I have found the article of Dick Ponsini (NJN # 18 page 37) on British skirmishers very interesting. Some of the comments are the logical explanation of many French battle reports saying essentially that they went through the first and sometimes the second British lines without much difficulties but were repulsed by the intact third line. What the French apparently did not realized is that they were only pushing back one or two "extended lines" of light infantry acting as a screen for the battle line which was consequently going in action absolutely intact with the results we all know. The situation is well described by Oman in WELLINGTON'S ARMY page 85: "So considerable was the British screen of light troops that the French not unfrequently mistook it for a front line, and speak of their column as piercing or thrusting back the first line of their opponents, when all they had done was to drive in a powerful and obstinate body of skirmishers bickering in front of the real fighting formation." Oman goes on with a footnote on the same page: "Note especially Vigo-Roussillon's account of Barrosa, where he speaks of his regiment having pierced the first British line, when all that it really did was to thrust back four companies of the 95th Rifles, and two of the 20th Portugese. Similarly Reynier's report on Bussaco says that Merle's division broke the front line of Picton, and only failed before his second. But the front line was only five light companies." I don't think that we should conclude that the British Light Infantry was not capable to fight as true skirmishers. Instead I prefer to say that the extended line was apparently the preferred order of battle for the British Light infantry. Many instances of detached British light infantry companies operating independently as skirmishers etc. In 1809 the rifles companies were detached from their battalion at the rate of one company per brigade, (ref. Wellington's Army page 83) by breaking up the Sth battalion of the 60th. The proportion of rifles and light infantry was latter increased by the addition of Portugese Cacadores, Brunswick Oels, etc. (same reference). In addition the rifles and some light companies were given some very specific detached companies duties like picking at French artillerists etc. Such actions are described in several books such as (1) THE UNIVERSAL SOLDIERS, (2) Weller's WELLINGTON IN THE PENINSULA, (3) WELLINGTON AT WATERLOO etc.. The same is true sometimes for the French sharpshooters in a skirmishing line. Such action is described in Weller's WELLINGTON AT WATERLOO, page 56. It is my old argument of allowing sharpshooters to pick up enemy artillerists under certain conditions etc. My idea is not to present a complete argument on the respective abilities of the skirmishers (British, French and others) but rather to define the different skirmisher formations and to come up with a definite solution for wargaming purposes. Formations Basically we can find two basic formations. They are the screening skirmisher formation and the non-screening skirmisher formation. The screening skirmisher formation is nothing more that the extended line described by Dick Ponsini. It was used by the British and the French when they desired to protect the line of battle for defense or attack purposes. The formation in order to provide an adequate screen had to be relatively dense. The Russian line Jaegers were always operating in that fashion to the best of my knowledge. The fire was sometimes delivered by volleys and some other troops were capable of individual aimed fire. Basically for wargame purpose the stands of screening skirmishers should not touch each others. Let us say at least 1/4 of an inch apart. But since they still must screen they should not be too far apart either, so let us pick the maximun as 1/2 an inch apart. The non-screening skirmishers formation is somewhat different. It is the relatively loose order, open formation in which every men is for himself and consequently takes cover behind all the available cover to deliver his fire as safely as possible. It is obvious that the target size offered by the skirmishers operating in that fashion is very small and that the volley fire (that is unaimed fire) is very ineffective against them. The French light infantry and the British rifles were pretty good in this kind of target practicing .... because it's what it was in certain instances. See Chandler's THE CAMPAIGNS ON NAPOLEON page 87 : "Some French sharpshooters, concealed by the bushes at the edge of the river ... kept up a very constant and annoying fire on the fine regiment of Kehl (3 battalions)...which were absurdly drawn up on the top of a dyke forming the great road on the left bank of the river, occasionally making discharges to drive away their invisible enemies. By stepping back six or eight yards, and lying down on the reverse bank of the dyke, not a shot from the enemy could have told; whereas a loss of nearly 150 men killed or wounded was the consequence of this stupid bravado; as if the honor of such regiment under such circumstances could be affected by the men being placed in a position of security. During the ensuing day the French had it much their own way." Some identical events took place in many other battles not only against the Austrians but also against the Prussians and the Russians. They are related by other reliable authoritative authors such as (1) Petre in THE CAMPAIGN OF PRUSSIA 1806, (2) Manceron in AUSTERLITZ, (3) Houssaye in IENA etc., just to name a few. One should not conclude that such type of very loose skirmishers formations and actions were within the capabilities of the light infantry of all nations. On the contrary very few appear to qualify. The Russian Jaegers, for instance, with perhaps the exception of the Russian Guard Jaegers, were not capable of such actions. Apparently, they were strictly limited to the extended line tactics, operating only at the battalion size level and incapable of independent company size actions. It is also questionable if the Russian Jaegers were capable of independent individual fire. I am not sure about the status of the Austrian skirmishers and light infantry. There is certainly a great deal of difference between the Freicorps, the Tyrolean Jaegers, the Jaegers and the Grenz. I am sure, that Ray Johnson will be able to help us on that matter. It is obviously too complex in this article to attempt to identify all the infantry units that could operate as non- screening skirmishers. At the present time we'll only attempt to publish a partial list subject to further discussion: (1) FRANCE all Guard and light regiments and voltigeurs of line regiments. (2) Russia Guard Jaegers only. (3) England Rifles and light infantry units(?) and Light infantry companies of line regiments. (4) Austria No data (5) Other countries Rifles and Jaegers(?) To resume, we have the following: (1) EXTENDED LINE OR SCREENING SKIRMISHERS Stands must operate within the following space limitation: MINIMUM: 1/4 of an inch MAXIMUM: 1/2 an inch (2) NON-SCREENING SKIRMISHERS Stands must operate with a spacing of at least 1/2 an inch. Note 1. Some units operating in extended line may be incable of individual aimed fire and may fire in volley only. Note 2. It is obvious that any unit operating with a space less than 1/4 of an inch will be treated is a line. The above is by the way nothing more than our rule 3.8 written in June 1976 but never enforced. It is my feeling that the application of this rule should eliminate most of the confusion on the tactical use of skirmishers in our wargames. Back to Empire, Eagles, & Lions Table of Contents Vol. 1 No. 18 Back to EEL List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1977 by Emperor's Headquarters This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com