When Napoleon reached Paris on December 18, 1812, he knew that he had suffered great losses during the retreat of Russia but did not yet know the magnitude of the disaster. He still hoped to rally the Grande Armee at Vilna. Napoleon kept this state on mind until the final returns of January-February reached him. Then, he had to face the facts. His Grande Armee had simply ceased to be an effective fighting force! Even the Guard was in a sorry state. All the arms had suffered greatly. The French infantry contingent-some 36 Line and Leger regiments (156 battalions) which had numbered 107,097 men in June 1812, was reduced to a mere 6,436 as of February 1, 1813! Yet, the French line cavalry was even worse. Entire regiments had simply ceased to exist while others were reduced to a few men, mostly officers and NCOs. The Cuirassiers regiments had suffered the most and several of these regiments had no one to answer the roll calls. The Light Cavalry fared no better with the notable exception of Marbot's 23rd Chasseurs. General Bourcier in a report dated February 1, 1813, to Clarke Napoleon's Minister of War: ... They might as well have excluded the cavalry from the inspection. The survivors of 1812 are too few to bother counting." The Guard cavalry was in slightly better shape than the line cavalry. Yet, out of the 5,996 officers and troopers of the 6 main regiments that entered Russia in June 1812, only 125 Polish Lancers, 31 Dutch Red Lancers, 260 Chasseurs A Cheval, 120 Dragoons and 127 Grenadiers A Cheval answered the roll calls at Posen, on January and February 1813. It is estimated that over 175,000 trained horses perished during the Campaign and retreat from Russia in 1812, representing an irreplaceable loss from which Napoleon's French army would neverrecover. However, if the majority of the cavalry horses had been lost, there were some 9,000 to 10,000 dismounted horsemen that had survived the ordeal. The line cavalry regiments that had entered Russia in June 1812 were: Hussars regiments: 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th and 11th, Chasseurs a Cheval regiments: 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 11th, 12th, 16th, 19th, 20th, 23rd, 24th, and 25th, Dragoons regiments: 7th, 23rd, 28th and 30th Chevau-Legers Lanciers regiments: 1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th, 6th and 9th. Cuirassiers regiments: 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th and 14th, Carabiniers regiments: 1 st and 2nd. And the above list did not include the cavalry regiments of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw and of the allies of the Confederation of the Rhine. Practically speaking all these regiments, with the notable exception of the Marbot's 23rd Chasseurs a Cheval, had to be rebuild and reorganized from scratch for the Campaign of 1813. The major problem was that it takes several months to form a competent horseman, months to train a horse, when numerous competent cadres were available which was not the case in 1813, since there was a shortage of competent officers and NCOs. The rebuilding of the Grande Armee, and especially of the cavalry, faced immense problems. Of course there were veteran cavalry units left in Spain consisting of Chasseurs a Cheval, Hussars and Dragoons, as well as the 13th Cuirassiers. However, the bulk of these units was needed in Spain and could only furnish limited help in the form of cadres. The Rebuilding of the Guard Cavalry Napoleon had not waited to know the state of the army to begin the process of rebuilding the Grande Armee. On January 6, 1813 the Emperor wrote Duroc: "I have ordered the thirty regiments in Spain to furnish 20 men each, and I have called another 200 for the Gendarmes d'Elite. I believe the Mameluks can be recruited from their children at Melun and Marseilles. As for horses, we are still short a thousand. You must see the Minister ... and choose the best from the departmental requisition." The cavalry Guard regiments were to be rebuilt around the few survivors of the retreat and cadres were requested from the cavalry units and depots in Spain, Germany, France and Italy, and 3000 officers and NCOs were also taken from the Gendarmerie. In addition, old retired horsemen were asked to rejoin the army and their response was very good. Most of these veterans were used as cadres to rebuild the Guard cavalry which was to a certain extent given priority over the line cavalry. All available cadres for the Guard were sent to the depots at Gotha and Fulda. General Walther took 1,000 dismounted officers and men to Fulda where he was ordered to organize 4 squadrons with horses donated by the Princes of the Confederation of the Rhine. Several cities and departments near Paris also sent cavalry contingents which, for political reasons, were incorporated into the Guard forming "Young Guard Squadrons" in the Grenadiers a Cheval, Chasseurs a Cheval, Dragoons and Lancers. The Paris contingent of some two fully equipped squadrons strong totaling 500 men and horses were incorporated in the 2nd Guard Lancers. In February, General Barrois took with him five squadrons of assorted horse Guards, each trooper led an extra horse fully harnessed and equipped for the still dismounted troopers in Fulda. Each Guard cavalry regiment was to be extended to a full brigade including a Young and an Old Guard regiment. However, the necessary funds were lacking. Napoleon began to finance the rebuilding of the Guard out of his own pocket. As of April 15, 1813, he had given the Guard 7 million francs. Yet, the money was still tight. Lefebvre-Desnoettes complained that he no funds to buy horses for his Chasseurs a Cheval who were gradually increased to 2,441 officers and men, including 5 Young Guard squadrons. The 1st Lancers was reorganizing at Friedberg around the survivors of the Campaign of Russia, 500 picked Polish lancers from Dombrovski's Division, the survivors of the 3rd Lancers and the company of Lithuanian Tartars, with horses contributed by the Princes of the Confederation of the Rhine in addition to 600 horses purchased in Hanover. The 2nd Lancers was also increased to some 2,400 and, like the Chasseurs, also included 5 Young Guard squadrons. A 6th Young Guard squadron of 300 horses was attached to both the Grenadiers a Cheval and the Dragons. The Gendarmes d'Elite ranks were increased by 200 national gendarmes. A 2nd Gendarmes d'Elite was also raised. A third of his 640 newly recruited horsemen were required to speak German. All these paper numbers were impressive, but to put all these new units in a fighting shape was going to take time. A resource that was more in short supply that any of the others. In addition, as early as January 6, 1813, Napoleon had decided to raise some Gardes du Corps, which were to become the Guards of Honor. The candidates, who had to provide their own horses, uniforms and equipment, were to be offered a commission after 12 months of service. These regiments were organizing as it follows: 1st Guard of Honor: Versailles 2nd Guard of Honor: Metz 3rd Guard of Honor: Tours 4th Guard of Honor: Lyon But all these new Guard cavalry units were far to be operational when the operations in Germany resumed in April 1813. Practically none of the 25 Young Guard squadrons were yet operational as of April 25, 1813. The active, operational cavalry of the Imperial Guard, as of April 25, consisted of 18 1/2 squadrons and 3272 horsemen. The Rebuilding of the Line Cavalry Napoleon intended to reconstitute the 52 regiments of the late Grande Armee in 2 Corps under Latour-Maubourg and Sebastiani, that is some 3 Heavy and 4 Light Cavalry Divisions. The cadres were to be provided by the survivors of the Campaign of Russia, the depots, the recalled veterans and by some cadres from cavalry units from Spain and other parts of the Empire. Considering the lack of trained horses and the shortage of cadres it was a very ambitious project. At the beginning of 1813, the cavalry depots in France were full of the conscripts of the class of 1812 and the premature levy of 1813. The first group was only half trained and the second group had just began their training. There was no time to train these recruits in the depots and 2,600 of these raw recruits were sent to Metz and Germany to be organized in fighting units. On February 6, 1813 Napoleon ordered Clarke, to organize a 3rd Cavalry Reserve Corps to be under the command of Arrighi de Casanova. Arrighi set up his headquarters in Metz and, like Latour-Maubourg and Sebastiani began the patient task of organizing the small groups of horsemen from fragments of units and various detachments and raw recruits not yet part of any regiment. One can easily imagine the challenge for these commanders to train and organize such a large numbers of recruits into combat ready squadrons, regiments and brigades. We can not put the emphasis on the facts that while an infantry conscript can be turned into some sort of shape within a few months, a cavalry recruit took considerably longer to train to a reasonable standard. All that being done in spite of shortages of all sorts among which that of competent cadres and horses (let alone trained horses) were certainly the worse. Initially, some of the new troopers were barely capable of staying on their mounts during maneuvers. Rigo--a well known French historian--called that that newly raised cavalry the "patratas cavalry" since as soon as it was mounted it was down again! However, several hours of drill a day resulted in steady progress. The result was that, at the beginning of the campaign in April, most of Napoleon's new line cavalry regiments, which had been in existence for a few short weeks, could only field an understrength squadron. Great difficulty had been encountered in procuring the great number of horses required to rebuild the line cavalry. Many of the traditional remount sources in Prussia and central Germany, because of the events, were progressively shut down for the French army. However, some 7,000 to 8,000 saddle horses were directly purchased on the markets. Generals Bourcier and Preval on Napoleon's orders provided 5,200 horses for the Cuirassiers, 2,400 for the Dragoons and 14,000 for the Light Cavalry. Additional contracts were to be made for additional purchases: 6,000 in Warsaw, 2,700 in Posen, 3,000 in Glogau, 3,500 in Berlin, 3,200 in Hamburg, and 3,200 in Hanover. Despite the great efforts of Generals Bourcier and Pr6val, only 12,000 replacement horses could be raised in Poland and Hanover. Some 3,000 more were provided by the depots in France, 22,000 were donated by local authorities and an additional 15,000 bought. All other sources were tapped. An additional 4,000 horses were transferred from the gendarmerie. Finally a grand total of 64,000 was reached by requisition. The big problem was that only the 3,000 horses provided by the gendarmerie had been properly trained as well as very few horses from the depots. Unfortunately, these horses would arrive in the depots at a very slow rate and the problem lasted throughout the entire campaign. In May, when the need for additional cavalry was very severe many new regiments were still without mounts. On March 31, Prince Eugene told Napoleon that Bourcier still had some 6,000 dismounted cavalrymen awaiting horses. The equipment, saddles, weapons, etc. to equip all these new regiments was also slow to arrive. In addition some of that new equipment was of low quality as the produced quantity was increased by some manufacturers at the detriment of quality. In addition, a large number of conscripts had never seen a horse and in addition to learning how to become efficient horsemen and the basic of drills and survival, they also had to learn how to take care of their mounts. The poor caring of horses was to be a rising problem in 1813. Then, all the reasonably trained cavalry had to take the field as the new Grande Armee was forced into action in early April. The available cavalry ready to take the field were far below the reasonable cavalry needs of any army. Napoleon had been able to reconstitute the infantry of the Guard and of the line organized in some 11 army Corps plus the Guard. In April, he was able to concentrate a new Grande Armee some 250,000 men strong but he was growing increasingly concerned about the weakness of his mounted arm. Not only the shortage of cavalry was robbing him of detailed knowledge of the enemy moves and strengths, but the enemy's cavalry had begun to harass the French columns as they moved forward, causing unnecessary losses, delays and confusion among his green troops. Napoleon was well aware of the negative consequences that his lack of cavalry caused. In a letter to the King of Wurttemberg, he wrote: "I would find myself in a position to finish matters very quickly if only I had 15,000 more cavalry; but I am rather weak in that arm." Napoleon was right in his assessment of the situation. Matters would have been settled quickly if had had sufficient cavalry to pursue the defeated Allies after Lutzen and Bautzen. He would have preferred to wait another month, until May, before resuming the operations as he was (optimistically) expecting an additional 30,000 horsemen to join the army by that time. But what was the cavalry situation in the Grande Armee at the end of April? The returns show the following: ARMY OF THE MAIN Marshal Soult, Duke of Dalmatia 3rd CORPS: 7 squadrons and 1217 men 4th CORPS: 4 squadrons and 965 men 6th CORPS: No cavalry had yet joined the Corps IMPERIAL GUARD: 18 1/2 squadrons and 3272 men Total 29 1/2 5454 ARMY OF THE ELBE: Prince Eugene de Beauharnais, Viceroy of Italy 5th CORPS: No cavalry yet available. 9th CORPS: 2 squadrons and 278 men IMPERIAL GUARD DIVISION: Italian Guard Cavalry: 2 squadrons and 212 men 1st RESERVE CAVALRY CORPS: 24 squadrons and 2854 men. 2nd RESERVE CAVALRY CORPS: Thus Napoleon started the spring Campaign of 1813 with: Army of the Main: 29 1/2 squadrons 5454 horsemen Army of the Elbe: 2 squadrons 212 horsemen 1st Reserve Cavalry: 24 squadrons 2854 horsemen 2nd Reserve Cavalry: 21 squadrons 2570 horsemen That is a total of 74 1/2 squadrons and 11, 090 horsemen. At that time the Prussian and Russian cavalry numbered no less than approximately 25,000 regular cavalry, 11,000 Landwehr cavalry and 14,000 Cossacks. At Bautzen, additional troops were available. Both Reserve Cavalry Corps had been reinforced. The 1st Reserve Cavalry corps had been increased to 6,114 men and the 2nd Reserve Corps now included 2752 men. However, the French cavalry was much too weak to protect the new Grande Armee communications and the raids of both the Cossacks and of the Prussian Landwehr cavalry were raising havoc in the French rear. It resulted that the already understrength French supply system-because of the shortage of horses--could not assure the supplying of the Grande Armee. After Bautzen, Napoleon realized that it was impossible to go on as he had stretched his supply resources to the limit. Supplies were captured or prevented from reaching his army by the numerous enemy cavalry. Strategic consumption became too great. Hence Napoleon became favorable to accept an armistice. In Correspondance 203 98, a letter to Clarke dated June 2, Napoleon justifies his decision: "You will see in the Moniteur that an armistice is about to be signed today or tomorrow... This armistice will interrupt the course of my victories. Two considerations have made up my mind: my shortage of cavalry, which prevents me from striking great blows, and the hostile attitude of Austria." The spring campaign lasted only from April 25 to June 2. Although the French had had the upper hand, both sides desired a break to bring reinforcements. It is true that if Napoleon had had sufficient cavalry especially after Bautzen, the Allies would have been decisively defeated. Unger, a pro-Austrian historian wrote in Histoire Critique des Exploits de la cavalerie, the following on the 1813 spring campaign: The battle planning, the courage and the excellent troop morale as well as the ground where the combats were to take place, everything appeared to forecast great success for the Russo- Prussian cavalry, or, at least, to achieve locally some brilliant actions; and yet nothing of the sort took place. The Allies tried to claim some alleged triumph during that campaign, yet an impartial look at history only show defeat: the Allies objective was not reached; their cavalry, especially, did not accomplish anything decisive, and suffered heavy losses without accomplishing anything. THE ARMISTICE Both sides used the armistice to reinforce their armies. The siding of Austria with the Allies considerably worsened Napoleon position in Germany, as it added no less 127,000 additional troops into the scale. Napoleon had considerably reinforced his army and especially his cavalry as it can be seen from the returns of August 15, 1813: Imperial Guard: 1st Cavalry Guard Division: 22 squadrons, 4,028 men 2nd Cavalry Guard Division: 24 squadrons, 4,984 men Guards of Honor: 20 squadrons, 5,037 men 1st Corps: 4 squadrons, 83 5 men 2nd Corps: 6 squadrons, 781 men 3rd Corps: 11 squadrons, 1,659 men 4th Corps: 8 squadrons, 763 men 5th Corps: no cavalry 6th Corps: 8 squadrons, 907 men 7th Corps: 13 squadrons, 1,521 men 8th Corps: 6 squadrons, 1, 182 men 9th Corps: no cavalry (5th bis Reserve Cavalry Corps attached) 11th Corps: 7 squadrons, 1, 165 men 12th Corps: 10 squadrons, 1, 187 men 14th Corps: 12 squadrons, 2,231 men 1st Reserve Cavalry Corps: 84 squadrons, 17, 472 cavalrymen 2nd Reserve Cavalry Corps: 52 squadrons, 10,353 cavalrymen 3rd Reserve Cavalry Corps: 27 squadrons, 7,278 cavalrymen 4th Reserve Cavalry Corps: 24 squadrons, 3,968 cavalrymen 5th Reserve Cavalry Corps: 21 squadrons, 5,408 cavalrymen 5th bis Reserve Cavalry Corps: 17 squadrons, 3,841 cavalrymen Army of Italy: 26 squadrons, 4,916 cavalrymen. So, Napoleon's cavalry now numbered 394 squadrons and 79,516 horsemen. There were additional cavalry reinforcements on their way to reach the Grande Armee. Even, with that considerable increase in strength the French cavalry arm remained dangerously weak in quality since many its troopers were novice horsemen. Yet that cavalry performance on the battlefield, was worthy of praise as the French cavalry generals constantly over achieved in spite of all the handicaps. The greatest handicap of that young cavalry was to be unable to provide the much needed information on the enemy and adequate scouting, which had disastrous consequences especially at the Katzbach and at Dennewitz. Back to EEL List of Issues and List of Lochet's Lectures Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1995 by Jean Lochet This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com