"Famine makes greater havoc in an army than the enemy, and it is more terrible than the sword." --Vegetius, III 3 The object of war is to defeat the enemy by destroying, or at least, depleting sufficiently his armies to force him to sue for peace. A very interesting work by Archer Jones, Elements of Military Strategy, (Praeger Publ. 1996) p. XIV, outlines the four possible combinations of strategic means of depletion: 1. combat + persisting 2. combat+ raiding 3. logistic + persisting and 4. logistic + raiding That remarkable work also points out: "The strategy of any military operation is almost certain to fall into one of the four possible combinations; the use of one combination does not preclude the simultaneous of others." Archer Jones, p. XV, also makes another very pertinent statement directly concerning our study of the causes of Napoleon's defeat in Russia in 1812 and part of it applies more specifically to the fulgurant Campaigns of 1805 and 1806: "These concepts underlay the operational strategy of the deployment of the deployment and use of armed forces on land and sea and in the air. They had as their basic assumption that concentrating against weakness on the offensive and against strength in the defensive were essential to success and were the means of winning with the least effort." Napoleon was certainly an adept of the first combination which he applied very successfully in the strategy of most of his early European campaigns. (Some historians have more than suggested that Napoleon's successes were mostly due to the fact that he was opposed to mediocre generals. It is somewhat untrue. His initial success were due to his ability to field, and command larger armies than his opponents could by the generalization of the army Corps system. By 1809 his continental opponents had caught up with this new style of warfare and applied to their own armies.) Victory was achieved with little effort in 1805 and 1806. However, the Campaigns of 1807, 1812 and 1813 imposed a strategy that involved to a certain extent all the four combinations. But that was not a choice the Emperor had made, it was imposed to him by circumstances and in these campaigns, he had expected to only apply the first combination. Archer Jones continues: "The aim of winning with the least effort also guided the choice among also guided the choice among the four comprehensive strategies. For example, the Roman political and military leader, Julius Caesar, distinguished between combat and logistic strategies, and labeled them as winning by hunger rather than by steel, he drew the conclusion from his experience in finding his enemy more vulnerable to a logistic than to a combat strategy. Like Caesar, many other great commanders used least effort as their principal guide in making strategic military decisions." (The Roman involvement in war was based on a very conservative economy of forces to conserve the precious legions, moving them quickly when necessary through the strategic Roman roads, and was based on a very elaborate logistic system. An excellent study on the Roman army and its logistics can be found in chapter II of John Peddie's Invasion the Roman Conquest of Britain published by St. Martin Press, New York, 1987.) That last statement is most inspiring to find an answer to our inquiry on the causes for Napoleon's defeat in Russia! Napoleon intended to defeat the Russians in the first 20 days of the invasion but, after he defeated them, to pursue them, but not beyond Smolensk. Hence Napoleon's strategy to invade Russia, although it gave great importance to logistic, was primarily based on the first combination: "combat + persisting". Little doubt that Napoleon's choice, at least in his mind, was to defeat the Russians by the path of least effort and that he expect to trap and force the Czar's armies to battles through his superior maneuvering. The Russians on the other hand made a different choice. They decided to fight by principles (3) and (4): logistic + persisting and logistic + raiding. The Invasion of Russia In 1812, Napoleon, was to invade Russia with an army of over 600,000. That was in itself a major command problem since he previously never commanded in the field a army far above 200,000. His Grande Armee was to be about three times that size. Of course, all of the 600,000 could not be front line troops as it was essential to protect the lines of communications as well as the army flanks. But the front line troops were to operate over a vast theater, much too large to allow a direct central command as it had been the case in the previous campaigns. Consequently, the Grande Armee was subdivided in army groups. The Grande Armee was to operate from initial bases located over 1000 miles (1700 kilometers) from Mainz, the main border depot of the Empire. The immensity of the country to be invaded and occupied required effective vastly superior to that of the previous campaigns. To support his front army of half a million men he had calculated that he needed further large formations to the rear in the order of an additional 200,000 men. The preparations for the invasion of Russia began in 1811 and a all the available resources of the Empire were channeled to that project. (In April 1811, 1,000,000 rations had been stored in Kustrin and Stettin. In January 1812, sufficient supplies to sustain 400,000 men and 50,000 horses had been accumulated in Danzig.) The lack of resources of part of the country to be invaded required the creations of depots and transportation of all kinds of supplies such as ammunitions, equipment, clothing and food. With his usual attention to detail, Napoleon had devoted considerable time to the preparation of the invasion of Russia. He did not wholly underestimate the problems his army was about to face. However, he certainly miscalculated the scale of the difficulties he was to encountered. To provide an adequate supply system in a country that could not even support a fifth of his army, he had to revert to the supply train system. Napoleon's supply system in Russia, like that of any other continental nations at the time, depended on wagon trains pulled by horses. It was a very slow system, but the only one available at the time. In 1811, Napoleon began to greatly expand his military train and by June 1812, he had organized a supply train system to follow his Grande Arme, in addition to the 4 days carried by the soldiers, with 20 additional days of supplies. (The 24 days of supplies would have been sufficient to support the limited operations that the Emperor had expected.) No less than 26 transport battalions had been organized. (18 of these battalion consisted of 600 heavy wagons drawn by 6 horses and capable of transporting about 6,500 pounds (about 2,900 kg.) each.) The Grande Armee went into Russia with 16 of these battalions plus a bataillon d'ambulance. These were quickly found much too heavy for the Russian roads and much too slow to follow Napoleon's fast advancing central army. (In June an additional 6 companies of 100 light carts each were formed in Poland to increase Oudinot's Corps transportation. All the other Corps were in the same predicament and also needed increased transportation and most of them formed auxiliary transportation companies with captured Russian wagons and cart, drawn by though little Russian horses. The heavier wagons battalions were relegated to the carrying of supplies between the depots of Danzig and Konigsberg to Vilna and Smolensk. The more lightly equipped battalions forwarded supplies from Smolensk. Most of these battalions were lost during the retreat and about 5,700 of the approximately 7,000 hands became casualties.) The results was that army, right from the beginning, could not be provided with rations once their 4 days supply was exhausted. The northern road chosen by Napoleon to invade Russia, i.e. via the Duchy of Warsaw, then through the ex-Kingdom of Poland-Lithuania via Vilna, had the advantage of passing through friendly territories (The territory was predominantly populated with Poles and Lithuanians, which not too long ago was the kingdom of Poland-Lithuania, which had extended on the east up to Orza. Those people were pro-Napoleon and would have cooperated to supply his needs if he stopped, as planned, at Smolensk. The Lithuanians raised 5 infantry and 4 cavalry regiments.) and to provide a base of operation to either move againist St. Petersbourg or Moscow. However, it also had the significant disadvantage to go through a poor country shy of resources. Then, beyond Smolensk and toward Moscow, the country became frankly hostile (The Russian population in the provinces cast of Smolensk had been stirred by the Orthodox church against the French who were presented as heretics sent by Satan to destroy their religion. They were to engage in guerrilla actions against the Grande Armee.) but much richer and fully capable of sustaining the needs of the French army. (Napoleon was well aware of that fact and certainly played a significant role in deciding to push the army beyond Smolensk.) Most likely, if Napoleon had decided to spend the winter in Smolensk, as originally planned, (Caulincourt, p.75.) he would have been able to establish a supply base for the next spring campaign. Initially, the huge mass of the Grande Armee was organized in three lines. The first line, the spearhead of the invasion, included three armies with the bulk of his fbrces: 449,000 soldiers. Napoleon planned to engage the Russian army quickly and destroy it, close to the border. Then, the defeated Russians were not to be pursue beyond Smolensk. The main, central army, under the Emperor's direct command, had an effective over 180,000 and consisted mostly of French soldiers. That main army consisted of. 2 Cavalry Corps, I and II Reserve Cavalry Corps, under Murat (22,513), Imperial Guard (47,283), Davout's I Corps (72,051), Ney's III Corps (39,342) and the Grand General Staff which, in addition to the staff including the officers, orderlies and escort to the staff, numbered no less than 3,983. The two other armies, or army groups, and two additional semi-autonomous Corps, were to be used to protect the flanks and rear of the main central army and for mounting secondary operations. The left flank was protected by Eugene's IV Corps and III Reserve Cavalry Corps, while Poniatowski with his V Corps (36311) and IV Reserve Cavalry (7964) operated on the right. Oudinot's II Corps (37,139) also operated on the right. What was the state of organization and training of the Grande Armee in 1812? Unger, in Histoire critique des exploits et vissitudes de la cavalerie, Vol.2, p. 122, makes some comments on the Grande Armee at the beginning of the Campaign of Russia: "The cavalry was, as a general rule, good and well trained; the same could be said about the dragoons, French cuirassiers, and about most of the German and Polish cavalry regiments; the rest of the cavalry (the French Light Cavalry) had a great number of young recruits and young horses. There were some regiments with cadres arriving directly from Spam and which had been completed and mounted while on their way to the Niemen and which had been constantly moving since six months. (This is the case of the Italian IV Corps under Eugene de Beauharnais.) These troops could not even have been able to bare the strain of an ordinary campaign; hence it was almost certain that they would soon be ruined. And, as a matter of facts, most of these troops did not even reach Moscow and had not survived when stroke the real catastrophe stroke in which the rest of their brothers in arms disappeared." The young and the poorly trained horses were to be the prime victims of the poor diet, of wet and green rye. The cavalry was distributed among the different corps. In round numbers, the Grande Armee entered Russia with no less than 250,000 horses, which included 30,000 horses for the artillery, 80,000 for the cavalry and the remaining affected to the 25,000 vehicles such a supply wagons, ammunition caissons, ambulances and all other forms of transportation. (The following approximate figures give an idea on the number of horses part of Napoleon main army which were approximately as it follows): Unit Cavalry Artillery Divisions Total Imperial Headquarters ? ? ? 1150 Imperial Guard 7000(6279) ? 9000* 16000 I Corps 3800(3424) 2300 5500 11600 III Corps 4000(3587) 2800 2100 8900 IV Corps 3800(3368) 2500 4200 10500 V Corps 4200(4152) 2600 2300 9100 VIII Corps 2000 (2050) 1500 800 4300 I Reserve Cavalry Corps 13270(12077) 530 - 13800 II Reserve Cav. Corps 10070(10436) 530 - 10600 III Reserve Cav. Corps 10470 (9676) 530 - 11000 IV Reserve Cav. Corps 8500 (7964) 530 - 8500 Grand Parc Artillery - 4800 - 4800 Grand Parc Genie - - - 800 Equipage militaires - - - 9300 Total 67110 18620 23900 120350 *That figure includes the Guard artillery draft horses. These figures are approximate and are from Labaume, pp. 449 to 453. The loss of these draft horses was going to be, with that of the cavalry, the most significant losses of the Campaign of Russia, as these majority of these horses could not be replaced. The supplying forage for 250,000 horses (That figure included the 80,000 horses of the cavalry, 30,000 of the artillery and the rest were draught horses of some 25,000 vehicles such as supply wagons, ammunition caissons, ambulances and other vehicles.) was completely beyond the capabilities of any supply system of the period. The problem of feeding so many animals was to be very critical and it is not surprising that Napoleon delayed the *invasion of Russia until the Russian plains would be holding an abundant crop of grass. But horses are delicate animals and do not accommodate well to change in food, weather and water. The diet of wet grass and wet green rye in the beginning of the campaign did not agree with many of them. It resulted that in the first week of the campaign some 10,000 horses had already died. Labaume gives us an idea of what took place around Vilna: (Labaume, Eugene, Chef d'escadron, Relation circonstanciee de la campagne de Russie en 1812, Paris, 1815, p. 52.) He was an officer of the IV Corps): Our stay in Pilony, during rainy time was terrible.... In that awful village, even the Vice Roi (Eugene, JAL) was without quarters. We were packed in poor shed... food was scarce; the rain falling heavily overwhelmed men and horses that had no shelters; the first one held up but the abysmal state of the road finished the horses. Around our bivouacs, we could see them falling by the hundreds; finally on the roads, one could only see dead horses, disabled wagon .... From the beginning, the weather did not cooperate with Napoleon. It was at first very hot, but on June 29, a one day deluge flooded the roads turning them into a sea of mud. The supply wagons and the artillery became stuck in the muddy roads and could not follow the troops. The supply system broke down and rations could not be issued on a regular basis. The troops broke down into aggressive and unorganized foraging groups which alienated the Lithuanians and later on the Russians. (The discipline or lack of it was to become a very serious problem. The Grande Armee had been fleshed up by the massive incorporation of recruits and the veterans were diluted by such an influx. The recruits lacked the discipline and basic knowledge to sustain themselves by foraging. The allied contingent were even less adept in foraging and, unlike the French soldiers, most of them did not share the food they found with their units. It resulted that the troops remaining in formation went hungry in too many instances. As soon as rations were not moved on a regular basis, the discipline broke down and the control over the troops decreased significantly.) Murat was riding hell for leather toward Vilna at the head of 22,000 horsemen When the French army reached Vilna on July 3, no rations could be issued. The Russians had burned all the stores and the supply train---because of the roads condition--had been unable to follow the advance. Already the discipline started to suffer and there was some pillaging. The inhabitants complained. The advance resumed and the supplies continued to be scarce as the Russians systematically burned or destroyed their depots and other food supplies to prevent them from falling into French hands. After a month of advance, the campaign appeared to everyone on a much different aspect than the previous campaigns. Clearly, as it had been ompossible to pin down the Russians and force them to give battle, the campaign would not be over in a month as Napoleon had expected. So far, in spite of the hard fought--but inconclusive--encounter at Ostrovno, only rear-guard actions had taken place. Beside an enemy so far invisible to the mass of the army, immense fatigue, unexpected torrential rains, the very cold nights after the crossing of the Niemen, the abysmal muddy roads, the unexpected difficulties, the heat, the dust, the thirst quickly succeeding to the mud for the horses as well as the men, caused the horses of the train and of the convoys to die by the hundreds. (More than 20,000 horses had already been lost by the time Napoleon had reached Vilna.) As the supply were not following the advance, the regiments were forced to send every day foraging detachments further and further away. Many men were leaving the ranks for the same purpose and the bad soldiers took that opportunity to desert. Many of the stragglers of good will or not, were incapable to rejoin their units, such was the picture the mass of the Grande Armee had of the campaign! Obviously that was not the optimum way to increase morale. In fact the campaign of July represented a strategic defeat of the first order. (Duffy, p. 60.) After a month of campaigning, the Grande Arme had advanced only 190 miles (300 kilometers), as the crow flies, from the Niemen. That was less than half the distance to Moscow and the effective had been reduced by strategic consumption to a degree unknown until then. The battle casualties had been less than 10,000 but over 100,000 men had already disappeared from the ranks! So did many horses. The main reasons were the immense fatigue caused by the terribly hostile weather conditions and the style of Napoleon's warfare resulting in continuous march without sufficient rest, which compounded with insufficient food, caused additional hardship and increased losses. Many young, unseasoned soldiers fell on the side and just died of exhaustion. Caulincourt in his memoirs With Napoleon in Russia, p. 634 gives us his point of view on the state of the Grande Armee's cavalry around Witebsk, i.e. after a month of campaigning, on July 29, much before it reached Smolensk on August : "At least he (Napoleon) decided to give the army a much needed rest. Part of the cavalry was already worn out, the artillery and infantry were exhausted, the roads were covered with stragglers who destroyed and wasted everything. It was essential to organize our rear... Eventually (July 29) he resigned himself to the necessity of returning to Witepsk. As I have said, our cavalry had suffered severely. A very large number of horses had died. Many were lagging behind, wasting away, wandering at the rear; others followed their corps, to whom they were but a useless embarrassment. Murat, the King of Naples was better able to appreciate these troubles than anyone, and he told the rest of us when he chatted with us. He even ventured to make some remarks to this effect to the Emperor, but His Majesty did not care for reflections that run contrary to his projects, and lent a deaf ear. (That is a trend in Napoleon's behavior that increased with time. Perhaps the worse example was prior the Battle of Ligny, in 1815, when Napoleon refused to accept that he was facing the bulk of the Prussian army and not an isolated Corps. EE&L, Vol. 2, issue 12, p. 11.) Always at the forefront of the skirmishers ... he succeeded in ruining the cavalry, (The fact that Murat ruined the cavalry has been related by many other sources, for instance Nafziger, etc.) ended by causing the loss of the army, and brought France and the Emperor to the brink of an abyss. One day, however, General Belliard, chief-of-staff to the King of Naples, observed in his presence to the Emperor, who was questioning him: "Your Majesty must be told the truth. The cavalry is rapidly disappearing; the marches are too long and exhausting, and when a charge is ordered you can see willing fellows who are forced to stay behind because their horses can't put to the gallop." The Emperor paid no attention to these prudent observations. He wanted to reach his prey; and in his view it was evidently worth paying any price to attain that object, for he sacrificed everything to gain it." Caulincourt, pp.68-69, continues with an analysis of the state of Murat's cavalry: "The King of Naples, who, like the Emperor, had constantly been nibbling at the Russians, while doing ten or twelve leagues a day, (Since a French league is equivalent to 2,400 paces or 2.76 miles, we are speaking here of 28 to 33 miles a day, or 45 to 53 kilometers a day.) and whose hope of success on the morrow had hindered him from calculating his daily losses, realized his weakness as soon as he was in position. He saw with apprehension the decreasing strength of his regiments, most of which were reduced to less than half their numbers. (During the advance, the losses in horses were enormous. Already at Vilna, 5,000 horses had already died of colic for eating wet grass and rye and horses were taken from the artillery of the line to replenish the artillery of the Guard. Labaume, in his Relation circonstanciee de la campagne de Russie en 1812, makes many comments on the heavy looses of horses in several chapters.) Forage and stores of all sort were lacking, for his forces were always in close order and on the alert. Arrangements had been made for rationing the men during the first few days, and the Cossacks were already hindering them from bringing stores. The horses were not shod, the harness in a deplorable state. The forges like the rest of the material, had been left in the rear. The greater number of them, indeed, had been abandoned and lost. There were no nails, no smiths, and no supplies of iron suitable for making nails." Caulincourt paints a picture of the Emperor (and of Murat) that is not very flattering. (Murat far above everything desired to please Napoleon and flattered his own vanity at the same time, by doing so.) Both were gambling everything for a decisive battle. Both were completely unaffected by the human tragedy that began to unfold and were ready to sacrifice everything for it including the precious cavalry. (During the second part of the Campaign of 1813, for a second time, Napoleon did not hesitate to sacrifice almost half of his second Grande Armee in search of that elusive decisive battle that could change everything.) But, in spite that Napoleon did not appear to be concerned with the 'increased strategic consumption, yet, the losses steadily increased. By the time he reached Smolensk in mid August, his central army had been reduced to 156,000 effective down from the initial 200,000. (By casualties we mean, dead, wounded, sick, stragglers and individuals too tired to follow.) So, some 44,000 had become casualties -- or 22% of the effective. Not a small loss by any mean. But if Napoleon did not appear to care about the looses due to strategic consumption and the lack of supplies, was he not conscious about the developing situation? Caulincourt reports, p. 68, that at Witespk: "The Emperor was extremely preoccupied and, thought such behaviour was by no means usual with him.... He was greatly struck by the departure of the townsfolk and the flight of the country people. This method of retreat opened his eyes, maybe, to the possible consequences of this war, and to the distance it might take him from France; but the thousand-and-one things that ought to have opened his eyes to his position vanished before the slightest incident which might revive his hope." Caulincourt, pp. 66-67, makes some other very pertinent comments on the state of mind of the intendance and explains the reasons for the failure to distribute the supply to the troops: "On the return from Witebsk (July 29), the Emperor's first care was for provisions and hospitals. (In a letter from Smolensk dated August 23, Berthier informs a number of responsible officers of the intendance that the Emperor is greatly dissatisfied with the way the hospitals are supplied. He mentions that the intendant of the army had to ask General Lariboisipre, commanding the artillery, to deliver him, to dress the wounded wounds of the Battle of Smolensk, some oakrum used by the artillery as no lint was available.) I was given the duty of visiting them, distributing money to the wounded, consoling and encouraging them. Never was there a situation more deplorable, or a spectacle more hearth-rending for those who could think, and who had not been dazzled by the false glamour of Glory and ambition. With the exception of the chiefs, the indifference of the administrative officers was complete. The innumerable wagons, the enormous quantity of supplies of all sorts that had been collected at such expense during the course of two years, had vanished through theft (Napoleon the day before Leipzig, Marmont bitterly answered.) and loss, or through lack of means to bring them up. They were scattered along the roads. The rapidity of the forced marches, the shortage of harness and spare parts, the dearth of provisions, the want of care, all had helped to kill the horses. This campaign at express speed from the Niemen to Wilna, and from Wilna to Witepsk, had, without any real result, already cost the army two lost battles and deprived if of absolutely essential provisions and supplies. To ensure that no indiscreet word should be uttered, the Emperor had consulted no one. Consequently our waggons and all our transport, built for metalled roads, and to accomplish ordinary distances, were in no way suitable for the roads of the country we had to traverse. The first sand we came across overwhelmed the horses; for the loads, instead of being cut down in proportion to the weight of the vehicle and the distance to be covered, had been increased in the notion that the daily consumption would sufficiently lessen them. But by working out this scheme of daily consumption the Emperor had not taken into account the distance that would have to be covered before the point was reached when this consumption would begin. The men, lacking everything to supply their own needs, were little inclined to pay any heed to their horses, and watched perish without regrets, for their death meant the breakdown of the service on which the men were employed, and thus the end of their personal privations. There you have the secret and cause of our earlier disasters and of our final reverse. Disorder reigned everywhere; in the town, as in the country around, everyone was in want. The Guard was no better provisioned than the other corps, and thence arose indiscipline and all its attendant evils. The Emperor was angry, and took the corps commanders and administrators to task with something more than severity; but this did no good in the face of the continued failure to bring up rations. From a spirit of inexplicable and unpardonable meanness the provisioning of the ambulances had been inadequate. Even the personnel was too scanty. Never had carelessness been carried to greater extremes by the underlings of the administration: never had the courage of unfortunate men been more abused. The army surgeons and their administrative chiefs, as praiseworthy for their zeal as for their talents, were in despair at the state *in which they found the hospitals. In vain did they endeavour to make up, by their care and attention, for what ever was lacking. We had got only as far as Witepsk, we had not fought a battle, and there was not even any lint." The central part of the Grande Armee was short of food and everything else. The problem was not a lack of supply, but the total inability to distribute them to the troops that were advancing much too fast. Consequently, the troops had no choice but to resort to foraging to survive. The leading units managed to quench their hunger but the following troops were not that fortunate. (Many eyewitness account's among which is Labaume, etc. complain about the constant shortage of food, mostly due to the scorched earth policy of the Russian army. In fact, later on, the Intendance, the service in charge of the supplies, later on, was remarkably successful in setting a series of depots along the road to Moscow. The depot of Vilna had rations for 100,000 men for 40 days, 30,000 pairs of shoes, 27,000 muskets and large amounts of beer and brandy. Comparable supplies were accumulated along the road to Moscow at Minsk and Kovno. Smolensk was also well supplied with equipment, food and supplies of all sort. But that does not mean the intendance was anxious to distribute its stocks or had the means to do so.) It is interesting to note that the Macdonald and the other flank commands that did not advance so far in Russia, and at a slower pace, did not suffer from hunger and where adequately supported by the supply system. Consequently, their rate of strategic consumption was much lower. Caulincourt is far to be the only eyewitness reporting the problems so well outlined above. Many other eyewitness' accounts of the campaign comment about the large quantity of stragglers they encountered before the Battle of Borodino as well as the lack of food and forage. For instance, General Latour-Maubourg, commanding the IV. Reserve Cavalry Corps, wrote to Berthier on August 31, 1812. (Quoted by Chuquet, p. 68.) "Ryzzkov, August 31, 1812 I have the honor, etc... to morrow morning early, I shall be in Ermakova, on the road from Viazma to Jouchnov, with the 3rd, 11th and 16th Lancers regiments and the 7th Division of heavy cavalry. ("Grosse cavalerie" in the French text.) Each and every villages is deserted and pillaged, and one can not find any subsistence for the men and the horses. I have encountered today on my way many stragglers ("isoles" in the French text--(The word isoles deserves a little explanation. An isole was not necessarily a straggler (at least not yet), but a soldier who has been isolated, i.e. more or less unable to rejoin his unit.)) from different regiments and of all the Corps. I believe it is my duty to inform you Serene Highness." Beside the deserters who assembled in groups to loot what ever available, had no intention to rejoin their ranks and acted as privateers, there were two types of stragglers, the first category were the soldiers that had been unable to rejoin their units after foraging, but some still willing to rejoin their ranks, and the second category included the wounded and sick that had fallen by the way side and incapable to go any further because of their exhaustion. These stragglers, some willingly and some unwillingly were reorganized into bataillons de marche and used as garrison or as escort. The results were much too often far from satisfactory. Lieutenant de Merville, of the artillery of the Guard, entrusted with a convoy from Smolensk to Moscow wrote in his report to the Emperor: (Letter quoted in Chuquet, pp. 80-81.) "Moscow, September 23, 1812. Sire, in agreement with your orders, etc..... I left Smolensk on September 3, in charge of a convoy consisting of 34 artillery wagons of the Guard. That convoy had been consolidated with other convoys from other army corps to a total of 105 wagons. A bataillon de marche 500 strong under the command of M. Broussard, a major of the 48th regiment of the Line, was assigned as an escort. The escort also included a squadron de marche. Some parts of the convoy advanced at a different pace and finding little forage for the horses of the 105 wagons, it was decided to break us down in smaller detachments. M. the Major assigned me a company as escort. After three days, it had disappeared, the men scattering themselves on the road side. I asked and obtained a new escort that followed me a little longer, but every day soldiers disappeared in spite of care of the officers. A few day before we arrived in Moscow, I had no one left to escort us with the exception of the few gunners part of the parc, most of them being sick. M. the Major did everything possible to rally his escort; but the men he assembled during the day disappeared during the night. The cavalry marched constantly on our flanks, as it was forced to move away from the road to search for forage." That report is to the point and Chuquet to further comment: "And, here is the discipline of the Grande Armee as of September 23, 1812." Caulincourt p. 69 recognized the problem with Napoleon's staff- "As a matter of fact, a number of things went wrong: the staff foresaw nothing. But on the other hand, as the Emperor wanted to do everything himself and give every order, no one, not even the chief-of-staff, dared to assume the most trifling responsibility. The administration, deprived, as we have seen, of the means of execution and transport, was quite unable to produce the results demanded by the Emperor, or to carry out orders which he gave without troubling himself as how they should be executed." The situation was exacerbated by Napoleon's state of mind and constant state of irritation engendered in him by the annoyances of a campaign did not go as per his desire and according to his illusions. That is an important and very significant point: Napoleon had set illusions and he tended to ignore all the facts that pointed out the contrary of his set ideas. (See Caulincourt p. 70, etc. and other objective eyewitnesses. That is a fact that is denied by Napoleon's worshipper but yet well documented by men like Caulincourt.) The Campaign of Russia entered a new phase after Napoleon decided to continue his pursuit of the Russian army beyond Smolensk. Caulincourt, p. 84 comments on the situation of the army: "In Poland everything had been lacking: at Witepsk, by dint of infinite pain and care, we had fared meagerly; at Smolensk, by searching the country side, we had found standing crops, grain, flour, cattle, and even forage, but no brandy and wine. After Dorogobouje all was in flames, but the shops and the cellar were well stocked, even to the point of luxury. The houses were soon found to contain hiding-places where abundance of everything was discovered. The soldiers pillaged; nor could this stopped, since there was no issue of rations, nor, as we were marching without transport and living from hand to mouth, could there be any such distribution. Most of the men fared well, even very well. Once again the soldiers became indefatigable." But, in spite of the new enthusiasm, the army and especially the cavalry needed rest. Forage was hard to find. Napoleon did not appear to mind and continued his pursuit undisturbed. The roads were littered with dead horse, but every day and every moment the Emperor flattered himself that he was about to make contact with the enemy. By that time Napoleon's central army reached Borodino, it had been reduced to approximately 130,000. After the costly victory, the army continued its advance toward Moscow which was reached on September 14. In spite of all the problems, the army rested in Moscow and was able to feed itself reasonably well. At Moscow, Napoleon, was hopeful to enter peace negotiation with Alexander or to spend the winter there. That other wishful thinking lasted for all full month. Napoleon's state of delusion is once more well covered by Caulincourt whom, pp. 154-5, reports a conversation he had with Napoleon (At that point, Napoleon had not abandoned his project of decisively defeating the Russians. In fact he kept that idea up to Smolensk.) in the Kremlin in which he mentioned that Kutusov had lull him into a false sense of security while he was in Moscow, since at Petersburg they realized their advantages and the difficulties of the French army: "At the words lull and difficulties the Emperor gave a start. "What do you call our difficulties?" he asked with an air of irritation. "The winter, Sire," I answered, "' a big difficulty, to begin with; the lack of stores, of horses for your artillery, of transport for your sick and wounded, the poor clothing for your soldiers. Every man must have a sheepskin, stout fur-lined gloves, a cap with ear-tabs, warm boot-socks, heavy boots to keep his feet from getting frost-bitten. You lack all this. Not a single calkin has been forged to rough-shoe the horses; how are you going to draw the guns? There is no end to what I could tell your Majesty on this subject. Then there are your communications; the weather is still fine, but what will it be in a month, a fortnight, perhaps even less?" "So you think I am leaving Moscow?" he demanded "Yes, Sire." "That is not certain. Nowhere shall I be better off than in Moscow." The hardship of the coming winter, the total lack ofprecautions against cold, and so forth, did not enter Napoleon's calculations. "You know the French, " he said to me. "They will get all they need... The extreme rigours of winter do not come in twenty-four hours.... We have not had an autumn yet; we shall plenty of fine days before winter set in." (So far, the weather had been extremely mild to the surprise of the few Moscovites left in the city. Hence, Napoleon's belief that he still had plenty of nice days ahead.) Do not trust to that, Sire." I answered. 'Winter will come like a bombshell--and you can not be too apprehensive, considering the present state of the army." This conversation shows all too clearly the Emperor's hopes, desires, and wishes. It would be superfluous to add further details. In the event of not meeting with success he anticipated in his attack on Kutusof, the Emperor considered himself in a fit state to keep the field, and imagined that the temperature would allow him to do so for some time yet. He intended to make no movement without having previously beaten Kutusof, but should he decide to retire on Witepsk he wanted at the same time to arrange everything in Moscow, so that if necessary the winter could be passed there, and so that he could retain the means of keeping the place if he decided to hold the line. In the event of a withdrawal, he considered that he would have time and the means to withdraw the Moscow garrison when he wished to do so. Such was the reasoning upon which the Emperor based his conduct and his prolonged stay in Moscow, waiting for a reply which never came and could not come." So, we have Napoleon state of mind in Moscow, while Murat continued to waste the precious little cavalry he had left. But soon, a wave of realism was going to fall on the Grande Armee as the Russians became more aggressive, and Murat was severely defeated at Winkovo. Now the need to retreat was imperative. Then, the terrible retreat began. (Upon leaving Moscow, the Emperor had the intention to redeploy his army behind Witebsk and Smolensk. From there, he planned to renew his offensive in the spring to attack Kiev and St. Petersburg. The battle on November 6 and 7 had further reduced his effective, he blamed his change of plan on his reduced effective and the rigor of the climate, while the true reason was that at Smolensk he was informed that Wittgenstein had taken Polotsk and that Witebsk had been taken with its garrison. Labaume, p. 303, Caulincourt, etc.) Soon the Battle of Malo-Jaroslawetz (November 6 and 7) took place and Napoleon decided to withdraw to Smolensk by the ravaged road he had taken to Moscow. Soon the meager supplies collected at Moscow were exhausted and the army, once more, was starving. Soon, the discipline rapidly deteriorated and, while a nucleus of formed troops remained organized around their flag, and that until they reached the Niemen, with the exception of the Guard, the army became a mob reduced to a survival diet of horse meat. (Labaume, p.345 claims that over 30,000 horse died in a few days.) Smolensk brought some relief as all the contents of the magazines were distributed to the troops. (At Smolensk, the sorely needed food stores were found to have been depleted by the retreating administrative units that had preceded the army.) The retreat continued and the effective continued to steadily dwindle. The raiding by the Cossacks and the partisans greatly increased the already frightful casualties caused by the lack of food and the cold weather. (The uncontrolled pillaging of the Grande Armee alienated the peasants which formed armed groups of partisans. These partisans as well as the Cossacks massacred the stragglers as well as the wounded. During the retreat the partisans and Cossacks inflicted more damage to the Grande Armee than the regular army.) The substantial magazines along the way, because of the lack of transportation could not sustain the need of the army. In addition, the Cossacks were able to capture some of them before the army reached them. That was the case of the depots in Minsk containing two million rations. We have here the main reasons of the destruction of the Grande Armee One may considered the invasion as an enterprise doomed to failure from the beginning because the needs of such an invasion were beyond the logistic capabilities of the period. There is much truth in that statement, but there were several other basic big problems and a multitude of others too numerous to enumerate, that contributed to the defeat among which were: 1. A rate of advance much too fast to allow the basic supplies to follows, and caused unnecessary casualties among the cavalry and infantry; 2. Napoleon's and Murat's and other leaders' lack of concern about the high and unsustainable rate of strategic consumption, and even the failure to recognize the extent of the problem. 3. The stubbornness of the Emperor to ignore the facts around him and to stick to his wishful ideas much too often much too far remote from reality. 4. To stick to the idea that a decisive battle could save everything. 5. The failure of Napoleon to stop at Smolensk for the winter. (That point shows the calculated gambling that a victory could save everything.) 6.The failure of Napoleon to realize the seventy of the Russian winter and prepare the army for it with special clothing. 7. The failure to prepare the horses for icing conditions, resulting in additional horse losses. (Only the Polish Corps and the Household horses had been shoed for ice. Some 200,000 trained horses were lost in Russia. That was a blow that could not be compensated for during the Campaigns of 1813 and 1814.) Unfortunately, for France, errors (1) (2), (3) and (4) were to be repeated during the Campaign of 1813. There is also another subject that deserves our attention. Several times in Caulincourt's memoirs, Napoleon made allusion to the Polish Cossacks that were on their way to counter the Russians Cossacks on an equal basis. Unfortunately for the Grande Armee these Polish Cossacks never materialized, and there is little evidence that they were even formed. Before we end this chapter, there is another point that must be covered in other to understand the state of mind in the Grande Armee. There is little doubt that the Grande Armee was a remarkable institution, originally in 1804, well in advance on the other armies. According to Caulincourt, p. 160, "Dashing courage was valued above all else; method, foresight, and even a love of discipline were underestimated. At all his reviews the Emperor made everything of audacity, courage and luck. Those who organized, trained the men at the bases, and kept things going, obtained no recognition if they were no longer with the Grand Army or had not taken part in such-and-such a battle. No commanding officer was ever brought to book for the losses occasioned by his negligence, his lack of order and discipline, even if two thirds of his force had been wasted from time causes. If he led a gallant charge at the head of the hundred men left to him on the day of battle, he obtained what ever he desired--and nothing was given to lieutenant-colonel who, after fighting his twenty campaigns, was back in the depot organizing and drilling the detachment that were to reinforce the army. He was forgotten, because he had had no chance of contributing any brilliant deeds to the successful affair of the moment. Far be it from me to say that the Emperor did not reward old soldiers. There are too many instances to prove, on the contrary, that they were the objects of his solicitude when they remained with the army or were invalided out; but let them remain in the depots even in the interest of the service, and they could obtain no promotion until they returned to the fighting line. Undoubtedly this system had the advantage of making all officers anxious to get back to the front, but it was really detrimental to the service and to the best officers as well, for the depots were given to the most capable men. Any honest investigator who would compare the conditions of his corps at the beginning of the campaign with its state at the end, seeking the causes of loss and wastage, would certainly find that it was not the enemy's guns which had done the most damage to our cavalry. The fine state in which some corps were maintained to the very last moment, compared to the disorder and destruction suffered by others that had seen no longer service, proves that our greatest foe was lack of discipline; and the disorders that followed in its train originated in the negligence of the commanding officers." The above is an excellent outlook on one of the flaws that afflicted the Grand Armee, and explain, with the factors outlined above, the causes for the high rate of strategic consumption during the Campaign of 1812 which finally led to its destruction. Yet if the infantry and artillery losses were severe, the greatest losses suffered by Napoleon were that practically all the cavalry and the huge supply train had disappeared in the snow of Russia. Back to EEL List of Issues and List of Lochet's Lectures Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1995 by Jean Lochet This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. 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