Tactical and
Simulation Problems

Squares and Cavalry

by the EE&L Staff

The EE&L staff will answer tactical and grand tactical questions related to Napoleonic battle situations. Our answers are based on historical documentation and not to fit any specific set of rules. Questions, comments and historically documented rebutals should be sent to: your editor, Marc Raiff (mraif@worldnet.att.net), or Mike Gilbert.

MORE COMMENTS ON SQUARES AND CAVALRY

We continue to receive comments and additional questions on infantry operating in squares. As expected, most of these comments and questions are related to some kind of abuse and/or misinterpretation of what we have been publishing on squares as well as infantry attacking cavalry. We don't renege on what we have published which has been well documented in previous issues:

    (1) Infantry could move in square at a reasonable speed.

    (2) In some more or less desperate and very rare situations infantry attacked by cavalry did countercharge cavalry. However, that was relatively rare and should not become an everyday occurrence, and, furthermore, we don't believe that many infantry units had the necessary confidence and ability to do it.

Problem: (One of our readers asked our opinion on a precise situation) Some infantry battalions in square advanced against a position held by cavalry, fired against the cavalry and charged it. The referee did not allow that maneuver to take place.

Answer: We have here a compound question which, in our opinion, is due to an unrealistic tactical situation which had little to do with what took place on a Napoleonic battlefield. Consequently, we'll approach the problem not with a wargame rule view but what took place on a Napoleonic battlefield: [2]

    (1) On a Napoleonic battlefield, cavalry did not occupy ground. [3] Cavalry was essentially an offensive arm dependent on shock action with blades or lances. It was completely unsuited for static defensive actions and needed space to successfully charge infantry, artillery or other cavalry. Consequently, cavalry commanders placed their cavalry in a position suitable to launch a charge and awaited favorable conditions to do so.

    (2) In addition, cavalry commanders were particularly careful in shielding their cavalry from enemy fire, be it musketry or artillery and tried to place their units in sheltered positions out of enemy fire. That is a point very often ignored by wargamers and well covered by some historians. [4]

    (3) After a charge, cavalry did not occupy ground, but withdrew to reform to be ready to charge again.

Hence, the problem boils down to the application of real Napoleonic tactics and grand tactics to a wargame if a group really desires to recreate true Napoleonic battle situations. A quotation from Unger's Historique critiques des exploits et vicissitudes de la cavalerie, p. 221 illustrate the above and following is an translation of what he says:

    "When infantry launches an attack… and forward movement comes to a halt… it engages in a firefight… Between running away and victory there is an intermediate state, which is also that of the enemy; from such a situation both sides can expect a decisive victory, which is often achieved by simple perseverance. In the case of an attack by cavalry that is a completely different matter. To leave a regiment of cavalry stationary under the fire of a body of infantry, recognized too strong to be successfully charged, [5] would not be a praiseworthy perseverance; that would be a sign of folly capable of completely ruining the cavalry, without any compensating damage to the enemy since cavalry can only riposte to volley fire with some musketoon and pistol shots.

    Any decent cavalryman, anyone who has some notions on the capability and effect of our weapons, can understand these points with out any effort or difficult calculation. Cavalry must vanquish quickly or give up, and that has been since the very beginning of time. As soon as the horse does not have the impulse and shock on its side, it becomes a burden, and a man is stronger standing on his two feet that sitting on a motionless horse."

Thus, cavalry either defeats its adversary immediately or withdraws. After a charge, it withdrew to reform. Standing holding ground was not an option and that principle should be strictly enforced. Note that if the principle is applied, the situation described in the question simply does not develop and it can not occur.

Note that in the rare documented cases in which infantry charged cavalry, it appears that the cavalry was surprised, had lost its momentum or was at the end of a charge (which is the same thing). Hence, as Unger tells us, it was at a disadvantage against infantry. Of further importance and an essential consideration in interpreting an attack on cavalry by infantry is the fact that any decent commander of a cavalry unit having lost its momentum and coming in contact with steady and unshaken infantry, would immediately order his command to withdraw and reform. Note that such an action in itself could be interpreted and reported by the infantry as "victoriously repelling cavalry".

Our Rules

In our rules, after many years of trying different solutions to prevent cavalry from standing immobile under enemy fire, we have come up with a very specific rule: "If fired upon, cavalry must either charge in the next segment or withdraw out of enemy fire." We believe that this achieves the desired results (and conforms to reality since cavalry did stand under fire). [6]

We are all aware of another principle. In most battles, victory was achieved by the successful cooperation between the three arms, infantry, artillery and cavalry. So, let us apply that known principle to the situation described in the original question. Let us support the attacking infantry with artillery. [7] Most likely, the artillery is going to fire against the enemy position, the opposing cavalry, prior to the infantry attack. Then, if applying our charge or withdraw rule, the enemy cavalry would have to either charge or get out of the way.

There is another significant aspect of Napoleonic battles. A survey of battles shows that battles were very often fluctuations resulting from attacks, charges, counterattacks and countercharges. In an issue of EE&L, Vol. 1 we have documented that fact and, furthermore, shown that charges or attacks originated out of artillery range, usually about 800 to 1000 yards from the enemy position (or closer when a suitable closer position sheltered from artillery fire was available). [8]

Consequently, infantry was not constantly standing in the open (unlike as it is so often done in wargames) unless it was defending a position or could not do otherwise. Prior to an attack, that attacking commander sheltered his forces (infantry or cavalry) from enemy fire to minimize his losses (and hence increasing his chances of success with stronger forces). Then, only, after an artillery preparation to soften the enemy, the attack took place. To further illustrate our point, we'll be reprinting that article in our next issue.

As usual, comments (positive or negative) would be appreciated. Also in our next issue, we'll be covering Bonaparte's 1803 cavalry reforms as well as French cavalry tactics from original French sources. [9]

End Notes

[2] Not much different from what took place in earlier wars.
[3] It took a considerable time to train a cavalryman. Consequently, cavalry was used carefully most of the time and not used for a function in which infantry was muchbetter suited.
[4] Well pointed out by Unger.
[5] Such a formation would be unshaken infantry in a square, which is practically invulnerable to a cavalry charge.
[6] Historical fact that cavalry did not stand under fire without either charging or taking cover out of artillery range--usually about 800 yards.
[7] Not unreasonable since a French infantry division was usually supported by a foot and an additional horse battery.
[8] An issue to be covered in a later issue.
[9] Courtesy of George Nafziger. A paper was already presented (and well received) at Historicon 1994.


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© Copyright 1997 by Jean Lochet

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