Our battle of Ebelsbach, our first battle using 1 inch = 50 yards, was intended to reveal the problems associated with that scale, e.g. the consequences of the unrealistic habits we had developed over our years of wargaming with scales like 1 inch = 10 or 25 yards, etc. Such smaller scales, in our opinion, have the inherent disadvantage of rendering impossible the complete deployment - in a realisitc manner - of an army on a wargame table. That was one, if not the main, reason for abandoning our scale of 1 in. = 25 yards. But that leads to a very basic question what is deployment in the first place? Are we sure we know what deploying an army is?
Ned Zuparko's article in "Winters Quarters" (EEL 85, pp.) raises some interesting points related to the deployment of an army on the battlefield, and missing in our comments on the battle of Ebelsbach. (see note 1)
Ned tells us that, before he wrote his article, he had not given much thought to the distances at which armies deployed for battle. We have a feeling that many of us fall in that category.
After examining several battles, Ned further demonstrated that, even if there was no hard and fast rule that generals followed in keeping their armies apart such as "one will deploy 1237.45 yards from the enemy line", armies were always deployed according to some basic principles. After analyzing the data, the deployment distance can be established in the range of 1200 to 1800 yards. That far exceeds the deployment distance that most wargamers are use to.
But why were such deploying distances used?
One basic rule was mandatory: armies were always deployed well outside of enemy artillery range (see note 2). That distance depended mainly on weather (visibility) and terrain, but was also modified according to specific (anticipated?) battle conditions. This was done not only to keep the main battle line out of fire but also to give space to redeploy if need arose or to allow a defeated attack line to run and rally without carrying the reserve with it.
Of course, we should recognize that the army deployed each of its components (Divisions, brigades etc.) into their assumed attacking or defending positions according to a plan established by the CIC, as delineated in the orders received by each unit.
Once issued, the initial orders and plan were changed only if circumstances, new information or threats rendered it imperative. Changing plan and dispositions was a laborious task and often brought a great deal of confusion (see note 3). It is especially true for the attacking army. As mentioned by Ned, At Austerlitz, as in many other battles, the orders were very often issued the night before and the troops deployed accordingly but always outside of enemy artillery range. (See Soult's deployment at Austerlitz in EEL 72, pp. 23 to 29.)
The initial deployment outside of enemy artillery range is a recurring theme to anyone reading reliable and detailed accounts of almost every battle. Some well known instances are D'Erlon's and the Middle Guard's attacks at Waterloo, as well as Soult's attack of the Pratze at Austerlitz, just to name a few that have been related in recent past issues of EEL and consequently immediately available to our readers (see EEL 71, 73 and 74).
After the troops had been deployed, orders issued, etc. the designated troops attacked, as if almost following a ritual, but not without leaving some reserves behind and outside of, or hidden from, enemy artillery range whenever possible. The reserves moved up only as they were needed or remained close behind as a base to reform in case of repulse.
So, basically we have our attacking army distributed in three zones:
- ZONE A(or initial zone of deployment) in which the units
deployed in the formation in which they were ordered to attack.
ZONE B (or "decision zone") in which the attacking troops move up as quickly as possible to engage the enemy and minimize losses.
ZONE C (or a "reserve zone") in which an attack reserve and support was formed and held to serve as a second line or rallying point. Often, these troops were held in the same geographic area as the original "Zone A".
"Zone A" was the starting point - or deployment line - in which, very often, some fresh troops were kept handy by a wise commander, especially those in the attacker role. At Waterloo, for instance, "Zone A" was occupied by the VI Corps behind d'Erlon's departure line during the attack of that Corps. It's easy to find such zones for Austerlitz, other phases of Waterloo, etc.
"Zone C", the buffer zone, was geographically fluid. It is the zone in which a wise commander had some troops in reserve, often a full second line (as seen below) or, in some instances, at least one battalion, on which he could rally his troops in case of needs. In addition, it's the area in which supporting units (i.e. those not in immediate reserve) are held. We find three instances of that practice at Waterloo alone. In EEL 73, p. 29, we find, during the attack of the Middle Guard, one full battalion of a total of only six - i.e. a significant 16% of the total assault force was kept in reserve, half way between the farm of La Haye Sainte and Hougoumont.
Again at Waterloo, during the first attack of d'Erlon's 1st Corps, we find Durutte (see note 8) leaving the two weak battalions in reserve of a total of eight, 25% of his forces! (The attack is described in EEL 74 from pp. 25 to 39 and then in EEL 78 and 79.) The same is true for Marcognet's Division which had a battalion in reserve near La Haye Sainte. (see Note 9)
"Zone B", the "decision" zone included only the minimum troops necessary (of course there are exceptions) to break through or push back the enemy. In most cases, any excess of troops appears to be have been more of liability than an asset. A perfect example is given by d'Erlon's attack at Waterloo.
D'Erlon's troops were 'crammed' together in 'Zone B', unable to deploy, maneuver or form squares. Only a small 'Zone C', each one battalion strong, existed for Durutte and Marcognet's Divisions. The attack would have been more flexible if executed in two waves, (each Division having only one brigade in the first wave and the second brigade held in 'Zone C' until the enemy had been shaken by the attack) as suggested by our drawing (i.e. a first line and then a 2nd line some 500 yards behind).
Both lines would have been formed of very classical battalions in columns of attack (or of divisions) at deploying distances. Such small columns had the advantage of (1) being easy to control, (2) offered a smaller target to artillery than larger columns and (3) could very quickly form a square if attacked by cavalry (it took only 30 seconds to form a solid square from a column of attack or of divisions!).
Possibly, the first line, or more likely only part of the first line may have been thrown back or cut down by the British cavalry - but even that is questionable since small columns can form square so easily. The cavalry attack would probably not have been as successful and achieved the decisive results it did.
Once the British cavalry menace had been dealt with, the attack could have been resumed with the second echelon. The first echelon could now be in reserve awaiting for opportunity to help the second echelon. We can only speculate on the possible results, but one must consider the fact that it would have been a different battle.
Who are we to make such suggestions! None of us are special, but simply wargamers who read a lot of pertinent material and try to learn from their mistakes. As a matter of fact, what we are saying above is nothing more that some of the simple principles outlined in many books on tactics such as Paddy Griffith's "Napoleonic Wargaming for Fun", Ward Lock Ltd., London, 1980, pp.31-33:
Napoleonic Divisions normally deployed on two or three lines of battalions, with either a separate brigade in each ]in-,, or some parts of each brigade. Opinions varied on the best method; but it had often been found from experience that a single line of battalions was a very weak formation, and required some sort of reserve. Putting one brigade behind another was damaging to morale, since the men of the front line brigade would be unfamiliar with their supporting line, and would feel uneasy. Also supporting the front line would be the massed artillery of the Division, sited at the most commanding spot, and perhaps some cavalry positioned to the rear.
The formations used by each battalion would vary enormously, and each battalion was an entity complete in itself, with only a moderate interest in what was happening on its flanks. in theory the battalion line three deep tended to be favoured for the defensive, while the battalion column of divisions was preferred for the attack. To both of these rules, unfortunately, there were innumerable exceptions, and it would take a whole book to explain them all in detail. It is a curious fact, by the way, that no book devoted entirely to Napoleonic infantry tactics has been published since 1902.
Perhaps all that need concern us here is that, firstly, since it was particularly vital to cover a battalion's flanks against cavalry attacks, a solid column or square was often used for defence whenever cavalry seemed to be threatening; although this was an especially weak formation against infantry or artillery.
The text is well illustrated by the diagram:
DIVISION FORMATIONS: EACH SYMBOL REPRESENTS A BATTALION (Excerpt from the chapter in Paddy's book dealing with the divisional game, pp. 30 to 57.)
Such basic deployments are found in many good battle reports and some past issues of EEL (note 5).
We are pretty much for the deployment of our troops - whenever possible - in three lines, the second line about 500 yards from the first and the third line being the reserve. If enough troops are not available, simply fully man the first line, but reduce the density of troops in the second line in order to have always, at least, one or two battalions in reserve with, if possible, a fresh artillery battery. That combination has prevented many breakthroughs, especially the two- battalion reserve supported by an artillery battery.
Ned also showed the importance of a second line of battle occupied by the reserves - but outside of enemy artillery range - on which, if need arise, a second line of defense can be set up to allow defeated troops to rally (and often attack to resume). That would be our "Zone A or C However, the primary purpose of that reserve, in an attack, is not to remain static and on the defensive (although it may be handy in that function (see note 61).
That "reserve" second line can be the "masse de rupture" kept, or patiently collected by the CIC as troops enter the battlefield, to make the final push. Here is what Paddy Griffith says, p. 71:
As the battle developed, the successful commander might gradually collect a rnasse de rupture in reserve. He would eventually throw this forward in a huge frontal attack, supported by massive artillery fire, at the moment when he judged the enemy to be sufficiently worn down. If everything went well this mass would break through, and its cavalry would fan out in pursuit of the beaten enemy.
Things could go wrong at any stage in this process, however. The enemy might luckily defeat some of the early attacks, and thus be able to keep up more pressure than vice versa (e.g., at Eylau, 1807, when Augereau's corps was defeated early on). Again, a corps detailed to swing round the enemy's flank or rear might well arrive late or in the wrong place (e.g., Ney's corps at Bautzen, 1813). The final central attack might totally fail to break through (e.g., Waterloo, 1815); or might achieve only partial success (e.g., Wagram, 1809). Most likely of all, perhaps, the victorious army might be too exhausted to exploit its success in a pursuit (e.g., Borodino, 18 12). In the end result, the plan would probably have to be changed several times, and would not look nearly as neat and tidy in practice as it had on paper.
That is what Napoleon intended to do at Waterloo with the VIth Corps and the Guard kept in reserve well outside of enemy artillery range. as shown on the following map.
MAP SHOWING THE VITH CORPS AND THE GUARD ON THEIR RESERVE POSITIONS (is prior the entering of the Prussian Army on the battlefield)
The actions by the Ist and IInd Corps only had the primary purpose of wearing down the enemy to prepare the ground for the final decisive attack by the "masse de rupture" composed of the Guard and the VI Corps.
In our opinion, the lack of having a "masse de rupture" for an attack, and a reserve in the defense, are the major weak points of many wargamers. In many cases, too many troops are jammed together in the first line -- in Zone B -- (see note 7) and are engaged in ineffecient firefights, taking unnecessary casualties. Furthermore such affairs often end up in deadlocks and remain so until some fresh troops (again fresh troops!) break the stalemate or one side runs away. Following is another comment from Paddy Griffith (p.34):
If the first assault cleared away the enemy, well and good: the cavalry could pursue. If the first attack faltered, on th,_- other hand, there would probably be a long and indecisive fire fight between the units directly concerned. The victory would go to whichever side could feed in fresh troops to break the deadlock. Thus at Talavera (1809) the first French wave was repulsed by the British, but the British were then in turn thrown into confusion by the arrival of the second French line. At Albuera (1811) the French first wave again faltered; but this time it was British reinforcements who arrived first, to repulse the French. A very great deal depended upon who had the freshest reserves at hand, and how well they could be fed into the decisive combat.
Cavalry action tended to follow the same lines as infantry fighting, although faster movement and less emphasis on musketry led to more frequent clashes with cold steel. Whether or not there were such clashes, it was once again the timely arrival of formed reserves which proved decisive almost invariably. Keeping some 'sabres in hand' was the only sure way of winning the cavalry fight, so most cavalry regiments would attack with one or two of their squadrons held back from the front line. Against infantry, on the other hand, horsemen found that their mounts were reluctant to charge home into formed units. Most would shy away at the last moment, and it was only against unformed or broken infantry that they posed a serious threat.
This discussion can be summarized by the following principles:
- (1) As a first step the CIC must get all the information he can on
the enemy troops (strength, location, etc.) including probing
patrols on the flanks etc. to avoid surprises.
(2) In the light of (1) the CIC will prepare a suitable, simple plan for attack or defense) as a function of the battle objectives and issue orders to his subordinate commanders to execute the plan.
- IMPORTANT: the CIC does not wait for the battle to start to make a plan.
(3) The army is then deployed -- in ZONE A -- by the subordinate commanders as per the plan and the orders received.
(4) If an attack is to be launched, assigned troops (as per the plan) move in "Zone B" (the decision line) leaving troops in "Zone C".
(5) Then, in an attack, comes the time to use the reserve or masse de rupture to breakthrough and achieve victory. (The timing here can be very critical)
In defense, the critical time may be when the reserve is committed to repulse or even crush an exhausted or overextended enemy.
There are no sure recipes for victory but, usually, victory goes to the side with the best plan, that makes the least mistakes and shows the best team work.
Note 1. It is well understood that a good commander recognizes the importance of seeking information on the whereabouts of the enemy as seen in EEL 85 from pp.51 to 57, and preparing his plan of deployment accordingly. That applies to a commander of any level from a marauding band of cossacks to Napoleon.
Note 2. Artillery practical range is considered to be to approximately 1000 yards.
Note 3. The importance of a well conceived initial plan and deployment becomes very obvious. If the initial plan is bad, the deployment positions are likely to be bad. Commanders must realize that a good battle Plan is a must, and too often, wargamers don't have a battle plan and react to situations or threats as they develop. Again, a good -- attacking or defending -- plan can be developed only if enough information for a good understanding of the situation is available. Lack of information usually leads to defeat and often to disaster such as the Austro-Russian plan at Austerlitz.
Note 5. See EEL 78 and 79 for d'Erlon's attack at Waterloo. EEL 72 for Soult attack on the Pratze, etc.
Note 6. At Waterloo, for instance, the VIth Corps was kept in reserve by Napoleon as his "masse de rupture" along with the Guard. Unfortunately, the arrival of the Prussian army prevented from being used in that function and, instead, it was sent to hold the Prussians. It should be noted here that both the Guard and the VIth Corps were kept in reserve well outside of enemy artillery range.
Note 7. Many times, troops are kept in column for lack of space to deploy and suffer unnecessary casualties precisely because they are jammed together. Then, insufficient strength remains for an effective and efficient push.
Note 8. D'Erlon Corps included 4 divisions; Durutte's Division was the 4th of that Corps [see EEL 74, pp. 36-37 for order of battle]) and was the only one to survive the British cavalry attack without heavy losses. The 85th of the Line (2 weak battalions having a combined effective strength of only 40 officers and 591 men) , held in reserve, was able to repulse Vandeleur's cavalry. We can note in EEL 78 and 79 that during d'Erlon's attack Durutte is the only Division commander beside Quiot, that kept a reserve and left 2 battalions in support, on which he effectively rallied his troops after being repulsed. The same is true of the Middle Guard at Waterloo which left a battalion behing in support to rally upon.
Note 9: In the Saxon attack on Deutsch-Wagram, on July 6th (see EEL 76) two battalions of von Steindel's brigade were kept in reserve behind Wagram north of Aderklaa. They served as the rally point for the Saxons disorganized in the town.
Back to Empire, Eagles, & Lions Table of Contents Vol. 1 No. 86
Back to EEL List of Issues
Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List
© Copyright 1985 by Emperor's Headquarters
This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web.
Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com