At noon on a warm and hazy June 1st, 1813, the U.S. Frigate CHESAPEAKE (38) loosed her top hamper and sailed out the meet his Majesty's Frigate SHANNON (38). The ensuing engagement, which occurred off Cape Ann, Massachusetts, was one of the shortest in American naval history and resulted in the capture of the CHESAPEAKE. The American commander, Captain James Lawrence, was mortally wounded during the battle. As Lawrence was suffering in the horror of the CHESAPEAKE's orlop, he purportedly uttered a rallying cry to his faltering command: "Don't Give Up The Ship"! Whether or not these were Lawrence's actual words, the quote has come down as one of the most famous phrases in the annals of the U.S. Navy. Even in defeat and death Lawrence was idolized by the American public. He was eulogized in the Boston Daily Advertiser and the Palladium. Oliver Hazard Perry named his flagship after his dead friend and used Lawrence's dying words on his battle flag. Perry's great success further enhanced Lawrence's name and perpetuated his fame. But in all the brouhaha certain things were almost overlooked; things were spoken of only in hushed tones among informed navel officers. Lawrence was a romantic, dashing and impulsive officer. His name first came to the fore when he served as Stephen Decatur's second in command when the frigate PHILADELPHIA (38) was recaptured and burned in Tripoli harbor. Further accolades were gained while Lawrence commanded the HORNET (10). In February, 1813, Lawrence captured one British brig and sank another. Lawrence had made his reputation and was immediately promoted and given a new command, the CHESAPEAKE. The CHESAPEAKE had a reputation of her own, that of a jinx ship. it started when she was launched, having stuck twice on the ways before she floated. Off Alexandria a hitch broke and the fore topgallant yard crashed onto the foc'sle, killing two and injuring several. And although sailors plunging to their deaths was not uncommon on ships, CHESAPEAKE's seamen remembered hearing their agonized screams later on dark nights when the wind whistled through the stays, or seeing their blood on freshly holystoned decks. [1] Her greatest humiliation came in 1807 when under the command of Captain James Barron, the CHESAPEAKE was fired on and surrendered to the HMS LEOPARD (74), and four supposed British deserters were forcibly removed from her decks; three of these men were actually American citizens. [2] On her last cruise before the battle the CHESAPEAKE lost a topmast in a gale while entering harbor and several men were drowned. Her crew had seen little action and had not achieved the same professional level in seamanship and gunnery as many of the other American frigates had. The CHESAPEAKE was not a happy ship. The SHANNON on the other hand was the antithesis of the CHESAPEAKE. Her Captain, Philip Bowes Vere Broke, had drilled his command to the peak of efficiency since taking command in 1806. Broke (pronounced Brook) had seen no action as of yet, but he prayed for the opportunity, and his ship had the reputation of being the best trained and disciplined on the American station. Should the battle have even been fought? Upon taking command Lawrence orders were to operate against the enemy's supply ships near the Gulf of St. Lawrence and Nova Scotia, and against the British whaling fleet off Greenland. American frigates were few and far between and could not be casually risked against British warships. The CHESAPEAKE's officers had some experience, but were very young. Her first lieutenant was only 21, and her second and third were both in their teens. Many of the CHESAPEAKE's crew were new hands and were unfamiliar with the vessel, while the old hands were disgruntled and sullen because they had not received prize money from previous cruises. Then there was the jinx; almost all sailors were extremely superstitious. Lawrence himself had only been in command for two weeks. Just before sailing Lawrence gave a rousing speech to his crew. Instead of the cheers he expected, Lawrence was greeted with silence or a few muttered oaths. These circumstances would have given a cautious officer food for careful thought, but Lawrence was anything but cautious. The U.S. Navy had established a winning tradition in this war, defeating the foe in every engagement where the odds were even or close to equal. Lawrence was aware of the SHANNON's reputation, aware of his orders, aware of his vessel's deficiencies; but to the brave, ambitious and impetuous Lawrence the only honorable thing to do was fight. Much has also been made of an eloquent challenge issued by Broke, that Lawrence was goaded into action by the flowery proposal. In actuality the challenge was never received; the CHESAPEAKE sailed before the fishing boat carrying the message reached port. The vessels were evenly matched. Both were rated as 38's, although the SHANNON carried twenty eight long 18's, sixteen 32-pounder carronades, four long 9-pounders, three 12-pounder carronades, and on long 6. The CHESAPEAKE carried twenty-nine long 18-pounders, eigh! teen 32-pounder corronades, two long 12's and one 12-pounder carronade. [3] The SHANNON had a complement of 330, while the CHESAPEAKE carried 379. [4] Lawrence had the advantage of men and his long 18's were longer thus giving him a slight advantage in range. This advantage would be nullified in a yardarm to yardarm match. When Broke observed CHESAPEAKE's pyramids of canvas he sailed further out to sea. He wanted to take no chance of being dismasted where he could easily be towed into Boston harbor. When Broke felt the distance was adequate, about 15 miles from Boston, he allowed his jib and maintops'l to shiver and barely maintained steerage under fore and mizzen tops'ls. Broke had several courses of action to choose from. He could yaw into the wind and attempt to rake CHESAPEAKE as she approached, or he could wear, rake CHESAPEAKE, and run down her port side. Or Broke could yaw and then wear, using both larboard and starboard broadsides. Broke chose none of these actions. He maintained his course and waited for Lawrence to make the first move, seemingly uncaring as to what course of action Lawrence might choose. Broke's action constituted a calculated risk. He was gauging the temperment of his opponent, deliberately placing his ship at the mercy of Lawrence. He didn't want to get into a long range duel where SHANNON might become disabled near an enemy shore. Broke's guiding principle was yardarm to yardarm, what he had been training his vessel for for years. He was purposely taking no action, challenging Lawrence to fight him on his own terms. In doing so Broke was virtually helpless. Lawrence held all the cards and had several options. Maintaining the weather gauge he could stay well to windward and use just his long guns, or he could loose a broadside and cross SHANNON's bow and rake her. A more likely course would be to cross her stern and then rake her, wear ship and rake her again. Any of these maneuvers, particularly the latter, would have caused serious damage and might have finished SHANNON right then, and both could have been accomplished before Broke had the time to fill and maneuver. Even if Lawrence crossed SHANNON's stern and Broke could maneuver, if Broke tried to tack he would be in irons and suffer considerably, and if he tried to wear Lawrence could luff and still rake SHANNON. A fourth option would have been for Lawrence to pass well to windward and escape to raid British supply routes, thereby fulfilling his orders. But the red flag was waving and the bull could not pass it up. Broke could do nothing but wait. If he calculated wrong his ship and his career were finished. Lawrence recognized Broke's open challenge and was unable to resist. His chivalry dictated he not try fancy tricks against an enemy who was offering a fair fight. Lawrence chose a fifth and least desirable course of action, to pull alongside and fight yardarm to yardarm. He broke up a pair of aces to draw to an inside straight. American dash was no match for British training and discipline. SHANNON's first broadside decimated CHESAPEAKE's foc'sle guns and shot away her jib. In minutes all the upper deck officers, including Lawrence, were wounded. As the CHESAPEAKE moved forward her waist and quarterdeck received the same treatment as the foc'sle. The CHESAPEAKE fought back but the carnage on her decks reduced her rate of fire. Broke's gunnery training paid off. With her tiller ropes and heads'ls shot away the CHESAPEAKE turned into the wind and was caught in irons. She gathered sternway until her larboard quarter ground into SHANNON's starboard side. Broke called away boarders. CHESAPEAKE's marines and a few seamen fought desperately, but the majority of the terrified seamen huddled below decks, ignoring the pleas and curses of the officers. The outcome was all too predictable, in 13 minutes the CHESAPEAKE was a bloody shambles and a British prize. The inevitable court of inquiry was essentially a whitewash. Most of the blame was heaped on third lieutenant William Cox, who was a midshipman aboard the HORNET and appointed acting lieutenant just prior to the battle. Cox helped Lawrence below when he received his mortal wound, unaware he was the only officer unhurt and wishing to assist his mentor. He tried to rally his men to repel boarders afterward, but most abandoned him and ran below decks. Cox refused to cut down some of his men as examples because he felt it was too late and it wouldn't work on the panicked seamen. At his court-martial Cox was charged with five counts. He was exonerated on charges of cowardice, disobedience of orders, and desertion of his quarters. Cox was found guilty of unofficer like conduct for leaving his post to help Lawrence below, and neglect of duty for not doing his utmost to capture the SHANNON and not using force of duty to stop his men from deserting their posts. Cox was cashiered from the navy. [5] Five others were also court-martialed, but Lawrence's name was left unsullied. Lawrence was a hero, Cox a scapegoat. The CHESAPEAKE's butchers bill was 145 killed and wounded, the SHANNON lost 82. As always, and especially in this case, the Captain must assume blame for the loss of his ship. Lawrence was cognizant of the situation and perceptive enough to know he was fighting at a disadvantage, but the whole U.S. Navy was at a disadvantage. A prudent commander would have carefully weighed all the factors, but in the end would the decision have been any different? Would a Decatur, a Stewart, a Hull, or a Bainbridge have elected not to fight? Avoiding a battle would certainly not have embellished his reputation and if anything Lawrence was an ambitious man. The daring and intrepid captains were the ones who were winning the glory and promotions, not the cautious ones. Lawrence really had no choice; he had to fight. Criticism can be levelled at Lawrence for his tactics. To a navy out-numbered 50 to 1 every frigate was pure gold. His major objective was the British supply route and this should have been the prime consideration in his tactical planning. One more frigate would have been bad for morale, but would not have materially affected the British blockade. Whereas to the U.S. the loss of a frigate left a major gap in her offensive capabilities. Lawrence may have felt he had to fight, but the advantages Broke gave him could not be passed up. With the defeats of the GUERRIERE, MACEDONIA, and JAVA, many American sailors, Lawrence among them, were convinced of their own superiority. Lawrence's ambition convinced him to fight, his arrogance convinced him he couldn't lose, and his impetuousity and rashness cost him his life and his ship. Broke handed him the SHANNON on a platter but Lawrence refused to eat. Lawrence gave up the ship. NOTES [1] Poolman, Guns Off Cape Ann, pages 46-47 [2] ibid., page 39 [3] Roosevelt, Naval War of 1812, page 181 [4] ibid. [5] In August, 1952, Harry S. Truman signed an order commissioning William S. Cox a third Lieutenant in the U.S. Navy, 139 years after his courtmartial. BIBLIOGRAPHY: Gruppe, Henry E. The Frigates, Alexandria, Va.: Time-Life Books, 1979 Padfield, Peter. "The Great Sea Battle", American Heritage Magazine, December, 1968 Poolman, Kenneth. Guns Off Cape Ann, London: Evans Brothers Limited, 1961 Roosevelt, Theodore. The Naval War of 1812, New York and London: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1882, Presidential Edition The above article was written by Gerard T. Altoff. chief Ranger at 'Perry's Victory and International Peace Memorial, Put-In-Bay, Ohio. Back to Empire, Eagles, & Lions Table of Contents Vol. 1 No. 86 Back to EEL List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1985 by Emperor's Headquarters This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com