In this issue of EEL, the READERS' FORUM could be called "A Debate on Combat Effectivness... We have at first an article by Mr. James S. Daniel on "Fire and Shock" and then some comments on past issues of EEL from Paddy Griffith which further mostly debate the same basic old questions on FIREPOWER versus SHOCK and formations etc. 1.0 SOME MORE COMMENTS AND CONSIDERATIONS ON 'FIRE AND SHOCK' by James S. Daniel I have just finished reading Paddy Griffith's "Afterthoughts", and I find myself moved by his admonitions to expand our debates. Over the past year or so, I have been very interested by the debate on the effect of firepower to several thoughts and observations. Therefore, I am sending in my thoughts on firepower and shock combat. To begin, I would like to look at how both types of tactics, fire and shock, have been measured. For, to make an accurate comparison of them, it is necessary to be sure we are comparing them in the same way. Most often, firepower is measured in the number of hits made, i.e., the number of casualties. Shock (charge) tactics, on the other hand, are traditionally measured by either how often they are used and/or by how often the enemy is forced to yield ground; by its morale effect, in other words. The methods for measuring firepower and shock are used because they are the easiest to get information one. It is relatively easy to count how many rounds have been fired and compare it with how many rounds hit the target (living and otherwise). It is also quite simple to see how many times a charge has forced the enemy to give ground, or caused the enemy to flee in panic. I feel that it is obvious that while the methods used to measure the effectiveness of both fire and shock combat are equally valid, they do not measure the same thing, and therefore violate a basic premise of "zero sum" game theory. It is paramount that we must change how we are studying the effects of fire and shock combat. Since the methods of measuring both basic kinds of combat are equally valid, I suggest that we combine them. To do this effectively, it becomes necessary to define what is meant by effective tactical combat. I would like to propose that effective tactical combat is that which removes the ability of the enemy to resist. This can be done on either a purely physical plane: shooting, stabbing with a bayonet, etc; on a physchological level panic, freezing, etc. Or there can be a combination of both the physical and psychological. I am personally inclined to believe that the combination of both means to remove the enemy's will to resist was the most common. Just from what has gone before in the firepower debate, I feel that it is safe to say that fire combat does inflict more casualties than did shock combat. This can be tested by counting the number of bullet wounds and comparing it with the number of wounds caused by cutting, stabbing, concussions and capture. This, as one can see, is a purely physical measurement. How the number of casualties affect the enemy's ability to resist is quite straight forward: the less troops, the less the resistance. No troops, no resistance. Yet this casualties measure is only one part of the story. Rarely, if ever, has a unit been reduced to zero effectiveness. It becomes imperative that to be able to evaluate the psychological effects of both fire and shock combat. Any ideas out there? One last point: It has long been held that a good hypothesis helps in exploring a phenomenon. Therefore, I would like to propose "That firepower and shock are two basic elements to tactical combat and that tactical combat can only be truly effective when they are combined." 2.0 COMMENTS ON MACDONALD COLUMN by Paddy Griffith This was on the "Eastern Front" and I should not really talk about it. However, I know that is a hardy perennial in much of the tactical literature, and has therefore a special significance. This emphasis is probably quite accidental, due to the fact that it was mentioned as an example in some of the early debates. COLIN talks of it in his classic preface to "La Tactique et la Discipline (1902)", which - at the risk of repeating myself -- I -must insist is the best work ever written on the French Napoleonic infantry tactics. I am astonished that EEL hasn't picked it up, and regret to say that I suspect it is because Quimby translated only the "Infantry in the 18th. Century" book of Colin's, and garbled the rest of Colin's work. I believe Quimby has done a grave disservice to Napoleonic tactical studies. But EEL should be tearing apart the "Tactique & Discipline" preface page by page, rather than listening to Quimby. There are some big errors in "Tactique & Discipline", I believe, but it is still better than anything else in the field.  Home & Pratt ("A Precis on Modern Tactics", London 1892) have plenty of details on Wagram, and Macdonald gives details in his "Souveniers" (Tr 1893) p. 156. Pelet's "Guerre de 1809" vol IV, p. 222 also describes it. Jomini has it in "Vie de Napoleon" iii p. 272, which was (funnily enough) criticised by Okouneff, "Use of Artillery in the Field" (1956), as having too LITTLE depth (!1) Okouneff also cites Valentini's "Campaign of 1809" p. 200 as a source. The appalling Dodge has it in Chapter 23, as has the excellent General Renard in his papers of 1865 (in British Pulic Record Office code WO/33/15 p. 947 and following). Ardant Du Pick has it (US translation 1921 p. 150 - possible the best short ref. for "combat skulkers" - and p. 132). Chandler has it. Everyone has it. It is part of the mythology. Napoleon even tried to make it part of his mythology (see "Proclamations, Ordres du Jour" edition 1018, Paris 1964 p. 121-2). The key to all this interest is probably Jomini, who was a great opponent of heavy columns, and a champion of small ones. I'm afraid I do not actually }now who called Macdonald's column "monstrous" first, but I suspect Jomini. I have no reference, however. Oman, I think, does use this phrase, but even if he was actually the first to use it he was only echoing a sentiment expressed many, many times by others before him. 3.0 COMMENTS ON THE POINTS RAISED BY EEL 76 & 77 by Paddy Griffith (1) ON ISSUE 76: (a) Page 13 - I disagree with Bressonet's assumption that French columns always wanted to deploy, for reasons discussed at length elsewhere. This is a very 'pro-firepower' argument that Bressonet is putting forward. It may be worth pointing readers to Daniel Reichel's "Davout et l'Art de la Guerre", which has an extensive modern view o - Auerstadt (from the French side). Published Delachaux & Niestle, Paris 1975. (b) Wagram column - you have done a good job on this! (c) overall - this issue was very full, but please can we have less Saxons in future? Just my prejudice against the 'Eastern Front'! (i.e. I don't know German.) (2) ON ISSUE 77: (a) Ditto on Saxons! However, I DO congratulate you on the way you worry out these issues at lengti. That is surely correct. (b) Page 3. Bill Haggert on firepower misses the fact that the range tests DO show great efficiency in the muskets, in fact. The problem arises when range test' results are assumed to apply in battle. They don't. Nowhere near such accuracy is achieved in the sweat and fear of actual combat. Need I repeat that is irrelevant to the efficacy of a bayonet attack to say that it caused no casualties. What matters in battle is destroying enemy units as effective fighting units. A bayonet attack could often do this quickly without casualty, whereas a prolonged firefight might cause lots of casualties but not destroy the enemy unit. Which method would YOU prefer? Which is more humane?  Bill has a good point on doctrine of fire. It's similar to your point about the doctrine of gunners not firing at enemy artillery. Yes, the officers DID want troops to hold fire down to 60 yards or less. But, remember that the soldiers often decided otherwise, and opened fire recklessly as soon as they saw the enemy. I agree with Bill that cannon were the greatest killers on the Napoleonic battlefield, and their morale effect was also greatest than that of musketry. I'd put skirmishers next after that, and volley fire last. When a good volley could be calmly delivereu at close range it would be more destructive of life - and might also have a marked effect on unit cohesion - but. such volley fire was rare. (c) This brings me on to Digby Green's comments on p. 10. I don't fully agree that in 'Forward into Battle' I said that infantry Preferred the bayonet to a long range exchange of shots. What I meant to say was that the bayonet was often the best solution to the problem, whether or not the soldiers realised it. Obviously many soldiers preferred to fight fire by fire at long range, because that was less dangerous than coming to close range...or LOOKED less dangerous, even if it wasn't. My feeling is that long range firing was the natural psychological reaction to seeing the enemy, and a lot of Napoleonic battles consisted of just thick skirmish lines blazing away uselessly at each other at a range of about 200 yards. It took sore strong leadership, or good training, to get troops to chance their arm closer to the enemy than that. Maybe a good subject for an EEL debate would be on the fire efficacy of skirmishers. How close did they usually work to the enemy skirmishers and the enemy mainn body? flow many enemy did they hit per hour? There is much that is mysterious in all that! A good place to start would be Clausewitz' discussion of the firefight, cited in my book p. 49 in this connection (vol. 3, p. 263) in the Graham edition of 'On War'.) I liked Digby's article - especially as he agrees with my general conclusions - and thank him for his excellent discussion of Culloden and the problem of madhat irregulars (compare the "Celts" - actually mostly lowland Scots - noted for their suicidal charges in the American Civil War: "Attack and Die" by P. Jamieson and G. McWhiney, University of Alabama Press, 1982. Interesting to note that they also home in on Culloden.) David Chandler's discussions of Marlburian tactics are also interesting, since they show how firing during an advance was a normal practice. By Napoleonic times my feeling is that even the British infantry had reduced this to just the one volley - if they could get away with that - and had also downgraded the fire fight to near vanishing point (again - if they had any choice). Hence it had been gradually realised through the 18th. century that it was the forward movement of the line infantry which was its trump card. Fire during this was just icing on the cake. In any case the firepower function had been largely devolved to artillery and skirmishers - neither of which were anything like as efficient in 1700 as they had become by 1800. Duffy on the evolution of Frederick's tactics is interesting indeed. But we must remember that Frederick's troops became successively diluted in quality as their wars went on. It is therefore consistent with my views in "Forward into Battle" to suggest that a 'high risk' bayonet policy was favoured by good troops with confidence in themselves in the early years, but that a 'low risk' standoff firefight was preferred by uncertain levies. The high risk solution was, of course, the one which brought the highest chance of a cheap and decisive outcome as well as the highest chance of a debacle. The low risk solution was just a matter of showing you were trying to do your bit, but without much hope of anything emerging at the end except a number of dead soldiers. Quinby(*) in any case centres his attention on 18th, century tactics based on the Prussian model. In this there is an INORDINATE stress on advancing, having a fire fight, and then retreating. Dundas, in 1788, was FULL of this "retreating" business. You wonder how he ever got his people to advance in the first place. But the general idea, I suppose, is the same as the idea behind driving a car. The first thing you have to learn is the brake! Drill books were full of the retreat part because they had to prevent the troops routing if the enemy fought back too hard. It is only a shame that this emphasis made them neglect the real business that was supposed to ensue once battle was joined. (No driving instructor would ever spend his tine talking about how to argue your way out of an accident, would he?) I think it. is important to remember that drill manuals describe how their authors want troops to be trained, not what actually happens in real combat. I may in the past have expressed the view that drill manuals are 'irrelevant' to combat, and this has been misunderstood. What I meant, I think, was nearer to this idea that the priorities which drillers impose are for THEIR reasons rather than for the actual real-life world of what really happens in battle. Digby made a shrewd point when he noted that Quimby's discussion of drill did not include a discussion of what happens in close combat! Oman - as I have said many times - was wrong to say the British fired frequently in a charge. I don't know where he got it, but it is not often substantiated in the sources. My guess is that in British fights in the Peninsular War the number of vollies fired by any given battalion in its main line clash was: 0 vollies - 10% of cases 1 volley - 50% of cases 2 vollies - 20% of cases 3 vollies - 10% of cases more than 3 - 10% of cases That's only a guess, and there is no sort of statistical base behind it - but it is a guess based on a lot of sniffing around among eyewitness accounts. So that's all I have on Digby's interesting article. (d) p. 4 of EEL 77: Nafziger on the cost of an infantry regiment was an EXCEPTIONALLY interesting article. Well done! May I also draw his attention to the collected legislation of France, which also lists the various pay scales, allowances etc. (it all had to be passed by law). The reference is: DUVERGIER, J B: 'Collection complete des lois, decrets, ordonnances, reglements et avis du conseil d'etat de 1788 a 1851' - 51 volumes of which the first was published in Paris 1834, and they became annual after that (i.e. keeping up with current laws). I fear that I have only looked at it for the period after 1815, but it is very full. It gives all the changes each year. The key question, of course, is what ELSE you could get for 8 million francs apart from an infantry regiment? Did that make it cheap or expensive? I am sure that George is correct to say it was expensive, since cash was ALWAYS a vital concern of Napoleonic commanders (in the Pyrennes campaign of 1813 Napoleon prevented Soult from calling formations of 15,000 men "Corps" because the extra costs of appointing marshalls, etc. would have been prohibitive. They were called "Lieutenancies" and had to make do with Lieutenant Generals.) - but what comparisons can we make with the cost of other things in society? Also note that on campaign the state would dodge quite a fair percentage of these costs, with soldiers not being available in the regiment, illegal requisitions of food, etc. An in peacetime - when the costs could not be dodged - there would be provision for reduced pay scales anyway. Footnote (*) From Editor: The readers should see the comments on Macdonald's column page 15, in which Paddy Griffith comments on Quimby. I would like to point out that Quimby has the merit to be for most of us about the only source in the English language counterring the line versus column concept presented by many historians and should be credited for doing so. That does not mean that one should depend on a single source and it's where Collin is of importance. Indeed Collin is the best work ever written to-date on French Napoleonic infantry tactics. We should take a look at his work in a future issue. Back to Empire, Eagles, & Lions Table of Contents Vol. 1 No. 78 Back to EEL List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1993 by Emperor's Headquarters This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com