This article is entirely based on the information contained in Dr. Richard Alan White's "Paraguay's Autonomous Revolution 1810 - 1840" published by the University of New Mexico Press in 1978. This is a scholarly work which re-evaluates Francia's rule sympathetically and concentrates on the economic developments in Paraguay during this period. It is a tribute to Dr. White that an academic work like this is such a pleasure to read. The information on the army is incidental to the main themes of the work but presents some fascinating insights into the origins of the Paraguayan army.

Following the revolutions in the Rio de la Plata Spanish officials attempted to preserve their power in Paraguay and even contemplated handing the province to Portugal, but the local creole officers of the force which had been rapidly raised to supplement the Spanish troops and defeat an invasion from the revolutionaries of Buenos Aires under General Belgrano rebelled themselves and seized power. This constituted the bloodless May 14th and 15th Independence Revolution.

The creole officers chose a Spanish-born officer, Lt. Colonel Juan Valeriano de Zevallos, and the creole lawyer Dr. José Gaspar Rodriguez de Francia to form a government with the former Spanish governor Velasco. Francia insisted from the start on a fully autonomous Paraguay, independent of Buenos Aires. Velasco didn't last long and was soon dismissed. All Spanish officers with the exception of Zevallos were relieved of command. The army that had defeated Belgrano was made up of some 6,000 mostly mounted men, only 500 armed with guns and the rest with lances, swords, machetes and clubs - the first Paraguayan army. In the action at Paraguari the Spaniards had fled and the battle was won by the creole officers and the Indian rank and file.

With continuing threats and raids from Portuguese territory and aggression from Buenos Aires trying to force Paraguay to submit to integration within a porteño dominated Argentina, and the fact that Paraguay was a poor country almost bereft of industry and with woefully undeveloped agriculture, the state did not seem destined for an independent existence.

Francia was to dominate the government of Paraguay simply because he was overwhelmingly able and became indispensable. The first General Assembly in 1810 represented the creole elite who elected Francia as one of a junta with Fulgencio Yegros and two others; the feeling amongst all but Francia was that Paraguay should unite in some way with Buenos Aires. Disagreements lead to Francia's resignation in August 1811, but he was already so essential that the rest begged him to return and the commander of the Asunción barracks expelled one of his principal opponents in order to ensure his return. In fact Francia was steadfastly opposed to the military's dominant role in the country. There was a continuing sense of crisis caused by the virtual blockade imposed by Buenos Aires and continuing disagreements amongst the Junta.

Francia resigned again and this time it was a year before he returned but he used the time to build up his influence with the ordinary Paraguayan people. Recalled in 1812 to deal with the deepening crisis he insisted on the creation of a second regular battalion which, along with half the munitions of the country, should be under his direct command. His opponents were gradually expelled from the Junta and a new Congress was called, an extraordinary affair for Latin America, or indeed anywhere; it represented, however crudely, all the classes of Paraguay and all free male citizens were to have a vote. Two more congresses were to follow, each elected on the same basis, and Francia's careful wooing of the ordinary farmers and peasant indians paid off with the congresses being fully supportive of him.

The first congress proclaimed the Independence of the Paraguay Republic. There were to be two consuls forming the government, Yegros and Francia, who were to rotate the role of first minister. Francia and Yegros each controlled half the army, and Francia ensured his battalion was fully recruited. He also dominated the government, and created an efficient, honest and loyal administration, again unique in South America. He himself was utterly incorruptible and expected the same of all those who served the state. Increasingly he appointed officers and officials drawn from the Paraguayan people, not the creole elite of Asunción. All Spaniards were shut our from office and, by heavy fines and restrictions, were destroyed as a separate economic and social group.

Tighter control was established over the militia, the regulars were reorganised and the old creole officers gradually weeded out. Loyal Paraguayans replaced them, none of them from the powerful, rich families. Strict behaviour was expected of these officers drawn from the ordinary people and they faced instant dismissal if they abused their position. For the ranks, recruiting was limited to unmarried volunteers of 18 to 30 but the local commandante in charge of recruitment was charged by Francia to be "especially careful not to accept any that are of bad reputation in their public conduct, but only those from whom honour, proper subordination, and the fulfilment of their obligation in the service to which they are destined can be expected."

Francia fostered a sense of nationalism in the people, in the face of two particularly troublesome threats - from repeated raids into the Northern territories by Indians and the Portuguese, and the ravaging of the claimed Missions area, which had become a no-man's land roamed by bandits, deserters and army units from the Argentine civil wars. He also faced a continuing blockade particularly of armaments. Despite the threats from factions in the Argentine wars, as federales and unitarios fought each other, crossing through the Missions area, Francia stuck to a strict policy of neutrality and non-intervention for the outside world. Artigas, the Argentine Federal leader had many sympathisers amongst the creoles of Paraguay, and amongst army officers from that class still in place.

The pro-federal sub-delegate of the Missions, Viente Antonio Matiauda, was persuaded by Artigas to lead an unauthorised attack on a retreating unitario force in the Missions although the consuls ordered him to stop. He resigned his commission and continued his attack, joining Artigas. Apart from this, Francia's strict neutrality lasted for the whole period of his rule and Paraguayan troops never crossed the borders of their claimed territory. To reduce the threat from pro-federal creole officers still in the army, Francia dispersed them to the Northern provinces, drawing troops for this duty solely from the battalion still under Yegros' command. ( Others were retired and the control of the vital Asunción barracks was left to men loyal to Francia, whose battalion was recruited to its maximum. A special guard of mounted grenadiers was created, made up of better paid, well equipped and loyal soldiers by the end of 1814.

There was a renewed military conspiracy as the 1814 congress was gathering which came to nothing and Francia was elected as sole head of the government. In 1815 Artigas occupied Candelaria, the capital of the Missions., and raided the area, establishing a firmer blockade. Francia mobilized troops in Asunción, Paraguari and Villarica in the face of an expected invasion but as so frequently happened, events elsewhere lead to the calling off of the planned invasion as Portuguese troops threatened the Oriental province and Artigas withdrew.

1816

By the time of the 1816 congress, no officer remained in the army who had been in the first forces raised against Belgrano and Francia was appointed Dictator for Life. By 1820 Artigas had been overthrown in Uruguay and fled to Paraguay with his followers. They were granted asylum but were dispersed to the most distant provinces. Ramirez, Artigas' successor, mounted an invasion and plotted with members of the Paraguayan elite. By 1820 the wealthy were facing ruin because of the economic blockade and it was planned that the dictator and all his senior officers and officials were to be killed. Some officers were in the plot and it included members of the most prominent families in Paraguay.

Before the plot was discovered, Francia had increased the army, which only numbered 842 in 1816, to 1,413 in 1818 and finally 1,793 in 1820 (figures Dr. White worked out on the basis of the average pay and the totals for the military budgets for those years). A further 5 - 10,000 militia were mobilised for the most serious threat Paraguay had faced. They manned defences along the Parana river and the borders were closed, none being allowed to leave on pain of death. Very effective patrolling discovered the plot, from letters carried by men attempting to enter Paraguay. The Argentine forces were forced to call off the invasion by a revolt in the provinces but a force was left in the Missions. This was not withdrawn until 1821.

The conspiracy detected by Francia's police threw up more and more names and some 23 were executed as a result, including Fulgencio Yegros, while about 500 were imprisoned, most for the rest of Francia's rule. Property and wealth was confiscated on a widespread scale especially from the church.

In the face of the blockade, great efforts were made to procure, repair and manufacture weapons - by 1816 guns were being made in Paraguay and cloth was woven, dyed and tailored for uniforms. Warships were at first requisitioned (merchantmen adapted for the purpose) but by 1820 a sizeable river flotilla, some 100 assorted vessels, had been built, the first Paraguayan-built ship being launched in 1815. Gunpowder, leather and bullets were all produced locally and the state raised cattle to feed the army. The armed forces took 64% of the total budget, but the troops were also used on public works projects. It must also be remembered that Francia was concerned to keep taxation low and in this he succeeded. The numbers of troops fluctuated considerably according to the threats from outside. The years of greatest expansion were l8l6-20, 1828-29, 1831-32 and 1835-45.

The usually accepted numbers of the army are in the region of 4-5,000 given in most of the contemporary works on Paraguay, by Rengger for instance, but are a great exaggeration. In fact the regular army never numbered more than 1,800 and on average was around 1,200. The size of the army was a very well kept secret and no-one in Paraguay knew the proper figure with the exception of Francia himself and his Treasurer. Militia were certainly available to swell the numbers but the core was always the regular force, whose size at various times White has been able to work out by dividing the total expenditure on the army with the average soldiers pay. Only in 1828 is a detailed breakdown available and for some years after that.

Most interesting are the statistics for the minimum ratio of officers to nco's and men - 42 to 1, this made expansion at any time relatively easy. Also remarkable is the complete absence of any officer over the rank of captain - and for some years, over the rank of lieutenant. There were no senior officers in the army. Local district commanders appear to have exercised both a senior civil and military command. But officers were regularly rotated and no officer or official was ever able to gain any insight into the full details of the army.

The Missions were re-occupied by Paraguay after 1821 and patrols were sent out to expel intruders and re-establish control. The area began to flourish under protection. Trade increased especially with the now independent Brazil along the internal rivers and special terms made the import of weapons attractive to traders. An example quoted by Dr. White is the import of 1,000 high quality muskets and 1,000 high quality sabres in mid -1832 alone. Francia exercised the strictest control over trade as he did all contacts with the outside world - which is why the secret of the size of the army never emerged. The myth of the Paraguayan army was carefully fostered and in 1832 came the event that enshrined the myth as fact in the outside world.

The Argentine Federal State of Corrientes claimed part of the Missions area and objected to the detention and expulsion of its citizens. In 1832 the governor, Brigadier General Pedro Ferré, declared war and invaded. There was no battle but the troops skirmished and manoeuvred, the Corrientinos occupying Candelaria without opposition when the commandante of Itapúa withdrew, much to Francia's annoyance. No other federal state joined Corrientes in its campaign and the Paraguayans filtered back, laying ambushes and mounting raids, many of them unsuccessful or even disastrous.

The Paraguayans suffered from a lack of experienced officers - especially of officers used to commanding above company level. By December 1833 the Paraguayans were at last able to mount a full scale re-invasion and the Corrientinos were forced out, much to their surprise and to the surprise of the Federation. The myth of the size and effectiveness of the Paraguayan army dates very much from this event and the exaggeration played into Francia's hands. The French consul reported in all seriousness that the Argentine Federation believed that "Francia constantly maintains more or less 15,000 regular troops which, if necessary, can be augmented by an equal number in a very short time." While he pointed out that the estimates were probably exaggerated, he also stated that it was believed that the militias could provide another 40,000 at a moments notice. In this whole period the Paraguayan regular army numbered no more than 1,500 with a further 5,000 militia mobilised. Francia contented himself with occupying two forts and keeping within his self-imposed boundaries and the rest of the federation were unwilling to support Corrientes in a war. By 1834 the Corrientinos had withdrawn completely and commerce resumed.

By the time of Francia' s death in 1840, Paraguay had become a nation, stable both politically and economically, its population more than tripled in the forty years to 1830 and the people were materially far better off than they had been in 1810 and on the whole better off, paying lower taxes and better educated, than in any other South American state. This stability came at a high cost in terms of personal freedoms and freedom of expression and the elite had suffered severely, but one great achievement of Francia was that he had forged a nation, one that was even able to survive the catastrophe of the war of the Triple Alliance.

The Paraguayan Army 1816-1840 Budget and TO&E