EEL vol. 2 Number 7,8,9,10,11 contain extended descriptions of the battles, plus numerous maps and other illustrations not included in this lecture series. -- RL
Generalities on the Campaign of 1814
The 1814 Campaign of France shows Napoleon, in spite of some major mistakes, at his best and can be, classified has one of his finest, especially during the so-called "Six Days Campaign". [1] With raw and feeble effectiveness, Napoleon almost always outnumbered (except at Champaubert), came, at least twice, very close to repulsing the Allies. After the retreat from Leipzig, all the Emperor had left were about 80,000 exhausted disease-ridden survivors to defend the 300-mile length of France's eastern border. He began, once more, to rebuild his army. France was exhausted and during the short Campaign of 1814, the French army under Napoleon's direct command, i.e. facing directly the Allies' eastern invasion, never exceeded 120,000. That was not much to face some 250,000 Allies troops constantly and steadily reinforced during the course of the campaign.
The labels brigade, Division or Corps are among the most misleading terms that can be used to quantify the effective facing each others. Some formations numbering a few thousands are pompously called Corps. For instance at Champaubert, we find Olssufiev's corps with a strength of 5166 infantry and 24 guns, every regiment being 1 battalion strong.
The French fielded to the front line understrength units often brigaded together under the pompous name of Brigades, Divisions or even Corps. Some infantry formations numbering 1000 to 2000 men were often called Divisions, the most misleading formations were the cavalry in which a few disparate understrength squadrons were often called brigade or Division. Hence the related charge of a cavalry brigade may involve only 2 or 3 squadrons.... indeed a very confusing state of affairs!
In addition, the campaign was greatly handicapped by the dreadful condition of the roads
transformed in quagmire by the constant rain and troop movements.
On February 1st, 1814, the Allies severely defeated Napoleon's smaller army at La Rothiere [2] and the Emperor retreated to Troyes, That was a battle won over Napoleon on French soil! For the Allies, Napoleon's charm broken at Leipzig had not been reborn. The Prussians and the Russians, after La Rothiere, were overconfident. The careful Schwarzenberg was somewhat less exuberant. The Austrians congratulated Blucher by saying: "That victory crowns all the others" and Sacken finished his report with these words: "From that day on, Napoleon ceases to be a dangerous enemy."
Their morale boosted, the Allies thought they would easily reach Paris and the Czar told General Reymer coming back from captivity after an exchange "Will be in Paris before you."
On February 2, during a council held at Brienne, the Allies decided to march directly to Paris. They were to move on two parallel columns. The Army of Silesia would move toward Paris along the valley of the Marne and the Army of Bohemia would move to Troyes and then toward Paris by the both banks of the Seine.
Since both command operated independently, they were to be linked by Wittgenstein's Corps and Seslawin's Cossacks. However, the forward movements of both columns were carried without any
coordination and with too much enthusiasm by the over confident Prussians and Russians and much too slowly by the careful Austrians.
From the beginning of the operation things began to go wrong for the Allies. A series of small reverses afflicted the Army of Bohemia. Particularly worrisome was a reconnaissance in force by Mortier from Troyes on February 6 suggested other dangers on the Austrian southern flank. Consequently, Schwarzenberg began to edge south Wittgenstein and his accompanying Cossacks. By such a maneuver, the Austrian General had eliminated any linkage between Blucher and his command.
Blucher was not informed or ignored this development which meant that a widening gap was
developing between the two Allies armies. Always eager to move "Vorwarts", Blucher had started moving his large command immediately. The advance of his army different Corps was too fast as it became excessively strung out. Sacken's corps was pushing toward Chateau-Thierry, followed at two days march by the Corps of Kleist and Kapzewitsch.
During that time the over-careful Schwarzenberg, constantly stalling, moved very slowly to Troyes. After Mortier's reconnaissance on February 6, the Austrian general even gave his troops the order to withdraw to full speed toward Bar-sur-Aube. In fact that was very dangerous as it gave the time to Napoleon to rest, concentrate new reinforcements and reorganize his army.
The news of Schwarzenberg's retreat to Bar-sur-Aude, allowed Napoleon to begin switching troops immediately. In a few days, Napoleon had been able to concentrate 70,000 men in a central position. He was ready to strike.
Initially, Napoleon's plan was to hold Blucher (who he thought was heading for
Nogent-sur-Seine on the Seine River) while he was dealing with the Army of Bohemia. Consequently, on February 5, Marmont occupied Nogent-sur-Seine and prepared for defense. With the reinforcements on their way, Napoleon estimated that by February 6, Marmont's command would include some 21,000 infantry, 2400 cavalry and 46 guns concentrated in Nogent. A force sufficient, he felt, to hold Blucher while with his 40,000 men he would fall on Schwarzenberg.
Later that day, cavalry reconnaissance reports started to unfold a completely unexpected picture. Blucher was not heading for Nogent-sur-Seine but toward Chateau-Thierry, Meaux and Paris along the Marne river. It became evident that Blucher was engaged in a very risky lateral march in which his four corps were spaced out from each other by a day's march. Napoleon's fertile mind was quick to take advantage of the opportunity to defeat the enemy piecemeal.
[3]
As shown on MAP 1, there were three roads to Meaux by which Blucher could advance:
On February 7, the situation was still murky and Napoleon issued some orders to face the developing situation:
Note that Sezanne was central position and the Emperor would have some 30,000 men under
his direct control concentrated there and in a position to attack the Army of Silesia as he felt that Blucher would not be far from Sezanne.
Time was precious but Napoleon did not want to rush anything and mare some false maneuvers. He had calculated that BhIcher, Yorck and Sacken had between them some 45,000 troops. Macdonald retreating on the right bank of the Marne should be able to contain at least some 5000 of them. So, he was left to deal with 40,000 men which he expected to meet and destroy in detail. However, to be successful, he wanted to be absolutely certain that Blucher had irremediably compromised his command by spreading it in several parts.
The Events after February 7
On February 8, Macdonald reported that Yorck was near Epernay with some 18,000 men and
that there were no signs of a larger concentration of troops there. Consequently, if 18,000 men of Blucher's total of 45,000 were on the northern route, the rest--some 27,000--had to be south of the Marne River!
At 9 AM on the 9th, Marmont reported from Champaubert that General Sacken and at least
15,000 troops were at Montmirail some 15 miles to the West. It became evident that while Yorck
was chasing Macdonald up the Marne river toward Epemay, Blucher was taking the shortest route
to Paris through Montmirail and La Ferte-sous-Jouare. Thus, Sacken was the van of the Army of
Silesia followed by Olssufiev a days march behind. Blucher was further in the rear at Vertus,
waiting for Kleist and Kapzevitch. The Army of Silesia was clearly scattered in four main groups too far from each other for mutual support. That was the golden opportunity that Napoleon had been looking for.
The Emperor immediately left Nogent. It had been raining steadily for five days, transforming
into quagmires the roads from Nogent to Sezanne and also the ones by which Blucher was travel-
ing from Vertus to Montmirail.
The poor condition of the roads and the resulting mud were going to be a formidable obstacle
for the French. The road from Nogent to Champaubert was considered impassable by large formations at that time of the year. Yet the army had to go through. The troops had great difficulties advancing. The artillery was almost immobilized and was only able to move forward with the help of the horses and of the enthusiastic population around Barbonne to pull through their guns and caissons through.
Marmont reported that Sacken had left Champaubert at 8:30 that morning heading toward
Montmirail. On the night of 9th, the Emperor arrived at Sezanne where he found Marmont. Marmont declared that it was impossible to advance further by such bad roads. Napoleon angrily ordered the advance to go on at any price. He had expected the latter to be in a much more advanced position and be in control of the bridge and defile at St. Prix, the only point on which his army could cross the Petit-Morin river and come out of the Saint-Gond marshes to attack the enemy. The defile and the bridge at St.Prix were the key position. From there, Napoleon had expected to unleash his troops by Baye on Champaubert.
Effectively, the next day, on the 10th, at 9am Napoleon was with an anxious Marmont in
front of the defile of St. Prix. An enemy battery and two battalions would have been sufficient to hold the bridge and ruin Napoleon plan.
Fortunately, the bridge at St. Prix was intact and the opposite slope unoccupied. By 10am,
French cavalry elements were probing the Allied positions at Champaubert, driving in Olssufiev's pickets. [4]
That unfortunate general, recognizing his fault of not occupying St. Prix, immediately sent
a few battalions toward that village. It was too late. Marmont's soldiers had already passed the defile and pushed back these weak battalions some 500 yards from Baye.
The Russians deployed 500 yards ahead of Baye. Marmont's troops pushed back the Russians
and Olssufiev tried to rally his troops in Baye, he could not hold that village. He redeployed his rallied troops on a line extending from the Andrecy farm to the Bannay wood. On that new position supported by his 24 guns the Russians were able to repulse several French attacks unsupported by artillery.
Soon Napoleon and Ney appeared with the numerous Guard artillery and 2000 horses that had
been sent by Napoleon through Fromentieres suddenly appeared on the Russians' rear and right.
The French infantry resumed its attacks. The Russians forced to go into squares because of the
cavalry threat slowly withdrew toward Champaubert keeping the French cavalry at bay by their
regular fire. Furious combats took place and Champaubert changed hands several tines. That combat was a bloody one with unusual bayonet fighting. The Russians finally were kicked out of Champaubert and separated into two groups.
By 3pm, the situation was desperate and the Russian general, ordered a retreat toward Etoges. But the direct route toward Etoges being off by the French infantry and cavalry forced the Russians, pushed back from position to position behind Champaubert toward the village of La Caure. They were repeatedly charged by cavalry, cut off in two, routed and several thousands Russians were scattered. That was the end of organized combats. 3000 Russians had been killed or taken, and 1500 more were taken prisoners by the peasants. By nightfall, Olssufiev was captured along with another general as well as most of the survivors, his artillery and some 200 wagons. A bare 1000 men of his command managed to escape. For all practical purposes Olssufev's command had ceased to exist. The French losses were very light, about 200 casualties.
It was a promising beginning. Champaubert is the only battle of that campaign in which
the French enjoyed superiority of forces.
The Events After the Battle of Champaubert
Late on the 10th, after leammg about Olsaufiev's defeat, Blucher sent orders to Yorck who had
pushed Macdonald as far back as Trilport, to return eastward to make his junction with Sacken
near Montmirail by crossing the Marne at Chateau-Thierry and then, taking the road to Montmirail. Sacken who had reached La Ferte-sous-Jouarre also received orders to return eastward to make his junction with Yorck.
Yorck suggested to Sacken to move toward Chateau-Thierry in order to meet his columns halfvvay. However, the over optimistic Sacken refused to believe that Napoleon in person
was at Montmirail and ignored Yorck's suggestion. Hence, strictly following his orders, he moved directly toward Montmirail.
The victory of Champaubert had placed Napoleon in a perfect central position in the midst of
Blucher widely separated army. Napoleon's priority was clear. He simply had to defeat Sacken
first.
Montmirail was the crossroad of the highway from Chalons to Meaux with the roads to
Sezanne and Chateau-Thierry. It had to be the rallying point for Yorck and Sacken. Marmont with
only part of his corps (4000 men) was sent eastward to observe Blucher. The rest of the army
moved toward Montmirail. Then, Macdonald was ordered to resume the offensive along the north
bank of the Marne and to recapture the bridge at Chateau-Thierry to deny the enemy the use of its bridge over the Marne.
Nansouty and Colbert's cavalry reached Montmirail at around midnight. They surprised Karpov's Cossacks in their sleep and threw them out of town.
On February 11, at 11.00 AM, Napoleon headed for the Marchais plateau and halted at the
Dogeatefie, farm on the road to La Ferte-sous-Jouaffe. From the cavalry reports it became evident that both the Russian corps of Sacken and York 'a Prussian Corps were converging on Montmirail. Sarken had to be attacked first and disposed of before the arrival of Yorck.
The overconfident Sacken discounted his Cossacks' reports mentioning that Napoleon in person
was at Montmirail with the Imperial Guard as nonsense. His Russian command included 15,700
men and 90 guns. [5]
The Russian general was anxious to reach Montmirail where he expected to find Blucher. Sacken's vanguard by 10AM, had reached the village of Viels-Malsons, 6 miles west
of Montmirail and came in contact with the French vanguard. It was clear that the French had
beaten him to that city.
When Sacken arrived on the would-be battlefield, he saw the French before him and deployed
his forces to attack them. At that time Napoleon had only with him the Nansouty and Colbert's
cavalry, the Guard and Ricard's conscripts, a total of about 10,000 with 36 guns.
[6]
He was at a considerable disadvantage. He deployed some of his cavalry in the plain on his right, [7] Ricard in and behind Marchals, Ney with part of the Guard infantry was behind Ricard. Finally the Old Guard occupied the center on the road to Vieils-Maisons.
Sacken, apparently discounting the magnitude of opposition he was to meet, made no effort to
get closer to the Chateau-Thierry road along which he could expect to make his junction with
Yorck. Sacken's plan was to reach Montmirail by the valley of the Petit-Morin via Pomesson while he expected to hold the French in the plain. Hence, he dispatched a large force south of that main road toward the village of Marchais where he encountered stiff opposition, and another one further south by the road following the swampy valley of the Petit-Morin to Montmirail via Pomesson.
Napoleon understood Sacken's plan and fought a defensive battle with limited counter-attacks
until 2pm when Mortier finally appeared on the battlefield, increasing the French strength to
20,000. Assured of a reserve, Napoleon redeployed his troops, positioned some troops north and was ready to strike the Russians along the road to La Ferte-sous-Jouarre. Repeated combined attacks of the Guard infantry and cavalry broke though the Russians defenses and Sacken, badly beaten forced to retreat toward Chateau-Thierry. Yorck's command because of terrible road condition was slow to arrive and was easily repulsed by Mortier. York had advanced with great
caution with only part of his Corps. [8]
Montmirail-Marchais was won by superior tactics skill, superior training, and discipline and
Sacken was soundly trashed. His Russians were badly shaken and suffered some 4,000 casualties
(a little less than 25% of their effective). The French loss were about 2,000. The Guard had performed miracles.
The Battle of Chateau-Thierry was the continuation of that of Montmirail-Marchais against the
retreating Sacken's Russians and the Prussians of Yorck. During the night of the I Ith, during their retreat, the Russians managed to save most of their artillery through the quagmires of the secondary roads by astounding actions.
Napoleon and Ney had set out to pursue the discomfited Allies. Yorck's rear guard attempted a stand at Chateau-Thierry, but soon Ney blasted his way through their position defeating the cavalry on the left and captured the hills overlooking the Marne. This complicated the Allies retreat.
Fortunately, for them, Macdonald had not captured the bridge over the Marne at Chateau-Thierry as ordered. [9] Hence, in spite of great difficulties, most of the allies infantry protected by artillery was able to cross over the Marne. However, 2 Russians regiments were forced to surrender. The Allies destroyed part of the bridge.
It was another victory. At the cost of 600 men, Napoleon had inflicted an additional 1,500
casualties to the Russians and 1,250 on the Prussians capturing 9 guns and much baggage and
transport.
The Emperor spent the night at Chateau-Thierry while the bridge was being repaired. In the
morning as the bridge was again serviceable, Mortier pursued the retreating Allies with part of the Old Guard and Colbert's cavalry.
After his victory, Napoleon intended to finish the Army of Silesia by pursuing Blucher, if necessary, to Chalons. However, on February 12, even before the end of the Battle of Chateau-Thierry, he had received news that his affairs were not doing that well in the south. Schwarzenberg had launched an offensive on the 11th and had succeeded in driving Victor back over the Seine.
Blucher had received news of Schwarzenberg's success on the Seine at about the same time
Napoleon did. He decided to westward march with the Corps of Kleists and Kapzewitsch.
[10]
On the 12th, Blucher's army was at Bergeres, and on the 13th had reached Champaubert pushing with ease Marmont's small corps. He continued his advance toward Vauchamps. Marmont's retreat had been so well conducted that it gave Napoleon time to react. On the night of the 13-14 February, the Guard and Grouchy's cavalry proceeded to Montmirail and early on the
14th Marmont was informed the Emperor was coming to his rescue.
Marmont was ordered to attack Blucher as soon as he would come out of Vauchanips. Marmont skillfully drew Blucher to attack on the morning of the l4th to the west of Vauchamps. Suddenly, to his great surprise, Blucher saw Marmont's weak force that he had been pushing back,
stop and counterattack vigorously. At the height of the engagement, Grouchy's cavalry crashed
into the Prussian right flank. The surprised Prussian vanguard fell back in disorder into
Vauchamps and came out in the same condition. Blucher called his reserve and prepared to counterattack Marmont's weak corps. However, he recognized the Guard cavalry among the numerous
cavalry deployed in front of him. He realized that troubles were ahead.
At about 9 AM, the cheers of the troops announced the arrival of Napoleon with the Guard
formed in columns of attack behing the artillery deployed in front.
[11] The Guard stormed Ziethen's vanguard and then attacked Kleist and Kapzevitsch. Ziethen was badly handled on the spot but Blucher succeeded in extricating the rest of his men and commenced his retreat. Unfortunately he had not enough cavalry to cover his retreat, so, he formed his infantry into squares and placed artillery between those squares. His wings were covered by 5 cavalry regiments.
During two hours, his troops formed in squares on both sides of the highway to Chalons, in
echiquier, withdrew in good order, calmly enduring the fire of Drouot's artillery and the repeated charges of the Guard cavalry. All was not over yet. The Prussian right was menaced by Grouchy and his 3500 horses and the left by the cavalry of the Guard. Grouchy found a road running parallel to the Prussian line of retreat and managed to get ahead of the hard pressed Allied squares. The Prussians appeared hopelessly trapped. However, the Prussians were saved by the mud as Grouchy charges could not get momentum. In addition, the mud prevented his horse artillery to join him in time to support his charges. Nevertheless, his 3500 cavalrymen broke some squares and threw the Prussian masses in confusion. [12]
BlUcher hardly pressed *in the ftont by the French infantry and outflanked on his right by
Grouchy and on his left by the cavalry of the Guard tried to keep his harassed command to withdraw in order. [13] He was successful in doing so as far as Janvilliers.
But, behind that village, charged on his left flank by Grouchy and on the right by the cavalry of the Guard, he lost 4 guns and 3000 men. In spite of the loss, full of fight, he managed to rally his forces. He still presented a determined front until Drouot, galloping at the head of 50 guns, crushes him with canister at half-range. Fortunately for the Allies, night was falling. During two hours, the Prussians were pursued as far as Champaubert and pounded by artillery littering the field and the highway with dead and wounded.
As night was falling, Blucher tried to organize a defense there. Once more Grouchy's and the
Guard cavalry fell on the Prussian flanks. Both charges broke through and met in Champaubert,
which had been recaptured. Confusion was everywhere but the night prevented further charges.
According to de Segur, the night was hiding the extent of the success. In the midst of the confusion, Blucher, Prince August of Prussia, Generals Kleist and Kapzawitsch were several times on the verge of being captured, killed or wounded but manged to escape. A brave offensive return by Ziethen and his artillery amidst of that confusion ended the combats.
Blucher realized that finally the French grip was easing and continued his retreat as far as Etoges some 10 miles from Champaubert, where, regaining some control over his troops and he placed there Urusov and his Division. Marmont, had been ordered to pursue and managed to attack the Russians in Etoges where he captured 7 guns, 800 men and their General, Prince Urusov. The rest of that Russian Division melted away. Blucher continued his retreat toward Chalons. The time was 7pm.
Koch says that for a loss of 600 men, the French army took 15 guns, 10 flags, and 2,000 Prussians prisoners, and inflicted 3,500 casualties on the Prussians and around 3,500 on the Russians. [14]
Vauchamps: The Aftermath
Blucher was able to rally his troops and withdrew under the cover of a weak Division at
Etoges. The shattered debris of the Army of Silesia continued its retreat to Chalons that night, littering the road with its dead and wounded, plus a multitude of broken and abandoned vehicles. The Army of Silesia reunited itself on the 16th, weakened by a loss of 18,000 to 20,000 men over this week.
During the space of six short days Napoleon had successively pounded the five corps of the
Army of Silesia that had been marching so confident of victory only a week earlier.
Though a tremendous victory for Napoleon. However, "The Six Days Campaign" was far leas than it could have been. If Macdonald had pursued Sacken more aggressively and had arrived at the bridge at Chiteau-Thierry before Sacken, it would have been the complete destruction of Sacken's and York's Corps. In addition if Blucher's retreat at Vauchamps had been slower and conducted with less skill, the French infantry would have been able to enter the fray. There is little doubt of what should have been the fate Blucher's command. Certainly this string of victories would have been greatly enhanced by the total annihilation of one or more of Blucher's six infantry Corps. No doubt this would have changed the complexion of the campaign and might have been sufficient to force peace negotiations.
Napoleon's intention was to pursue Blucher to Chalons and finish hin up and from them, via
Vitry-le-Francois to fall the rear of the Army of Bohemia. However, the last dispatches he had received informed him that the Austro-Russians of the Army of Bohemia had accentuated their offensive and pushed back Victor and Oudinot even further. Their vanguards had reached Provins,
Nangis, Montereau. and Fontainebleau. Paris was threatened.
What Napoleon did not know is that the news of Blucher defeats had disturbed the Allies high command. The Allies, once more become very hesitant. One can imagine what would have happened if Blucher had been captured at Vaucharaps. The invasion of France might have ended there.
However, Napoleon could only make a decision from what he knew! He did not know was that
the Allies forward march was interrupted. These forces received the orders from the alarmed
Schwartzenberg to remain on their position and await the development of the Napoleon's maneuvers.
Anyway, the Emperor had developed a new plan. To cover Paris, he had to abandon the pursuit
of Blucher. (He ordered Marmont to continue the pursuit of Blucher). On that evening the all
Guard minus Mortier's detachment slept at Montmirail and the next day moved to Meaux.
[1] The "Six Days Campaign" are the 4 victories of Champaubert, Montmirail-Marchais, Chateau-Thierry and Vauchamps that took place between February 12 and 14 and covered extensively by this author in Empires, Eagles and Lions, Vol. 2, issues 10, 11 and 13.
This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web.Particularities about the Campaign of 1814
The Set Up of the Stage
Napoleon's Reaction and the Events from the French Side after February 2, 1814
(1) the highway from Chalons through Epernay and Chateau-Thierry was the most northern was the most unlikely;
(2) the most direct road was from Chalons through Vertuis, Champaubert and Montmirail.
(3) from Chalons to Sommesous and Sezanne.(1) Marshall Victor, with Marshall Cudiot on a second line, was to hold the lie of the Semie
and especially Nogent-sur-Seine in bare of an eventual attack by the Army of Bohemia.
(2) Marmont with his 8000 men was to move to Sezanne to clarify the situation there.
(3) The Guard and Grouchy were to follow the Marmont to Sezanne.The Battle of Champaubert (February 10, 1814)
The Battle of Montmirail-Marchais
The Battle of Chateau-Thierry (February 12, 1814)
The Battle of Vauchamps (February 14, 1814)
Footnotes
[2] 2 At La Rothiere, the French were outnumbered 3 to 1.
[3] Napoleon state of mind is well reflected by a quotation from Fain (Fain quoted by Houssaye 1814, p. 87).
[4] The Russian general had only 12 understrength regiments (all reduced to 1 battalion) and 24 guns (5000 men) at his disposal and no cavalry.
[5] Sacken's conunand included the 11th corps under General von Lieven III consisting of the 10th and 27th Division plus 1 brigade of the 16th Division. The second infantry Corps was the 6th Corps under General-lieutenant Tallisin II, consisting of the 7th and 18th Division. The cavalry Corps under Generallieutenant Vassilshikov, consisted of the 2nd
Hussar Division (General Major Lanskoi) and of the 3rd Dragoon Division (General Major Pantschichscheff) . His assigned Reserve Artillery under General Major Nikitin conssited of 3 12-pdr batteries and 4 6-pdr batteries. The Prussians engaged in the battle numbered about 5000.
[6] The Guard included 5000 infantry and 4500 cavalry and 24 guns, while 'Ricard's command consisted of 1800 conscripts and 12 guns.
[7] That cavalry was DeFrance's 7 squadrons of Guards of Honor.
[8] Yorck, from Viffor, had sent the 8th brigade under Prince Whilhem and all his 12-pdrs to Chateau-Thierry to prevent Macdonald from capturing
its important bridge over the Marne to secure a line of retreat. Then, he resumed his advance toward Fontenelle which was held by his vanguard with Pirch's and Horn's brigades.
[9] Napoleon judgment pronounced at St. Helena was not very flattering to Macdonald. He conceded his courage and loyalty but thought him slow and even lazy, able enough with a small force up to 20,000 men and under supervision, but no more than that.
[10] His command consisted of Kleist's Corps (less Klux's brigade), 13,500 men, Olssufiev's survivors, 1,500 men and Kapzewitsch's Corps, 6,500, plus about 2,000 cavalry.
[11] The Guard consisted of 4 Old Guard battalions, the cavalry of Laferriere and Guyot as well as of Drouot artillery. Curial's Division was to be picked up on the way.
[12] The French cavalry broke several squares. The 1/2/Fusilier/1st infantry regiment and the 1/2/10th Reserve Infantry regimnent were
destroyed in this action. Von Damitz, Vol. II, p. 167.
[13] Blucher was further handicaped by the reports of his scouting parties that a large force of French infantry marching from Sezanne to Montmirail. He immediately switched 2 cavalry regiments on his left to face that new threat. It was Leval's 7th Division, 13 battalions, 2 foot batteries and 1 horse battery of the VII Corps. These were veterans from Spain Oudinot had detached Leval but they were too far from Vauchamps to take part in the combats.
[14] Koch, Vol. I, p. 264.
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