Time for another volley. In Issue number 24, pages 18 to 24, Jean has presented some very interesting and indeed helpful facts concerning musket ranges. This is certainly the type of information that we need upon which to base our rules and ranges. Jean has given several good examples in his quotes on page 18 that proves the results of FIRE DISCIPLINE. Of course, no rules or regulations can apply to every and all situations, so the answers to Jean's questions on page 13 are all NO. Perhaps though before continuing, a few comments should be made regarding musket fire power in the 18th century especially the first half when armies were just completing the transition from the musket and pike to the musket and bayonet. These earlier muskets were much poorer made than those of the Napoleonic and later periods. In the 1720's the muskets were capable of: "Firing a one-ounce ball perhaos twice or three times a minute, its range was about 250 yards, although for accurate shooting not more than 100 yards was attempted." The Art of Warfare on Land by David Chandler, Page 133, Hamlyn Publishing Group Limited, London, 1974. Jean mentions the firepower of the French during the War of the Austrian Sucession and that, "( in 1743) .. As regards to small-arms all accounts agree that the fire discipline of the French infantry was inferior to that of the Allies". Perhaps this could best be explained by the French habit, at that time, of firing from the waist NOT the shoulder. This would certainly produce much lower results and a much lower standard of FIRE DISCIPLINE. Yet the best example of middle 18th century FIRE DISCIPLINE occurred on the Plains of Abraham outside Quebec, on September 13th, 1759. "Under a sun which had just begun to shine brightly the armies of these two Ancient Enemies once again joined in tattle. When the foremost French rank had advanced to within forty yards of his motionless men, Wolfe shouted "Present". At once hundreds of long barrels rippled down to the horizontal. 'FIRE'. The first volley caused such a tremendous report that men in the distance thought siege guns had begun to play. The leading files of all three French columns had been mowed down as if by a titanic scythe." Following a second destructive volley the British charged with the bayonet. The Battle for Quebec by F. Van Wyck Mason. Houghton Miflin Company, Boston, 1965, Pages 171-172. Again during the battle the French were firing from the waist, as was the universal European custom, except in Britain. "On this memorable day only the Light Infantry, voyageurs and Rangers actually sighted their weapons. Yen composing the Line Companies were only supposed to point in the direction of the enemy ranks and let fly." Ibid. pages 170-171. According to author Robert Leckie, "A musket's killing range was only a few hundred paces and firing was not very accurate; in fact the British fire drill of the period did not include the order 'aim'. The object was not so much to riddle the enemy as to frighten him and pin him down for the shock action of the cavalry." The Mars of America by Robert Leckie, Harper and Row, -Flew York, Clew York, 1965, Volume I, page 45. During the American Revolution, battle ranges were seldom OVER 100 yards. At the Battle of Breed's Hill ( Bunker Hill ) the range was indeed short. "Behind the Mystic wall Colonel Stark went Putnam one better, dashing out about 40 yards to nail a stake into the ground. 'Not a man is to fire until the first regular crosses the stake' he yelled". Ibid. page 117. A more practical illustration of the ranges of muskets can be viewed at the two yearly firelock matches held by the Brigade of the America Revolution. Using Charlevilles, Brown Besses, Spanish 1752 Fusils and various Committee of Safety muskets, as well as Hessian pieces, the ranges for competition are: MUSKET PISTOL 50 Yard slow fire 15 yards slow fire, smooth-bore 30 Yard slow fire 25 yards slow fire, rifled. These are the battle ranges of the Brigade as well as the competitioa ranges. Even Brigade members with eight and nine years shooting experience, using better made weapons and powder than their historical counterparts, do not always score high because of the basic characteristics of the weapons which negates accurate fire. A few words now about General Alexander Smyth, whose letter of instructions both Jean and I have used in different articles in Issue 24. Smyth was not a brilliant man. He was however a political general who owed his rank to people he knew, as well as how much land he owned; not to any knowledge of military tactics. After several fiascoes, he resigned and passed quietly from the scene. During the War of 1812 (The American Theater of Operations of the Napoleonic Wars), battle ranges again were short. At the Battle of Chippewa - July 3rd, 1814, one of the few European styled battles of that conflict, the Americans practiced FIRE DISCIPLINE. "...With American and British guns already dueling counter battery, Scott led his men over a creek and deployed. Marching steadily, tall in their trim grey uniforms and high hats, Scott's soldiers spread out in a concave line to put a converging fire into the redcoated British drawn up in column, two regiments abreast. The British opened fire. Americans toppled, but the gaps were quickly closed and the long gray line came on. Seventy yards apart the two forces halted and fired. Now there were gaps in the British line, and the Americans charged with the bayonet to break and rout Riall's redcoats." Ibid, page 980  These U.S. soldiers were led by competent military men who did not follow the foolish instructions of General Smyth. By 1814 the American Army was learning the art of warfare from practice and experience, not theory. Rifles, in the hands of the Tennessee and Kentucky troops at the battles around New Orleans December, 1814 to January, 1815, practiced no such discipline. The riflemen opened fire and hit targets at 300 yards against formed troops in the open. A point to remember is that even though a weapon had a much longer range than that actually used, it was the battle range that rules should be based upon. Otherwise one will end up distorting history. Comments by Jean A. Lochet I think before we go any further on FIRE DISCIPLINE that the term should be defined so we can compare apples and apples or oranges and oranges and not apples and oranges as we appear to do how.. In the mean time I would like to add the following comments: (1) I fully agree that rules should be based on battle ranges. Please note that I say ranges, because I don't believe that a specific battle range existed. Obviously I will have to come back on that point. (2) Different Nations had different fire practices. The Prussians are the best example of that. They opened fire at ranges sometimes in excess of 200 yards. See my articles and references in issue 24 pages 19 and 20 etc. I don't think that that point can be ignored. (3) Prussian and Austrian (perhaps some others) volley fired against skirmishers at least around 1806. Don't tell me that they did know about skirmishers. The Austrian had used swarms of them against the Prussians during the Seven Year War, see also my article of pages 19 and 20, issue 24 and the miscellaneous articles on light troops. (4) Different nations had different reactions when under attack by skirmishers at different periods. The Prussian of 1806 volley fired. The Prussian of 1813 had certainly a different reaction. They had adopted a new set of Manoeuvre Regulation published in January 1812, which subsequently provided the direction under which the Prussian Armies of 1813-1815 were trained and fought. The Prussian line infantry of 1813-15 was provided with a skirmisher screen. ref. David Nash THE PRUSSIAN ARMY, Almark Publications, pages 99 to 103. At Quatre-Bras and Waterloo we see examples of British infantry sending forward one or more companies from the same battalion to clear up the French skirmishers... ref. Jack Weller, WELLINGTON AT WATERLOO. I don't think that the British infantry used in the Flanders prior to 1800 performed such a manoeuvre. (5) I find surprising to conclude that riflemen from Tennessee and Kentucky did not practice firing at close range. I think that is not to be expected to be the normal practice of troops equipped with rifles. Rifles were long range weapons, longer to load that smoothbore musket and riflemen usually longer to train. In all armies riflemen were expected to perform long range precise firing usually outside of musket range like the picking by riflemen of artillery crewmen. I think that once for all we should differentiate the volley fire practiced by line infantry, the independent "chasseur type of fire" practiced by the light infantry. We can even make a further distinction for the-light infantry fire. We find the ordinary light infantry using a smoothbore musket and a more sophisticated kind using the rifle. Both types were used to practice precise aimed fire against individual or formed troops. We know that, because of tea verttcal drop and the lateral deviation.'.it_was easier to hit a solid target at long range that a single soldier. We have seen that in my article of issue 20. We should make a difference between. (1) volley fire against formed troops, (2) Volley fire against skirmishers and -he like, (3) Skirmishers and the like against formed troops and (4) Skirmishers and the like against skirmishers and the like. We should continue in the next issue. Back to Empire, Eagles, & Lions Table of Contents Vol. 1 No. 27 Back to EEL List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1978 by Jean Lochet This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com