Report of the Engagement

The Batteries at Cape Haitien
and the blowing up of HMS Bulldog
by Capt. Charles Wake to Prevent
her Falling into the Hands of the Enemy

Haitian Steamer of War
22nd Dec. 1865

Sir. It is with feeling of the deepest regret that I have to report the events which have caused the destruction of H. M. Ship "BULLDOG", lately under my command, not with out the loss of a few of her gallant crew.

The circumstances which have led to so unprecedented an event, as the blowing up of a British Ship of War by her own Captain are complicated and unusual, that I must earnestly request a patient consideration of the details into which I must enter in order to give you a clear view of them.

On the morning of the 12th October I left the anchorage at Cape Haitien with the intention of exercing the crew at general quarters, firing at a target, and afterwards of communicating with the Government Ministries at L'Acul, 8 miles distant, on the subject of the blockade; a circular letter as to its having been raised by the rebel flotilla having been sent to me by the Consul. The exercise having ended, I steered for L'Acul bay and before long observed the rebel flotilla in chase of and firing at a steamer bearing English colours and also heading for L'Acul. Immediately altering course to cut them off and on a nearer approach observed that the English steamer, then out of gunshot of her pursuers and close to the entrance of L'Acul harbour, had stopped and sent her boat to me.

I picked up the boat, which contained our mails from Port-au-Prince, and learned from her that the steamer was the British ship "Jamaica Packet" chartered by the President of the Republic to convey stores, and the flotilla "Voldrojue" (lately captured from the government) having approached, I fired a lee blank gun and lowered a boat hailing her to the effect that I would send on board - I then directed the Senior Lieutenant (Way) to go on board and acquaint her commander that I would examine the papers of the steamer flying English colours and that until I had done so, I desired he would desist from pursuing her, that if I was satisfied of her right to the Nationality she appeared, I could not permit him to meddle with her, but that if she proved to be Haitien I should not interfere.

I sent no message about his having fired at the British Flag, and instructed Lieutenant Way to be as temperate as possible. He replied with much insolence of manner "that he must go on board with me to verify the papers" saying "that he thought as much of himself as the Captain of the "Bulldog" did of himself." In the meanwhile the British steamer had must unfortunately mistaken the gun I fired for a signal to her, and steamed back again, whereupon the "Voldrojue" attempted to run along side of her; in spite of my warning him not to do so, from this attempt he did not desist and actually run onto the "Bulldog", which I had placed between the two ships.

When he came forward, revolver in hand, and demanded information respecting that steamer; to a demand made with such insolence, I returned a refusal. When he again attempted to run alongside the "Jamaica Packet", upon this I hailed him to the effect, that if he touched her I would capture him, which threat had the desired effect, and he steamed away to his consorts. I ordered the master of the "Jamaica Packet" to come onboard with his papers and satisfied myself of his right to the English Flag, and although he had gunpowder onboard I refused the rights of belligerent to rebel crews, and told him that I would see him clear into L'Acul, but had it been otherwise, I could hardly have allowed him to be captured seeing that he had , through his own mistake, returned from his position of safety to within pistol shot of the "Voldrojue", trusting to my protection and his right to the British Flag. Having taken a list of his papers, I steamed after the "Voldrojue" with my boat towing alongside and a whipt at the masthead, and fired a lee blank gun, intending to send a copy of them onboard her, I however got into shoal water in the attempt and was obliged to give it up.

I trust that considering the violent conduct of the Commander of the flotilla (so great that on his running into us, I felt compelled as a matter of prudence to order the small arms men ship aft) it will be allowed that I acted with moderation.

In reference to this event, which led to the deplorable consequences that have ensued.

I beg leave to reflect to my letter Nos. 12 to 25.

2ndly it being too late to return to Cape Haitien, I remained out-side that night and next morning arrived, half an hour before the flotilla, which followed me in, it was well that I did so, for I had time to send Sub-Lieutenant Eyrwhict, on shore with a dispatch (No.12) to H.B.M's. Vice Consul, reporting what had happened, and requesting him to come onboard and got him safe off again before the rebel commander landed and thereby saved his life, but so little did I expect what followed that I allowed the paymaster to go on shore on duty. His landing was repelled by soldiers, brought down to the pier. I then addressed a letter (No.13) to General Salnave claiming the right to land on peaceful errands; this letter was allowed to be landed, but no reply was vouchsafed, General Salnave surrounded by most of his numerous Generals coming down to the beach, and speaking to the immense and excited crowd, in the most violent manner, giving orders that I should not be allowed to land, because that I would be apprehended if I did. I however kept my boat (armed) laying off, taking on board Mr. Dulton, the Vice Consul, who after some difficulty and much danger to himself, succeeded in doing so.

I then, after my explanations with him, in the course of which I learned that on the receipt of my letter he had immediately forwarded it to the Council. Wrote another letter to him (No.15) to be sent to them, correcting the mistaken information received from the false reports of the rebel commander and I think it will be allowed that the tone I assumed therein, was commentary though firm. While I was in the act of dictating this letter (Mr. Dulton on board) a body of troops and a large crowd was seen to assemble round the Consulate and the Red Flag (as a signal of war) was hoisted on shore. I cleared the ship for action, and got steam up, seeing all clear for stopping.

When my dispatch was ready I sent W. Dulton on shore, as he wished to go, having great fears (which I shared) for the safety of those within the Consulate, nether the less he went at the most imminent risk to his life, and I was most uneasy about him until I heard next day of his safety. I remained clear for action that day and kept everything ready for expelling an attack during the night. I should mention that in the morning of the day I had sent an officer to "De Soto" with orders to explain to him all that had occured. I also sent a note apologising for not entering more into particulars on paper, being unwell at the time and much engaged.

Late that evening I received accidentally through an American officer who came onboard information that the British Consulate had been forcibly entered and the refugees, who had been there since the beginning of the Revolution under the acknowledged protection of our flag, were taken from it and cast into prison, I immediately addressed a note to the Captain of the "De Soto" (No.16) informing him of what had occurred and asking him what support (if any) I might expect from him. In the morning I sent another letter (No.18) informing him that after what had happened I must take my own consul, and asking him to do what he could for the foreigners on shore. To this I received an answer, urging me to adopt the course that I myself most earnestly desired to follow, that of patience and moderation. I wrote to our Consul (letter No.20) containing a demand for redress, a copy of which letter I showed to Captain Walker, who approved of it, also letter (No.19) advising him to haul down his flag and come on board, but at the same time also, privately, leaving the handing down of the flag to his discretion, but begging him to come off in the American boat.

I visited Captain Walker of the "De Soto" and explained everything fully to him, he admitted that I had been right in everything I had done and that I was entitled to demand the respect I sought, but wished to know what I proposed to do: I then told him confidentially of my intentions, to which he made no objections, but kindly volunteered to use his influence to induce General Salnave to accede to my demand: this offer I thankfully accepted, on the understanding that he as unsolicited from me and solely on the interest of peace and humanity.

The reply of the Council to my moderate demand for the restitution of the refugees was a fresh violation of the Consulate and the forcible abduction of two ladies (the sister of the President and her niece) and the placing of fresh guns in positions directed against us. I then prepared the ship for battle in every possible way, protecting the engines supplies with the chain steam cable, lighted up and down her sides in the wake of the wheels.

The American Consul had come onboard of my ship, with the American Captain and wished to remain there, Captain Walker making no objection, he did so and desiring to leave the place, subsequently went down with us to L'Acul. On Friday afternoon the Consul received a reply from the Council to our demand for the repatriation of the refugees, it contained nothing but castigation for our volubilate continuation of the correspondence, being crossed by this he returned a commendable answer disapproving completely of their provocation's and informing them that he closed the matter.

Captain Walker saw me that same afternoon having completely failed in his actions as envoy. The next day - having manned all night to repel an attack, which I was informed through the American seamen was confidently spoken of on shore, as in contemplation, - I visited Captain Walker early and requested him to use his influence with General Salnave to obtain permission for the only Englishman on shore (Mr. Lyons) to come off. Captain Walker, who had on the previous day endeavoured to bring him off now most kindly wrote to General Salnave to that effect, but his request was politely but firmly refused. I then decided after much deliberation, that all my efforts to obtain redress for the gross insults the British Flag had received, having failed on our first and moderate demand for satisfaction having been met with contemptuous defiance.

It would be my duty for the honour of our flag and to the preserve the English name from this contempt that would have been crowned upon it. Had we quietly submitted to such intolerable outrage and defiance. To inflict a just retribution and at the same time do all in my power to put an end to this rebellion, which had not received the support of a single Haitian outside the town of Cape Haitien, and whose promoters and leaders exercise their power in so violent and unscrupulous a manner. Trusting to our knowledge of their power over the refugees they had seized and over the town in general. I decide to refrain from chastising them as they deserved, but with these views I sent the Senior Lieutenant (Way) to the Head Quarters of the Presidential forces at Limonade with letter (No.21), this I did because I felt that a combined attack would leave no time for the insurgents to pillage or outrage, and must end in complete and immediate sweeps.

The United States Consul wishing to arrange his residence at Limonade or L'Acul, offered to accompany him and introduce him to the General and this offer it was right to accept. On Sunday morning the Council having made no advances and having received on board the last Englishman, I know of (Mr. Lyons) who escaped by swimming off, I determined that it would be neither safe nor advisable for H.M. Ship to remain in the harbour, and therefore after addressing letters (Nos.22, and 23) to Captain Walker and the senior merchant on shore, and proceeded with my crew at quarters as we backed the ship to L'Acul, in order that I might arrange a combined plan of attack with his Excellency the President, who was then expected. I arrived their about noon and that evening visited the President, who had just arrived. It was arranged that I should return next morning for his answer, but on leaving his quarters a despatch was put into my hand from Captain de Horsey of the "Wolverine", ordering me to return immediately to Jamaica. I returned to His Excellency who behaved annoyed and asked my intention, I told him I desired time to reflect on what would be my duty under the peculiar circumstances, and went off to the ship.

That evening the President sent an Aide de Camp with a letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the effect that the President in Council accepted my offer of co-operation. I had already decided that it would be my duty to take action and destroy the rebel flotilla, which was the main flag of the Revolution, and then immediately to return to Jamaica at full steam, a proceeding which would not have entailed a delay of more than four hours. It was clearly my duty to demand redress for such acts of outrage and defiant hostility of demeanour, and it seemed to me that when my temperate demands were met with contempt, it was equally my duty to inflict a punishment that would teach respect to the English Flag and name. I therefore informed the Aide de Camp of my decision, and at about 1 o'clock a.m. on the morning of the 23rd the Aide de Camp returned with a reply from the President approving of my decision, and expressing a determination to co-operate if I would arrange a plan of attack. It was accordingly decided upon that His Excellency's troops should attack the town simultaneously in three different places, and that his steamers should follow the "Bulldog" in.

My intention had been not to fire at the shore at all, but as the opening of fire from the ship was to be the signal for the advance of the troops, I so far altered my plan as to open fire on Fort Picolet, mounting some 14 guns, chiefly 24 pounders, as I passed, but otherwise I decided not to fire a shot on the town, but solely to destroy the flotilla, hoping to be out again in half an hour and on my way to Port Royal. The firing on Fort Picolet, I also thought would warn their crews of my intention, and give them time to escape, and in a great measure it had this effect, though at the same time it had the effect of strengthening their hands on shore. I had good reason to believe that by this time my advice had been followed, and that all foreign residents were safe on board the American ship, Captain Walker having kindly promised to embark and receive them. I accordingly weighed anchor at 5.30 a.m. and having completed my preparations steered to Fort Picolet, on approaching which to a distance of 300 yards at 8.45 a.m., I eased the engines and opened fire; then procceeded at half speed round the shoals. When our fire was returned by the only two guns which they brought on us, but without effect. Having cleared the shoals, and supposing the front to be clear, I steamed at full speed for the "Voldrojue" which I believed to be in the same place as when I left, intending to run her down, and then sink the schooners: this I considered to be a more appropriate plan, than of firing into them.

I accordingly fired but one shot at her. When the "Bulldog" struck the ground and the Batteries all opened fire upon her at 500 yards distance she being completely aground in 12 feet of water. I had somewhat misjudged the position of the "Voldrojue" and the distance from the shore and saw that there was little chance of saving Her Majesty's Ship (though her position by bearing on the plan, placed her clear of the shoal). I then ordered the "Voldrojue" from whose covered deck a straggling fire of musketry had been kept up upon us, to be sunk: which was done by two shells: also the larger schooner, which was also close, the other schooners had made off to the American ship under English colours, and of course I did not meddle with them, not quite understanding the proceeding.

On the sinking of the "Voldrojue" some twenty persons were seen in the water and I immediately sent a boat and succeeded in saving seven of them. I then got the Port Paddler and put the steam anchor and cable in her, in doing which I deeply regret to say that Mr. Paniter, Boatswain, was killed by a grape shot, while cheerfully performing his duty. Lieutenant Cozy volunteered to lay out , a service of great danger, and did eventually without loss. Hove taunt upon it and started foremost Boilers, though without much hope of success. Meanwhile the Batteries were playing upon us with Round Shot, Grape and Musketry, and one Control were returning the fire.

I then decided that it was my duty to apply to the "De Soto" for assistance, thinking it possible that with her great power and weight she might tow us off, but Captain Walker did not think himself justified in interfering, though he most kindly offered to take my wounded, and I am bound to say that I think the attempt would have been useless.

I then directed all my attention to silencing the enemy's batteries, and by a sharp lookout, unrelenting exertion, the greatest precision of fire and unexampled coolness and steadfastness on the part of everyone on board, without exception, we succeeded in silencing the fire of those guns - unprotected by massive embrasures . The fire from this Battery we were never quite able to silence though we did so far subdue it that they did not often get a shot at us, but when they did, they almost inadvertently struck us. As the daylight commenced into darkness, the enemy ceased their fire, and glad to give some rest to the men who had been working the guns under fire for upwards of eight hours, I also ceased firing keeping the men "standing" at their Quarters. I then reflected deeply on our hopeless situation and considering that three of our boats were destroyed by round shot, that I had not shot and shell left to continue our fire for long into the next day, what if the Enemy opened fire again in the dark, which they were most likely to do, being able to see us, though we could not see them, we should not be able to subdue their fire by precision of aim, as we had hither to succeeded in doing, that my men were nearly exhausted by unrelenting exertion under fire, and that in the heat of an Indian sun, and the confusion consequent on the probable great loss of men in the dark, would under the circumstances even with the "Bulldog" crew be very great, when any effectual return of the enemy's fire was hopeless, also that the destruction of more boats by round or grape shot would put it out of my power to save the men.

Further considering that the saving of the ship hopelessly aground, was out of the question, believing moreover that when they had refreshed themselves and got more guns into position, as I leant from private information the "De Soto", they were doing (transporting them from Fort Picolet) and also remembering that my men would be surely incapacitated by exhaustion from further exertion on the next, it being necessary to keep them all night at their fires. I came to the conclusion that there being no hope of saving H.M. Ship, it was my duty to save the gallant men, when I had, to my unexpressible service ensued in such heavy misfortune, when I had felt sure to leave then to a speedy success, and that it was also my duty to destroy her while I had the means of doing so, preserving the lives so valuable to their country, the only alternative being that of blowing her up with all hands on board, or failure of ammunition, it being necessary to keep enough powder on board effectively to destroy her.

The yielding to such a foe was not to be thought of, I therefore on its becoming dark sent the badly wounded and the prisoners to the "De Soto", and quietly hoisted out the starboard Paddlers and Pinurace, providentially without attracting the fire of the Battery, and after announcing my decision to the Officers and Ship's Company, mustered them in silence with the boats, every preparation having been made for the burning and blowing up of the ship, and at about 11.00 p.m. they shoved off from the ship and awaited my joining them at a distance of about 600 yards.

Having seen every one out of the ship, excepting those who were to assist me in the last sad duty on board the "Bulldog", viz. Mr. Costes (Gunner) who fired the fore Magazine, Mr. Harris (Carpenter) and James Taylor (Caulker) to ignite the laid fires, I lighted the fuse leading into the after Magazine from the board room, and having seen the others into the boat waiting alongside, rejoined the boats and in a few minutes witnessed the total destruction of the ship, that had been entrusted to my care. I then pulled for Limonade a friendly shore about seven miles distant, and on arriving there procured a horse and a guide from the Commandant, and accompanied by the Second Lieutenant rode to Politeance, the head-quarters of General Galeutreu, 6 miles distant, and being most kindly received by him, obtained all the needful supplies for my men, and the promise of a steamer to take us to L'Acul. The steamer arrived at sunset and all hands were embarked and about 11 p.m. were onboard the Haitien Corvette "22nd December", whose Captain the President had ordered to receive us. I visited the next day on His Excellency and was received with the greatest posible kindness and sympathy and was informed by him that unavoidable circumstances had prevented his ships or troops from joining in the attack as agreed upon.

( there are another 9 hand-written pages of this letter, and I feel that this would be sufficient to wet people's appetite.)

(Signed ) C. Wake
Captain late of H.M.S. "Bulldog"

( The source for this and the next two articles is the Public Records Office, Kew, Ref. No. FO-35-72, T.D.H. )


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