No one can denied that Oman's writings on Maida and in Studies in the Napoleanic Wars are responsible for the firmly entrenched theory of British effective firepower which has prevailed in the majority of English language accounts of the Wars of the French Revolution and of the Empire. In many English language works, we find adaptations of Oman's theory on column versus line and his initial interpretation of the Battle of Maida -- and reproduced verbatim in the chapter on Maida in Studies in the Napoleonic Wars -- in which he claimed: "The French received three volleys, at 150 yards, 80 yards and 20 yards" Two specific points are particularly disturbing. (1) Why did Oman, in 1929, represented the French in columns in Studies in the Napoleonic Wars, when he had admitted in 1913 in Wellington's Army, 1809-1814 that he had found that the French were in line at Maida? (2) Where did Oman got the data to substantiate his claim that at Maida the French sustained 3 volleys? None of the British or French eyewitness narratives of Maida or of any of the pertinent subsequent battles in the Peninsula mention multiple volleys. On the contrary Bunburry at Maida speak of a single volley! One of Oman's theories is that the British owed their success to their superior fire. In addition he makes the point that a battalion of soldiers drawn up in a line two deep will be able to use more muskets than an equal number of soldiers in column on a frontage restricted to between 30 to a 100 men across. Hence, one had simply to count muskets and logically deduct that the firepower of the line would always be greatly superior to that of the column. Hence, since the Battle of Maida, (which had been the key point of his theory) the British infantry were able to shoot the French - always in columns or occasionally in the ordre-mixte - to pieces faster than vice versa. The British firepower and multiple volleys theory is still powerfully entrenched and perpetuated today as we already seen it in part I. It is the key argument of General B.P. Hughes to substantiate his famous Firepower in the treatment of the Battle of Albuera, etc. In The Spanish Ulcer, New York, 1986, David Gates says, p. 21: ... "Given such inequality between the opposing forces it is little wonder that the column was invariably shot to pieces by the line. Indeed, the defeat of French columns by British lines was a prominent feature of the War and some discussion of it is essential... Indeed we agree, but an objective discussion based on first hands accounts leads to a different conclusion. We also find Dr. Long, the commentator of Dr. Finley's erroneous account of Maida, saying p. 188 of Consortium on Revolutionary Europe, 1750-1850, Selected papers, 1984: The precedents which Oman found have naturally been questioned by a subsequent generation of historians. Professor Finley is uniquely suited by his various researches to settle the controversy, and it does it so convincingly. Drawing on memoirs and documents in the Archives de la Guerre and Public Record Office.. and on his own investigations into several of the major figures, notably Reynier, Finley does more than revisit the Battle of Maida.... Still, it is easy to understand Compere's frustration when his men having absorbed devastating volleys at one hundred fifty yards, then eighty, then twenty, broke and ran ...... These erroneous conclusions of Dr. Finley and Dr. Long are understandable if one only takes only in consideration Oman's theory (after all Oman is a historian of considerable stature) and ignore the true interpretation of an bataille clearly stated in Reynier's report and also ignores Griois' and Bunbury's narratives clearly stating that the French were in line. Are the so-called revisionist historians who question Oman's theory guilty of misinformation or is it the other way around? Dr. Paddy Griffith, a former senior lecturer at the Royal Academy of Sandhust, was the first English language historian to question Oman's multiple volleys theory in his Forward Into Battle, Battle Tactics from Waterloo to Vietnam, in 1981. Brent Nosworthy in his recent With Musket, Canon and Sword, p. 220: "In his Forward Into Battle, Paddy Griffith has already provided the following passage of Jac Weller's Wellington in the Peninsula, 1808-1814 to demonstrate the tendency to attribute the practice of repeated fire to British infantry of the period. However, this passage so typifies attitudes found throughout many other modern works that perhaps it is not out of place to repeat the quotation in the present work: "The first volley from the First Battalion of the Fiftieth was fired at a range slightly over 100 yards, others followed it regularly at 15 seconds intervals as the range gradually shortened. Slowly, the flanks of the 50th wrapped around the column. The British line was using every one of its muskets; the French could reply with no more than 200 of their 1,200 firearms. General Thomieres, who commanded the French brigade, endeavored to deploy the column to line under fire, but found it impossible. The French recoiled at every volley; they finally and fled to the rear with the riflemen in hot pursuit." From Jac Weller's Wellington in the Peninsula and is his interpretation of the Battle of Vimiero. Perusing the numerous British memoirs and battle accounts that are commonly available, however, we quickly discover that there is little or no basis for the notion that British troops somehow defeated the French utilizing a continuum of well -orchestrated volleys. Only rarely do we find the British infantryman engaged in any type of continuous fire in the manner associated with Frederick's Prussia infantry which, we have already seen, was sometimes imitated by even French infantry during the Napoleonic Era. In fact, the overwhelming body of evidence suggest most convincingly that the recurring British success was due to something other than crushing their opponents by the weight of fire derived from mechanical unleashing five rounds per minute. Weller's account of that Battle has little to do with what took place when one studies the numerous British primary sources! In his Forward Into Battle, Paddy Griffith made the following pertinent comments: "This account bears more than a trace of Oman's musket-counting, and is in fact even more explicit... All in all this account of the action represents a textbook statement of what is today orthodox view. It makes it clear that the French were defeated purely by British infantry fire. The Duke of Wellington (or Wellesley), however, who effectively commanded at Vimiero, did not see things in quite the same light. He said that the French were 'Checked and driven back only by the bayonets of that corps' (i.e.the 50th).." Rifleman Harris who says that the regiment charged grandly and 'The French, unable to bear the sight of them, turned and fled'. Paddy continues: This account does not mention fire any more than the Duke's, but it does make two interesting points. Harris states that the British made a charge and that it was what they looked like which beat the enemy. Harris's account of the battle is confirmed by General Anstruther who commanded the brigade next to the 50th: The 50th Regiment, however, by a very bold attack, defeated the enemy opposed to them, taking all their guns, tumbrills, etc." Forward Into Battle, p. 18) Harris's account is complemented by the reports of two colonels who were involved in the battle. The first one is Colonel Landmann, who was initially posed behind the 50th position. He reports that: (as the French were in the process of deploying some sixty to seventy yards from the British battery) Walkers (the commander of the 50th, JAL) immediately advanced his gallant 50th to the crest of the hill and gave the words, 'Ready, present! and let every man fire when he has taken aim.' This order was most strictly obeyed, and produced a commencement of destruction and carnage which the enemy had not anticipated. Then Walker called out ... 'Three cheers and charge, my fine fellows!" and away went this gallant regiment, huzzing all the time their charge down the hill, before the French recovered from their astonishment at discovering that the guns were not unprotected by infantry. The rush forward was awfully grand; the enemy remained motionless, until our men were within ten to twenty yards from them; then discharged a confused and ill-directed fire from their front ran, for the line had not yet been formed to its full extent, and the rear were already breaking up and partially breaking up and partially running off. The whole now turned round and started off, ever man throwing away his arms and accoutrements..." The key point of the above quotation is that - beside the fire of the skirmishers and of the artillery - only one volley was fired at the surprised French column at close range and followed immediately by a bayonet charge preceded by three cheers. The French, in the process of deploying, were so surprised by the sudden British infantry's fire and their bayonet charges that they simply turned tail and ran. Colonel Walker, who commanded the 50th, tells a similar story, but his account refines Landmann's narrative. At Vimiero, the decisive factor was the volley followed by the bayonet charge. We are far from Weller fairy tale of several volleys following each other at 15 seconds intervals. A pertinent question comes to mind. Where did Weller -- like Oman -- got the data about the several volleys following each other at 15 seconds intervals? Certainly not from primary sources! Griffith did considerable research in the other Peninsular battles using primary sources and comes to the conclusions that: A study of British infantry tactics in the Napoleonic Wars reveals that this reliance upon the bayonet was far from rare. Reports of officer's words at the moment of going into action certainly stress the point. Thus at the battle of Busaco, 1801, Wellington told General Hill: 'If they attempt this point again, Hill, you will give them a volley and charge bayionet. That is conformed by Lt.Col. Mitchell in his Thoughts on Tactics and Military Organization, London 1838: ... a charge of bayonet, - a thing that hurt nobody, but was out of the conventional rules of European warfare - invariably put the whole to flight, thought generally with that might be deemed a trifling loss. This was the constant tale from Vimiero to Waterloo, whenever the French were the assailants; and when the British were the attacking party... A single volley followed by a cheer and a bayonet charge was the decisive factor in most Peninsular battles such as Busaco, Salamanca, etc. Nowhere do we find evidence of multiple volleys. The very same conclusion is reached by Brent Nosworthy in With Musket, Cannon and Sword. The very same conclusions was reached in many past issues of EE&L vol. 1. Even a partisan of Oman's theory David Gates, in The Spanish Ulcer, in his account of the Battle of Talavera, p. 180, has to recognize that the 9th Leger was defeated by a single volley: Suddenly, feeling its way through the dark, the third battalion of the 9th Leger appeared to the left of the British line. Unable to deploy, it was broken by a volley.... Contrary to popular belief, apparently because of the defensive stand at Waterloo, the British were very often on the offensive like at Vitoria, etc. Again primary sources provide us with some interesting facts. At Vitoria, the 88th Foot after deploying into line, continued its advance towards the enemy. At a range of three to four hundred yards the French. (Contrary to Oman's theory, it was standard practice for the French infantry to deploy into line when engaging a firefight.) The French began a running fire: ... As soon as the British regiment had recovered from the shock... they commenced advancing at the double time until within fifty yards nearer to the enemy, when they (i.e. the British.) halted and in turn gave a running fire from the whole line, and without a moment's pause cheered and charged up the hill against them. The French meanwhile were attempting to reload. But being pressed by the British, who allowed them no time to give a second volley, came immediately to the right about making the best of their way to the village. The above quotation is of double interest it gives us an instance in which the French were the defenders - and deployed in line - and a case in which the British were the attackers - also deployed in line - but used their usual tactic: a single volley followed by a cheer and bayonet charge. Let us consider Barosa. Oman leads us to believe in his account of the battle to be found in his A History of the Peninsular War (Oxford, 1902-1930.AMS reprint, 1980, Vol. 4 pp. 117-8: "...Leval's fighting formation was the usual 'column of divisions",: i.e. a front of two companies and a depth of three in each battalion, or (since these units averaged 650 men each, and the companies over 100 bayonets) a front of seventy-two men and a depth of nine... when the columns advanced firing, the skizmisher line had to fall back... A lull followed as the British main line formed up and then advanced slowly. The French marched forward to meet them. Then pp 129- 30, Oman continues: The formation of the French at this moment was an uneven line of four battalion columns, counting them from their left 1/8th, 2/8th, 2/54th, 1/54th, the other two battalions were in reserve... The whole was advancing, but slowly, the battalions in the front line were firing, the centre was a little more to the front than the wings, the 2/8th being ahead of the other battalions because (as its chef de bataillon remarks in his memoirs) he only allowed his men to fire volleys by order, while the units on the right and left were using independent fire... Only one of the French battalion attempted to deploy into line - this was the 2nd of the 54th, which was opposite the British 28th - the other kept on from the first to last in column of divisions. An eye-witness (Surtee of the 95th) remarks They never got into line, nor they did they intend to do so, I believe, but advanced in solid bodies, firing from their front. However, when the French account by Vigo-Roussillon is consulted, one, gets a very different story than that of Oman. ... The Duke of Belluno, (Victor), seeing a squadron of English cavalry in front of us, took it to be the head for a cavalry column. He halted the 8th regiment and a battalion of the 54th and ordered them to form squares. While we were performing this maneuver, the English left wing (its skirmish line , ), led by four light guns, marched toward us. Their artillery, unlimbering at close range, fired canister at our squares... There was some confusion in the French command, and as a result the battalions were slow in getting out of square. Finally the 8th regiment got formed into battalions lines. Vigo-Roussillon continues: ... I had barely formed a battalion in line (en bataille in the French text), with the greatest difficulty, when a cloud of skirmishers was upon us. They preceded a Portuguese unit which charged my unit. I let it advance and ordered to fire at 10 paces. The regiment was annihilated... Finally the British main line attacked, followed by a French counterattack: A line of English infantry advanced slowly on the regiment, halting 0 en to straighten their alignment. The artillery riddled us with canister. The 1st battalion of the 8th was firing as fast as possible. I forbad my men to shoot. When the enemy were very close, and only then, I ordered battalion fire (feu de bataillon). They fell back... Finally Colonel Autie ordered a charge in line (en bataille). On their side the English were advancing toward us. I had my battalion shoulder arms to make sure no one fired until ordered to. The 1st battalion (of the 8th) and that of the 54th advanced slowly and in confusion firing while marching. I saw that these battalions were lagging behind to shoot, and that I was going to find myself alone at close quarters with the English. I had to halt to await them. The English appeared determined on a general charge... Shortly thereafter the British did indeed charge, and the French line, crippled by canister and unsupported by its two reserve battalions, melted away. Vigo-Roussillon was severely wounded and captured. No matter how one slices it, it is difficult to see how Oman reached the conclusion that the French fought from first to last in 'column of divisions'. In the light of the above, we can not accept Oman's statement: Only one of the French battalion attempted to deploy into line - this was the 2nd of the 54th, which was opposite the British 28th - the other kept on from the first to last in column of divisions. Vigo- Roussillon is formal: Colonel Autie ordered a charge in line, So at least two battalions - that of the 8th Line commanded by Colonel Autie - were in line. It is hard to believe that the 2 battalions of the 54th did not deploy. Colonel Autie did not order the charge on his own. He had to be ordered to do so at least by his brigadier (since all 4 battalions charged) and perhaps by Victor himself. Furthermore, the French like anybody else knew that the best formation to engage in a firefight was the line. It is very precisely what the terminology en bataille means! At Barosa the decisive factor - once more - was the final charge of the British infantry after the French infantry unsupported by its own artillery had been disorganized by canister fire and not the British multivolleys firepower. We see little musket firing from the British side while 3 French battalions out of 4 were happily blazing away at the British infantry at long range. At least we have Oman and Vigo-Roussillon on agreement on that point. Vigo-Roussillon knew the futility of long range firing and ordered his battalion to hold his fire until the enemy was at close range, and like the British infantry during the Battles of Maida, of the Peninsula and Waterloo, he repulsed the enemy. Unfortunately, we have to conclude that Oman's version of the Battle of Barosa - like that of Maida - is far to be in agreement with that of Vigo-Roussillon, hence French primary sources. Time and time again it appears that Oman simply ignored - at the very least - the primary sources when in conflict with his theory. In all the first hand accounts we find only one instance in the Peninsula in which the British infantry was forced into a prolonged firefight: at Albuera. After the successful charge of the French, two fresh brigades, that of Hoghton and Abercrombie, were committed to cover the British army flank. Paddy Griffith in Forward Into Battle, p.24-25, comments on the firefight of Albuera: ... With a heavy French infantry colum in front of them, artillery firing grapeshot into them overhead and cavalry threatening their flanks; it's hardly surprising that these troops were unable to achieve a quick decision by a brisk bayonet charge. They did, apparently, edge forward gradually, but "Unfortunately the intervention of a steep but narrow gulley rendered it impossible to reach the enemy with the bayonet, and the 29th [the leading British battalion] was directed to act and open fire" (9. quoted from the United Service Journal, February 1830, p. 207.) It was under these conditions that the famous firefight of Albuera developed. Far from being the chosen tactic of the British it was forced upon them by the circumstances. In the event the two opposed masses of infantry faced each other for about 45 minutes, exchanging shots and suffering exceptionally heavy casualties. Neither side had any offensive impetus remaining into it... The prolonged firefight at Albuera was very costly on both side and resulted in a stalemate which was only broken by the arrival of fresh troops on the British side. That combat is not without similarities with a combat that took place during the Campaign of 1813 in Germany at Bautzen. General Brun de Villeret was ordered to capture a Russian position with two battalions of his brigade. He moved forward and the Russians held their position and a lively fusillade started. Both side, like at Albuera, were locked in the fire fight. Villaret decided to break the stalemate by sending his two other battalions which advanced and the position was carried. The study of the Napoleonic wars outside of the Peninsula shows that numerous firefights developed during the battles between the French, Austrians, Prussians and Russians, etc. These armies, contrary to the British army were still under the influence of the Frederick the Great's school delivering quick successive volleys during a battle. The theory was that the fastest firing side would destroy the lesser capable opponents. Hence the emphasis in the Continental armies on delivering five rounds per minute. That school of thoughts also prevailed in the French army. It is no wonder that, according to some British accounts like that of Colonel Mitchell: The French were always ready to faire le coup de fusil (i.e. to open fire at long range) as they termed it, for hours and days together. But who ever saw them await a bayonet onset? The very fact that Continental soldiers seldom awaited an enemy onset is reported by many historians. General Duhesme, quoted by Nosworthy, pp. 242-3 claims that: he was frequently able to defeat larger Austrian forces deploying in line by charging with three or four battalions in closed columns... Duhesme freely admitted that such a feat certainly was not restricted to French troops. The Austrians were able to rush in their columns and overthrow the French infantry almost as easily. Faced with onrushing Austrian columns, the French infantry would begin to deploy and quickly commence a 'lively fire'. The explanation of such easy defeat was that the defenders opened an ineffective fire at long range which almost invariably failed to stop the assailants. That was the price to be paid by following the 'quick fire' school, the French, Austrians, Prussians, Russians, etc. which was to defend themselves by a succession of quickly delivered volleys. In most cases, the defenders unable to stop the enemy became dispirited and fled upon the approach of the enemy. Rarely - if ever at least in early years of the Wars of the French Revolution and of the Empire - was there any attempt by the armies of the Continental powers attempt to withhold fire until the enemy was very close and countercharge with the bayonet. It should be realized that once more than one volley was fired, the fire fight degenerated invariably into an uncontrolled fire and once the fire became uncontrolled the officers completely lost control of their battalion or regiment. The uncontrollable fire was so feared by some officers and generals that, in French service, it was quite common to prevent the soldiers to load their musket, so they would not stop to fire prior to the contact with the enemy. Many French generals were the partisans of the attack without firing a shot. That was standard practice in the French Imperial Guard. Many commanders among which was Ney commended their troops to shake off the priming of their musket so they could not fire. Such commanders knew that once troops stopped to fire, it was most difficult, if not impossible, to get them moving again. Hence it became almost standard procedure to assault an enemy position without loaded muskets. We find many accounts in which infantry assaults took place with shoulder arms, i.e. without firing a shot, as the enemy 'softened' by artillery fire was in no mood to resist. That is not to say that the efficiency of close range musket fire was not appreciated by some French commanders. The above account of Barosa shows that Vigo-Roussillon taking full advantage of its efficiency. He was not the only one. At Vitoria, at the end of the battle, we find the hard pressed French under General Ferey: ... Deploying seven of his nine battalions into three-deep lines. Ferey posted his remaining troops in squares to cover his wings. Then, from his position on the edge of the Pelagarcia Wood, he poured a volley into the advancing Sixth Division, laying low some 800 men and sending the rest reeling back. (Bates's The Spanish Ulcer, pp.356-7..) Beside firing a single volley we find a full French Division deployed into line for maximum firepower. In this case, the British assault was repulsed. There are other instances of the French being deployed into lines and overwhelmed by a British assault with a single volley, a cheer and a bayonet charge. It is interesting to note that at Maida Reynier issued the orders not to fire to his troops. An order which was ignored. The surprising point is that the 1st Leger fired a volley at close to medium range but did little damage as the shots passed harmlessly over the British infantry- men's head. (Dyneley (Lt.Gen. * ) Letters Written by Lieutenant-General Thomas Dyneley while on Active Service Between the Years 1806 and 1815, London 1984.) pp.9-10 to Captain J.K.Douglas R.A. from Messina dated 14 August 1806.) The fact that the French infantry had a tendency to fire high has been commented on by many primary sources. For instance, Wheeler tells us how at Vitoria that during a British infantry charge that altho they sent us shower of balls and bullets very few done any harm. The very same took place in Germany in 1813. As we began to ascend, the enemy fired one volley, which being ill-directed passed over us armless, or nearly so; and then they abandoned their position. (From Morris Quoted in EE&L 71, p. 31.) Perhaps one of the most striking example is the one reported in EE&L 71 and quoting Hennel at Salamanca: By this time it was quite dark [and] our skirmishers (3rd Cacadores) open upon the brow of the hill and immediately the French returned it which passed mostly over our heads. We had express orders not to fire until ordered. Our regiment was well prepared to give them an excellent charge but they received another lesson that afternoon that they will not forget in a twelve month. Had they stayed til we came up twenty yards further they might have given us a most destructive volley but they fired a volley or two that passed mostly over our heads and then they ran away. Of course, the British and Portuguese were not always that lucky, as we have seen above, when at Vitoria Ferey's 9 battalions inflicted 800 casualties to the British Sixth Division and send the rest reeling back. There are many instances in which the soldiers of other Continental armies fired high in many battles, such as the Russians at Austerlitz, etc. The facts show that the British infantry was not plagued by poor fire efficiency at short (or any) range like the Continental infantries were at one time or another as it is shown time after time by the numerous British eyewitness accounts which consistently comment on the devastating effects of British volleys. Brent Nosworthy, p. 195 claims the following: The difference in the accuracy of the musket fire between the two arch rivals is attributed to the British infantry's heightness awareness of the importance of properly leveling their muskets and their increased ability to successfully implement these practice under fire. The fact was that the French for a number of reasons usually aimed their muskets higher than the British. We don't have the space to fully debate the question here. In addition, the French tactics did not depend as the British tactics did on a single efficient volley. That is a subject in itself that is well covered in With Cannon, Misket and Sword. Conclusion As it has been said in many past issues of, we have to conclude that the French were constantly defeated in the Peninsula by the British infantry ability to hold its fire until the enemy came to close range and counter-attacking with a single - often devastating - volley followed with plenty of cheering and a bayonet charge. It did not matter if the French were in line like at Maida or in column like at Vimiero, etc. In addition, there are no primary sources to substantiate the multivolley theory in the defeat of the French at Maida and in the Peninsula? A theory so dear to Oman and part of the established standard belief of many historians. A belief we are sorry to say is based on falsehood. The notion that the French army fought exclusively in closed columns is so far removed from the events that occurred on the battlefield during the 1805, 1806 and 1807 campaigns one wonder how much of an effort, if any, did those subscribing to the 'column only' theory of French grand tactics make to understand the French army's performance during these, the most notable of Napoleon's campaigns! When forced into battle, the French armies exhibited a much greater flexibility on both the tactical and grand tactical levels than acknowledged by such simplistic representations. (With Musket, Cannon and Sword, Brent Nosworthy, pp. 124-5.) Back to EEL List of Issues and List of Lochet's Lectures Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1995 by Jean Lochet This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com