Last year, at the Symposium on Revolutionary Europe, during the comment part of a lecture, one of the commentator mentioned that during the armistice negotiations at Prague, in the summer of 1813, Napoleon refused the Allied conditions for peace. Since I was (and I am still) in the process of writing a chapter of book covering the Campaign of 1813. [1] I immediately mentioned that it was not so. But the majority of the audience did not appear to believe me. In further investigating the question I was surprised to find out that most English language sources mention that the French Emperor rejected the Allies peace offer on the ground that the peace conditions were unacceptable. (See for instance Chandler, The Campaign of Napoleon, p. 900). The sequence of events and an objective look at the facts suggest a different story. Austria State of Mind in Early 1813 When the Austrians learned of the magnitude of the disaster in Russia in mid-December 1812, they secretly dispatched an envoy to the Czar. Technically, Austria because of the marriage between Marie-Louise and Napoleon was a French ally. [2] Then, Schwarzenberg commanding the Austrian contingent in Russia, was instructed by Metternich to withdraw and, if possible, to negotiate a secret verbal armistice with the Russians. Such a verbal armistice was promptly obtained and the Austrian withdrew safely to Austrian territory. [3] While engaged in these activities Metternich as well as the Austrian government still professed their loyalty to Napoleon. [4] Then, Marshal Buna, a Francophile, was sent to Paris as the Austrian ambassador. He was instructed to ask Napoleon for his conditions to open negotiations. Napoleon conditions were: (1) Portugal was to be returned to the house of Braganca. (2) Naples was to remain under Murat. (3) Spain was still to be ruled by his brother Joseph Bonaparte but the French army was to withdraw from Spain, while the British were to withdraw their army to Sicily. (4) The Russians were to return to their 1812 frontiers and were to keep the Polish provinces that they had held prior to 1812. However, not one village of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw to pass to the Russians and the terms and conditions of the Treaty of Tilsit were to remain unaltered. Napoleon told Buna that he expected Austria to adhere to its treaty obligations and renewed his demand that Austria provide a contingent of 60,000 men in case the Russians would not accept these conditions. [5] Napoleon further asked the Austrians to dispatch to England a minister with his proposition and offered Austria the return of its Illyrian provinces in return for its cooperation and assistance after England agreed to a peace. Austria also sent some secret envoys Ministers to the principal states of the Confederation of the Rhine; Bavaria, Saxony, Baden, and Wurttemberg, in an effort to provoke their active support and agitation for a negotiated peace. It was hoped that if these allies were persuaded to break their solid support of Napoleon, Napoleon might be forced to accept a mediated peace. These efforts were rejected by Bavaria, Baden and Wurttemberg and Napoleon informed. However, Saxony was temporarily drawn into a neutral for a while by the Austrian initiative. In spite of all these intrigues, Austria, in early 1813, remained reasonably faithful to its alliance with France. Metternich even turned down a 10,000,000 pounds sterling offer for an alliance with England, despite the miserable condition of the Austrian treasury. [6] Yet Austria was rearming. When France became aware of these military preparations, Metternich answered that this was an "interior" mobilization intended to put Austrian on a footing to act against France's enemies. He further told Otto that Austria did not wish to alarm the Russians by enlarging the Austrian contingent under Schwarzenberg and provoke a Russian attack before the Austrian army was ready. In fact, by April, Austria was to have 100,000 men under arms. Russia in Early 1813 The Convention of Tauroggen had neutralized a Prussian army and secret negotiations had accomplished the same with Schwarzenberg's corps to the south. Though the Austrian Emperor was not yet his ally, the Czar knew it was only a matter of time before his diplomats would incite Austrian court to change side. Czar Alexander was ready to fight the French until they submitted, Germany was liberated, and Russia had achieved her goals. However, the Russian treasury was drained and her armies were in a miserable state and only the financial support of England kept the Russian military functioning. Russia desperately needed money, reinforcements, allies, and more money. Pursuing the war with Napoleon by herself would soon leave her exhausted at the end of her supply lines. The Prussian Dilemma In early 1813, the Prussian nobility and townsfolk were favorable to a war with France. The king of Prussia, had lived in absolute terror of Napoleon. However time had changed. Napoleon's Grande Armee had been destroyed in Russia as well as his myth of invincibility. Prussia was still heavily occupied by numerous French garrisons. Only the Prussian forces of General Bulow were heavily occupied by numerous French garrisons. Only the Prussian forces of General Bulow were in a condition to undertake a campaign but there were no provisions for financing a campaign nor were the magazines in a state to support one. The King of Prussia was faced with extreme internal pressure to join the Russians by a large faction, led by his wife, Queen Louisa, who pressed for revenge against the French for their humiliation of Prussia in 1806. Initially the King of Prussia denounced Yorck's actions at Surrogen as an act of insubordination. Consequently, he sent Prinz van Hatzfeld to Paris on 4 January 1813 to assure Napoleon of the king's sentiments, and his intentions to adhere to the alliance between the two states. In early 1813, Napoleon still felt that the King of Prussia's best interests lay in maintaining his alliance with France. He perceived Russia as being the greater threat to Prussian existence. But the King of Prussia also played a double game. The King of Prussia sought an alliance with Russia while not breaking the alliance with France. The situation evolved quickly. The King of Prussia moved to Breslau and, after Eugene evacuated the line of the Oder finally declared war to France in March 1813. The Evolution of the Austrian Position The news of Yorck's defection was as embarrassing to Austria than it was to the Prussians. Metternich, [7] actively moved to contract a peace between the warring parties. [8] Metternich communicated his plans for peace to Hardenberg, knowing that Hardenberg was little more than an intermediary for the English. The terms for peace were the return of France to its natural boundaries, the Rhine, Alps and Pyrenes. Germany was to return to a collection of autonomous states whose independence was guaranteed by Austria and Prussia. Prussia was to be returned to the ranks of great powers. Italy was to be divided into two states, in which Austria was to receive its former territory up to the Mincio and Russia was to return to the boundaries established by the Treaty of Tilsit. Metternich's objective was to push Napoleon to accept Austrian mediation, both to bring peace to Europe as well as to return lost Austrian provinces without resort to force of arms. We should keep in mind that the Austrian prime minister feared Russian dominance in Germany as much as, or perhaps even more than that of Napoleon. The news of the Prussian declaration of war in March 1813, greatly affected the Austrian position and reinforced the Austrian war party against France. In early 1813, Austria had tried to negotiate an armistice with the Prussia and Russia and the opening of negotiations between the antogonists. The Allies were very reluctant until Bautzen.... The Spring Campaign Napoleon, in spite of incredible difficulties, had raised another Grande Armee and large scale military operations resumed in the spring of 1813 against the combined armies of Prussia and Russia. Napoleon's new army was a shadow of the army he had lost in Russia. It was numerous but particularly deficient in cavalry and transportation because of a shortage of trained horses. Nevertheless Napoleon managed to severely defeat the Allies at Lutzen (May 2) and Bautzen (May 20-21) and pushed them back as far as Silesia but these battles failed to achieve lasting results as Napoleon lacked the necessary cavalry to transform them into decisive victories like after Jena-Auerstadt in 1806. However, the Allied were badly mauled and the Russian even considered a retreat as far as Poland. On May, 17, just before Bautzen, Napoleon, had sent Caulincourt in an attempt to negotiate directly with the Czar, hence by passing Austria, but the French envoy was politely denied passage. After Bautzen, the hard pressed Allies, now in an increasingly desperate situation saw an immediate advantage in agreeing to an armistice which was signed on June 2. Such an armistice ended Napoleon's pursuit and gave the Allies time to reorganized their shattered armies. Napoleon was forced to seek an armistice for several reasons, but mainly to reorganize his understrength cavalry. In addition, the march of the Grande Armee had outstripped the meager transport and administrative services. In. fact his lines of communication, with not enough cavalry to efficiently protect them, were constantly cut off. Hence, supplies were captured or prevented to reach his army by the numerous enemy cavalry. The Conference of Prague: The Peace Negotiations The Austrian peace initiative proposed a considerable curtailment of French influence and possessions east of the Rhine. Poland was to be restored to its division before the last peace of Vienna, Prussia was to receive back all her old possessions and France to renounce all claims in Germany east of the Rhine Furthermore, Holland was to be independent, the states of the Church to be restored and all the French forces withdrawn from Italy. Austria was to be reinstated in all she possessed in Italy previous to the peace of Luneville. Tyrol, the Illynia and Dalmatia were to be resumed to her. Finally France was to renounce all claims of suzerainty in Germany and influence in Italy. These conditions were so harsh, that Austria realized that Napoleon could not agree to them. Such terms were too much like conditions dictated to a decisively vanquished foe to be readily acceptable. However, the French Emperor was willing to compromise. He was willing to give back Illyria and Dalmatia to Austria, accept the dissolution of the Duchy of Warsaw, revised boundaries between Austria and Bavaria, the return of the former South Prussia to Prussia and the dissolution of the Confederation of the Rhine. The Allies, including the supposedly neutral Austrians, during the negotiations for the terms of the armistice were unwilling to compromise on many points and the armistice negotiations dragged on until their defeat at Bautzen. Suddenly they became more flexible and an agreement far from what Napoleon desired was reached. [9] The peace conference was to take place in Prague. The final armistice was to be much shorter than expected and the Emperor had to accept a mere seven weeks plus 6 days noticed In Correspondance 20398, in a letter to Clarke, dated June 2, Napoleon justifies his decision: "You will see in the Moniteur that an armistice is about to be signed today or tomorrow ... This armistice will interrupt the course of my victories. Two considerations have made up my mind: my shortage of cavalry, which prevents me from striking great blows, and the hostile attitude of Austria." Many historians have criticized Napoleon for accepting the armistice, and argue that Napoleon could have defeated the Allies without it. It is true that the Allies were in an increasingly desperate situation. They had suffered two heavy defeats, their effective were steadily declining, and it appeared to be no chance of defeatnig Napoleon or to convmce Austria to take side. Clearly, before the armistice, the Allies were in a much more desperate situation than Napoleon was aware of and he did not realize that he came very close of decisively defeating the Prusso-Russian alliance after Bautzen. From that standpoint, it can be argues that the Allies gained more from the armistice than Napoleon. [10] It does not appear that either Napoleon or his opponents expected the peace negotiations to succeed since their views varied so widely. Napoleon had been victorious during the spring campaign. He had inflicted two severe defeats on the Allies and, undefeated. he had no intention of retiring behind the Rhine. There were no immediate need to do so. So he thought. If he had retired behind the Rhine have lost the Confederation of the Rhine, as well as the Duchy of Warsaw and all the garrisons of Dantzig, on the Vistula and the Oder. In addition, the garrisoning of the numerous fortresses on the French border would have required some 150,000 men. He felt that these 150,000 men would be better far better in the field in Germany. Consequently, both sides, as well as Austria, utilized the period to reorganize and increase their forces for the apparently new inevitable campaign. A series of intrigues was going to change the situation for the Allies. On June 15, England gave 12,000,000 pounds to Prussia and Russia, and promised 600,000 pounds to Austria if it joined the coalition against France. On July 7, Sweden promised to join the Allies. Then on July 19, by the terms of the secret Relchenbach Convention, Austria decided to declare war to Napoleon if he failed to accept the stipulated terms. The Allies foot dragging caused several delays of the opening of the peace negotiations suffered several delays which caused the lost of a full month. They finally opened in Prague on July 12 and were conducted in the greatest secrecy. Not much was accomplished until Caulincourt, on July 24, replaced Narbonne as Napoleon's envoy. [11] The armistice was emended until August 10 with the agreement of both parties. Many English language historians place the blame of the failure of the peace negotiations on Napoleon. The study of the chain of events that led to the failure of the negotiations suggest otherwise as it appears that Napoleon was not given enough time to really negotiate at the critical moment as it will be seen later. It can be even argued that the peace negotiations were a farce right from the beginning as Metternich played a double game while Austria, in spite of all Mettermich's numerous assurances of the contrary, Austria was already committed to side with the Allies. Caulincourt arrived in Prague on July 8. He committed an error during a private conversation with Metternich and said: "Ask everything that is fair and especially everything that represent the idea of a true base for peace, you should obtained it easier than too little, because Napoleon will say: Austria is more decided to war than in a truce." [12] On July 30, Metternich, supposedly the mediator, in spite of the secret Reichnebach Convention, who was aware of Caulincourt desire for peace, gave encouragement to Caulincourt during a conversation in the presence of Narbonne and said: "It will be only on August 10 that we will know the thoughts of the Emperor, and that day may decide between peace and war. But be well assured that after August 10, nothing can extend the duration of the armistice. I give you here my word that we'll reach that time without Austria having another arrangement without any other nation and that it will be only at that very instant that we will decide with whom we shall fight. We sincerely desire that it wont be against you. What is impossible is that we'll remain neutral." [13] The fact that Metternich had made up his mind before and eventual answer from Napoleon is shown by the letter he sent to Stadion on the same day: "Monsieur de Caulincourt who is in a good state of mind has confirmed that, since my trip to Dresden, the Emperor Napoleon is the most complete state of illusion concerning the true situation. Confused since a long time about all his projections, he always choose to cling to the ideas that flatter his own desire, he appears completely convinced, at the present time, that Austria will never the side against him, that the Emperor of Russia would favor peace... De Vacquant is on his way to the Allied headquarters to stay there as military commissary. He has been given by the Prince of Schwarzenberg a letter to accredit him for the commander in chief of the armies of Prussia and Russia. These orders instruct him to follow all the directions that your Excellency will give him." [14] From the above, it is quite clear that Metternich had decided to go to war against France. It appears that the later was somewhat worrying that Napoleon accepted the proposed peace conditions, which had not yet been sent to him. [15] Caulincourt was of another opinion since after a conversation with Narbonne, on July 30, wrote to the Emperor: "Everything I see here confirms what Monsieur le comte de Narbonne tells me, that Austria has made its decision. The moment is grave. Your Majesty is going to find himself at war with the world if peace is not made within ten days." [16] But let us take a look at Napoleon state of mind considering the negotiations. On August 5 he wrote to Maret: "Let it know that at the negotiation of June 30, no date limit was set to end the nego- tiations; that it is only said that they will be continued to achieve peace, but as we are al- ready August 5, it will take at least 40 days to negotiate." [17] On the same day Napoleon sent a note to Caulincourt and Maret, reminding them that when France had accepted the mediation of Austria, it had been agreed that the negotiator would be impartial; that he had not made or would not made any agreement, even eventual, with a belligerent, during all the time that the negotiations were taking place, and also that the mediator would not act as an arbitrator but as a conciliator to iron out the differences and bring the parties together. The plenepotentianies were to propose to treat the matters by notes and to meet regularly twice a day." [18] In addition, Napoleon sent a secret note to Maret at the attention of Caulincourt, asking on which manner Austria intended to make peace. If the Emperor accepted the conditions, would Austria make a common cause with the Allies, or would remain neutral? As soon as the Emperor would be sure of the Austrian word, he would mistrust his negotiators accordingly. Caulincourt was to declare that one desired that in twenty-four hours, Caulincourt would write its conditions under the dictation of Metternich, and that within three clays the answer would be given. [19] After receiving Napoleon's *instructions sent from Dresden on August 5, Caulincourt went to see Metternich on the evening of August 6, and informed him of the instructions he had received from the Emperor. The Austrian diplomat went to Brandeis to see the Emperor of Austria, to whom he presented Napoleon's initiative as a proof of Napoleon's worrying about Austria military build up. He was of the opinion that it was imperative to speak strongly to Napoleon. "The more he tries to separate us from our allies, he said, the more we should reinforce our ties with them." Thiry remarks that it was not the language of a mediator! Metternich, desiring to give the Allies a new proof of the firmness and loyalty of Austria, recommended to Francis to increase the Austrian requests from four to six, thinking that it was the surest way of forcing Napoleon to a refusal. He was so convinced on that point that he asked Gentz to prepare in advance the act informing Napoleon of the rupture of the negotiations. [20] Metternich came back to Prague on the eve of August 7. He immediately informed Anstett and Humboldt about his answer, then he went to see Caulincourt to whom he asked for secrecy. He assured Caulincourt that Austria was not yet committed neither to Prussia or Russia. He added that Austria would commit itself to the side of Europe if peace was not made by August 10. Then Metternich repeated to Caulincourt Austria's conditions which were identical to the ones given above, adding that they were the conditions that Prussia and Russia "apparently wanted to bring a pacific arrangements." [21] He added that the Austrian Emperor, in his instructions, declared that the articles of his ultimatum were to be answered by a yes or a no by August 10. And that on the 11th, he would take party and would join his forces to that of the Allies. The Austrian ultimatum conditions were: (1) Dissolution of the Duchy of Warsaw, and the distribution of its territories among Austria, Prussia and Russia. (Dantzig was to go to Prussia), (2) Hamburg and Ubeck were to be again free Hanseatic cities, (3) Dissolution of the Confederation of the Rhine, (4) Prussia was to be restored in its pre-1806 borders, (5) The Illyrian Provinces were to be returned to Austria, (6) France was to abandon any influence in Italy. Metternich added, on the order of the Emperor of Austria, that if Napoleon did not accept the conditions, any counteroffer made after August 10 would be unacceptable. The Alliance of Austria with the powers at war with France was to begin on August 11, no other communication would be accepted after that date. Caulincourt forwarded the conditions immediately to Napoleon and in his report asked Napoleon to accept the Austrian conditions. In his report dated August 8, Caulincourt said: "By favor, Sire, place in the balance for peace all the chances of war; see the irritation of the minds, the situation of Germany as soon as Austria takes side, the exhaustion of France, its noble devotion, its sacrifices after the disasters in Russia; listen to all the wishes for peace that are made in that France; that of your devoted servants, of the true Frenchmen who, like me, must tell you that it is necessary to quiet the European fever." Napoleon received Caulicourt's report and conditions which were nothing less than an ultimatum only on August 9 at 3 P.M. His answer should have been sent at that very same time to reach Prague on August 10. It is quite clear that not enough time was given to Napoleon make up his mind or make a counter offer. Napoleon prepared two notes for Caulincourt, in which he accepted the dissolution of the Duchy of Warsaw, Dantzig as a free city, the return of Illynia to Austria and Dalmatia with the exception of Trieste, Goritza and Villach, and requested the Allies to keep the integrity of Danemark. [22] However, these notes were only sent to Caulincourt on August 10 and the decisive day of August 10, went by and Caulicourt was unable to present Napoleon's counteroffer within the required time, as it was only were received on August 11. On August 10 at midnight, the three Allies envoys, declared that the negotiations had ended and that hostilities would resume. On the afternoon of August 9, after he received the Austrian ultimatum, Napoleon had a two hours conference with Bubna, the Austrian diplomat who had negotiated the armistice and who was also in Dresden. During the discussion, Napoleon basically agreed to some of the conditions and said to Bubna: "As you can see, I want to do a lot for peace: my allies are loosing and I abandon a all nation that has done much for me; but you treat me like I am already defeated. Don't take the uncertain for the certain; you would not have requested more from me if I had lost four battles." [23] Bubna was under the impression that Napoleon had basically accepted the conditions of the ultimatum and he asked the Emperor to quickly make his decision as he was under the impression that Napoleon was playing for time. "Don't hurry me like that," said Napoleon, "I want peace, all negotiations in the world have take time." It appears that Napoleon was under the impression that, since according to the armistice the hostilities would only resume on August 17, time to negotiate was still available. [24] Furthermore, the armistice conditions did not stipulate that the negotiations were to end with the armistice. [25] The Emperor asked Bubna to immediately go to Prague to report the conference he had with Napoleon, but Bubna, who was sick, could not go to Prague and only sent a note to Metternich. No follow up took place. The peace negotiations had failed and the hostilities were about to resume. Austria declared war on August 12. Hostilities resumed on August 17. CONCLUSION We have seen the chain of events that led to the failure of the Prague Conference. After the disaster of the Campaign of Russia, every European power in Europe tried to take advantage of the situation. Austria was not different. We can blame Metternich and the Emperor of Austria for playing a double game with Napoleon. However, before we condemn them, we should remember that Austria had been constantly humiliated by Napoleon since his first campaign in Italy in 1796 and after 1809 practically eliminated as an influential individual power in Europe. In fact since 1809 it had more or less became another French satellite. Can we blame Austria or Metternich for seeking revenge? In fact, since in office, Metternich had constantly sought to strengthen the diplomatic and military position of Austria in order to make future resistance to France possible and to disrupt the alliance between Napoleon and the Czar consecrated at Tilsit. To minimize the disaster in 1809, he was successful in securing the marriage of Archduchess Marie-Louise to Napoleon (1810) and perhaps reluctantly to a temporary alliance with France (1812) to invade Russia. The disaster of Russia middle course gave the opportunity to develop between France and Russia a policy of armed mediation in 1813, The substitution of Austrian for French supremacy supplanted this policy in 1813 and Metternich jumped on the opportunity to defeat France. The Quadruple Alliance was formed, and war of the coalition againist France resulted in the allied victory at Leipzig (1813). Although Metternich wished French domination checked, he had no desire to see the country crushed, for he did not want Prussia and Russia too greatly strengthened and the balance of power upset. He hoped to make Austrian influence supreme in Italy and, while vigorously opposing German unity, sought Austrian ascendancy in the newly formed German Confederation. In fact Napoleon in invading Russia, Napoleon had simply committed political suicide. He could not recover from it. But Napoleon's fault do not excuse Metternich double game and the usurpation of the role of mediator claimed by Austria during the negotiations. That role began with the defacto treason of Schwarzenberg in December 1812. I simply can not agree that Napoleon rejected the allied conditions for peace as professed by so many historians. With a little perseverance peace could have achieved at Prague as Napoleon, as he told Bubna, was ready to negotiate. All that was needed was to give him a little more time. But for some strange reasons Metternich did not want that to happen. In fact what we witnessed at Prague during the so-called negotiation was old fashion imperialism, where Austria as well as Prussia and Russia were simply to make the best of the situation to reestablish their respective hegemonies shattered by Napoleon for a few years like the Congress of Vienna was to show. Footnotes [1] Actually it a book on the Campaign of 1814, covering the previous campaigns to explain the causes leading to the decay of the French army previous to that short campaign. [2] Prussia was also a French ally, and like Austria, had reluctantly been been requested to furnish a contingent to invade Russia. In late 1812, the Convention of Surrogen seriously damaged that alliance. [3] On a strictly military point of view It was a clear act of treason as such action opened the French right flank and trapped Reynier's French contingent acting with Schwarzenberg. In fact Reynier's command was neutralized until the summer armistice. [4] It was the beginning of the Austrian doubleplay. [5] In case the Austrian honor would not allow them to be *involved against Russia, they were free to withdraw their present corps under Schwarzenberg and to remain as a spectator to the French war with Russia. [6] The Austrian state went bankrupt after the financial crisis of January-March 1811. [7] After all Napoleon was married to an Austrian Princess and Metternich fearing that he might not be able to control the pending political events, at the time opted to stopping the war. [8] Austria actively feared the intrusion into and the control of German politics by the Russians. To this end the Austrians felt an alliance with Prussia was their best recourse. [9] Napoleon expected the armistice to extend over the all period of peace negotiations but if that was impossible he was willing to settle for 3 months plus a 15 days notice before hostilities recommenced. [10] See Chandler, p. 899. In addition, the later events were to show that Napoleon after the armistice was no longer capable of defeating the far more numerous armies of the new coalition, which now included Austria and Sweden beside Russia and Austria. [11] On July 24, Napoleon says to Caulincourt that he agreed to give back Illyria to Austria and assured him that he had a great deal of latitude to negotiate. Thiry, p. 19. [12] Oncken, Osterreich und Prussen in Befreilungskrieg, report from Metternich to the Austrian Emperor, quoted by Thity, p. 27 [13] Report from Caulincourt and Narbonne to the Duke of Bassano, dated July 30 and report of Caulincourt to Napoleon dated July 30, 1813. [14] Oncken, Osterreich und Prussen in Befreilungskrieg, letter from Metternich to Stadion, Vol. II, p.440, quoted by Thiry, p.28. [15] Thiry, p.28. [16] Letter from Caulincourt to Napoleon dated from Prague July 30, 1813. [17] From Napoleon to Maret, Dresden, August 5, 1813, Correspondance 20330. [18] Coffespondance 20330. [19] Thiry, p. 32. [20] Gentz, Tagebficher, quoted by Thiry, p. 3 3. [21] French text: "paraissaient mettre 6 des arrangements pacific", quoted by Thiry, p. 34. [22] Letter from Marct to Caulincourt, August 10, 1813. [23] Report from Bubna dated Aust 9, 1813 in Oncken, quoted by Thiry, p. 39. [24] Thiry,p.39. [25] Answer of the French diplomats at Prague on August 10, 1813 in Fain, Vol. II, p. 198-200, quoted by Thiry,p.38. Back to EEL List of Issues and List of Lochet's Lectures Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1995 by Jean Lochet This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com