With the dawn of the 19th Century Austria-Hungary, in common with the other European powers, placed little emphasis on the role of firepower in the determination of the outcome of decisive battles. We have an observation by Archduke Charles dating from 1796 that all shooting and skirmishing only costs lives and decides nothing'. His point is based on the principle that battles were ultimately decided by the shock of bayonet and saber, and when these battles were won--the war was won. The recognized role of firepower was to prepare the opposing battle line for the shock by weakening and disrupting it before hand. Further than this the casualties caused by fire were merely a waste of life--particularly of valuable trained professional soldiers. It was not even politic to destroy the professional army of your opponent unnecessarily; without it he may not be able to retain his crown, which would lose you the benefits of the concessions he may sign away to you. Of course Firepower was considered the vital element of the softening-up process; so much so that it had become standard practice to deploy the infantry battalions in a line formation in order to maximize the delivery of musket fire. This fire was further augmented with the assignment of two or three light (2, 3 or 1 lber) guns per battalion. When the fire had taken effect sufficiently, the attack was carried out methodically with the infantry and/or cavalry still in their rigid unbroken lines. Ironically the very tools which brought about the obsolescence of this system had found their origins in the Austrian Army, which was the archetype of the status quo. The first of these was the rifle or rifled musket which had a much greater inherent accuracy than the musket. An exto:onsive experiment had been carried out in the Austrian Army in equipping elements of Grenz regiments with a doubly unique weapon. This was an over-and-under airgun and musket. The airgun was rifled and quite accurate as well as relatively quiet and quick firing. The musket barrel was to serve as a back-up in case of exhaustion of the air supply or jam:ping. The project was dropped because: these weapons were expensive, required special training and were subject to fouling if not kept absolutely clean. The other was the swarm of light infantry skirmish lines which presented no valid target to the volly fire of the line while continually stinging and whittling away with their fire. The first appearance of light infantry since the advent of firearms was in the army of Maria Theresa. These were the Grenzers (or Croats) who were primarily employed for raids and reconnaissance and as a screen for the main body in rough or wooded terrain. Later a Tyrol Jager regiment was added to the order of battle. During war a number of volunteer battalions would be recruited from friendly local districts which were to be used for this purpose. In the early years of the French Revolution many of these were formed from emigre Frenchmen. In the army of Bourbon France there had been a long contoversy between two military schools. One advocated maintaining linear infantry formations which were best suited to exert fire. The other insisted upon the use of infantry columns-to advance and attack.; these were more manueuverable and could bring to bear more shook at the point of impact. The first school argued that an opponent deployed into line could blow away the heads of these columns.. . .it was not until a minor action in Calabria at Maida that these were shown to be right. During the Wars of the French Revolution a happy compromise was met in the ordre-mixte. -With the expansion of the armies, the new militia battalions were found to be too unskilled to maintain the drill required to steady a line. With the amalgam, two militia battalions were paired with a veteran line battalion to form a demi-brigade. In the advance the veteran battalion stayed in line in order to shield the militia battalions in column behind. When the way had been prepared by the vollies of the line, the columns were loosed on the enemy. A further enhancement was to cover the whole with a loose cloud of skirmishers. When Archduke Charles assumed the supreme command of the Austrian Army, he began a series of reforms which were to bring the army of Maria Theresa into the 19th Century. These were in recognition of the successes which the French Army has achieved against them. Among these reforms was a new set of drill regulations for infantry. Here a striking innovation was a procedure which enabled each line battalion to provide skirmishers while the bulk of the battalion retained its traditional linear formation. On the order 'Form Zugs from the Third Rank' (note that the zug was a subcompany formation similar to the platoon, four zugs per company) the members of the rank rank of each company withdrew to form ad--hoc zugs. This left the rest of the company in a two deep formation. For a 6 company battalion, 12 zugs were-formed. Each zug was assigned three corporals These zugs were arranged into three groups; each group commanded by a field officer and three 1st Lieutenants with a drummer attached. These zugs formed were only partially intended as skirmishers; additionally they were to serve as an advance or rear guard or to form a reserve. In the first case they were stationed between the battalion and the enemy; in the second they remained behind the battalion front. They could also prolong the battalion frontage, cover the flank or be emplyed as a separate formed unit. Since in only one of these uses were they acting as skirmishers it can be seen that this was given no special emphasis. There was no established procedure for the skirmisher role. The assigned duties were hold off enemy skirmishers, spy our enemy positions and obscure the position of friendly units. In effect this was equivalent to open up the regulations to cover everything. The general intent was to employ skirmishers in broken terrain where the formed line was at a disadvantage. There was a rule that skirmishers were not to attempt a decisive action or to put up a lasting resistance. No additional troops were to be assigned to provide support for reinforcement or to assist in disengagement; this support had to be provided from the initial formation. Normally one group was deployed while the other two remained behind it. It should be noted that at no time were these units fully dispersed. They fought in discrete elements of one or more zugs; each element volley fired. A typical skirmisher formation resembled a pyramid; of the first group, one or more zugs formed the point with the rest in close support. Still further behind were the other two groups which would feed additional zugs if required or form a closed body of sufficient strength to disengage the rest. We can see that of the third of the battalion employed as skirmishers, only a fraction of these were actually on the firing line. This represents the observation of the principle of economy of force; only so much strength was to be employed as was required for the mission. The men assigned to this duty were expected to be the most nimble, dextrous best shots and able to use terrain. Of the rest, one required only steadfastness and knowledge of drill. Those assigned were to be armed with the best available weapons. By regulation there were now to be a number of rifled muskets (Stutzen) assigned to each battalion for this use. While they were not true rifles the stutzen were more accurate and had a slower rate of fire than did muskets. Ideally the stutzen-armed men were at the point, supported by the more rapid fire of the muskets. To direct the movements of the skirmishers elements, a series of drum signals was established. In the Prussian Army horn signals were used while in a later Bavarian regulation fifes were to be used for longer distances or in closed terrain. Unfortunately, although the Drill Regulations of 1807 were approved and officially adopted, there was not enough time to fully impliment them before the opening of hostilities in 1809. This was because normal economy measures put most of the army on leave during peacetime; there was a single annual training session which was insufficient time even if there had been instructors available. Later during the Befreiungskrieg there is ample evidence that these regulations had been for the most part adopted. Documentation 1. Drill Regulations for Austrian Infantry - 1807 2. An article by Dr. Herbert Schwartz in Die Zinnfigur 3. Erzherzog Carl von Osterreich - Criste 4. Firepower - Maj Gen P.B. Hughes 5. Krieg 1809 - KuK Kriegsarchiv Back to Empire, Eagles, & Lions Table of Contents Vol. 1 No. 22 Back to EEL List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1978 by Jean Lochet This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com