If at first you don I succeed.. fix it in the next issue! One victim of TEN 10's holiday time crunch was the chart which was to accompany Charles Sharp's EXchange letter. To make amends, we are reprinting part of Charles' letter and the AWOL chart at the end of this column.

Forrest Opper

A few months or so ago I received some back issues of TEN. In one of these there was an article by Deen Wood on playing FitE/SE without the North (TEN #3). Since I am rather cramped for space, it sounded like a good idea and so I wrote to him asking for more information. He, like GR/D has also done in the past, replied with a great deal of camaraderie and information. I was very impressed.

The point I'm trying to make is that, for the first time since I began this hobby in '81 or'82, I feel like I belong to something alive. I was a "member" of the National Wargaming Association (Kriegsrat), the old American Wargaming Association, and the National Monstergaming Society (Chain-of-Command), but I never "belonged" to them, since I really couldn't contribute any articles to their newsletters (plus, it seemed that whenever I wrote a letter to the editor, the newsletter folded or changed its name). I now get TEN, of course, and am a member of the Europa Association. I am absolutely amazed at the amount of information and the good gibes. There are very few put-downs or negative ("You're not O.K.") type responses. In the vast majority of the print on this wondrous system, I've seen nothing but the healthy exchange of ideas and the gladly accepted building on others' ideas, modifications, and errors. I am very impressed and I want to do what I can to help it to continue.

Well, Forrest, your string is intact. As you have no doubt noticed on the cover of this issue we have changed our name to the Europa magazine.

Deen has indeed updated and expanded his article 'Scorched Earth Without the North.' Anyone who is interested in obtaining this improved version may receive one by sending a request, along with a self-addressed stamped envelope, to the Editor

Peter Robbins

I know who your "Ghost" in TEN #10 is: It's

Two additions to Winston Hamilton's "Music for Europa': First, Dimitri Shostakovitch's "Leningrad," or 9th Symphony. Shostakovitch, along with other musicians from the Leningrad Symphony Orchestra, worked as an air raid warden and fireman during the siege of Leningrad. He was flown out of Leningrad to conduct the Moscow premiere of that work. The symphony takes up two long LP discs, or about the length of the average SE turn.

Or, if you prefer something a bit lighter, there is Al Stewart's 'Roads to Moscow.'

A two-LP turn is not the average in these parts, there must be something to the theory that music increases productivity, after all!

Ray Kanarr

What exactly is Europa ?

I have felt for a while that quite a bit of the controversies that crop up with regard to our particular hobby are involved with the question, misapprehension, miscommunication, and/or vagueness regarding what Europa is. Is it a series of games (in the sense of a competitive pastime, like contract bridge or backgammon) that happen to share certain basic constructed equivalencies (scale, terrain, movement rates, etc.), which enable the "games" to be combined into a sort of supergame, though the bases (plural of basis) of the games may have only the remotest connection to reality (like chess)?

Is it a visual monograph, or series of operational maps for various campaigns of the Second World War as known in history, more or less straitiacketed into historical lines, with an invariable historical outcome?

Is it a visual amusement (like a jigsaw puzzle) or aesthetic pursuit (as mah-jongg, or more likely, Go, might be)?

Is it an accurate political/economic/military simulation of the state of Europe at some time during the 1930's, and progressing through the mid-1940's, open-ended as to what might (within reason and capability) happen or have happened in Europe during this period of time, and encompassing all reasonable (which is a vague judgment that someone will have to make) alternate possibilities and outcomes in this geographical area with and between the nations, territories, dependencies, and colonies involved (note that even the use of the term Europe is stretched to include Northern Africa, the region known as the Middle East, and in all ways except territorially, many of the states of the Americas)?

If it is a 'game," then anything can be done without "violating" any concept of "historical' parameters, and any whouse rule" is as good as any other, and all should be given equal consideration.

If it is simply a replay of history, then rules should be promulgated to ensure that a historical outcome (as far as we know history, which is not at all an objective science) is the result every time.

If it is a visual amusement, then there should be discussion on the most elegant means (in terms of precision, neatness, interest, and simplicity) of accomplishing any goal in the exercise.

If it is supposed to be a simulator, then a great deal of work needs to be done in all aspects of it, and those areas should be identified and addressed in a methodical and exhaustive manner.

Part of what is going on, of course, is that Europa has elements of all of these things combined within it. This is not necessarily a "bad' thing, but (to my way of thinking) it does mean that there needs to be some clear indication given by someone, as to what part of Europa is a game (are all of the air factors just rated in relation to each other, in someone's opinion, and therefore not necessarily directly related to some sort of 'reality'?), what part is historical mandate (if there is no other way in which something could happen, or in which some unit could be used, then there should be a rules prohibition against any alternatives; if not, then there should not be a prohibition), what part is visual amusement (my own thoughts in this area lean toward units that are "factored in", rather than explicitly denoted, but there are, of course, other possibilities), and what part of it is political/economic/military simulator (any number of points could be indicated here, that being the nature of something that is open-ended. The creation of alternative mixes of units, given different national priorities, however, seems to be one candidate for examination, as in: what would the Germans have had to give up to complete the naval Z-plan ships?)

Anyhow, this very briefly and superficially covers what I consider to be the stumbling block to coherent thinking about Europa in general, any specific Europa title, or Grand Europa. I think that it is the "real" problem behind a question like 'What should constitute an overrun?'. What is the actual historical data behind the concept of the overrun as it relates to an exercise with two-week split turns (rather than simultaneous movement/action), with sequential action (in terms of hex-to-hex combat), and a defined phase sequence of events, given the historical doctrine and use of various military units with the division as a basis from which all factors are derived? The overall question really seems to be: how do we define and assign parameters to all of the factors involved in this enterprise?

Well, those are most of my thoughts on this issue. Sorry for running on so, but I'm geared, in both my personal and professional life toward seeing overall patterns, rather than singular events, and these are much more difficult to discuss, due to the usually sweeping area encompassed.

Louis Rotundo

I am pleased to see that my article on Soviet warplans (TEN #9) and the remarks that concluded that subject have generated the thoughtful commentary of fellow Europa players (TEN #10 "EXchange'). It was not my intent, as Rick Gayler pointed out, to propose solutions, but rather to frame the issues that should be debated. To that end, I would like to respond further to the comments of several of the readers.

Dean Wood is quite right, I believe, when he states that the counters for the Red Army represent Soviet deficiencies. The question is, which deficiencies are reflected? Many pre-war Soviet divisions are 3-6. Post June 22 divisions are also 3-6. The former represented a trained cadre and in some cases partially trained manpower recalled to service. Equipment and logistics were lacking in all Soviet formations; however, the pre-war formations were lavish in their training and equipment compared to the post- invasion formations. Where is the deficiency rating?

In reading my article, I call attention to the actual Soviet expectation that the German attack would occur along the planned axis of western Belorussia and the northern Ukraine. It would be accompanied by one-half the Wehrmacht (100 divisions) and the Luftwaffe. The purpose of the existing Soviet deployment (yes, a straitjacket for both sides) was to outnumber that anticipated German attack by two to one. Hence, 200 Soviet divisions were drawn up to repulse the imagined lesser threat. Now, to question the requirement to execute the only Soviet plan known by the Red Army troops (an idiot rule to some), while accepting the deployment that is the basis for that plan, is to exhibit selective denial.

Are some requirements better than others if they happen to suit my taste? Victor Hauser correctly states that there is indeed a difference between history and historical simulations. My intent in indicating actual Soviet doctrine is that many who play this game feel that it quite accurately delineates history as it was. I believe, however, that Europa reveals history as it might have been. This is at the heart of the issue of which rules are restrictive or required. The problem is defining the ingredients that go into the mix.

For example, Soviet doctrine in June 1941 was no great surprise to the German Army. The deployment pattern alone indicated the expectation for a stiff fight at the frontier. Indeed, German planning called for the destruction of the Red Army west of the Dnepr-Dvina river lines. The campaign issue that arose in late June-early July was not over the level of fight in the Red Army, but over the strength of the Red Army beyond the reach of the initial German attacks. My attempt to suggest an alternative to the existing two-turn (surprise and first) hammering of the Red Army does not stereotype the game any more than the existing lack of Soviet response to surprise turn attacks. By doing away with the surprise turn and allowing the Soviets to execute their plan much as the French-British move into Belgium, much as the British collapse the Italians in Africa, or the British dash to Norway, the game follows the pattern caused by it being an operational simulation of an already existing strategic situation.

Victor is concerned that a German player who knows that the Soviets will attack can rig the information to benefit himself. Yes, this is true. However, under the current conditions, Moscow knows the strength, advance rates, targets, and weather which will influence the first campaign. Moscow further knows on turn one that its Army can't win at the border. I can assure you that no Soviet general was privy to any of that information as discussed above. Further, where did we get these victory conditions? Who selected Germany's allies for this fight and who decided on their level of participation? These conditions are all straitjackets for the German player that were picked from history - not from simulations.

Victor is right that my suggestions go to the problem of mobility. During my writing of Soviet Strategy during the Great Patriotic War, one issue continued to recur in Soviet operational conversations during the summer-fall campaign. The problem centered around the existing German capability to exceed Soviet mobility in the tactical battlefield. Couple this to the German ability to reorganize and redeploy their operational forces quicker than the Red Army could respond, and the situation was created that basically equal strategic forces were meeting on the operational battlefield at points of decided German superiority. Worse, once the Nazi breakthrough occurred, the superior German logistics system was allowing their forces to continue advancing faster than Soviet forces could seal the breach.

Result: German advances continued to occur until losses, logistics, and yes, weather, finally slowed the Nazi tactical evolutions on the battlefield to a rate equal to the Soviet capability.

However, just when it seems that Europe solutions require difficult fixes, along comes an article like Duane Romfoe's 'Forward... March!' in TEN #10. The simplicity of the suggestions and the detail with which Romfoe builds his case encourages me to suggest that this rule be quickly adopted. Yet, the apparent fix on one side opens a problem on the other. Soviet forces were simply not capable of executing these maneuvers during the summer-fall. Neither by hasty training nor by logistics support could Soviet forces move to this system. As Romfoe indicates, the rule needs to be tempered by existing conditions. Deny this ability to Soviet infantry the first summer-fall. Indeed, the advance after combat rule could be denied to regular Soviet rifle divisions. Since attacks were especially prepared by Soviet forces, only Guards and other selitem units should perhaps possess this ability.

I believe this fix goes to the heart of my argument that Soviet forces have abilities in game terms that did not exist in the real world. Battle-trained German infantry with several campaigns under their belts should be expected to perform better than raw Soviet recruits. Romfoe uses historical documentation to represent this point. Now I suggest the same. German infantry did perform better in the summer-fall. Not in all cases, but in a great many. That could be attributed to excellent junior officers, better training, superior logistics, and better equipment. The combat rating covers the obvious, the movement advantage is also the result of the obvious.

With the Soviet fix, both doctrine and logistics now have some measure of involvement with the cardboard units that pretend to be the Red Army.

Finally, I wish to return again to the question of the air game. I have read more comment on the air game than any other element in recent days. During playtesting of both FitE and SE, I remarked continuously that the masses of Soviet air power never intervened to such effect in 1941. Charles Sharp's historical deployment and proposed rules that appeared many years ago in The Grenadier provoked much comment in my circle of players. I even tried a playtest with the air units deployed for a surprise air strike and using a special abort rule. The result was that Soviet air power was overrun on its fields during the first several turns. This result coincided with history in some cases.

The problem is that German air power does not seem to exert the result it did in real life. Conversely, it seems much too effective at the same time. Let me explain what I mean! Williamson Murray has examined the German in-service rate for the Luftwaffe. After the opening of the campaign it declined rapidly. At most points in the campaign it was about 50%.

The Soviets were hit even harder by the lack of spare parts and new production. Rates as low as 25-40% were not uncommon. Now I don't wish to propose another logistical straitjacket, but air power doesn't seem as effective as it ought to be if used in force and concurrently seems damned too plentiful for both sides at all times. So here is another suggestion for the weary. Again I caution that this needs work. Try a two-phase air system, first a strategic strike phase, and then a tactical phase. The purpose is not to give you twice the bang for the buck, but rather to make you think about the uses of the air force. If air power flies a strategic and a tactical mission (that's right, two separate missions in the same turn), roll for attrition (aborts) in the middle of the turn.

Meanwhile, German repair rates are much too generous. Likewise, Soviet repair (roll = 1) never was that good in the first summer. These should be devalued, perhaps using a two dice table.

With this approach, air power can do more, but at a penalty. There will be plenty of aircraft; they just won't be in-service.

Charles Sharp

... To add my two cent's worth to the "Victory Possibility" debate: I have to agree with Rotundo, in that I cannot imagine any way the German military could have conquered the Soviet Union.

Now, a German state that had started real economic mobilization for war and kept at it in something other than the semi-feudal and slipshod fashion the Nazi state did, and a political leadership that was willing to enlist the Soviet subject peoples in a real "Crusade Against Communism," might have brought Stalin's state crashing down. The fall would have been as much from internal stress as external, however, because the German military alone could not strike deep enough and hard enough to crush the Soviet forces.

Just for example, in spite of truly amazing victories in 1941, the German Army in Russia was actually weaker in both firepower and mobility at the beginning of the 1942 campaign than it had been less than a year earlier! The average German infantry division by 1942 had lost over 50% of its motorized equipment, not very plentiful in the first place, and the Panzer formations outside of the units specially rebuilt for the campaign in the south averaged less than 70 tanks each. Finally, (and also from recent V/Z articles) the "massive" counteroffensive at Stalingrad that trapped and destroyed the spearhead of an entire German army was launched by the THIRD largest grouping of Soviet forces at the time (see the attached chart).

A glance will show that the Soviet forces around Stalingrad had less than half the tanks and only 2/3 the artillery of the "static" Western theater around Moscow, and less artillery and men than the defenses around Leningrad and vicinity! Only in air power was there a significant massing on the Stalingrad/Volga front. Of course, the strategic reserves were shunted south after the counteroffensive proved a success: but the initial attacks on 19 November 1942 that isolated or destroyed almost 15% of the Axis divisions on the eastern front was launched by a relatively modest Soviet force.

STRATEGIC AREA	Men	Artillery	Tanks	Aircraft
Karelia + 7th Army	340,000	3,931	220	177
Leningrad, Volkhov, and NW Fronts	1,232,000	16,435	1,089	277
Kalinin, West Fronts, and Moscow Defense Zone	1,890,000	24,682	3,375	1,170
Bryansk and Voronezh Fronts	644,000	7,834	884	225
Stalingrad, Don, and Southwest Fronts	1,103,000	15,501	1,463	928
Trans-Caucus Front	816,000	8,797	319	255

These figures do not include the PVO, VMF, or ADD (Air Defense, Naval, or Long Range Air Forces).