In our last issue we saw that lighter howitzers of the Austrian 7-pdr class (which became the 24-pdr howitzer in French service) were preferred to the larger 6-in. or 8-in.Gribeauval types and were, after 1809, almost exclusively used with the 6-pounder French field batteries. At the same time the 6-pdr guns, except in Spain, became the standard field-piece. The 12-pdr remained in service but exclusively in the Corps reserve batteries i.e. where mobility was not as critical. The larger but heavier howitzers of the 6 and 8-in. types (such as the Prussian 10-pdr) were, very likely for the same reasons, kept almost exclusively in the 12-pdr Corps reserve batteries. We should note that the Prussian and the British armies had at least one full battery equipped exclusively with the smaller howitzers of the 7-pdr class for the Prussians and 5.5in. for the British. Such was the trend. In this issue, we'll make an attempt to understand the tactical usage of howitzers and how they were used by the major opponents during the Napoleonic Wars in function of the ratio of howitzers to guns and of the types of ammunition carried I. RATIO OF HOWITZERS TO GUNS: The ratio of howitzers to cannons has been already covered in EEL 85, p.19. The British had a lesser ratio of howitzers to guns (5 to 1) than the French (2 to 3 to 1) which was also the average ratios found for the Austrian and Prussian armies. About 50% of the British howitzer ammunition allotment was 'schrapnel' or case. The other 50% were split as "common shells" 38%, canister 8.5% and carcasses 2.5%. One may wonders why, if case fired by howitzers was that effective, the ratio of howitzers to guns was not increased? (see note 1) II. STANDARD ARTILLERY AMMUNITION SUPPLIES: The standard artillery ammunitions supplies are reported as per the sources given below. ROUNDS OF HOWITZER AMMUNITION CARRIED INTO BATTLE Nation Canister Grape Common shell Shrapnel Carcasses Austrian:(*1) 10 (+12) none 62 (72) - - British:(*2) 8 (?) none 32 (?) 42 2 French :(*3) 11 (?) none 49 (?) - - Prussian:(*4) 26 (?) none 74 (?) - 5 Prussian:(*6) 22 (?) none 63 (?) - 3 Russian :(*5) 5 (?) none 54 (?) - - Note: In parenthesis - when available - are the additional available rounds carried in the corps reserve ammunition train. (*1) "Armies on the Danube, 1809", Empire Games Press, Arlington, Texas, 1980: Austrian field-howitzers carried only 10 rounds (+12 in reserve ammunition train) of "buckshots", light case officially desig- nated to be used against friendly troops who were attempting to desert, which appears_to be 2ractically doubtful since the same source (p. 19) gives a field howitzer range of 300 Austrian paces. (*2) "Artillery and iqui~pment of the Napoleonic Wars", Osprey, London, 1979. (*3) Ibid. for 6-in howitzer (compare with data below). (*4) Ibid. data for 7-pounder foot-batterie howitzer. (*5) Ibid. data for 10-pounder Licorne only. (*6) Horse artillery howitzer supply, see EEL 78, p. 6. From the "standard (?)" ammunition allotment, we can see that the general trend, except in the British artillery, was to prefer common shell to canister. However, it appears possible that such supplies were not always as I standard' as some of us would like to believe and may have varied somewhat according to some commanders preferences or on the kind of missions to be performed by a given unit or group of units. That is stated - at least for the French artillery - by Rouquerol in "L'Artillerie au Debut des Guerres de la Revolution", Paris, 1898, p. 40 : "The ratio of canister to balls (or "shells", JAL) was not set, and since the first type required more space than the second, the number of shots carried by a type of caisson varied in function of the combinations used...." Rouquerol further quotes Gigendi, 1st Edition, p. 124 for typical combinations of ammunitions: 6-in. Gribeauval Howitzer caissons: 49 shells, 3 canisters Wurst 6-in. Howitzer caissons : 27 shells, 3 cannisters Some variations in the howitzer ammunitions supplies can be found in some of the "official French archives Returns" such as the returns for the 4th Corps as of 17 April 1809. III. A SPECIFIC ARTILLERY AMMUNITION ALLOTMENTS Artillery Ammunitions Carried by the 4th French Corps on 17 April 1809: The 4th Corps, as of 17 April 1809, included 4 French Divisions and Baden and Hessian contingents an artillery park and cavalry. The ammunition carried by the Corps is reported below (Source: French War Archives, Official Returns quoted by Colonel Saski in "Campagne de 1809 ", Paris, 1899-02): Cartridges 1st Div. 2nd Div. 3rd Div. 4th Div. Parc Total 12-pdr balls 312 394 353 394 516 1969 6-pdr balls 1611 1512 1277 1292 2302 7994 12-pdr canister 120 86 99 72 108 485 6-pdrcanister 260 233 300 312 440 1545 Howit. canister 15 15 12 31 39 111 Howit. shells 263 261 206 245 517 1492 Infantry (see Note 2) In addition, contingents of Baden and Hesse-Darmstadt troops were part of the 4th Corps and carried the following ammunition supply: Type Baden Artillery Hessian Artillery 6-pdr balls 1336 825 6-pdr canister 648 300 24-pdr shells 544 180 24-pdr canister 200 16 IV. SOME REMARKS ON THE TACTICAL USAGE OF HOWITZERS: We have seen de Toussard's views on firing howitzers at ricochet, etc. (see EEL 85,p.21, etc.). Rouquerol p. 61 (see note 3 for French text) says approximately the same: "Howitzer common shells were fired in "direct fire" or at "ricochet"; they worked at first as a round shot because of their mass, then by their burst." That does not appear to be everyone's opinion. Rouguerol, in a footnote quoted Decker (see note 4), a captain in the Prussian artillery, as expressing a different opinion: "...common shells should not be fired at ricochet..." Rouguerol added a note from the translator of Decker's work without further comments: "In the French artillery, that type of fire was used, and everyone felt very comfortable about it." Rouquerol continues: "A common shell burst into 25 to 50 pieces, which had a range of about 150 to 200 meters (yards); but these shell pieces were really dangerous for infantry only in a radius of 20 meters (yards). Practical range for common shells was up to 500 meter (yards); the extreme range was 600 meters (yards). Common shell fire was very advantageous in bringing disorder to enemy lines, in firing into hidden low spots and setting villages afire." Should we conclude that howitzers were not fired above 500-600 yards. I don't believe so but that is a point that must be explained if we want to understand howitzer fire. What is meant by Rouguerol, and the other authors, by: "practical range was up to 500 yards (meters)", should not be accepted as a statement of fact that common shells were never used beyond 600 yards. Actually, we can see in many battle reports that the "practical" firing range of 500 to 600 yards does not appear to have been respected on the battlefield. One well known instance took place at Waterloo. Mercer's battery was located more than 600 yards away from the French artillery and was under howitzer fire, which was considered much more of a nuisance, (under the poor ground conditions) than anything else (see note 5). Also at Waterloo, Bull's famous howitzer battery consisting of six long 5.5-in. howitzers cleared the woods of Hougoumont in a very short time. What about de Toussard's report on the Strasbourg's tests (already mentioned in EEL 85, p. 24) that a 6in. Gribeauval howitzer had the following ranges: ANGLE OF FIRE FIRST GRAZE FULL RANGE 6 degrees 834 yards 1386 yards 10 degrees 1200 yards 1450 yards 15 degrees 1524 yards 1582 yards 45 degrees No ricochet 2386 yards "FULL RANGE" is defined as the point that the common shell or howitz, if it had not burst before, stops after the several bounces that take place after the point of 'first graze'. Rouquerol, p. 55, gives us a hint on that practical range and mentions that some authors mistake the point of first graze ("but en blanc" in French) as the limit of fire efficacy. He continues by adding that, the projectile, unless it fell on very unfavorable ground (like at Waterloo), made a series of bounces of ricochets, and remained lethal much behind the first bounce point. In fact, he further mentions that other artillerists such as Scharnhorst (vol.III, p. 184), in agreement with Gigendi, considered 900 meters (yards) as the maximum distance at which the fall of a shot could be observed in clear weather and optimum conditions. (see note 6) The importance of the point of first graze was realized and the variables calculated very precisely as a function of the target range, for the Gribeauval's system, by Lombard, a professor of mathematics at the Brienne Artillery School (see note 7). One weakness of the table system was that no instrument was yet available to evaluate distances and one had to rely entirely on the experience of the gunners. The usefulness of such firing tables on the battlefield is challenged by Decke - and is quoted by Rouquerol pp.54-5 (see note 8 for French text): "...the accumulation of all these problems considerably reduces in practice the usefulness of these tables of ranges, which are, in theory, calculated to ease the usage of the ordnance; this usefulness becomes nil on the battlefield since one can not then measure the distances, and can evaluate them only by a quick observation." The difficulty of evaluating distances under battle conditions is likely one of the reasons for Lombard to limit his firing tables (let us not forget that we speak of the point of first graze) to approximately 500 to 600 yards for the howitzers. Of course, once more, the projectiles of howitzers bounced several. hundred yards behind the point of first graze before it exploded it has been already shown in EEL 85 by quoting de Toussard. That is further confirmed by General B.P. Hughes in "Firepower", p. 33: The practical howitzer range situation can be summed up by General Gigendi's "Aide-memoires..." in his guidelines for French artillery officers, p. 566: "With howitzers, direct fire (tir de plein-fouet) must never be usd behind 800 yards (meters) for shells and 200 yards (meters) for canister. The optimum range for shells is 400 yards -- The overall range for shells, with the angle of fire at 45 mill., is about 1100 to 1200 yards with 3 to 4 ricochets; up to that distance the effect of the projectiles against troops remains good. Do not fire with round shots or shells beyond 1000 to 1200 yards.... - Fire with round shots or shells against the front of a column, against a line taken in flank or from behind, and against artillery. Fire with shells against houses occupied by the enemy, behind screens, or behind covers.... Shells are used advantageously against cavalry..." V. SOME LIMITED CONCLUSIONS ON THE TACTICAL USAGE OF HOWITZERS It's always hard to draw conclusions from a limited amount of data with any degree of confidence. I expect - as usual - to be corrected by the readership if I make any mistake. I believe the following can be said: (1) Except in British service, the main type of projectile fired by howitzers was the common shell or howitz. It was used against troops as well as against buildings to set them afire. Against troops, the common shell had a direct effect similar to that a round shot and, as a bonus, a burst effect somewhere beyond the point of first graze. (2) Canister was also used, apparently with mixed feelings, especially by the Austrians and the Russians; somewhere in the average of 10 to 25% of the projectiles fired, depending on the results expected. (3) Howitzers had a definite morale effect that cannot be ignored or neglected, since they could throw formed troops into disorder. (4) Howitzers complemented the actions of field guns in specific circumstances which have been outlined above. VI. HOWITZER FIRING RULES AT THE NEW JERSEY ASSOCIATION OF NAPOLEONIC WARGAMERS We have made an attempt to reflect in our howitzer firing rules all the points covered and raised in our howitzer analysis. We'll be presenting them in our next issue. Note 1: I make that remark being fully aware that case was also fired by 6 and 9-pdr field-guns. However to be more effective shrapnels had to be of a larger caliber. A 5.5 inch howitzer had a 5.5 in. bore versus 3.67 in. and 4.2 in. for the 6 and 9-pdrs. Is it one of the reasons for the trend, in the British army, to replace the 6-pdr by the more powerful 9-pdr? We have here data out of the context of the subject considered: howitzers. However we feel it rather interesting to find out how much spare ammunition was kept by a French Corps and Allied troops. On 17 april 1809, the reserve infantry ammunition supplies carried by the 39 infantry ammunition wagons of the 4th Corps were: Division Rounds: French Infantry Rounds: Attached Baden or Hessian Infantry 1st 222,270 411,300 (Baden) 2nd 223,600 263,363 (Hessen) 3rd 151,440 - 4th 218,600 - Parc 594,370 - Total 1,410,280 - On 17 April, 1809, the 4th Corps included: Division French Infantry Attached Infantry Off. NCO & Men Off. NCO & Men 1st 113 4122 121 5373 (Baden) 2nd 174 663 6114 4058 (Hessen) 3rd 209 6931 none none 4th 154 5318 none none Total - 21007 - 9431 So, each French infantrymen had an average of 67 rounds in reserve, the Baden infantrymen had an average of 76.5 rounds and the Hessian infantrymen had an average of 64.8 rounds. Note 3: FRENCH TEXT: Tir a obus. - Les obus se tiraient soit de plein fouet, soit a ricochet; ils agissaient d'abord par leur masse comme boulet, puis, par leurs eclats. Un obus donnait de 25 a 50 eclats, dont la portee variait de 150 a 200 m; mais ces eclats n'etaient reellement dangereux pour l'infanterie que dans un rayon de 20m. La bonne portee de 1'obus s'entendait jusqu'a 500 m; sa distance de tir extreme etait de 600m. Le tir a obus etait tres apprecie pour porter le desordre dans les lignes enneinies, battre les bas-fonds et incendier les villages. Note 4. "Traitd Elementaire d'Artillerie A l'Usage des Militaires de Toutes les Armesle by E.Decker, 1816, Captain in the Prussian army and 1st class professor at the Berlin School of Artillery and Genie (1816) and translated by J.Ravichio de Paretsdorf, colonel of artillery, and A.Nancy, captain of artillery, Paris, 1825. Note 5. Mercer, General A.C."Journal of the Waterloo Campaign", 1870. We should keep in mind that, at Waterloo, the ground, because of the heavy rains, was extremely unfavorable to ricochets and that most shells remained stuck in the soggy ground without bouncing at all. Note 6. Decker is not of that opinion and considers that a well exercised eye can spot in extreme cases the effect of shots up to 1600 to 2000 meters. Note 7. The "Tables d'Artillerie des Canons et Obusiers a l'Usage de MM. les Officiers du Corps Royal d'Artillerie" calculated by M. Lombard, Auxonne, 1787, gives the angle of fire in function of the target range, etc. Back to Empire, Eagles, & Lions Table of Contents Vol. 1 No. 86 Back to EEL List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1985 by Emperor's Headquarters This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com