France had been America's first and most important ally during her revolution, and the Franco-American treaties of 1778 and French economic and military assistance had helped secure political independence for the thirteen rebellious colonies. But with the coming of war between Britain and France in 1793, relations between the latter country and her former ally became increasingly strained by differing conceptions of neutrality and variant interpretations of the treaties of 1778.

And the ratification, on 30 April 1796, of the Jay Treaty, whereby Britain agreed to remove all agents and soldiers from United States soil in exchange for concessions on certain maritime issues, was, for the French, the last straw. Since the beginning of the war, they had tried to bully the United States into a more pro-French alignment by periodically harassing American commerce, and now, on 2 March 1797, they issued a decree renouncing the principle "free ships make free goods," contained in Article XXIII of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce of 1778, and extended the list of contraband beyond Article XXIV. They also made it clear that, in future, failure to produce proper forms and clearances for a ship, cargo and crew would constitute grounds for seizure and condemnation.

Vessels engaged in legitimate neutral trade carried papers for ship and cargo, and the French had the right to demand, under the terms of Article XXV of the Treaty, that American ships carry a rôle d' 'equipage, a list of the crew giving names and nationality. But the French had never insisted that American ships carry a rôle d' 'equipage during the Revolution, nor during the four years of war preceding the, decree. Hardly any American ships bothered to carry such a list, as the French well knew. Nor were the Americans given any time to comply. The decree took effect immediately, making all American ships and cargoes fair game for French cruisers and privateers.

In response, the United States Congress passed the Naval Act of 1 July 1797, empowering the President to man and employ three of six frigates begun in 1794. But while preparing for war, the administration of President John Adams sought peace. And, in July, a diplomatic mission sailed for France. The French, however, issued, on 18 January 1798, yet another decree, stating that henceforth a ship carrying any British goods or cargo would be considered a legitimate prize. They also demanded a doceur - a $220,000 bribe before negotiations began. When news of this demand, known as the XYZ Affair, reached the United States, a wave of anti-French feeling swept the country. And, with no diplomatic options left, the administration resigned itself to a military response.

Between April and July 1798, Congress passed a series of administration-sponsored naval acts, which, in sum, created a navy of six government built frigates and thirty other warships, either purchased or rented by the Government, or purchased by the patriotic citizens of America's port cities. The fleet was administered by the newly created Department of the Navy, headed by Benjamin Stoddert. Legislation dictated the organisation of the ships crews, including. a marine guard on a rough scale of the Royal Navy's one for each gun. And, on 11 July 1798, Congress passed a law organising the Navy's marines as a Corps of Marines, capable of providing thirty-two ships guards, and consisting of 1 Major-Commandant to administer the Corps, 32 captains and lieutenants, 48 sergeants and corporals, 720 privates, 32 fifers and 32 drummers.

As far as the Marines were concerned, the nature of the Navy's mission in the Caribbean during the Quasi-War, as it was termed, produced little opportunity for combat. The Navy protected American merchantmen by convoying them, or by patrolling the most important passages in and out of the Caribbean. The Navy's opponents were more than 100 French privateers and assorted pirate vessels that hovered about Haiti and the Spanish colonies of Cuba, Puerto Rico and Santo Domingo. Between 1798 and 1801, United States naval vessels captured or liberated some sixty vessels, sank one, and fought inconclusive engagements with perhaps fifteen others. Captures were generally made by American frigates, brigs and schooners, which outclassed the privateers and forced a quick surrender.

Nevertheless, the war did witness two small scale amphibious operations, the first ever undertaken by the infant Navy and Marine Corps. The first of these operations had its origins in late April 1800, when Commodore Silas Talbot, commanding the 44-gun frigate Constitution (then at the Haitian port of Cap Francois ), received information that a French privateer was at Puerto Plata, which lay 100 miles to the east, on the northern coast of the Spanish colony of Santo Domingo. The, ship, wrote Talbot, was "from the boasting publications at the cape and the declaration of the officers . . . one of the fastest sailors that swims. She ran three of four years . . . as a privateer out of France and with greater success than any other that ever sailed out of their ports. "(Quoted in Alien, 1909, 183-4) Formerly the British packet Sandwich, she was now loaded with coffee and preparing for a run to France.

Because he feared that the Constitution might not be able to find her if she was to get to sea, the Commodore determined to capture her where she was. Since Spain and the United States were not at war, the legality of such an undertaking was questionable; but pirates and French privateers had been treated so hospitably in the Spanish West Indies, that Talbot and his officers were not inclined to worry too much about points of international law.

The Commodore sailed eastward to see if the stories at the Cap about the privateer were true. At about 6 p.m. on 1 May 1800, the Constitution reached Puerto Plata, where Talbot could see at anchor not one, but three ships. From the port, the tall American frigate, too, was visible as she stood off and on under easy sail until dark. At daybreak, Talbot's ' first lieutenant, Isaac Hull, and another lieutenant left the Constitution in a small cutter to reconnoitre Puerto Plata, while the Commodore continued sailing in full view of the shore. At 10.30 am, one of the three vessels ran out. Talbot pursued, and, after a ninety minute chase, fired a gun, where upon the fugitive hove to. She turned out to be a Danish ship, bound for Cape Samana to the east. Talbot detained her, and returned to his station to await the return of the cutter. At 7 p.m., Hull came back and made his report.

Puerto Plata was a small semi-circular harbour, about half-a-mile across, The channel was deep, about 15-20 fathoms, but shoaled quickly to less than 12 feet half-a-mile from the head of the bay. The approach was narrowed on either side by reefs, and on the west by Owen Rock. On the eastern point lay a sixty-five foot hill, at the summit of which was a small fort, mounting three heavy cannon. South of the fort lay the town of Puerto Plata. The Sandwich was moored in the harbour, on an east-west axis, with all her cannon, four 6 and two 9 pounders, facing seaward to enable her to co-operate with the fort against any hostile force.

It had been Talbot's "intention to have gone in with the Constitution and to have silenced the fort and ship;" but Hull's report convinced him that it would "be somewhat dangerous to approach the entrance of the harbour with a ship of the draft of water of the Constitution. "(Quoted in Alien, 1909, 182) Nor was attack mounted with the frigate's boats or the detained Danish ship likely to succeed, for the element of surprise had already been lost, and the guns of the fort and the Sandwich would destroy any assault force.

While the Commodore was still trying to decide how to get at the Sandwich, he had occasion to send two of the Constitution's boats in pursuit of a suspicious barge. They did not catch the barge, but they did bring back an American sloop named the Sally . An examination of her papers and cargo had convinced one of the Constitution's lieutenants that the Sally was engaged in the contraband trade, and therefore subject to seizure. Talbot, however, saw in the sloop more than a prize. Since she had left Puerto Plata a few days earlier, and was planning to return there before she sailed for the United States, it seemed to the Commodore that she would make a perfect 'Trojan Horse.'

Talbot devised a plan whereby the Sall would sail into Puerto Plata harbour in "open day" with the morning breeze. Her master would stand prominently on his quarter-deck, with an American naval officer beside him and half-a-dozen of Talbot's men working the ship. Hidden in the hold would be more seamen and Marines. They would seize the Sandwich, storm the fort and spike the guns. If possible, they would then sail both ships out of the harbour and rejoin the Constitution. If not, the privateer would be burned or sunk. The risk was great, for during the day a steady wind generally blew into the harbour. There could be no retreat before a breeze came off the land after sunset.

The afternoon and early evening of 10 May was spent preparing the Sally for her short voyage. Talbot placed Lieutenant Hull in overall command of the operation. Hull had at his disposal about ninety seamen and Marines, the latter of whom were to be commanded, "when on shore," by Marine Corps Captain Daniel Carmick and Second Lieutenant William Amory. Both seamen and Marines worked excitedly throughout the day, and, at 10 p.m., the Sally, outfitted and provisioned, sailed into the darkness for Puerto Plata.

At midnight, Hull and his men were surprised by the report of two cannon and a hail in English, followed by an order to come to. The ship was the British 32-gun frigate Alarm, commanded by Captain Robert Rolles. Rolles sent a boat to examine the Sally, and the British lieutenant who boarded the sloop expressed considerable surprise at finding such a small vessel carrying so many men. On being told what their mission was, he intimated to Hull that his own ship had been waiting only for the Sandwich to finish loading before attempting to cut her out. Hull replied that as he himself intended to cut out the privateer next morning, the frigate would have to do so before then, or it would be too late. Thereupon, the British officer left the sloop, wishing the Americans good luck.

At about noon on Sunday 11 May 1800, the Sally sailed into Puerto Plata harbour. The sight of the familiar sloop, with her own master and no more than a normal number of men on deck, provoked no alarm. This was just as well, for throughout the approach Hull sailed directly into the Sandwich's broadside, and within musket range of the fort to port. The First Lieutenant, who was standing by the stern, ready to let go the anchor, directed the helmsman to lay the Sail aboard the corsair, "which he did on the starboard bow." As the two ships came together, Hull let the anchor go and gave the order to board.

The men, who had been cooped up for twelve hours rushed on board the privateer "like devils," and, Captain Carmick wrote 'lit was as much as the first lieutenant and myself could do to prevent blood being spilt. "(Quoted in Alien, 1909, 184) No resistance was offered, the

Sandwich's crew having been completely surprised; but the Americans discharged their pistols in the air, as ordered, so as to create an illusion of battle and determination for those ashore. The prize secured, Carmick, Amory and a boatload of Marines rowed for the shore, their objective being the fort on top of the hill. As the boat neared the low sandy shore, the eager Marines leaped over the gunwales, and, in water up to their necks, muskets and cartridge boxes held over their heads, charged up the hill before the Spanish garrison had time to react. After spiking "all the cannon," the leathernecks returned to the Sandwich.

Hull, meanwhile, had had the corsair's twenty-two-strong crew confined below, and all of her cannons shifted from the larboard to the starboard side, facing the town. The whole operation had taken only thirty minutes. Throughout the afternoon, while Carmick's Marines held off irresolute Spanish probes, Hull's seamen worked unhurriedly to re-rig the Sandwich. They had found the ship wholly unprepared for sea, with "her topmasts down and all her sails unbent." Fortunately, the remaining spars, cordage and canvas were stored below.

"By 6 o' clock," wrote Carmick, "the lieutenant had everything in order and the men stationed at the cannon, ready with my marines to oppose all their force, which we understood was about 500 men. They sent several flags of truce making different requests, to which we answered that we had only executed the orders of our commander. On shore they were not ignorant that it was impossible for us to get out until the land breeze came, (yet they) remained very quiet."(Quoted in Allen, 1909, 185)

This stand-off continued until midnight, when the land breeze at last began to blow. With it sailed the Sally and the Sandwich. Not a man had been killed or wounded on either side.

In the end, this well executed operation cost the Constitution's crew dearly. In early July, the Spanish protested the seizure of the Sandwich in Puerto Plata, on the grounds that the Americans had no right to take a ship from their territory. Since Spain had ceded Santo Domingo to France in 1795, but the latter had yet to effect an occupation, it was debatable whether Puerto Plata was in fact Spanish territory. But for Benjamin Stoddert it mattered not. He knew that Talbot's capture would not hold up if challenged in court, for the Commodore's instructions permitted seizures of French armed ships only on the high seas, which the harbour of Puerto Plata certainly was not. The Secretary, therefore, ordered that the Sandwich be returned to her owners, who sought and won damages that offset all of the prize money gained during the Constitution's cruise.

Second Landing

The second American amphibious landing of the Quasi-War took place at Willemstad, capital of the Dutch colony of Curacao, in September 1800. Although the Dutch were, in theory, allies of the French, Curacao contained a sizeable community of American merchants, for whom the island was a valuable export market. In 1799, for example, American exports to Curacao and the Netherlands other Caribbean colony, Surinam, totalled - $5,150,000.

On 1 February 1800, the French 40-gun frigate la Vengeance, Captain F.M. Pitot, fought a fiercely contested action with the American 36-gun frigate Constellation, Captain Thomas Truxtun. The fight ended when la Vengeance bore away, and headed towards Curacao. Having been holed by a dozen shot below the waterline and 180 above, she had seven feet of water in her hold, and nothing standing but her bowsprit, lower foremast and mizzenmast. Casualties among her crew probably numbered about 160 killed and wounded.

La Vengeance was still at Curacao on 23 July 1800, when a French force from Guadeloupe, commanded by a General Jannet, and consisting of two brigs and three schooners with 500 troops on board, appeared off the island. Jannet intended to seize Curacao with his troops and armed ships, supported by la Vengeance. But he kept his plans a secret until the men and supplies he had brought from Guadeloupe for the frigate were safely ashore. When all appeared ready, he presented his demands to the Dutch: they must make a loan to the French, allow his troops to garrison the island's forts, and seize all American property ashore and afloat to compensate for the damage to la Vengeance.

The Dutch had not been taken entirely by surprise. The local burgher militia, about 400-strong, had been called out. The Governor, Johan Rudolph Lausser, agreed to consider the ultimatum, and called a meeting of the colony's council. But while the Dutch stalled, Jannet's scheme began to unravel. Captain Pitot of la Vengeance wanted no part of the plan, and as his ship was now repaired and ready for sea, he cut his cables and sailed. With the frigate gone, Lausser rejected Jannet's terms.

With only 500 men, Jannet had no hope of defeating the Dutch, who were mobilised and controlled all strong-points. On 2 September, a second French force appeared at Willemstad, but found the channel into the harbour barred by a chain. Next day, Jannet, his plan thwarted, left Curacao with all his forces. The Dutch relaxed, and the burgher militia returned to their homes.

But Jannet had not given up. With both forces in hand, he doubled back to the island and landed on the 5th at a small bay a few miles west of Willemstad. The French, now 1500strong, overran the small fort of St Michael's, commanding the western approaches to the capital. Lausser attempted to block their advance, but his 400 militiamen, joined by many American civilians, were defeated. As many as eighty of the latter were reported massacred. By the 6th, Jannet's troops were in Othrabande, the district of Willemstad on the western side of St Ana harbour. The US Consul at Curacao, Benjamin Hamell Phillips, chartered a small vessel, the Escape, and sent an American merchant, William D. Robinson, to St Kitts (which, with British consent, had been used as a base by the US Navy since January 1799) with a request for assistance from the commander of the American squadron there. Phillips believed that the situation was critical, and that if a frigate and a ship of twenty guns did not reach Curacao within fourteen days, all would be lost.

On 14 September, Robinson reached St Kitts, where he found the 28-gun frigate John Adams and the sloops of war Merrimack (24) and Patapsco (20). The merchant conferred with Captain George Cross of the Adams, who recognised the necessity of swift action, but who was unwilling to take his frigate, the only one of two in the Lesser Antilles, to Curacao. Yet he offered no objections to either or both of the other ships going, and so Captain Moses Brown of the Merrimack and Henry Geddes of the Patapsco prepared for sea and sailed next day.

Meanwhile, assistance had reached Willemstad from a different source. On 10 September, Captain Frederick Watkins, RN, commanding the 36-gun frigate HMS Nóróid, arrived off Willemstad, where he noted the firing coming from the town. He joined in, engaging both the French and Dutch, until hailed from an American ship, the Sally, which had run out of the harbour. Her master, William Hampton, informed Watkins of the situation ashore. The Dutch were prepared to surrender if Watkins would provide assistance against the French.

The Captain agreed to the idea of a surrender, and, after transferring twenty Marines to the Sally, sent her back to Willemstad. Three days later, he and Lausser signed articles of capitulation, placing the island under British protection.

Jannet was now making preparations for a final attack. These preparations were noted by Lausser, who turned to Watkins for further assistance. The Governor wanted the Nóróid in the harbour to forestall a further assault. But Watkins, considering this to be too risky a venture, refused. There were good reasons for his caution. The entrance to St Ana harbour was only half-a-cable's length (360 feet) across, and ran between two long tongues of land. The town of Willemstad lay on the eastern tongue, the approach to which was guarded by Fort Amsterdam. The French held the western tongue - the Rif and sections of the town on that side of the harbour, known as Othrabande. The harbour itself varied in width from a half to a cable's length (720 feet) for three-quarters-of-a-mile, where it opened into the Schottegat, the main anchorage.

To storm the Dutch position at Willemstad, the French had to cross St Ana harbour. A warship in the harbour would make such an assault nearly impossible. But the French had established batteries on the Rif and in Othrabande, and a ship in the channel would be exposed even to musket fire.

By 22 September, the French were prepared to launch an amphibious assault in the evening, unless the Dutch surrendered. The situation was grim. Consul Phillips fled with his family to the Nóróid, but his countrymen, their ships trapped in the Schottegat or property and families ashore, took up arms with the Dutch. Among them was Captain Hampton of the Sally, who erected a battery of 18-pounders with some other Americans.

Then, in the afternoon, the Merrimack and Patapsco appeared off the town. Jannet, unsure of what their unexpected arrival heralded, postponed his attack. While Robinson went ashore to confer with Lausser, Brown and Geddes met Phillips and Watkins in the Nóróid. After some consultation, it was decided that the only means of saving the town and protecting American lives and property was to send one of the warships into the harbour. Moses Brown, the senior American captain, thereupon transferred twenty of his Marines to the Patapsco, and ordered Geddes into the channel. One of Patapsco's officers wrote:

"At five in the evening (on the 23rd ) we stood in, when the French opened a quick and well directed fire upon us from a fort of two 18, one 12, and two 9-pounders within half pistol shot, and from the windows and roofs of the houses in L' Ortha Banda, which was filled with the enemy's troops, who kept up a constant fire of musketry, which was warmly returned from the cannon and muskets of the Patapsco . . . (Quoted in Allen, 1909, 198)

The action continued for over two hours, and then the enemy's fire slackened. After another hour it all but ceased, the French troops withdrawing from the approaches to the harbour, having suffered 150 casualties. Only two Americans were wounded. Next morning, Geddes landed Brown's twenty Marines and fifty of Patapsco's seamen and Marines, under Second Lieutenant James Middleton, USMC. As another attack was expected, they took up positions in support of the Dutch in Fort Amsterdam, while the French kept up a desultory fire across the harbour throughout the day. This sniping, however, was but a cover for withdrawal. On 25 September, Brown took the Merrimack down the coast, and found that the French had completely evacuated the island. On the same day, Nóróid finally entered St Ana harbour, and the capitulation went into effect.

It is clear that the Americans saved Willemstad, and that if they had not appeared in time, the French would have taken possession of the town. Captain Watkins, however, did not have the decency to mention the contribution of Merrimack and Patapsco in his dispatch, with the result that the Naval Chronicle heralded the capture of Curacao as "the only in­stance, perhaps, of the surrender of a whole island to a single frigate. "(Quoted in Palmer, 1987, 201)

Sources

G.W. Allen, Our Naval War With France, Houghton Mifflin, Boston and New York, 1909.
A.R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps, Macmillan, New York, 1980.
H.P. Nash, The Forgotten Wars: The Role of the US Navy in the Quasi-War with France and the Barbary Wars, 1798-1805, A.S. Barnes, New York, 1967.
M.A. Palmer, Stoddert's War: Naval Operations During the Quasi­ War with France, 1798-1801, University of South Carolina Press, 1987.