Louis Rotundo

Recently John Astell discussed an option for increasing German panzer strength on the Eastern Front ("Inside Europa" TEM #12). In that article, he specifically mentioned two missing German Panzer Divisions; the 2nd and the 5th. Both were listed in the Balkan campaign. Both were discussed as having been shipped to Italy due to the rail congestion in the Balkans. Both were on ships attacked by British submarines.

Haider reports in his diary on 5/22/41 that 2nd Panzer Division lost through sinking a total of 122 tanks, 200 motor vehicles, 29 motorcycles and 1,328 men. Yet, later that same day Heusinger reports from Greece that the tank loss figure is erroneous as these had already landed. He pinpointed losses mostly in light/medium artillery. Haider reports these are "very hard to replace because of the shortage of prime movers." Personnel losses were also confirmed by Heusinger.

On May 28th, 12th Army HQ states it needs 5th Panzer Division to remain in Athens for the time being. The tense atmosphere within the city is given as the prime reason. On June 20th, Haider reports the Division is still at Athens, however Hitler wants it moved immediately to Romania.

These facts should help Europa players better decide how to handle the two missing Divisions. Certainly the most intriguing option is 5th Panzer Division at full strength in June in Romania. The decision on 2nd Panzer Division is trickier. My recommendation would be for Germany to deduct one motorized artillery unit and allow 2nd Panzer to appear at full strength on Jul I 41.

Ron Mazurkiewicz

I think Kasserine Crisis was a great idea. Introducing people to the Europa games has always been a problem without smaller scenarios like this one. I would also like to comment that I think your mix of articles in the Europa magazine is just great, as far as I am concerned. I think the historical articles have been outstanding. They have presented now information on the Eastern Front and the Orders of Battle involved. I prefer articles of this type to the "how to get a 7-1 on hex 2847" type of game tactics article. Don't fill up your magazine with them, please.

Lindsay Murillo

It seems the 'zine is headed in the right direction, from my perspective anyway. The "Rules Court," Slick Tricks, tactical and strategic articles form what I consider to be the heart of TEM.

(As one can see, we appear to be walking the tight-rope between the history and game-play factions fairly well. If you've enjoyed the mix in the last few magazines, you will continue to be pleased with future issues. Editor.)

Jason Long

A note for readers: I understand that the USAAF OB in TEN #10 does not include attrition replacements.

John Astell's article on divisional sizes (TEN #10, "Inside Europa") is all very well and good, but it does make a difference between supplying and transporting a 2 RE division and a 3 RE division. It also matters for AEC calculations. Granted that it is another thing to keep track of, but give us chrome addicts an optional rule specifying divisional sizes. That way players can use it if they care to.

I have been wondering about the high defense strengths of the American engineer units; just how many heavy machine guns do they have? And why the big difference in defense strengths between German and American railroad engineers?

P.J. Haugh

As regards SE play balance, I tend to agree with Charles Sharp that something goes wrong in late 1942- early 1943: a competent Axis player will not leave long lengths of his line held solely by Rumanians, Hungarians, Italians, and Slovaks. To redress this, and give the Axis player some of the problems the Germans faced with their minor Allies, I feel Rule 32A (Axis Allies) should be beefed up to read: "32A (Addition) Rumanian divisions, Hungarian divisions, and Italian divisions may not stack with German divisions."

Although slightly artificial, this rule will force the Axis player to man some sections of his line with extremely brittle (i.e., small cadre/ no cadre) forces.

Also, I find the use of certain bombers as transports per rule 39G not to my taste. If bomber units can carry out all "transport" functions, there is no point in maintaining type "T" units at all. I suggest replacing the word "cargo" with "supply" in rule 39G so as to read: "When used as a transport, such an air unit can carry supply at the same capacity as a type "T" air unit."

Tip: Plastic lamination of mapsheets is a good idea: it increases map durability and administrative details such as forts, RR cuts, and port hits can be "written" onto the map and erased as necessary, eliminating those pesky informational counters.

Deen Wood

All things considered ... Play Balance in the East: In reading the comments from TEM #13 I am immediately struck by two things: First, the incorrect equating of victory in Scorched Earth with total victory over the USSR and second, the tendency to line up cardboard, factories and bodies for a .mass balance' to determine who would win in the real world.

Victory conditions should be tailored to fit the probable outcomes of a game, allowing each side an equal chance to win-. So, just because the USSR loses the game does not mean they would lose the war. The Germans do not have to crush the USSR by obtaining a decisive victory to be victorious in the game. All they have to do is, failing the above, inflict enough casualties on the USSR to prevent them from running the Axis completely out of Russia.

Check the victory point schedule: By hanging on to the western edge of the USSR the Axis can get a marginal victory (or at least a draw). I see no historical anomalies in the game from this perspective. By all accounts I have read, given competent upper management, this goal was not an unreasonable one for Germany even as late as 1943, had she chosen to pursue a defensive strategy in the east. By having a set of victory conditions that allows each side to 'win' some level of victory about the same number of times one has a game that is interesting. But winning the GAME and winning the WAR need not be the same thing. If, however, either side wins some level of GAME victory much more than 50% of the time in games that are played to completion, then something is wrong with the game's parameters or with the competition.

As to the real prospect of the Axis defeating the USSR I think Mr. Kaufman said about everything I would say. I will add this: One cannot simply compare the number of factories, men, or tanks to determine the victor. If that were so then Germany should lose Fall of France most of the time and Russia should have crushed the Central Powers in the east in WWI. Germany had the same things going for it (training, doctrine and morale) when it launched Barbarossa that it had earlier in France in 1940; indeed, by 1941 the Nazi government was even more entrenched than it was in 1940.

The USSR, by many accounts, could have collapsed under the Axis hammer blows. Governments collapse because of just those types of physical and moral disasters Russia suffered. Not many governments survive to the bitter end and go down in flames like the Third Reich. Stalin had no encouraging, long-term SE reinforcement schedule to parade in front of his generals and commissars.

His position in 1941 and 1942 must have been very shaky at times. History is full of those who like the Czar might have won in the long run, but for' a little more stability. The political and human aspects of the real world argue that Germany had a real chance of defeating the USSR totally. I'd guess that a 15% chance for total Axis victory is about right, with an additional 20% to 30% chance of the Axis achieving a stalemate. Keep in mind that such a stalemate may or may not have been to Germany's ultimate advantage, depending on when and where it was achieved. The above numbers, however, have little to do with how a game's victory conditions should be designed.

Victor Hauser

Responding to Rob Ramey's "The Arctic Runaway" ("TAR") as presented in "Slick Tricks" from TEM #13, 1 would like to present a dissenting opinion. If I'm interpreting him correctly, Rob seems to be saying that trading Murmansk, 6 Lend-lease fighters, 3 resource points, and 10 armor RPs, all lost while Arkhangelsk's port is frozen during 41-42, is a good deal when many of the units of the 14th, 7th, and 23rd Armies can be immediately shifted south, when and where they are most needed, for the defense of Leningrad and other critical sectors. Besides the fact that I think the 6 Lend-lease fighters are more valuable than any 6 divisions in the 7th and 14th Armies, I also believe that the situation is more complicated and problematic than Rob indicates.

First, if the Soviets bail out of the Arctic theater, then the Axis are also free to explore other options with their forces in the theater, including the German winterized units, resource points, and air power they would otherwise have to commit there. Admittedly, the Soviet 23rd Army zone is of limited value unless you believe that the 23rd Army (and whatever reinforcements you send it) can stomp the Finns before the Germans stomp you at Leningrad. I don't. Thus, the 23rd Army can profitably pull out its best forces from the zone for use elsewhere. Likewise, there is no real value in keeping the 1st Tank XX in the Arctic - it too can go south. Indeed, by executing a delaying action along the road to Petrozavodsk, the Soviets present the Axis with the choice of either upgrading the road or having all the Finns go out of supply as they approach the Svir river and Belomorsk, as well as threatening them with amphibious/airborne operations north of Lake Ladoga.

Second, Axis air power can use harassment and rail bombing to dramatically retard the southward migration of the 14th and 7th Armies. Thus, those forces might not actually reach the "real" fighting until it's too late, and will have given up Murmansk in the process. This possibility could parallel d'ErIon's Corps marching to no effect between Quatre-Bras and Ligny on 16 June 1815.

Third, there is no reason to assume that the Axis, once having cleared the MurmanskKandalaksha sectors will be content to sit quietly. I would, as the German player, drive hard for Belomorsk knowing that if I captured it, then Leningrad would have its only northern potential supply option cut. Thus, the Soviets would be forced to fight hard there - maybe harder than they would have had to if they had simply fought for the Murmansk- Kandalaksha sectors in the first place.

Fourth, I think that Rob is making a very big assumption when he indicates that only those Lend-Lease forces during the years of 1941 and 1942 will be lost. For one, I am not very optimistic of Soviet forces driving north from Belomorsk (or worse) and retaking Murmansk by 1943. 1 say this because, if they are competent, the Axis will have the Soviets on the ropes throughout most, if not all, of 1942. Thus, the Soviets may well be very hard-pressed to assemble the offensive forces necessary to do the job, which will, in any event, be a significant and sizable undertaking.

Fifth, and most importantly, I strongly believe that the Soviets should not abandon good, defensible terrain - especially in a sector where they can meet the Axis on equal terms. I also believe that the Soviets can make the Axis spend a proportionately much greater effort than themselves. In other words, I think it is not only within the Soviets capabilities, but that it is good economy to make the Axis expend extra effort to capture some hexes of Arctic tundra. And if the Axis do, in fact, take Murmansk? So what.

As Rob indicated, not much is lost there anyway. But the bad guys will have had to fight long and hard for it on Soviet terms. I'm a firm believer in forcing my opponent to fight at a time and place of my choosing, and I can't think of a much more difficult place for the Axis than the frozen wastelands of the Arctic -- anytime.

In any event, much of this debate is worth little more than table talk if neither approach suits your individual style of play and that of your opponents. Clearly, Rob has faith in "TAR" while I believe it to be of illusory value. In the final analysis, it all comes down to your interpretation, understanding, and application of that fundamental principle of war - economy of force.

Rob Ramey

After reading Victor Hauser's letter (above), I do not feel he fully understood "TAR", The Arctic Runaway. Victor discusses fighting around the Belomorsk and Petrozavodsk areas. This would not be possible unless the Finns and Germans fought each other.

"TAR" calls for the total abandonment of the Arctic and Finnish fronts. Yes, that includes the northern supply route to Leningrad.

Why should Soviet forces be committed to the north? There are only three possible reasons; these are: (1) to hold Murmansk to allow arrival of Lend-lease reinforcements during snow turns, (2) to tie down a proportionately greater number of Germans, and/or (3) to hold open a northern supply route to Leningrad.

The Lend-lease reinforcements lost through December 1942 include: six fighters, three resource points, and ten armor RPs. It seems to me that this meager amount of resources is not worth an eighteen month campaign (36 turns) to hold the area. To conduct this campaign means that 80+ Soviet combat factors in the north are doing nothing a lot of the time or are dying with more having to be sent up to bolster the sagging defense or offense.

I really don't think that this would constitute a brilliant example of that fundamental principle of war - economy of force. Here's why. The claim is that holding the Arctic will tie down a proportionately larger number of German troops - please count again. I think you will find the Soviets will have to commit over a 2-1 ratio in favor of the Germans. I bet you forgot to subtract the Finnish troops: "TAR" completely negates the 109 combat factors of the Finnish Army. Now that is an example of economy of force, 109 - 0. I like that ratio. The 37+ factors of Germans can redeploy to other fronts, but the Finnish Army cannot efficiently do SO.

Now since neither the LendLease reinforcements nor the issue of economy of force can be justified as a valid reason for fighting on the northern front, that leaves only the northern supply line to Leningrad. This issue is a little more abstract.

The question arises as to whether you can hold the Leningrad Front and not need the northern supply route. Yes, I do believe you can. As a Russian commander, I have found the Leningrad area frequently comes under extreme pressure from an aggressive and experienced German player before I had the units necessary to slow him. However, the injection of 80+ combat factors from the 14th, 7th and 23rd Armies allows a much stiffer defense and maybe a counterattack or two.

Don't get me wrong, I don't think 80 points will smash the German offensive, but it can certainly slow it down. I believe you should dedicate these extra forces to hold the Leningrad area. This early influx of elite units will bolster the city's defense, removing the need for the northern supply route.

Furthermore, as the game continues I no longer have to reinforce the northern theater - the Axis are halted by the stop line. I do not think most people fully realize just how much is normally sent north for the counterattack, strengthening of the front, or the desperate attempt to stop a German attack. All these assets can be reassigned where needed on the main front.

Responding to Victor's other points: (Point 2) If the Axis commits this much air power to the north to try and stop the plan, there would be a proportionately fewer number of troops lost to air power support in the south. (Point 4) Once the area is abandoned, I agree that it is not profitable to attempt to retake it until '43. By then the main issue of the survival of the USSR should have been favorably resolved, with the aid of "TAR.".

Ray Kanarr

Regarding "The Arctic Runaway," this certainly is a slick trick valid under "RAW" (Rules As Written), and brings up the point that there will need to be a lot of input and playtesting before Grand Europa rules can be distributed as official. Certainly, my impressions from what I have read of the Finnish involvement are that:

• A less-spirited forward defense by the Soviet Union of the area contained within the bounds of the "stop line" might have led to either an expanded area of Finnish operations or no restrictions on Finnish ops at all.
• Greater German involvement in the Finnish theater than historical would likely have been forthcoming, possibly resulting in an envelopment of Leningrad actually causing its surrender. (Morale was maintained in Leningrad to some extent by such connection with the rest of the Soviet Union as the Lake Ladoga ice road and flotillas provided - no matter that the connection was tenuous. How would lack of such supply links have impacted the defense of Leningrad?) This would likely have been the result of success in the Arctic fighting (no matter that the "success" in the north in this case results from voluntary Soviet retrograde action).
• "TAR" would provide an increased amount of time and resources points for the Axis forces to use creating defensive lines, leading to increased Finnish morale (as well as the morale effects of lessened Finnish losses in taking the territory up to the .. stop line.") Finnish participation in the war past the historical point (based on the above effects) would have been likely.

I would have to say then that I feel a Soviet withdrawal to the "stop line" should not be allowed to occur in a vacuum - the effects of this in game terms (the loss of Murmansk and the transportation lines south to the "stop line" and the possible envelopment of Leningrad) should be reflected in something of the nature of eliminating the "stop line" restrictions upon achievement of the "stop line" objectives, or at least eliminating the Finnish armistice conditions, so long as there are a certain number of forts and German units in Finland and the "stop line" area between Helsinki and the front.

Just as the world didn't end at the map edge before Scorched Earth and The Urals, the war wouldn't end just because the Finns reached some sort of strategic "stop line." Moreover, an easy victory in this area would have strengthened the argument of those in Finland who felt that Finland should grab as much territory as possible from the Soviet state. This is, however, a question of politics that should rightly be addressed in Grand Europa, so I see no alternative but to grin and bear it.

My Soviet counterparts assure me that this is really not some Soviet slime, because only the Germans do that! But actually it's good of you to point out this trick, as it does give the German team a quid pro quo to ask for in return for not using the Brandenburgers as rear-area rail blocks.

Marshall Ruhismonger

I've been wondering: Why is it that 9-8 SS panzer brigades have no cadres, but 4-8 Italian mountain divisions do?

What becomes of the obsolete aircraft that are converted in Western Desert and then never heard from again? I know the Ba.65 is not a variation of the Ju87B, so what happened to them?

Why is it that Europa does not have a counter for the Jewish brigade which fought in "War in the Desert"?

Huh, huh, huh???

In the immortal words of our National Security Adviser Scowcroft "That's a good question, and let me state the problem more clearly without going too deeply into the answer." John? HELP!