The U.S. Army replacement system for the European Theater of Operations was established in 1943. By April 1944, this system was divided into two commands; the Ground Forces Replacement Command and the Army Air Forces Replacement Command. Only the Ground Forces Replacement Command is of concern to Second Front because it replenished ground maneuver units and provided emergency front-line infantry contingents in several campaigns, notably the Ardennes counteroffensive. [1]

On paper, the replacement system existed as a simple and streamlined organization. Replacements were received by Ground Forces Replacement Command depots, formed in England starting in December 1943, and were sent to tactical formations by depot-controlled replacement battalions. The depots were initially structured as large personnel holding/processing centers, but became specialized in different functions during the course of the European campaign.

Ideally, the forward-type replacement depot was designed to serve in direct support of an actual field army. It usually consisted of three numbered Replacement Battalions, each of which supported a front-line corps. For example, the 41st, 86th, and 92nd Replacement Battalions supported the three assault corps during the landings at Normandy. On June 11, the 92d Replacement Battalion landed in France to support VII Corps and, on the following day, the 41st and 86th Replacement Battalions began operations in support of V Corps and XIX Corps, respectively. It was from these battalions that replacements were sent to the combat divisions, and these battalions reported to a depot. [2]

The Ground Forces Replacement Command exercised increasing control over the replacement depots and replacement battalions on the Continent after June 16th, 1944 (these organizations had been placed under First Army jurisdiction for the invasion) . At that time, the Ground Forces Replacement Command was equivalent to a reinforced combat corps with a full complement of division and supporting troops.

By the time of the Ardennes offensive, this Command had expanded to a dozen depots and over 100,000 commissioned and enlisted replacements with a training cadre numbering in excess of 6,000 personnel. The Ground Forces Replacement Command headquarters was physically located in Paris, where it had been since September 6, 1944. [3]

Control

During the war, the replacement system was not as streamlined as hoped. There was widespread disagreement on the best way to achieve better control over the replacement flow. By October 1944, the replacement system became extremely overloaded and tens of thousands of soldiers were accumulating in replacement units.

For example, the 3d Replacement Depot contained over 19,000 men, equivalent to a full division of troops - all of whom had received stateside training prior to arriving overseas and were thus theoretically ready for action. Moreover, the men in this one sample depot were crammed into facilities designed only for half that number (10,000) while awaiting tedious administrative procedures designed to replenish units having the most need for refills or particular skills. Because the replacement battalions were situated in forward battle areas, many senior officers believed that such assets should have been directly under field army commands for ease of control.

The Ground Forces Replacement Command, however, insisted that control of forward replacement organizations should not be given to field force commanders. "The theater commander (General Eisenhower) desired to retain control over replacements in the pipeline on the theory that they would provide a strategic reserve." [4]

Therefore, he refused requests from the First and Third Armies for command of replacement units. The commander of the 12th Army Group also believed that placing both the army depots and their forward battalions under the Replacement Command resulted in more efficient operations. [5]

Officers of the First Army, however, believed that the replacement situation could have been controlled more effectively if the First Army could directly supervise its depot operation. In this manner, the First Army adjutant general's classification section, by being established within the depot, might have saved as much as three days in the time required for filling requisitions. [6]

Although First Army relinquished control of its depot and forward replacement battalions to the Ground Forces Replacement Command about July 15, the Third Army did not surrender its replacement system components to the Ground Forces Replacement Command until October 1944.

The replacement authorization for the European Theater of Operations was published in the ETO Section of the War Department Troop Deployment list. The War Department considered that the theater was entitled to a replacement availability of not more than 40,000 to 50,000 personnel at any one time. The actual availability, including all categories, consistently ran about 120,000 from June through November, 1944.

When tactical units met heavy opposition, they required replacements and emptied the depots. When opposition was light or stabilized, as in the case of the Ardennes front immediately prior to the German offensive, replacements tended to clog the pipelines and accumulate in depots.

Incessant combat caused shortages in divisions that necessitated the theater headquarters to seek more infantry replacements. At a London meeting on August 15, it was decided that any excess personnel in the system would be retrained as infantry. Instructions for a comprehensive retraining program for infantry was issued. As a consequence, many replacement units became heavily oriented to providing infantrymen.

Forward depots and battalions supporting the combat forces were depositories for static personnel of sundry categories, and these men were being rapidly molded into riflemen as a result of theater-imposed infantry retraining programs. Units of the replacement system that followed armies and corps as they advanced into battle were being increasingly prepared to meet immediate combat needs. Many of these units were consequently fielded as emergency infantry contingents in the Ardennes fighting. [7]

November 1944

The front-line infantry retraining situation during November 1944 was as follows. The Third Army was undertaking the retraining of 65,000 men under a program of its own. General Patton noted that the 80th and 5th Infantry Divisions were at full strength due to a 5 percent cut in army and corps overhead. An additional 4,000 soldiers were retraining in Metz, enough to fill the 26th Infantry Division and leave some over for the 90th and 95th infantry Divisions. Seventh Army had also started a massive retraining program.

All replacements disembarked at Le Havre, the location of the 15th Replacement Depot, since November 10, 1944. The depot at Le Havre received, housed, and fed replacements disembarking at the port until such time as rail transportation was available to move them. The Transportation Corps allotted one train daily to the 15th Replacement Depot and troops usually left Le Havre by rail, traveling in boxcars filled at the rate of 40 soldiers per car. All armored force replacements were sent from Le Havre to the 9th Replacement Depot at Fontainebleau.

Most Communications zone and service troops were sent to the 19th Replacement Depot at Etemps. Infantrymen, who comprised 62 percent of all enlisted replacements, were sent to one of two "infantry intermediate stockage depots". In December 1944 these depots were located at Givot, Belgium, and Neufchateau, France. The Belgium depot served the First and Ninth Armies through two forward depots, one to support each army. The depot in France stocked troops for the two forward depots which served the Third and Seventh Armies. [8]

Replacement units further forward than the depots sometimes moved directly into battle as entities in their own right. For example, as early as the Normandy campaign - on August 18, 1944 - the 38th Replacement Battalion was ordered to go into immediate action with XII Corps and advanced over 200 miles in its first offensive. After waiting two days in the vicinity of Orleans, this battalion moved just behind the 4th Armored Division to give flank and close infantry support during the allied drive for Sens.

"The 38th Replacement Battalion was well in front of both Third Army and XII Corps headquarters all the way across France into Nancy", being employed in a constant skirmishing role." [9]

General Eisenhower's anticipation of using the replacement system as a strategic reserve was fulfilled by the Ardennes emergency. During the Ardennes fighting, the forward replacement depots that were involved in supporting the field armies were called upon to use their subordinate organizations for a variety of defensive purposes. The number of strategic bridge crossings and roadways threatened by German forces could not be covered by the maneuver battalions on hand, and there was no time to assimilate general replacement companies or their manpower into tactical organizations. In some cases, tactical elements were in such a state of disarray, caused either by retreat or combat fragmentation, that replacement units constituted the only organized, officer-staffed whole units available for some sectors. These factors were responsible for the frequent utilization of replacement battalions in active operations as reinforcing line infantry components.

Example: 79th Replacement Battalion

An example of this wholesale commitment of forward replacement units to Ardennes operations is typified by the experiences of the 79th Replacement Battalion, attached to the 17th Replacement Depot (Forward). On December 16, 1944, the battalion received marching orders from the commanding officer of the 28th Infantry Division. The replacement battalion was ordered forward to become a fourth rifle battalion for the 109th Infantry Regiment. Responding to the German attack, the regiment was charged with the defense of Ettelbruck.

The 79th Replacement Battalion was ordered by the 109th Infantry Regiment to retain its current organization and to provide a series of infantry posts and anti-tank roadblocks on all roads leading into Ettelbruck. As the situation worsened, the battalion was ordered, as an additional force to defend the city itself.

The commander of the 79th Replacement Battalion formed task forces from his headquarters detachment and four replacement companies. These task forces were posted on seven roadblocks at 1800 hours on the evening of December 15. Numerous .50-caliber machine gun nests and bazooka outposts were placed at strategic positions on routes leading into the city. Squads were organized to connect roadblocks and control the area.

A reserve force was formed from lesser-qualified personnel, and a liaison officer from the replacement battalion was placed on duty at regimental headquarters.

By December 17, the entire 109th Infantry Regiment was committed to combat, leaving the 79th Replacement Battalion as the only defense of Ettelbruck against German infiltration. The city was defended by the replacement battalion until noon on December 15, when the VIII Corps commander ordered a withdrawal. [10]

This combat example of a replacement battalion's use in the Ardennes campaign is indicative of the service rendered by the forward replacement battalions in support of the engaged field armies.

The organization of the replacement system under the sole control of the Ground Forces Replacement Command provided General Eisenhower with one centralized strategic combat reserve. Although the replacement stream was only partially organized into actual replacement battalions, the combined availability of 120,000 personnel gave the Army a strong contingent of emergency manpower. At its forward edge, the replacement stream did fulfill the role of an organized military tool capable of immediate combat deployment.

The First and Third Armies could, for emergency purposes, utilize two ad-hoc replacement depot brigades, the 3d and 17th Replacement Depots with nearly 20,000 men apiece. The forward battalions of these depots were already assembled into rifle organizations (due to the infantry retraining program), pre-packaged into organizations complete with interior structures with officer and NCO supervision. In addition, two more "infantry intermediate stockage" depots at Givot and Neutchateau could have been pressed into service as additional depot training brigades on an Europa scale.

All replacement formations were doubtless less efficient, and certainly less equipped, than regular combat elements. The lack of artillery is most apparent. Most divisions in the Ardennes, however, were largely filled with non-combat experienced soldiers and many raw replacements. The replacement depots and their battalions effectively represented only slightly inferior potential manpower combat quality than some established divisions and regiments in that sector.

In summary, the replacement system had a large influence on the campaign, both in terms of actual employment (withholding large numbers of troops from immediate absorption into front-line combat units) and potential displacement to critical sectors as a strategic reserve.

Training Division-Groups