One of the interesting aspects of Gorbachev's glasnost has been the Soviet historian's ability to venture into new subjects. Not only have articles appeared that were written many years ago, but events and issues that have been discussed many times have again been reviewed with the twist of new details. The flow of new Soviet information covers not only the material in the Journal of Military History (VIZ), but also articles in Red Star, Pravda, and other less well-known periodicals. Surprisingly, the competition to uncover new data has led to some interesting situations. For example, K. Siminov's interviews with Zhukov were first published in Ogonek in 1987. It was a year later that VIZ published a slightly different version and then proceeded to rebut its own articles with a three-part series of reviews of Zhukov's comments. To be a Soviet historian today is to be behind in your reading!

One subject that might be of interest to readers of TEM is the recently disclosed efforts at peace launched by Stalin in 1941. Although the information on this subject is still not complete, it has received the highest confidence.

At the end of September, 1941 the German Army launched a final drive to take Moscow. By all accounts, the German Army could not be stopped. Not only had it demonstrated that it could go virtually anywhere it chose to move, the casualties and fatigue of the Red Army seemed to imply that the USSR was finished. This miscalculation would haunt the final two months of the 1941 campaign.

Opening on September 30th, Guderian's panzer forces were soon joined by the other troops of Army Group Center in a concerted bid to pocket the Soviet Western Front. Konev's forces had ample warning that an offensive was coming. However, through a miscalculation of the power of the attack, the Soviet reserves were not sufficient to handle it. Not only was Reserve Front deployed too close behind Western Front, the few Soviet reserves available to Western Front command were not deployed opposite the identified German panzer forces.

The quick disruption of Soviet communications and the loss of control by Western Front command left STAVKA completely in the dark as to the enormity of the disaster unfolding right on Moscow's doorstep. The first Soviet aerial reconnaissance reports stated that German forces were headed toward Moscow with no organized Soviet resistance between them and the capital.

Although Soviet formations still existed, they were in total confusion and fighting desperate rearguard actions to avoid or escape encirclement. In many places they had succeeded in pinning German troops to the containment of the newly formed cauldrons. By design they were to serve a valuable function in the coming days.

By October 5, the news could no longer be hidden that a major collapse had occurred on Western-Reserve Front. Orders were issued to begin to mobilize ten new reserve armies and to move them to Moscow as rapidly as possible. Additional Soviet Forces from other armies were made ready to move over the short distance to the capital. Much could be done, all that was required was time.

On October 5th, Zhukov received a Baudot call in Leningrad from Stalin to come immediately to Moscow. No hint was given of the seriousness of the situation. This was in keeping with Stalin's oft repeated stricture to avoid important discussions over the airways. Zhukov was told to leave on the morning of the 6th. However, the Nazi pressure on Leningrad's 54th Army made a departure impossible until the 7th.

Upon arrival on the evening of the 7th, Zhukov was informed that Stalin was ill and working at his Kremlin apartment. In his autobiographical discussion of the war, Reminiscences and Reflections, Stalin appears as tired, but firmly in control of the discussion. He indicates a lack of information on the events of the Western Front and requests that Zhukov assume control of the troops.

Nervous

When Siminov released his interview material with Zhukov (interviews that occurred in 1966), extra details appeared in the narrative. Stalin was nervous and angry over the course of events. Nervous over the magnitude of the disaster and angry by name with Konev and Eremenko. Budennyi was not mentioned and Zhukov states that Stalin seemed to imply that Budennyi was no longer accountable for military actions. A tribunal by Molotov had been sent to the Front HQ. After inquiry into the state of affairs, Konev was to be handed over to them.

Once before, Stalin had used a tribunal to "investigate" military disasters. At the beginning of the war, Pavlov, Klimovskikh, and a long list of military officers had been arrested and even now were being executed. Zhukov proposed that nothing good could come o this investigation of Konev. Instead he asked that he be made his deputy, a request Stalin granted.

After the war Konev denounced Zhukov as part of the antiKhrushchev faction. A part of this story and the Zhukov comment that Konev failed to deploy Soviet reserves along the spearpoints of the Nazi advance could well be responses to those bitter memories. In any event Rokossovskii also supports Zhukov's story about the miscleployment of the reserves, but in a slightly different fashion. He states that all preparations for and discussions of procedures in case of a need for a planned retreat were rejected by Konev. As a result, no preparations were made to handle the quick collapse of many of Western Front's positions.

Stalin and Treaty

But the bombshell of the October 7th meeting was left undisclosed until May 1989. On that date, Lt. General and Doctor of Historical Science Professor N. Pavlenko disclosed some additional details of the conversation between Stalin and Zhukov. Writing in Moskovskie novosti, Pavlenko discussed several previously taboo subjects. Included in these was the October 7th meeting and a part of the conversation Zhukov had not reported.

Specifically, Pavlenko reported that on August 29th, 1988 jurist Terekhov had appeared on Soviet television to discuss his part in the Lavrenti Beriia trial of 1953. Terekhov reported that Beriia had conducted peace talks with Germany during 1941. Pavlenko reported that he had learned of the Benia peace talks in 1954, right after the execution of Beriia. He had wondered at the time if Stalin had known of Beriia's actions.

During the mid-1960's, Pavlenko and Zhukov met to discuss certain historical events. At that time, Zhukov reported to Pavlenko that event which obviously no Soviet censor felt inclined to pass until Gorbachev's loosening of the reins. During the October 7th meeting, Zhukov, Stalin, and Beriia were in the room.

This was logical as Stalin rarely met alone with anyone. Beria said nothing during the military part of the conversation. Zhukov reports that Stalin took a very pessimistic view of the situation. Then, suddenly he switched the conversation to 1918 and the drama at that time. Stalin said Lenin had left "us" the state and "...said that it should be strengthened in every way." Stalin further added that "we" had failed to carry out his instructions because the enemy was now at the gates of Moscow. What was needed, Stalin said, was a breathing space some time -- to repair the damage. This was no different than the harsh reality of 1918 and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk that Lenin had signed: a treaty that surrendered western Russia to Germany. Addressing Beriia, Stalin directed him to explore options for another "Brest Peace." This peace would forfeit the Baltic States, Belorussia, Moldavia and part of the Ukraine.

Zhukov advised Pavlenko that Beriia's agents approached Hitler through the Bulgarian embassy. A Bulgarian diplomat, named Stotenov, was selected as the go-between. However, nothing came of the contact. Hitler had bigger game in mind than gaining a buffer from the Soviet state. A peace built on lands he already held probably seemed small reward for the effort. Through November, Hitler could still mistakenly believe that he was playing for the knockout.

Terekhov visited this Bulgarian during the Beriia trials. But, as Pavlenko reports, Terekhov recently died and unless his papers reflect additional information there is little to add. Zhukov, however, told this story to others and Pavlenko ends his article with an appeal to publish those portions of Zhukov's memoirs that deal with this episode. This remark reveals much about the process for new information in the USSR of today.