To understand the recent events of 1995, it is useful to first review the events of the last major clash between the two countries in 1981. This occurred in the Condor mountain range, particularly around the Comaina valley, which is very near the Cenepa river valley, the location of the current conflict. In January 1981, the Peruvians detected Ecuadorian helicopter flights around a number of jungle posts (called observation posts by the Peruvians) that the Peruvians had abandoned in 1977. On January 22, a Peruvian helicopter flight over the abandoned posts found they were occupied by Ecuadorian soldiers openly flying Ecuadorian flags. Attempting to make a second run over the posts, the helicopter was hit by machine-gun fire from the location known by the Peruvians as PV-22.

The posts detected to be occupied by the Ecuadorians were known as PV-3 and "New" PV-4. That night the Ecuadorian press reported that Peruvian helicopters had attacked Ecuadorian troops on the border. The next day, a second helicopter reconnaissance was made over PV-22 and again fired on by Ecuadorian troops. That same day, the Peruvian army received orders to recapture the posts.

On January 28, the Peruvians launched an assault against the PV-22. The first attempt consisted of dropping a helicopter borne force of 68 men 1000 meters from PV-22 under the cover of rocketing and strafing MI-8 helicopters. The troops then marched undetected to the base where they set up for attack. They observed that they were out-numbered 2-1, but would be supported by the rockets and machine-guns of the MI-8s that were scheduled to make a return run at the hour of attack. However, when they returned, they came under heavy machine-gun fire from small arms and a quad .50 and were forced to break off the attack.

The infantry force, seeing that they were outnumbered, withdrew without being detected. The next day a similar attack was launched with a heliborne force of 150 men. However, the men were landed in scattered groups along the beaches of a nearby river, and were unable to concentrate and march on the objective. Finally on January 30, a helicopter assault was made directly on the base which succeeded.

During the softening up bombardment, the Peruvians managed to silence the quad .50 when a rocket explosion flipped it over. The initial landing was met by heavy fire from some bunkers that was apparently covering fire for the Ecuadorian garrison that had made the decision to withdraw during the two preceding days of intense helicopter attack. They left behind a lot of intact equipment, including the quad .50 and some 60mm mortars. On January 31, Peruvian President Belaunde Terry visited the captured post. Within minutes of his departure, two Ecuadorian Jaguars launched an ineffective bombing raid on PV-22 and were fired on by an SA-7 shoulder launched ground to air missile that failed to hit its target.

Meanwhile, the Peruvians launched an assault on the PV-3 on January 31, the Peruvians first bombarded the base with 6 Mirages, an A-37B, an Antonov and 3 armed MI-8s. Three transport MI-8s and two Twin Bell helicopters landed the troops at a helipad to the south of the base. As the infantry approached the base they were fired on by Ecuadorian soldiers on an elevation to the east. This fire ceased when the Peruvians returned fire with an RPG-7, machine-guns and rifle fire. The Peruvians then walked into the post which had been abandoned.

Two Mirages covered a similar assault using the same helicopter assets on "New" PV-4 on February 1, that produced similar results with only one Peruvian soldier wounded by ground fire during the landing. The Peruvian troops took this post, also abandoned, under fire from Ecuadorians at a small helicopter landing pad about 1500 meters away from the main post. When an Ecuadorian helicopter landed reinforcements at this pad, the Peruvians directed fire from FN MAG machine-guns, 60mm mortars and RPG-7s at the helipad. The Ecuadorian helicopter conducted fire evasion manoeuvres and flew away. The Peruvians immediately reinforced their position with a platoon of men and an SA-7 ground-to-air missile team and prepared to assault the helipad, however the cease-fire order was given before they could attack. This ended the initial phase of fighting.

Later three more Ecuadorian posts on Peruvian claimed territory were discovered. These were known to the Peruvians as JB-2, PV-4 A, and "Old" PV-4. The Peruvians immediately attacked. Six MI-8s landed troops that attacked JB-2 on February 19 which was defended by approximately two platoons of Ecuadorian special forces. The first helicopters rocketing and strafing the base were greeted by heavy ground fire. This forced the follow on helicopters carrying the infantry to land 400 meters from the objective, rather than on the objective as planned. Meanwhile, the Ecuadorians apparently, withdrew.

The Peruvian infantry launched a violent assault, using a copious amount of ammunition and hand grenades took the post virtually unopposed. In the afternoon, the Ecuadorians launched a counter attack from the ground which was beaten off. The same day, PV-4A was attacked from "New" PV-4 through a platoon size infantry ground assault under the cover of a .50 caliber gun at "New" PV-4. The heavy machine-gun failed to adequately suppress the Ecuadorians, and the attack made little progress until Peruvian helicopters returning from the attack on JB-2 attacked PV-4A with their unexpended ordnance.

This caused the Ecuadorians to withdraw. The attack on "Old" PV-4 on February 19 involved a helicopter assault using the same assets and tactics as that on 113-2. When the first helicopters attempted to land their troops however, one of the helicopters was shot down and another was driven off after only landing 11 men. However the Ecuadorians, following the pattern of the other fighting, withdrew, leaving the post to the Peruvians. The taking of "Old" PV-4 ended the fighting.

Lessons and Analysis

There are several important lessons that were learned from this fighting. On a higher level, both sides were able to keep the fighting confined to the immediate area of operations, although both sides mobilized their complete military forces. There was no real thought on either side of the conflict of generalising the war. The fighting was kept within the limited political objectives they intended to accomplish. Second. it appears that the Ecuadorians were caught unready. According to Peruvian sources, the Ecuadorians had been preparing to go public in mid-February. The Peruvian assault came a month before they were prepared. As a consequence, Ecuadorian logistics was not in place, the only way to supply or reinforce being by helicopter from remote bases. As a consequence, Ecuador immediately lost local air superiority to the Peruvians.

This had a significant impact on Ecuadorian tactics which were to put up a stiff resistance against the initial Peruvian aerial assault and helicopter landing, when the Peruvians were most vulnerable, and then withdraw under a light covering force as soon as the Peruvian ground forces arrived, or began advancing in strength. The need to travel light in the jungle caused the Ecuadorians to abandon all but the most essential equipment. The abandonment of all the equipment was a great Propaganda feast for the Peruvians, with President Belaunde Terry posing in the gunner's seat of the quad .50 captured at PV-22. Only one counter-attack was made by Ecuadorian special forces, and none by other forces. Only at PV-4A did the Ecuadorians hold up the Peruvian attack for any length of time, until they received air support, whereupon the Ecuadorians immediately withdrew.

Uniforms and Equipment

The Peruvian soldiers and Ecuadorian soldiers were similarly equipped. Both carried FN rifles and FN MAG machine-guns. These were complemented by rifle and hand grenades. The Peruvians also carried RPG-7 anti-tank rocket launchers and a smattering of AK-47 rifles. The Ecuadorian soldiers were reportedly armed with a few M72 LAW disposable anti-tank rockets. Both the Peruvians and Ecuadorians employed the .50 caliber Browning M2HB machine-gun. The Ecuadorians in the M-55 quad mount and the Peruvians on a tripod ground mount. The Peruvians did not seem to have used any artillery, as the rockets and the machine-guns of the Mi-8s proved to be sufficient. The Ecuadorians had some 60mm mortars.

The Peruvians wore the standard infantry uniform of the day which consisted of some yellow green fatigues with two chest and four pants pockets. Their equipment consisted of light tan Israeli type H-harness, magazine pouches for the FN FAL and grenade pouches. Most Peruvian troops wore American M-l steel helmets. The Ecuadorians wore a tiger stripe patterned jungle uniform, similar in cut to the U.S. jungle uniform used in Vietnam, with four jacket pockets and six pants pockets, two of which were the large bellows pockets on the outside legs. The tiger stripe pattern was dominated by reddish brown streaks, but also contained green, light green and black. It is not known if the Ecuadorians wore helmets or not. The equipment harness was of the same pattern and color as the Peruvians.

Numbers of Troops and Casualties

There was not more than a brigade of troops involved in the fighting on both sides with probably a single battalion on both sides providing most of the troops for combat. The Ecuadorians also employed elements of their special forces in no greater numbers than a single company. Both sides employed limited air assets with Peru employing about a dozen helicopters and a similar number of fixed wing air craft in all missions. Ecuador employed a much smaller number of aircraft, two fixed wing and one helicopter from the account. Casualties were relatively light with perhaps a dozen killed on each side and twice that many wounded. Ecuador probably suffered relatively heavier casualties than Peru.

Sources

Teodoro Hidalgo Morey, "El Conflicto de la Cordillera del Condor-1981", Lima 1984.
Coronel E. P. Eduardo Fournier Coronado, "Tiwinza con Zeta: Toda la Verdad", Oficina de Informacíon del Ejécito, Lima 1995.
Jose Gallardo et al, "Tiwintsa", 2nd edition, Editorial Conejo, Quito 1995.
David Oliver, "Condor Conflict", Air Forces Monthly, No.93, Dec. 1995, pp.25-29.
"La Epopeya del Cenepa", Hoy, Quito 1995, newspaper supplement in 8 parts.