In issue 25, pages 18 and 19, I was quoting Rifleman Harris of the 71st Highlanders (A SOLDIER OF THE SEVENTY-FIRST, page 73) reporting the remanning of the artillery battery of Fort Napoleon at Almaraz. Following, is once more the extract from page 73: Fort Napoleon fired two or three shot into Fort Almaraz. We took the hint from this circumstance, and turned the guns of Almaraz on Fort Napoleon, and forced the enemy to leave it, it being a bridge of boats, two companies were sent with brooms to burn and cut it away; During a conversation with Dick Ponsini on that reference Dick brought up the point that Harris was speaking collectively and that that could mean anything. The only logical solution was to find more about the event. I have found, after many hours of patient research the following in Napier, HISTORY OF THE WAR IN THE PENINSULA AND IN THE SOUTH 0F FRANCE (see issue 26 for availability of a reprint edition) pages 413 to 120, volume 3. Almaraz, was apparently the only bridge available to the French Army, for the crossing of the river Tagus between Alcantara and Toledo. The bridge at Almaraz was a boat bridge laid down by Marmont and was secured by three strong forts and a bridge-head. ref.Napier, page 413. The first of these forts was called Ragusa and was unfinished but very strong. It was used as a magazine etc. On the left bank of the Tagus, the bridge had a fortified head of masonry which was again flanked by a redoubt called Fort Napoleon. This redoubt though imperfectly constructed was very strong. Both forts were armed with eighteen guns and about 1000 troops. In May 1812, General Hill was ordered by Wellington to attempt to surprise the French at Almaraz with a force including 400 cavalry, 2 field brigades of artillery, a pontoon equipage, and a battering train of 6 iron twenty-four-pounder howitzers. The enterprise, at all times difficult, was of one of extreme delicacy since the British force could be surprised by several French forces. Furthermore the bridge at Merida had to be repaired to allow the British to procede toward Almaraz with the artillery etc. The restoration of the bridge at Merida was very difficult and took a fortnight's labor. Hill with his force reached Jaraicejo on May 16. He divided his troop in three columns, and made a night march intending to attack by surprise and at the same moment the tower of Mirabete, the fortified house in the pass, and the forts at the bridge of Almaraz. The left column was directed against the tower. The center column with the cavalry and the artillery moved by the Royal road. The right column composed of the 50th, 71st and 92nd regiments under the direction of Hill was intended to penetrate by the difficult way of La Cuerva and Roman Gordo, again the forts at the bridge. The day broke before the columns reached the destination and tha hopes for a surprise were extinguished. Hill very carefully examined the French defences. He was convinced that to reduce the works in the pass, he had to incur more loss than was justifiable. Furthermore not enough strength would be left to carry the forts at the bridge, which was the chief objective of his mission. Yet, only through the pass of Mirabete the artillery could move against the bridge. The troops remained concealed until the evening of the 18th, and then Hill reinforced his column with the 6th Portuguese regiment, a company of riflemen of the 60th rifles. and the artillerymen of the center of riflemen of the 60th rifles, and the artillerymen of the center column, commenced the descent of the valley. His design was to storm fort Napoleon before daylight. The march was less than 6 miles but the terrain difficult. The attacking force carried ladders to escalate the fort. General Chowne of the left column began to attack as a diversion the castle of Mirabete. The garrison of fort Napoleon crowding on the ramparts were anxiously gazing at this signs of war since white smoke rose on the lofty brow of the Sierra. At that moment a quick and loud shout broke on their ears. That was the gallant 60th regiment, aided by a wing of the 71st that came bounding over the hills. The French were surprised to see the British so close while Mirabete was still defended, but they were not unprepared. Anyway, after a furious fight, Fort Napoleon was captured. The defeated French garrison fled toward the bridge itself. The following direct quotation from page 417 resume the situation. Still the British soldiers pushed their headlong charge, slaying the hindmost, and they would have passed the river if some of the boats had not been destroyed by stray shots from the forts, which were now sharply cannonading each other, for the artillery-men had turned the guns of Fort Napoleon on Fort Ragusa. Please note that Napier says that the artillerymen had turned the guns of Fort Napoleon on Fort Ragusa. It's in full agreement with Harris quotation given at the beginning of this article. Dick Ponsini was right Harris was speaking collectively... One can find almost what he wants. One can say that both quotations don't exclude the possibility that some soldiers of the 71st, or of the 60th did not help the artillerynen to fire the guns of fort Napoleon...perhaps it's on that spot that some men of the list were exposed to the firing oŁ guns and that they applied their learned skill at Waterloo three years latter. It is a possibility and very far to be a substantiated fact. I am only trying present a possibility and an explanation. NOTHING ELSE. Once more, I as raising a question. My theory may be right or may be wrong. I hope if anyone has some facts available to complete the above story to send it. It will be published. Please note that I am interested in substantiated facts and not to an academic dissertation. The above story raise also an interesting point. About two months ago, I had the pleasure to play a game using the Empire rules. I was fortunate to capture a French horse battery. (I was playing the Russians since usually in our club almost everyones wants to play the French...) I wanted to use that battery by splitting one of my Russian gun crew. The rules I was told by the referee do not allow the remaning of captured guns. Right or wrong that was the book was saying. That does not mean that after the battle one has to agree with the rules. In the above article we have an example in which the use of captured enemy guns was part of the tactical plan. Since the guns could not go through the pass, Hill deliberately took the gun crews with him to capture Fort Napoleon and obviously use the artillery of Fort Napoleon against Fort Ragusa. I know I am always coming with exceptions that complicate the business behind reason ... But I wonder if I am unreasonable... We wargamers in almost every battle or skirmish encounter a special case that is usually not covered by the rules... Almost all of us will agree that if a gun crew is forced to abandon guns for one reason or another, that after the guns have been recaptured intact by their owners; the original gun crew should be allowed to reman its own guns and use them. Well, the other day I was reading once more IENA by Houssaye. Page 95: "Ney...ordered the 10th chasseur a cheval to attack the battery Steinwehr. One squadron disbanded the artillerists and the conductors ... The footnote on the same page says that Hopfner reports that the chasseurs did not spike the guns but just took away the caissons and that the battery even after it had been recaptured, could not be used the all day for lack of ammunition and was eventually captured. Well, I don't see anything illogical. After all, war is not to be nice and all the dirty tricks can be used ... but how many rules provide a specific rule for such a situation. I am sure that such a trick was not an isolated case and that many reoccurences of such dirty trick took place. Of course I did not go to an extensive survey of such occurrences.... I hope the above is of interest. I just realized that I did not finish the story of the attack on Almaraz, so here is the rest of the story from Napier page 418. Please note the capture of the flags of a Foreign regiment. That Foreign regiment was the regiment of Prussia called 4eme Etranger in 1812. The 71st Highlanders is credited with the capture of that flag or flags. Please note that riflemen Harris does ever mention the event. ref, The Regiments and Uniforms of the British Army etc. by R.L.Yaple the Wargamers' Library volume V. Many of the French leaped into the water and were drown'd. but the greatest part were made prisoners, and to the amazement of the conquerors, the panic spread to the other side of the river the garrison of Fort Ragusa, although perfectly safe, abandoned that fort also, and tried with the others along the road to Navel Moral. Some grenadiers of the 92d immediately swam over and brought back several boats with which the bridge was restored, and Fort Ragusa was gained. The towers and other works were then destroyed, the stores, ammunition, provisions, and boats were burned in the course of the day, and in the night the troops returned to the sierra above, carrying with them the colors of the foreign regiment and more than two hundred and fifty prisoners including a commandant and sixteen other officers. The whole loss on the part of the B.ritish was about one hundred and eighty men, and one officer of artillery was killed by his own mine, placed for the destruction of the tower; but the only officer slain in tine actual assault was Captain Candler, a brave man wh.o fell while leading the grenadiers of the 50th on to the rampart of Fort Napoleon. This daring attack was executed with a decision similar to that with which it had been planned. The first intention of General Hill was to have directed a part of his column against the bridgehead, and so to have assailed both works together; but when the difficulties of the road marred this project, he attacked the nearest work with the leading troops, leaving the rear to follow as it could. This rapidity was essential to the cause of the success, for Foy hearing on the 17th that the allies were at Truxillo, had ordered d'Armnagnac to re-inforce Lugar Nueva with a battalion which, being at Naval Moral the 18th, might have entered Fort Ragusa early in the morning of the 19th; but instead of marching before daybreak, this battalion did not move until eleven o'clock, and meeting the fugitives on the road, caught the panic and returned.  Back to Empire, Eagles, & Lions Table of Contents Vol. 1 No. 27 Back to EEL List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1978 by Jean Lochet This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. 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