On June 8th, 1969 Honduras defeated El Salvador in a qualifying round for the 1970 World Cup, El Salvador gaining its revenge by defeating Honduras in a return match a week later. Within a month both countries were at War! Although it is a gross over-simplification to say that the brief 1969 conflict between Honduras and El Salvador was fought over the results of a football match, it was inevitable, in the circumstances in which it occurred, that it should become known to history as "The Football War". Despite its comic-opera overtones, the "Football War" was however a serious affair and claimed the lives of some 3,000 people. PART 1: BACKGROUND The origins of the conflict were principally demographic. El Salvador and Honduras are amongst the world's poorest countries. Although somewhat more affluent than Honduras, with an average per capita income of $270 per year, in 1969, against $231 for Honduras, El Salvador was and remains the most densely populated country on the American mainland. It then had a population of just under 3,400,000, giving it a population density comparable to that of the Netherlands. By contrast, that of Honduras, which then had just under 2,600,000 inhabitants, was comparable to that of Afghanistan. Land ownership in both countries was also very unevenly distributed, 60% of the available agricultural land of El Salvador being owned by less than 5% of the population and largely devoted to the cultivation of profitable non-food crops. Although the distribution of land ownership was almost as unequal in Honduras, large numbers of illegal Salvadorean immigrants had penetrated into the larger, but less populous neighbouring country, where they settled as squatters. This influx of unwelcome visitors from a relatively wealthy neighbour exacerbated the competition for the possession of land not already owned by the local oligarchy and caused increasing bitterness. By the late 1960's, Salvadorean immigrants in Honduras numbered approximately 300,000, equivalent to 11.5% of the total population of the reluctant host country. The Honduran military government of General Oswaldo López Arellano, which was then running into increasing economic difficulties, seized upon the immigrants as a convenient focus of public resentment and outrages against the Salvadorean minority began to occur with increasing frequency. In these inauspicious circumstances, Honduras and El Salvador were drawn to play against each other in the preliminary qualifying rounds for the 1970 World Cup. On June 8th, 1969, the Salvadorean soccer team lost to Honduras, in a match played at Tegucigalpa, the Honduran capital, the Salvadorean team and their supporters being physically abused. A week later, the Honduran team, in turn lost to the Salvadoreans, playing on their home ground, with similar results. Riots, directed against the Salvadorean minority in Honduras immediately erupted, numbers of Salvadoreans being killed or injured and others fleeing to their homeland with blood-curdling stories of real and imagined atrocities. On June 25th, both governments invoked the Organization of American States to investigate the alleged mistreatment of their respective nationals. Two days later, the victory of the Salvadorean football team, in the deciding match, played on the neutral ground of Mexico City, coincided with the severance of diplomatic relations between the two countries. The Salvadorean Government immediately declared a state of emergency and commenced the first stage of the mobilization of its military reserves on July 2nd. PART 2: THE OPPOSING FORCES The equipment and training of the Salvadorean Army were considerably superior to those of its adversary, and although its three ancient Italian-built tanks , which dated back to the 1930's, were all non-operational, it had some armoured cars, plus a number of extemporised armoured personnel carriers and an overwhelming superiority in artillery. It numbered about 4,500 in all, consisting of 15 Infantry Regiments (the first battalions of three of which were active), 2 Special Forces units, 1 partially mechanised Cavalry Regiment, an Artillery Regiment, equipped with about 20 relatively modern 105mm howitzers, and an Engineer Group. This was now expanded to approximately 15,000, by the mobilization of 15 reserve infantry battalions, to which could be added the 3,000 National Guard and the 2,000man National Police, both of which had a paramilitary organization. The Honduran Army, numbered approximately 3,500, was organized as a battalion-sized Presidential Guard unit and two Infantry Battalions (plus a third in process of formation), 20 company-sized units, largely tied down in garrison and internal security duties in the country's six military zones, and an Engineer Battalion. The heavy equipment of the Honduran Army consisted of a few armoured scout cars, operated by infantry units, and a single battery of 75mm howitzers. The Honduran reserve organization likewise did not approach the efficiency of that of El Salvador and the Armed Forces relied principally on the 2,500 man Special Security Corps (National Police) for support once hostilities commenced. In the air however the balance inclined in favour of Honduras, which had Central America's best air force with 1,200 men and a total of over fifty aircraft, including a dozen Vought F4U-5 Corsair fighter-bombers, three Lockheed RT-33A jet trainer/reconnaissance aircraft, three North American T-28 and six T-6 armed trainers, a transport force with half a dozen Douglas C-47s and a single C-54 aircraft, a few miscellaneous light aircraft and three Sikorsky H-19 helicopters. The 1,000 man Salvadorean Air Force comprised eleven obsolete fighter-bombers (five Vought Corsairs and six North American F-51D Mustangs), five Douglas C-47 transports and about half a dozen armed North American T-6 trainers. It also included a company of paratroopers and some air defence units. Both countries had small coast guard forces, equipped only with lightly armed motor launches, which took little or no part in the subsequent fighting. PART 3: THE AIR WAR Hostilities began on July 3rd when two Honduran T-28 armed trainers forced down a civilian Piper Cherokee light aircraft, which was believed to be scouting for a Salvadorean invading force in the north-western frontier zone. On the same day Salvadorean ground forces fired on a Honduran civilian DC-3 aircraft as it took off from the airstrip at Nueva Ocotepeque, just inside the Honduran frontier. Nine days later, in accordance with a prearranged plan, the major combat elements of the Honduran Air Force were dispersed from their usual base at Toncontin, outside Tegucugalpa, to San Pedro Sula, to the north-west. This dispersal was well advised as at sundown on July 14th the Salvadorean Air Force attempted to carry out a pre-emptive strike, bombing Tegucigalpa with a single unescorted C-47, hastily converted into a make-shift bomber, whilst the eight available Salvadorean fighter-bombers (two crashed into each other on take off and a third lost its way, ending up in Guatemala) carried out strikes against Toncontin, Juticalpa and Choluteca. The Honduran Air Force, which was not equipped for night flying, was unable to react until the following morning when it bombed El Salvador's sole military air base at Ilopango, outside San Salvador, with a C-47, also hastily adapted as a bomber. In the early hours of July 15th, whilst the Honduran C-47 carried out its rather futile bombing mission over Ilopango, Toncontin was again attacked by a Salvadorean Corsair and a Mustang, both aircraft fleeing before two Honduran T-28s and a single Corsair, the guns of which jammed when it attempted to close with the interlopers. That afternoon a flight of four Honduran Corsairs attacked Ilopango, destroying an obsolete training aircraft on the ground and proceeding to shoot up the port of La Unión and destroy El Salvador's vital oil storage depot at Acajutla, which was set ablaze and continued to burn throughout the official four-day duration of the War. PART 4: EL SALVADOR INVADES HONDURAS Isolated clashes had occurred between patrols of the opposing armies, mainly in the north-western frontier zone, from July 2nd onward. On July 12th and 13th, Salvadorean and Honduran patrols clashed again at several points, with some casualties on both sides, sporadic small arms and mortar fire continuing along the entire frontier zone. The Salvadorean Army had concentrated its forces in two main foci with some 3,000 men, under the command of Colonel Mario del Jesús Velázquez, in the so called "Teatro de Operaciones Norte", in the north-western frontier zone, and about 5,000 in the "Teatro de Operaciones Oriente", in the eastern part of the country. Another 1,000 or so, under the command of General Guillermo Segundo Martinez, were concentrated in the "Teatro de Operaciones Norte-Oriente" in the north-east and a similar number in the "Teatro de Operaciones Chalatenango", in the north western province of the same name. These were faced by less than 3,000 Hondurans, deployed along the entire length of the frontier zone. At dawn on July 14th the 1st (Regular) and 8th (Reserve) Infantry Battalions of the Salvadorean Army, with some artillery support, crossed the frontier in the El Poy/Nueva Ocotepeque sector of the Northern Theatre of Operations, a unit of Special Forces making a sweep to the west with the objective of capturing the airstrip at Nueva Ocotepeque. Simultaneously, a 700 man column of the para-military National Guard, commanded by General José Alberto Medrano, initiated a flanking movement to the east. The Salvadorean main force rolled up the weak Honduran right flank catching the main body of the defenders of the Nueva Ocotepeque sector in a defilade and inflicting heavy casualties. Nueva Ocotepeque itself was occupied by the evening of July 15th and the invading force pushed deeper into Honduran territory in the direction of Santa Rosa de Copán. The main Salvadorean thrust came however in the Eastern Theatre where meanwhile their 5th Battalion had penetrated into Honduran territory in the region of Aramecina, whilst the 4th and 11th (Reserve) Battalions, with most of the armour and artillery assets of the Salvadorean Army and supported by a Special Forces unit to the south, advanced on a 20 mile front in the region of Goascarán - El Amatillo. Further to the south the Salvadorean 6th (Reserve) Battalion, using the two patrol boats of the Salvadorean Navy and commandeered civilian small craft, carried out the only amphibious operation of the War, occupying the islands in the Gulf of Fonseca in the face of only nominal resistance. A minor probe in the Chalatenango sector to the north of San Salvador, penetrated only a few kilometres into Honduran territory. The 10th (Reserve) Battalion, at Santa Rosa de Lima, which formed the major strategic reserve of the Salvadorean offensive on the eastern front, saw no action. Surprisingly, neither the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, at Santa Ana and San Miguel respectively, both Regular units, nor the Air Force paratroop company, seem to have taken any part in offensive operations. The two main Salvadorean thrusts were resisted, initially somewhat ineffectually, by numerically inferior and less well equipped Honduran forces, consisting at first only of the garrisons of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Military Zones, each approximating to a weak battalion. From July 16th onwards, however, these were reinforced by the 1st Infantry Battalion in the El Poy sector and by the 3rd Infantry Battalion, elements of the Presidential Guard and the Honduran Army's sole field battery, in the El Amatillo - Nacaome sector. The Salvadorean advance was thus halted, first at El Morral in the North and subsequently just short of Nacaome in the Eastern Theatre, although this was due in the latter case principally to the Salvadoreans over-extending their supply lines which failed to keep up with the advance of the invading forces. Much air activity continued to take place, a Salvadorean Mustang being shot down in an encounter between two Salvadorean F-51s and a pair of Honduran Corsairs over the Goascarán - El Amatillo sector on the morning of July 17th. Later that day two Salvadorean Corsairs were shot down by the Honduran "ace", Major Fernando Soto, who accounted for all three Salvadorean fighters shot down in air-to-air combat during the War. Although Salvadorean anti-aircraft gunners claimed to have brought down four Honduran aircraft of unspecified type, this claim remains unsubstantiated. The Honduran Air Force eventually achieved complete air superiority, although the Honduran ground forces had to retreat in the face of the superior Salvadorean Army which penetrated some 15 kilometres into Honduran territory on the El Poy front and 25 kilometres in the Goascarán - El Amatillo sector, taking the towns of Nueva Ocotepeque in the north and El Amatillo in the east, before the Organization of American States succeeded in imposing a cease-fire, on July 18th. Sporadic action continued, both on the ground and in the air, until July 29th, when the OAS voted to brand El Salvador as the aggressor and to impose economic sanctions failing the immediate withdrawal of Salvadorean troops from Honduran territory. The withdrawal commenced the following day, being completed on August 5th. PART 5: THE COST The precise casualty figures of the 27 day long war are difficult to ascertain with any precision, although an analysis of official figures indicates 107 Salvadorean and 93 Honduran military personnel killed in combat, with 66 acknowledged Honduran wounded and presumably a similar number of Salvadoreans. Although exact figures are lacking, it appears as if anything between 2,000 and 5,000 civilians were killed on both sides, the generally accepted approximate figure being 3,000. The value of the damage to property on both sides is conservatively estimated at not less than US$50,000,000 or approximately 3.3% of the combined annual GNP of both countries. Tension between the two countries continued throughout the 1970's, with sporadic frontier incidents, almost escalating into full-scale warfare once more in 1976. Attempts at the solution of the differences between the two countries collapsed in 1973 but were renewed under the stimulus of the narrowly avoided resumption of hostilities in 1976, a peace treaty being finally ratified, under the auspices of the President of Peru, on October 30th, 1980. Whilst the war had resulted in the condemnation of El Salvador as the aggressor, lumbered the already overcrowded country with some 100,000 refugees and failed to achieve either any compensation for the damages suffered by the Salvadorean minority in Honduras or any guarantees of their future safety, its most serious long-term effect was the closure of the safety valve of emigration to Honduras, thus exacerbating existing demographic pressures and leading to the escalation of guerrilla activity to the level of full-scale civil war from the late 1970's onwards. Despite its serious shortcomings in the area of logistics, the Salvadorean Army had however demonstrated its clear superiority over that of Honduras during the brief inglorious little war and the Salvadorean mobilization system had been shown to work both smoothly and efficiently. For its part, the defects in the organization and equipment of the Honduran Army were underlined, although the Honduran Air Force reinforced its existing reputation as the best military air arm in Central America. Each country subsequently embarked on a programme of rearmament, resulting in the purchase of large quantities of equipment of all kinds, principally from France, Germany, Israel and Yugoslavia. The ratification of the Peace Treaty however, finally removed any immediate threat of the resumption of hostilities and the growing menace of left-wing terrorism and guerrilla activity demonstrated that both governments shared a commonality of interests which largely overshadowed their mutual antipathies. Although a degree of mutual suspicion remained, détente between the two countries developed to the extent that Honduran troops co-operated with the Salvadorean Army in the containment of guerrilla activity in their mutual frontier zone during the early 1980's and several complete battalions of Salvadorean troops were subsequently trained by the United States in Honduran territory. SOURCES: Anderson, T.P., "The War of the Dispossessed", University of Nebraska, Lincoln 1981. English, A.J., "Armed Forces of Latin America", Jane's, London 1984. English, A.J., "The El Salvador - Honduras War", Strategic Survey 1969, Institute of Strategic Studies, London 1970. Dienst, J. & Hagedorn, D., "North American F-51 Mustangs in Latin American Air Force Service", Aerofax Inc., Arlington, Texas 1985. Hagedorn, D., "Viva Corsario", Small Air Forces Observer, January 1981. Hagedorn, D., "Area Handbook For Honduras", The American University, Washington D.C., 1971. Hagedorn, D., "Area Handbook For El Salvador", The American University, Washington, D.C., 1979. Sohr, Raul, "Centroamérica en Guerra", Editorial Alianza, Mexico City, 1988. Back to Table of Contents: Booklet No. 7, Leticia Conflict Back to El Dorado List of Issues Back to Master Magazine List © Copyright 1998 by The South and Central Military Historians Society This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com