Mike Solli

To a certain extent the discussion on play balance is warranted, yet I feel that many people are attempting to solve the problem by changing and adding rules to benefit first one and then the other side. There seems to be no end in sight.

I think that a different approach to solving the problem of play balance should be considered. During my twenty years of wargaming I've discovered that in a "good" wargame a historical result will occur if the wargame is played as ft historically occurred.

Instead of arguing about how one side has too many advantages over the other, why not simply play the campaign as both sides historically fought it. When the Apr I 42 turn is reached, compare the final positions and strengths of each side with the start of the "1942 Scenario".

It's worth a shot.

This is indeed a worthy idea. However, to play the game "as both sides historically fought it" would present quite a challenge. Even if one could set up the opposing forces in their true Jun II deployments and then direct the German forces to their actual opening assault positions, the ensuing combat die rolls would immediately set an entirely random sequence of events into motion. Nonetheless, one could strive to play the game utilizing historical strategic decisions as a blueprint.

However, not all people are enthusiastic about attempting to duplicate historical patterns, as seen below.

Deen Wood

I read Louis Rotundo's article on the Kremlin Wargames of 1941 (TEN #9) with a great deal of interest. Whether his inferences and contentions are historically accurate or not may never be known; I certainly have no extra insight into the Kremlin. I do, however, take issue with some of the Europa proposals put forth in the article.

While I agree with the comments concerning Soviet problems with command control, supply services, and mobilization levels, I wish to point out that these deficiencies are, or should be, reflected to a great degree in the Soviet unit ratings. Surely one reason the Germans are rated so well compared to their Soviet counterparts is due to their effectiveness, which was in turn partially due to Soviet problems. What it all boils down to is that the few existing surprise and unpreparedness rules are sufficient since command and supply problems (or advantages) are factored into the ratings. The proposal to require unilateral Soviet attacks goes too far.

If I play the Soviet side, then I am Stalin and I reserve the right to order my armies as I please. If I want to lay back and identify the main enemy thrust before I attack, then I should be able to do so. I should have the right to set high command policy and make my own prewar plans. The game should do nothing more than give me historical tools, so that I can recreate history literally if I want to or explore alternatives (which is why most people play). The initial deployment and surprise rules are as much of a historical straitjacket as I can stand. Astell's free deployment rule (TEN #5) is much more to my taste. Soviet offensive requirements are not for me.

On another note, prior to the publication of the US order of battle in TEN #9 I was apprehensive about the representation of US artillery. This was one arm that the US excelled in. In almost every volume of the USA Center of Military History historical series the response time, coordination, and sheer volume of US artillery was cited by the Germans as decisive. In several instances German officers claimed US firepower exceeded anything they had ever experienced on the Eastern Front. At first glance I was disappointed in the US artillery OB. Then it became apparent that much of the "missing" artillery was in those monster infantry divisions, right where it should be.

Finally, readers may be interested in the following bit of information I recently came upon:

17 March 1941
Fuhrer conference (with Colonel Heusinger): 1500-2030 hours.

... 2. Barbarossa: ...
e. A Gp. South:'It would be fundamentally wrong to attack everywhere.' Pruth and Dniester Rivers, which will block any offensive. The Dniester is much more impregnable as a defense line than the Rhine. Hence, no attack across the Pruth. There we would only drive the Russian away from a spot where we should ask him to stay put.'

f. Conclusion:
In the Romanian sector, employ only the forces necessary for the protection of Romania. All other available forces will be used for frontal attack north of the Carpathians, with the weight on the northern wing, where additional armor will be brought to bear. Armored units must be pulled out of Romania at the earliest!"

--General Franz Halder, The Halder War Diary 1939-1942, Edited by Charles Burdick and Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Presidio Press, 1988.

Now I'm no expert on these rivers, but this guy was. And I've read the Rhine will be rated as a major river in Second Front. Sooo... it seems that maybe the Dniester River should be given strong consideration for major river status in future mapping.

Thanks for sharing the above.

It appears you may have misconstrued Mr. Rotundo's intentions. He is not proposing Soviet offensive requirements in addition to the existing surprise turn mechanics. What he suggests is that the current "double whammy" be replaced with a coupling of mandatory Soviet attacks and harsh movement penalties. In his opinion, this would provide a more accurate model of the Jun II turn. Merely another brand of straitjacket! In any case, all this is hypothetical, Louis only laid out a bare bones outline of how he felt the "surprise turn "should be handled. It would require a lot of testing to even begin to evaluate whether such a design change would be functional, much less produce the desired results in play.

It would be interesting for someone to try a game of SE using Louis Rotundo's suggestions from TEN #9 for simulating the events of late June 1941. Give it a test send your feedback report to us and we will pass it along to our readers.

Victor Hauser

In response to Louis Rotundo's "War Plans" article in TEN#9:

In his concluding paragraph Louis addresses the issue of rules tampering and the effect it could have on play balance. Also, in the immediately preceding paragraphs, he discusses the problems of simulating the historical authenticity and performance of the Soviet Army in the early summer turns in 1941. He proposes several "fixes": 1) prevent perfect Soviet responses to Axis moves, 2) limit Soviet air command/control capabilities, and 3) force the Soviet player to utilize historical, pre-war operational doctrine. I have several comments regarding his ideas and exposition.

Louis is convincing in his presentation of the facts. He persuasively refutes Fugate, and demonstrates an intimate and profound knowledge of the Soviet Army during the Great Patdotic War. However, there is a difference between excellent scholarship and excellent wargame design. This is not to downplay Louis's efforts, but I submit that the time commitment involved in each of the three areas of wargaming - research, design, and playing (not to mention the business/organizational aspect) - do not necessarily complement one another. In fact, I believe that to truly excel in one means that the others will suffer in proportion.

For example, I am first and foremost a player - some have said a pretty good one. But my playing skill has not come cheaply. One of the results of my dedication to playing is that although I dabble with design I've never completely designed a whole game. Another is that although my knowledge of WWII history is reasonably extensive, it serves mainly to provide me with some conversational fluency. Indeed, I have put my historical foot in my mouth often enough to realize that to acquire true historical expertise I would have to give up much of my gaming time. Further, each of the three areas of specialization provide definite and distinctly different viewpoints. Thus, I cannot help but primarily see Europa from a players perspective. And it is from this perspective that I take issue with Louis's suggestions.

Louis correctly identifies three big trouble spots in Europa: logistics, command/control, and limited intelligence (this is not exactly what Louis said, he wanted limits to Soviet mobility, but bear with me). However, I must point out that very few wargames handle any one of these issues very well, if at all. So even if Europa falls short on these points, it has plenty of company throughout the rest of the wargaming world. One of the problems with each of these areas is that from the design perspective they are extremely complex and don't lend themselves to rules that would be workable and acceptable to most gamers, however desirable such rules might be to the historians. I think that Louis was aware of the magnitude of the problems he identified, since he states his proposed solutions in broad, unrefined terms. He seems to be saying, "Hey designer(s), here are three things that need to be fixed, so fix them." In this I applaud him. But he also appears to have neglected the gaming perspective.

Players have the vantage point of hindsight. Thus, while it might seem reasonable to suggest that (1) there be some type of limited intelligence (i.e. mobility restrictions) to "solve" perfect Soviet responses to Axis moves, (2) that some kind of command/control rules be invented, and (3) that the logistics rules be much more comprehensively written, it is not reasonable to propose that any player be forced to adopt an historical doctrine some 50 years after the event. Louis' three suggestions are reasonable (regardless of how difficult to design or unpalatable to play with they may be), but I claim that any attempt to mandate historical doctrine will not only be impossible to design realistically, but that the effort to implement it will result in numerous and outrageous abuses by the wargaming community.

For instance, I thought for a while about what I as the Axis player could and would do to the Soviet player on the first turns of the game if I knew beforehand what his doctrine and required response had to be. It wasn't pretty. And I also claim that it isn't justifiable, because the Axis historically didn't know. Indeed, there were a lot of things they didn't know about. What should we do about them?

Well... Under the current rules players do know what the required Soviet response to the Axis Jun II surprise turn will be. The poor buggers must stand in place and take their lumps again during the Axis regular Jun II turn. As Deen Wood points out, this is an historical straitjacket already with us. Louis merely feels that it might be possible to have the game unfold in roughly the same pattern it does now (i. e. Soviet border forces get mauled) by adopting a slightly different approach which would contain more of the elements he sees as major contributing factors to that mauling. It never hurts to ask for what you want!

Forrest Opper

The recent issues of the magazine and John Astell's "The Europa Almanac" have been great. I cannot say enough about TEN. It is very well laid out, very informative, and full of interesting items and articles. It's arrival always makes my day. Rules Court is always such a shot in the arm and usually my favorite piece. It is invaluable in helping me learn the system and understand the intentions behind the rules.

I am very interested in the new standard maps. I hope that these can be purchased separately. I would very much like to get maps 13 and 14, but I am not all that interested in buying the new Marita-Merkur.

Regarding the possibility of John Astell incorporating additional penalties for attacks made in mud and snow turns, I believe Deen Wood has made some very pertinent observations. Particularly apropos is his comment concerning the possibility of the German player(s) running the campaign more intelligently than the Germans actually did. Are intelligent decisions to be penalized for the sake of forcing history to repeat itself?

I am in total agreement with John's inclination toward more abstraction in the strategic air war and naval system. Of course, none of us have had the chance to experience these first hand, but the knowledge that I do have of the current air rules leads me to believe that the Allied (American and British) strategic bombing campaign would not be all that exciting and I suspect designing workable naval rules could be a real problem where large numbers of ships are involved.

One last thing, I found it mildly inconvenient that The Urals Rules/Soviet OB booklet was not punched for inclusion into a three-ring binder. Has this been noticed by anyone else? Thank you for letting me "bend your ear".

Thanks for the kind words of your opening paragraph, Forrest. The people who deserve your accolades are our columnists and authors. Without their hard work there would not be a TEN. We avoid printing this type commentary in "EXchange", as it smacks too much of self-promotion. However, we do receive many letters of praise and support and this is a good opportunity to acknowledge that they are greatly appreciated.

On buying maps separately: GR/D currently sells Europa parts through advertisement in TEN. So it is reasonable to believe that the maps may be made available as replacement parts sometime in the future after the publication of the new "Collectors' Series" of games. However, one should note that the "Collectors' Series" production runs will be limited and waiting to pick up the maps on this basis will be time consuming and risky - spare maps may not be available.

The new Marita-Merkur will be a complete, self-contained GAME with new counters, new maps, and updated rules. It will even be given a new name, Balkan Front. This title will be marketed as a GAME, which can be played in its entirety without access to other Europa materials. GR/D must sell GAMES, not just maps, in order to exist as a viable wargame company. Although GR/D is sensitive to the desires of Europa players and attempts to give folks what they want, the above is a business reality.

Warren C. Wilson

I thoroughly agree with Theo Bierschenk's comments concerning the need for a naval module (TEN #7), which would be particularly interesting in the Mediterranean. Handling naval operations in the abstract is much like having one "German Army" counter in the game - it's there, but it doesn't function very well.

There has never been a decent European game that recreates the important role played by sea power, but Europa has great potential in this regard. And the US Naval Institute alone has 110,000 members; even a small portion of that group could be a significant new market. Although the FRIE and SE players may find this boring, a "Med Module" would allow players to add the sea power factor while not burdening those who prefer to concentrate on land actions. I feel a relatively few number of counters can make the naval aspect a lot more appealing. Europa's strong point is detail; leave the abstract to Milton-Bradley.

Theo Bierschenk

I'm generally happy with the mix of articles run in TEN, but I have been disappointed by some recent letters that seemed to be very critical of other people's writing. There's a certain gentlemanly, mature level that should be maintained, and to be insulting on a personal level oversteps the bounds. This could also have the tendency to discourage people who might want to write in with an article or letter, but are scared off by the people who afterwards send in really insulting letters to jump on mistakes. Maybe some editing could tone down some of the excessive ranting?

Would you believe? A fair amount of past ranting WAS toned down. There is a fine line between providing an uncensored forum for readers to express their feelings and allowing personal attacks which overstep the bounds of propriety. We want the "EXchange" section to be lively and somewhat saucy, but we definitely do NOT want to offend anybody. lts a fact of life that people who offer their ideas for public scrutiny risk rebuttal, but your words are well spoken and should be kept in mind by letter writers and editors alike.

Mark Telford

TEN is really "finding its feet" now, with good history articles, plus solid gaming related features. However, who is expected to keep up with the recent rash of changes? The rail unit errata for SE will quite frankly be ignored by me - not because it's right or wrong, but because I don't have the time to make up new counters, rewrite rules, and so on. If these sweeping changes are official, then they should be backed up by official errata for rules, and proper counters being available to the gamer. I feel that Europa periodicals tend to run away in their enthusiasm and leave the ordinary gamer behind.

A more general point related to the above is that Europa seems to be treated too much like a religion in the way it is approached by the hard core. I enjoy Europa. I think it's about the best series there's ever been. But at the end of the day it's a game, an attempt to simulate some aspects of history. Furthermore, it's a business.

There has been a lack of support for Europa in recent years with many titles going out of print. To often do I hear the comment "Europa was a good system, but it's not available anymore." or more commonly now, "What's Europa?" The more changes to a system largely out of print, the less relevant they become to the ordinary, run-of-the-mill gamer. Let's have new ideas, and so on, but with some sense of perspective.

GR/D is making steps in the right direction. New titles are essential to keep the system alive. But why aren't more of the old titles being reprinted? As far as I can see there is no good reason why Narvik, WD, CW, or SE cannot be reprinted. straight away. They need few, if any, changes. There is a market ready and waiting for them. We simply await someone willing to produce and market the product.

Other games (such as TFH and FF) need reworking of course. It would be helpful to know what the tentative schedule is for their revised editions. And whatever happened to Play Aids Kits? Will they be part of the revised product?

Anyway, GR/D seem to be the best people to run the series now, but I hope you appreciate the frustration many of us feel at seeing an excellent series not being fully available.

Finally, thanks to Jack Radey for the Kiev article in TEN#7. Good history at last. The German memoirs need to be shown in their true light, if a correct historical interpretation is to be made. Guderian's self-serving scribblings need to be looked at carefully too - as should all such historical documents really. However, the response Jack gets from some readers is always worth a laugh. Every time he points out that the Nazis weren't superheroes you can guarantee that some commie-basher will rear up and squawk. Keep up the good work Jack, you do have some fans out here!

I have copied, cut, and mounted the railroad engineer counters that were printed on the inside back cover of TEN # 9. The result was a very nice set of counters for a small investment of time. The article, "Rails through the Russias" from TEN #7 should be considered the official errata on the subject.

A continuing flow of new ideas is the life blood not only of Europa periodicals, but to a large extent the Europa system itself. The opening credits to Marita-Merkur state it well: "The concept of the Europa Series is that of a living, growing idea, and, like all living things, it is subject to change. While the Workshop has always emphatically rejected the concept of planned obsolescence, change for the improvement of the system or for the sake of quality is both healthy and necessary." TEN and other Europa publications provide the laboratory and testing grounds for experimentation with new concepts and refinement of the existing body of material. Most of the proposed changes are optional or experimental and should be clearly recognizable as such. The best of the lot may one day see inclusion in the system, thus benefiting everyone. And in those rare cases where a change is an official one, as in the case of the railroad engineers, the proper tools will be provided for their inclusion, given a reasonable spirit of participation on the part of the gamer.

Yes, Europa is a business, at least for GR/D. And as is the case with most small businesses, the restraining factor standing in the way of multiple reprints is very simple - capital. GR/D has just reprinted FitE. This reprint required a substantial outlay of cash and sell-through is now needed to replenish the coffers. As the capital becomes available and the design and other production work reaches completion, additional titles will appear - both new games and reprints/reissues. You must be patient. Remember GR/D is also eager for the day when all the individual games and Grand Europa will be available to the public. Following "News from GR/D" will keep you abreast of the schedule for new releases. As regards Play Aids Kits, the current thinking is to include these directly in the product, as was done with The Urals.

By the way, Europa-mass is held in my game room every Friday night. New converts are always welcome.

Karl Bourke Soderholtz

Awhile back I read an article about the Battle of Kiev which was basically written from a Russian point of view. But it is standard practice for the victors to write the histories in a way that makes them seem more powerful and set them in a better light.

As Mr. Radey stated, on November 3, 1943, a Russian offensive was opened with the objective of recapturing Kiev. This offensive was being led by the 3rd Guards Tank Army and the 38th Russian Army. This force quickly pushed aside the German 7th Panzer Division, 88th Infantry Division, and a Kampfgruppe of the 2nd SS Das Reich. The Russians recaptured Kiev and pushed on to the south in hopes of cutting off Army Group South at the "incredible" speed of 5 km per day.

According to the author, 6th Guard Tank Corps on the 7th of November ran into elements of the 25th Panzer Division, newly arrived from France. And the 6th Guards Tank Corps defeated them. However, this was because the Russians attacked only the wheeled elements of the division, the tracked elements were detained at another section of the front and arrived after the Russians had been stopped, but not before destroying most the 25th's wheeled vehicles. The 25th's tanks went on to support the 1 Oth Panzer Grenadier Division later in the battle.

Four days later the Germans staried an operation to remove the Russians from their imposing positions. Under the command of the 48th Panzer Corps, the 1st, 7th, 19th, (when it became available on the 18th of November), 25th and 1st SSLAH Panzer Divisions, a Kampfgruppe of the 2nd SS DR, and the 68th Infantry Division started to throw back the Russians and stabilize the front. In the course of the next 45 days, the Germans proceeded to push the Russians back on a 70 mile front some 20 to 60 miles pivoting on the town of Fastov. In the course of all this fighting the 48th Panzer Corps kicked the living hell out of the 38th and 3rd Guards Tank Armies and disrupted the deployment of the 60th Army. The 48th Panzer Corps also succeeded in destroying some 590 tanks, 250 artillery pieces, and 1200 antitank guns. They also captured some 5000 men and killed over 20,000 others.

This, of course, is the German account of the battle, but why should the Germans lie about the numbers in their unit histories since they lost the war? The second reason these numbers make sense is that according to the histories of the Tiger units present, the Tigers accounted for just short of half the Russian tanks destroyed. That is, 29 Tiger tanks destroyed 285+ tanks by themselves. And these numbers are believable when you find out that the formidable Michael Wittman was there in command of a platoon and added some 45 tanks to his kill record while the rest of his platoon accounted for 104 other tanks.

Also in his article, Mr. Radey makes a point of listing all the German tank losses which occurred during the battle for Kiev. Does he understand that the Germans listed all tanks as lost, whether they were battle losses or mechanical breakdowns which could be recovered from the field and sent to the rear for repairs? The recovered tanks then were relisted as combat operational and sent back to the front. According to the book Tiger: The History of a Legendary Weapon 1942-45, one Tiger of the Heavy Tank Battalion 502 was listed as lost four different times before fire gutted it in late 1944, and then it was destroyed by friendly fire! So the tank losses so painstakingly put down by Mr. Radey may be 10-20% of the losses which were destroyed beyond repair.

I must admit I don't follow the math used to derive a 10-20% factor. And a careful reading of Mr. Radey's article reveals that he is aware of your point about tank losses when he states "Realize that the reports are affected by many factors such as transfers, newly arriving replacements, and vehicles temporarily out of service.

So here is a short version of the "German side of the story". I repeat what I said some time ago in TEN #8, 'In the final analysis it is doubtful that the real truth surrounding the events of November - Oecember 1943 in the Ukraine will ever be fully known." But perhaps there is hope, as Charles Sharp points out in the next letter.

Charles C. Sharp

Lou Rotundo's letter in TEN #9 commenting on my Soviet artillery article, "The Guns of June" (from TEN #6), points out the continuing problems, and opportunities, that the current convulsions in Soviet society present to historians. The chart showing the placement of Soviet RVGK (High Command Reserves) artillery units at the start of the war was first published in the Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal (Military History Journal) in November 1987.

This was information I had not seen when I originally put together my Soviet artillery articles. Anything a western writer tries to publish on the Soviet military is now subject to being "updated" at any moment by new revelations from recently opened archives. I read in an interview with one of the Soviet generals involved in classifying and declassifying archive material that they are now considering the possibility of publishing casualty figures for Soviet forces in the "Great Patriotic War"!

While there have been estimates and guesses, this would be the first time we could compare the Germans' claimed Soviet casualties with the Soviet figures. It would be extremely interesting to get actual statistical data on the relative effectiveness of the two sides, instead of the guesses and approximations we have had to work on in the past.

And to add my two cent's worth to the "Victory Possibility" debate: I have to agree with Rotundo, in that I cannot imagine any way the German military could have conquered the Soviet Union. Now, a German state that had started real economic mobilization for war and kept at it in something other than the semi-feudal and slipshod fashion the Nazi state did, and a political leadership that was willing to enlist the Soviet subject peoples in a real "Crusade Against Communism", might have brought Stalin's state crashing down. The fall would have been as much from internal stress as external, however, because the German military alone could not strike deep enough and hard enough to crush the Soviet forces.

Just for example, in spite of truly amazing victories in 1941, the German Army in Russia was actually weaker in both firepower and mobility at the beginning of the 1942 campaign than it had been less than a year earlier! The average German infantry division by 1942 had lost over 50% of its motorized equipment, not very plentiful in the first place, and the panzer formations outside of the units specially rebuilt for the campaign in the south averaged less than 70 tanks each. Finally, (and also from recent V/Z articles) the "massive" counteroffensive at Stalingrad that trapped and destroyed the spearhead of an entire German army was launched by the THIRD largest grouping of Soviet forces at the time.

A glance will show that the Soviet forces around Stalingrad had less than half the tanks and only 2/3 the artillery of the "static" Western theater around Moscow, and less artillery and men than the defenses around Leningrad and vicinity! Only in air power was there a significant massing on the Stalingrad/Volga front. Of course, the strategic reserves were shunted south after the counteroffensive proved a success: but the initial attacks on 19 November 1942 that isolated or destroyed almost 15% of the Axis divisions on the eastern front was launched by a relatively modest Soviet force!

Much interesting material on the topic of Scorched Earth play balance has already been received and will appear over the course of the next several issues. Meanwhile, there is still time to send in your answers to the questions posed in TEN #9.

Because we like to tinker and because I have played this game and because there is an interesting fix for it, I asked Frank Chadwick to give me some copy for you to try out. If you own the game let me know how this works - Winston