Little David." According to my copy of British and American Artillery of World War II by Ian Hogg, it was developed by the United States in 1944 from a bomb testing device. It was intended for use against Japanese fortifications in the Pacific and might have been deployed in Operation Olympic (the invasion of Japan) in November 1945.

Firing tests began in April 1945. With the end of the war it was put in storage and is now in the museum at Aberdeen Proving Ground. Since it was intended to fire a 3,700 pound shell about 9,500 yards, it would have been pretty nigh impractical to use to deliver an atomic shell (assuming one would have existed at that time). With all due respect, I consider the 1x 4-0-6 Siege Art I T1 with atomic capability in Second Front to be pretty far-fetched.

Secondly, to add to the "War in the Desert" debate of Europa #14: As an added chrome rule, consider the so-called "Axis Bypass" around Tobruk (Hexes 18:4719, 18:4819, and 18:4919), non-existent until it is built using railroad construction rules. Most sources I have consulted, including Rommel's memoirs, note that this road was built in three months by the Italians at Rommel's behest during the fall of 1941 to give them a supply route around Tobruk which was then held by the Australians. See especially With Rommel in the Desert, by H.W. Schmidt, at page 70. As a sidebar, as noted by David Schee in his Italian Offensive scenario in The Grenadier #23, the road from the Libyan/ Egyptian border to Sidi Barani did not exist in 1940, and its construction was one of the reasons for the slow Italian advance in September 1940.

As for giving the Afrika Korps a 0-8 engineer III, this is not accurate. Again, my sources (especially Bender's Afrika Korps book) show that the Germans had very limited engineering and construction capabilities. Panzerarmee Afrika had Heeres Bau Dienst (mot) 73 and Bau Bataillion 73 on strength as of August 15, 1942; and this might justify giving the Germans a 0-8 construction II.

I would leave the divisional engineer capability in place for Allied divisions to use building forts. Most sources indicate that the manpower for the various and sundry "boxes" built by Eighth Army at Gazala, Matruh and Alamein was supplied by infantry divisions in reserve. In any event, Ben Knight's supply idea for fortifications is interesting, since most fortifications built by both sides in the desert were strong points surrounded by miles and miles of mines - witness the "minemarshes" of the Eighth Army's Gazala Line and the Axis defenses at Alamein. Persurnably the mines would have had to come from somewhere and if you were using your resources to bring up mines, you wouldn't have them available to supply an offensive.

In this case, you should allow the British the historical option of converting the First Army Tank Brigade (1x 6-4-6 Tank X 1T) into two Scorpion units, Matilda II tanks equipped with flails for minesweeping: 2x 0-1-6 Eng Tank II 44RT, 50 RT.

One last comment, I would use John Astell's 2x 1-6 Arm II 1M, 2M for the 1x 1-6 Arm III 41 substitution, but would not adopt the 2x 1-8 Lt Arm X 1,2 for the 7x 0-8 Lt Arm II's. The latter skews the Italian initial deployment too much, and from what is said in The Iron Arm, by Sweet, prewar Italian armored training in Libya concentrated on close support of the infantry by tank battalions and not independent maneuvering by larger formations. Based on Sweet, the 2x 1-6 Tank II 1M, 2M represent the 4th Reggimento Fanteria Carrista which went to Libya in September 1940 and were equipped with the M11/39 medium tank (MG in turret and 47mm gun fixed in hull).

To balance the addition to Italian initial forces, especially if you are using my "Operation Compass" scenario from TEN #5, add to the British attack force: 1x 1-8 MG II 1RNF.

I am presently playtesting the various ideas put forth by Ben Knight and John Astell, as well as some of my own. I will advise of the results.

Lastly, Europa #14 was one of the best issues yet. I nominate Pitcavage's article on The Urals for best Europa strategy ever. Keep up the good work.

Marshall Ruhlsmonger

A tip for mating the Balkan Front maps to maps 13 and 3B: Overlay the old maps on the new ones. Things match up well except for the transportation lines. Use common sense to connect these.