by G. Lacasse
[continued from VOL. III. No 1] The unprovoked Bolivian attack on Fortin Carlos Antonio Lopez, on 15 June 1932, escalated the long smouldering Chaco dispute. Unwritten convention allowed the aggrieved country to redress the situation, and on 15 July, Paraguay recaptured the fort. However, Bolivia broke the rules when it retaliated with attacks against Fortines Corrales, Toledo and Boqueron between 26-31 July. Attempts to stop the fighting failed, both sides rapidly and successfully mobilized, and war ensued. With its quicker mobilization, Paraguay was able to strike first. On 29 September, its forces recaptured Boqueron and forced surviving Bolivian units to retreat westward more than 100 kilometres to just before Ballivian, along a line from Munoz to Platinillos, just north of the Pilcomayo River. On 6 December, the Bolivian Chief-of-Staff Osorio was replaced by Kundt [Osorio was unfairly blamed for Bolivia's limited military success and unprepared state in the Chaco]. Kundt's first offensive, December 1932-March 1933, matched 12,000 troops against Paraquay's strategically important Alihuata-Nanawa central Chaco sector. The frontal attack, reminiscent of the First World War, failed with heavy casualties against the "Verdun of South America". A second campaign in July in the same area, strongly supported by tanks, aircraft [Bolivia had complete air superiority during the war] and artillery, again failed with heavy casualties. Kundt's failures partly rest with his "altiplano" Quechua and Aymara soldiers, who were unused to the dense, humid air of the lowland Chaco, unlike the Paraguayan foot soldier, the "pila". The Bolivian losses enabled the Paraguayans, under their tactically competent and energetic new commander, Estigarribia, to take the offensive. a limited Paraguayan probe at Pampa Grande on 8 September had unexpected success. A more ambitious attack on 23 October with 13,000 troops smashed the Bolivian line and forced the surrender of 8,000 Bolivian troops at Campo Via on 11 December. Kundt was replaced by his subordinate, General Penaranda. A month long truce in December allowed both sides to reorganize units [into Army Corps], call up additional reserves and replace equipment losses. Bolivian purchases included 50,000 rifles, 500 machine guns. 50 artillery pieces and 30 combat aircraft, while Paraguay obtained 15,000 rifles, 500 machine guns, 12 mortars and 10 aicraft, besides the vast quantities of captured Bolivian equipment. Paraguayan Offensive In January 1934, Paraguay went on the offensive. Over the next year its forces suffered only two temporary setbacks, most notably in May when the over-extended Paraguayan 1st Corps was partially encircled and lost 1,500 men. In September, Paraguay exploited a rift between Penaranda and his subordinate, Toro. While one Paraguayan force isolated Ballivian [from which Toro had refused to retreat], another drove westward to Picuiba. Although the latter was eventually forced to retreat, it managed to cut up 1 Divisions of Bolivian cavalry [led by Toro] in a pincer movement at El Carmen. The fall of Ballivian, on 17 November, cleared the way for a Paraguayan drive to the foothills of the altiplano. Two Army Corps struck out towards the important city of Villa Montes, a third towards Santa Cruz [in the Chaco's extreme north-west sector]. However, during February-April 1935, Bolivia who was now working from shortened lines of supply and communication were able to push back a Paraguayan army now suffering from over stretched supply lines, inadequate manpower reserves and fatigue. The Chaco War had reached a stalemate. On 14 June 1935 a ceasefire ended the fighting, 3 years of war had cost both countries nearly 100,000 dead, millions of dollars in destruction and severe social dislocations. On 21 July the final peace treaty awarded Paraguay 80% of the Chaco, most of which its troops already occupied. Further reading The Chaco War, in War Monthly No.15 [June 1975 pages 42-48, by Adrian English.
[The uniform section of this article has as yet not been recieved due to Mr. Lacasse's casework for his degree, its hoped that with a successful result he will be able to conclude with this section] Back to Table of Contents -- El Dorado Vol III No. 5 Back to El Dorado List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1991 by The South and Central Military Historians Society This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines articles are available at http://www.magweb.com |