Many books relate how some Portuguese troops entered French service after the successful Invasion of Portugal in 1808, by the combined forces of France and Spain. As a consequence of the conquest, the Portuguese army was disbanded. The French immediately started to recruit a Portuguese Legion from the disbanded troops. They were several battalions of infantry, cavalry and some artillery. A substantial contingent of Portugueses were part of Oudinot's corps at Wagram and fought very well. After the evacuation of Portugal by the French in 1808, the Portuguese Army was raised again with the help of England. It's rather puzzling to our 20th century minds to understand how some Portugueses could serve so well their enemies of yesterday? and to be complete still their enemies since in 1809 Portugal was at war with France and invaded by France .... The Portuguese population was not treated with kindness by the French and consequently the French were not treated with special kindness by the Portugueses. The military code of honor of the 18-19 centuries is full of mysteries and at least very complex.... One can understand Why some Portugueses may have join the French Army in 1808, but what about in 1810? That is the point. An additional force, of Portugueses was added to the ranks of the French army in September 1810. When Massena started the invasion of Portugal in 1810, several fortresses were held by Spanish and Portugueses troops from the newly raised Portuguese forces. Almeida was one of them and was garrisoned by an entirely Portuguese force of some 5000 men. They were regular and militia troops. The siege of Almeida started after the surrender of Ciudad Rodrigo, which took place on July 9, 1810. The French forces under Ney (Loison's division) started the investment of that fortress on July 24, 1810. The tedious siege work started at once. By August 26, eleven batteries were ready to start the pounding "work" against Almeida. The batteries were armed with 64 heavy guns, mortars and howitzers brought from Ciudad Rodrigo and Salamanca. The bombardment was started. and by the 27, the inhibitant were already in consternation and demanded that an end should be put to the ravages and destruction. A bomb had fallen during the night upon a powder magazine located in the city and caused a terrible explosion. Thiers in HISTOIRE DU CONSULAT ET DE L'EMPIRE, volume 3, pages 429 and 430, reports: "The troops of the garrison, like the defenders of Ciudad Rodrigo, indignant at the obstinate immobility of the English,(see footnote I) declared that they ought no longer to be sacrificed to the selfisness of an unfeeling ally, and spoke of surrendering." This took place on August 28, 1810. The surrender was helped by a conversation the Portugese General d'Alorna in French service, that Ney had with him, and the besieged Portugueses. ref. Thiers, vol.3 page 430. According to Thiers, more than 5000 prisoners were found in the fort. The French were perplex how to dispose of these prisoners composed of the Portuguese 24th line regiment and of militia.  Thiers reports that: "The English had endeavoured to persuade the Portuguese that the French were accustomed to kill all their prisoners." Massena thought that it would be an excellent way of refuting these reports to send back the militia, chiefly peasants, charging them to assure their countrymen that the same indulgence would be shown to all who made no resistance. To the 24th of the line, on the advise of the General d'Alorna, it was offered to enter the service of France after the same example of the other Portuguese troops already in the service of France. This was accepted by all, officers and men, some to desert shortly afterwards, but apparently many remained because of the resentment against the English. To date, I have never found a reference openly speaking about Portuguese resentment against the English. Thiers may exaggerate a bit, but does he really? It got to be an explanation for Portuguese joining the French army! Please note that I am not taking sides, but that I am just reporting here the "OTHER SIDE" point of view like I have done it in the past. I frankly don't know if Thiers is telling the all truth or part of it. It's always of interest to study and analyze each sides reports of a given event. Many of you remember my article on "WHAT HAPPENED AT JEMMAPES" in which I was reporting some conflicting reports of the cavalry encounter there. I still don't know for sure what really happened there either. One always wonder about the reliability of data Footnote I. The serious and non-emotional student of the Portuguese campaign of 1810, knows that Wellington had not enough troops on hand to resist successfully the fresh French invasion forces until they were considerably reduced by strategic consumption. One can not blame Wellington for retiring behind the lines of Torres Verdes and consequently beating Massena without a battle, just by stretching the French line of communications to the point that the French were almost completely isolated and practically starved. The result was achieved. In my humble opinion, very few generals of that period were capable to swallow their pride and withdraw without a battle. Apparently to Wellington only the end result was important. Perhaps it's a point that is often overlooked by many. Of course, at our level, some 160 years latter, it's easy to say so. But take just a minute the place of the poor Portuguese soldiers that were left behind in the fortresses just to slow down the French (such was the standard practice in military art) and it becomes easy to understand their (perhaps temporary) anti-English feelings when surrounded by the French. Nobody likes to be sacrificed. NOTE ON THE PORTUGUESE FORCES IN FRENCH SERVICE. According to Otto von Pivka, THE PORTUGUESE ARMY OF THE NAPOLEONIC WARS published by Osprey-Men-At-Arms series, in 1807, after the conquest of Portugal Napoleon dismissed half the Portuguese army. Only some 6000 to 8000 men were retained and formed in an army corps whose generals were Portuguese. They were sent to Grenoble (France) were a Portuguese Legion was formed by a decree of May 18, 1808. We should cover that subject in a future issue of this magazine.  I think the following is of interest since, once more, it gives the "other side" point of view. It is again from Thiers HISTOIRE DU CONSULAT ET DE L'EMPIRE, vol.3 page 424. It is an assessment on the value of the Portuguese soldiers. I just quote:(we are in 1810) "...But the English general(Wellington) had remarkably added to the extent of his forces by the organization of the Portuguese army, affected by General Beresford, to whom, in the first instace, had been given many English officers, considerable material and funds for their payment, which England contributed under the name of a subsidy to Portugal. The Portuguese soldiers, full of animosity towards the French, sober, active, brave, equipped, fed and drilled in the same manner as the English, were nearly equal to them when they fought in the same ranks, and were always of much greater value than the Spanish soldiers, not from any superiority in nature, but because they had enjoyed the advantage of more perfect discipline." It is quite an homage to British discipline and drill especially coming from a Frenchman like Thiers. Please note that Thiers wrote his book in 1883 during a period in which England and France were involved once more in their colonial expansion. That bring also an interesting point, it's the magnitude and importance of the financial help from England. The so-called "Cavalry of Saint George" for which even Murat was no match. Just think about it. Without financial help the campaign of Austria could not have taken in 1809. There is also very serious doubt that the campaign of Russia would have been possible. Prussia would have been unable to contribute such large contingents both in 1813 and in 1815 etc. Let us not forget here our subject: the Portuguese army. In French or Portuguese-English service the Portuguese were equally good. The Portuguese militia was of course below the line in training and military value but good enough to hold defensive positions such as Torres Verdes, or as garrison for fortresses etc. beside the second line duties usually reserved for such second line troops.  Back to Empire, Eagles, & Lions Table of Contents Vol. 1 No. 21 Back to EEL List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1978 by Jean Lochet This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com