Although serious fighting ended with Cornwallis' surrender at Yorktown on 19 October 1781, the War of the American Revolution dragged on for nearly two years after that date. In 1782, Carleton replaced Clinton as British Commander-in-Chief, the British evacuated Savannah and Charleston and five Americans were killed in the "last military action" of the war, a skirmish with a British foraging party on James Island, South Carolina. (Peckham, 190) 1783 saw a Congressional proclamation officially ending hostilities (eight years to the day after the skirmishes at Lexington and Concord), the signing of the final peace treaty, the British evacuation of New York City and Washington's resignation. As the war wound down in 1783, officers and men of the Continental Army were first furloughed and later discharged. These released soldiers left the service with mixed emotions. After years of war, most were presumably eager to get home, but many resented the fact that Congress had failed to settle the questions of back pay and bonuses before discharging them. In spite of Washington's request that the men be given three month's pay at the time of their separation, the typical Revolutionary War veteran returned home with the clothes on his back and, perhaps, an army-issue musket--a farewell gift from a grateful country! However, not all of the regulars were discharged. As long as British troops occupied New York, an "army" was required to watch that city. When the last British, German and Loyalist soldiers finally embarked in November, 1783, even this need disappeared. Early in January, 1784, Major General Henry Knox, senior officer of the Continental Army, could report to Congress that only 700 rank and file remained. Finally, on 2 June, Congress instructed Knox to discharge all but the garrisons of West Point and Fort Pitt, a total of eighty men! The reasons for this astonishing action are summarized in a Congressional resolution of the same date. In the opinion of the authors of that resolution, "...standing armies in time of peace are inconsistent with the principles of republican governments, dangerous to the liberties of a free people, and generally converted into destructive engines for establishing despotism...." (Quoted in Ganoe, 90) The words of the resolution seem to echo these of Sam Adams, who believed that a standing army, "...however necessary it may be at sometimes, is always dangerous to the liberties of the people." (Quoted in Weigley, 75) It is probable that the members of Congress responsible for this resolution had at least two recent events in mind when they wrote the passage quoted above. in January, 1783, Congress had received a "memorial" from the officers of Washington's army requesting redress of certain grievances about "arrears in pay, unsettled food and clothing accounts, and the failure of Congress to make provisions for the life pension of half pay starting 21 October 1780, the date they had been promised discharge." (Boatner, 780) In spite of the support and personal intervention of Major General Alexander McDougall, this list of "demands" was rejected Unrest among the American officer corps continued in 1783. The crisis came in March, when two anonymous "addresses" were circulated in the army's winter camp at Newburgh, New York. These documents probably the work of Major John Armstrong, Jr., aide- de-camp to Major General Horatio Gates, suggested two equally treasonous courses of action to the disgruntled officers. If the war ended, they were to refuse to disband until their demands were met, but if the fighting continued and Congress still did not act, they were to withdraw to some "unsettled country," leaving the* government without an army. Finally, the anonymous author implied in his second address that Washington was in secret sympathy with their demands. On 15 March, Washington, who had notified Congress of the developments in camp, met with an assembly of regimental officers. In an appeal to their common sense and honor, the Commander-in-Chief denounced both of the alternatives presented in the "addresses" and urged his listeners not to take "...any measures which will lessen the dignity and sully the glory you have hitherto maintained...." (Quoted in Boatner, 781) Convinced as much by Washington's emotion and sincerity as by his logic, the assembled officers "...expressed their confidence in the justice of Congress and repudiated the 'infamous prepositions...in the late anonymous address." (Boatner, 781) So effective was Washington's performance that when Major Armstrong attempted to revive the "conspiracy" in April he found little enthusiasm among his former supporters and quickly abandoned the project. The second threat to Congress came from the rank and file.In June, 1783, eighty new recruits mutinied at Lancaster, Pennsylvania, and marched to Philadelphia, demanding "immediate redress of grievances." (Weigley, 78) Joined by 200 of the city garrisons, the mutineers surrounded the State House, besieging Congress and the Executive Council Pennsylvania, and gave the legislators twenty minutes to satisfy their demands, or face the consequences. Meanwhile, the mutineers settled down in front of the building to do some serious drinking. Fortunately for the politicians, the liquor took the edge off the soldiers' anger, and when the former finally found the courage to leave the State House, they were offered insults but no serious injury. As a result of this confrontation in Philadelphia, Congress adjourned to Princeton and Washington dispatched Major General Robert Howe and 1,500 regulars to quell the uprising. General Howe, the man who lost Savannah to the British in 1778, had had previous experience handling mutinies: in 1781, he had put down a rebellion in the New Jersey Line. At that time, only two of the ringleaders had been hanged. This time, however, four men were executed for their part in the "only mutinous demonstration of this transition period." (Spaulding, 116) The "Newburgh Addresses" and the Philadelphia mutiny may have influenced the Congressmen who voted to discharge all but eighty of the remaining Continentals on 2 June 1784, but even the strongest critics of the army must have recognized the need for some sort of armed forces, if only to defend the settlers of the northwest and southwest frontiers from Indians. Unfortunately, the Articles of Confederation, ratified in 1781, made Congress dependent on the states for money and men. Unable to pay and perhaps unwilling to trust the few remaining Revolutionary veterans, Congress dismissed them and then begged the states for replacements. According to Berg, 56, Colonel Henry Jackson's Continental Regiment was the last infantry unit under arms. With its demise, the only Continentals left in service were fifty-five men at West Point and twentyfive at Fort Pitt. These eighty privates, with a "proportionate number of officers," were detailed to "guard the stores." (Ganoe, 90) The garrison at West Point was a company of Colonel John Lamb's artillery battalion under the command of Captain John Doughty, the "highest ranking officer continued in service after the Revolution." (Jacobs, 15) The military stores these men were expected to guard included gunpowder, small arms and cartridge boxes. At least some of the arms and equipment stockpiled at West Point were in need of repair. Even the powder, of which there was a large amount, had to be dried out periodically and re-casked. Apparently, the garrison of Fort Pitt--twenty-five privates under the command of a lieutenant and at least one other officer--failed to perform this vital duty. In 1785, when commissioners appointed to treat with the Wyandot, Delaware, Chippewa and Ottawa requisitioned powder from the commanding officer for presents to aid in their negotiations, most of the fort's supply of that item was found to be worthless. Captain Doughty's men had similar problems with the powder stored at West Point. As mentioned above, when weather permitted, the men dried the powder in the sun and repacked it in new kegs. Unfortunately, coopers--like most skilled workmen of the time--refused to work for the low wages paid by the government. For want of good casks and men to make or repair them, some of the powder was lost. Other types of skilled workmen were in short supply at West Point. For example, most of the small arms stored there required some kind of repair; even the cartridge boxes needed mending and oiling. When these necessary repairs were not-made, the place became a "rubbish heap" of "broken guns, leaking cartridge boxes, and blunted bayonets." (Jacobs, 16) Conditions at Fort Pitt may have been worse, for discipline there seems to have been poor. Well, disciplined or not, the eighty men stationed at West Point and Fort Pitt to "guard the stores" were the basis of a new U.S. Army. On 3 June 1784, Congress called upon four states to furnish a total of 700 men from their militias for national service. These men--165 from New York, 110 from New Jersey and 260 from Pennsylvania--were to serve one year in a unit that came to be known as the first American Regiment. Until the new recruits began coming in from the states, however, the last Continentals continued to do their duty, fighting rust, rot and boredom. Author's Note: The preceding article, written at the request of Tom DeVoe, is the first in a series covering the U.S. Army, 1783-1812. In the letter containing his request, Tom asked a question concerning the fate of surplus arms and equipment after the Revolutionary War. Some of the authors consulted in the preparation of this article suggest at least a partial answer to that question. As mentioned above, some discharged veterans were allowed to keep their muskets. (Higginbotham, 412) According to Jacobs, 16, small arms and accoutrements were deposited at West Point. Finally, Weigley, 81, says the Quartermaster General and the Commissary of Military Stores tried to sell "supplies remaining from the war." If the readers have information pertaining to Tom's question, the author would appreciate hearing from them. Sources: Berg, Fred A. Encyclopedia of Continental Army Units: Battalions, Regiments and Independent Corps. Harrisburg, Pa., 1972. Boatner, Mark M., III. Encyclopedia of the American Revolution. New York, 1966. Dupuy, R. Ernest. The Compact History of the United States Army. 2nd rev. ed. New York, 1973. Ganoe, William A. The History of the United States-Army. Rev. ed. New York & London, 1942. Higginbotham, Don. The War of American Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies and Practice, 1763-1789. New York, 1971. Jacobs, James R. The Beginnings of the U.S. Army, 1783-1812. Princeton, NJ, 1947. Peckham, Howard H. The War of Independence: A Military History. Pb ed. Chicago, IL.: University of Chicago Press, 1958. Spaulding, Oliver L. The United States Army in War and Peace. New York 1937. Wallace, Willard M. Appeal to Arms: A Military History of the American Revolution. Pb ed. Chicago, IL: Quadrangle Books, 1964. Weigley, Russell F. History of the-United States Army. New York, 1967. illustrations by Jeanette Danel Back to Empire, Eagles, & Lions Table of Contents Vol. 1 No. 23 Back to EEL List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1978 by Jean Lochet This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com