NOTE FROM EDITOR. Following is the report of the French CIC on the battle of Ebelsbach. Mike Gilbert's report follows that of Davout. Mike was the French commander in charge of the left flank and took over the French CIC job on the second night of that battle. It should be noted that the battle lasted 3 evenings and that on the second (critical) evening the continuity of the French command was disturbed by the absence of the French CIC (Davout below) and certainly influenced and disturbed the implementation of the initial French battle plan. 1.0 BATTLE OBSERVATIONS OF THE FRENCH CIC ON THE BATTLE OF EBELSBACH by Davout In EEL 85, Map 2, showing the French cavalry reconnaissance is somewhat in error since it does not show the probe made by a French cavalry regiment toward the French left as shown by the drawing below and executed as per issued orders. (see note 1) Note 1. Note from JAL. It is of interest to note here how an "eyewitness" report can be in error. I either completely missed the initial French cavalry movement toward 'POINT A' or simply forgot about it. One regiment, supported by a second, was sent to probe the area in front of the French left flank. Their mission was to advance and locate the Austrians to their front. It was during the absence of the French C.I.C. that the next in command on the French left flank altered the cavalry movement 'without' notifying G.H.Q. The forward probe o that flank and the failure to locate the Austrian train and the weakness of the Austrian position, coupled with the failure to notify G.H.Q . of this decision, was not the fault of the C.I.C. On the French right flank, General Claparede was issued orders for a reconnaissance towards and beyond the very ridge that Archduke Charles later used to anchor his position and uponwhich he established his artillery batteries. Claparede's orders were not carried out. Communications from Claparede appraising G.H.Q. of the situation on that flank were not forthcoming. Following the successful attack on Schoenburg and a general push beyond with all of his troops, t--leaving nothing for a reserve and failing to designate a rally point), General Claparede 'disappeared' from the field. Davout received no messages from the right flank until AFTER the flank had been routed and was almost destroyed. Thus with the right flank gone and nothing immediately available to Prevent the Austrians from flanking the French main body, and with the French 2nd Division in a position well to the rear of the action, AND Austrian units in front being heavily strengthened, the French C.I.C. conceded that it was highly unlikely, regardless of where the Austrian train was, that the French had the immediately available manpower to stabilize the situation and return to the attack BEFORE their avenue of attack was strengthened by the Austrians. The French C.I.C. most certainly did appreciate the importance of sighting and locating the Austrian train. He, contrary to what was written on page 52, was not simply satisfied with sighting the Austrian infantry. That the French cavalry on the left flank failed to carry out their original orders was the result of the un-authorized change of orders by the commander in that area. The French C.I.C. was not and is not overwhlemed by the new scale. His battle plan, given the restrictions set upon him by the game designer, was a good one. Orders to the various commanders were such that had they been followed the situation would indeed have been very different. The assumptions made by the game designer are wrong, but are given some credit by the fact that not the C.I.C. but the next lower level of command fought the 'old-style' battle. General Clarapede failed to report his situation. Using our new scale, Davout did not see what was happening on his right flank. Without a communication from Clarapede, Davout could not react. It was not that Davout failed to reenforce Clarapede, Clarapede failed to follow his orders and most importantly, failed to keep G.H.Q. appraised of his situation. Based on the above, the main French attack, thinking its' flanks secure and unaware of any problems, launched their attack at the very Point where the Austrian line was weakest. That it failed due to flank problems was not its fault. 2.0 MY POINT OF VIEW ON THE BATTLE OF EBELSBACH by Mike Gilbert It's the time to tell the truth, it was all their fault. Yes, indeed. Please refer to the map of the last issue, students. As the commander of the 2nd French Division I was posted far away on the left wing. Moving my cavalry up I discovered the far ridge lined with Austrian hordes and masses. Having dispatched my observations, I felt my way down the valley, avoiding contact while screening my troops and lightly probing the extensively infested Austrian positions. Far off down the pleasant green valley, the horizon was beginning to haze up and grow murky and we could hear the distant rumble that was not thunder. As we trudged through the warm breezes the cannonade grew louder and we came to where the French cavalry stood. Before us there was a gap in the Austrian lines between the ridge and the woods. I requested orders. They were to fall back. Jean was right in his conclusions. I do have my doubts about how much my cavalry might have found since they were ordered not to actually contact or even vigorously provoke the enemy. And the worst defeat was our unprotected left flank, though Claparede was left hanging out there in space; his defeat was entirely due to his own mistakes. The next time will be different, sure it will. 3.0 MORE GAME DESIGNER COMMENTS by Jean A. Lochet The above observations by Davout and Mike Gilbert complement what has been said on Ebelsbach. Everyone's input and all sides of the story are imperative in such a discussion. The French players have good explana- tions for each events and I respect their comments, opinions and ideas. Davout is of the opinion that some of my assumptions are wrong - and Davout may be right. I have no intention to reiterate my comments on the battle of Ebelsbach or change my mind on the basic remarks I made in EEL 85. Personally, I would have handled the French situation very differently according to the principles outlined in 'on the Deployment of Armies on the Battlefield, pp. 6 to 13. What I may have done is irrelevant and may not have been successful. However, I know what I would not have done. That does not make Davout's plan a bad one. There is more than one way to skin a cat and everyone of us wargamers has his own personal style to conduct a battle. The fact that the French CIC did not command the French on the second day was, without questions, heavy of consequences for the French. However, winning a battle is the result of (a basic ingredient): TEAM WORK. Each and every generals in an army has simply to do what is expected of him (as per the battle plan) to achieve victory. We certainly can argue all these points for a long time. What is important is not TO BE RIGHT OR WRONG but to discuss ideas and learn from all sides including the mistakes. It's what all our discussions and exercises in tactics are all about: to help us fight better battles in the future. Like Mike says above: "THE NEXT TIME WILL BE DIFFERENT, SURE IT WILL." Back to Empire, Eagles, & Lions Table of Contents Vol. 1 No. 86 Back to EEL List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1985 by Emperor's Headquarters This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com