A great deal has been written on the Campaign of 1813 but very little on the true reasons behind Napoleon's defeat during that bloody Campaign in which a second Grande Armee was lost in 2 months. [1] The main reason to Napoleon's defeat at Leipzig was caused by an unsolvable logistic problem that led to an unsustainable rate of strategic consumption during the fall campaign of approximately 1,700 effective a day, which compounded with the battle losses weakened the Grande Armee. We have covered these reasons in a paper called: "On Logistic and Strategic Consumption, The reasons Behind Napoleon's Defeat in 1812." The original Grande Armee had practically disappeared in the snow of Russia in 1812. If the losses in infantry and artillery were quickly compensated by some drastic measures. It was not the same for the cavalry. It takes a great deal more time to train a horseman (as well as horses) than to drill an infantryman in a reasonable fighting shape. The French cavalry had to be rebuild from scratch for the Campaign of 1813. The problem was that it takes several years to form a competent horseman, months to train a horse, even when competent cadres were available which was not the case in 1813. Since there was a shortage of competent officers and NCOs, it took longer to teach the new horsemen to learn their trade. It is estimated that Napoleon lost in Russia no less than 175,000 trained horses, representing an irreplaceable loss from which Napoleon would never recover. [2] The line cavalry regiments that had entered Russia in June 1812 were: Hussars regiments: 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th and 11th, Chasseurs A Cheval regiments: 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 11th, 12th, 16th, 19th, 20th, 23rd, 24th, and 25th, Dragoons regiments: 7th, 23rd, 28th and 30th Chevau-Legers Lanciers regiments: 1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th, 6th and 9th. Cuirassiers regiments: 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th and 14th, Carabiniers regiments: 1st and 2nd. All these regiments, with the notable exception of the Marbot's 23rd Chasseurs A Cheval, [3] had practically ceased to exist. They had to be rebuild and reorganized from scratch. We should point out that above list did not include the cavalry regiments of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw and of the allies of the Confederation of the Rhine. However, if the majority of the cavalry horses had been lost, there were some 9,000 to 10,000 dismounted horsemen that had survived the ordeal and had to be remounted. The Guard cavalry had fared a little better than the line cavalry but was far to be in a good shape. Out of the 5,996 officers and troopers of the 6 main regiments that entered Russia in June 1812, only 125 Polish Lancers, 31 Dutch Red Lancers, 260 Chasseurs a Cheval, 120 Dragoons and 127 Grenadiers a Cheval answered the roll calls at Posen, in January and February 1813. [4] The reorganization of the Guard cavalry was to a certain extent given priority over the line cavalry and most of the surviving veterans were used as cadres to rebuild it, the Guard Cavalry. Some 4 regiments of newly raised Guards of Honor with an effective strength of 2500 men each were to be added to the Guard. Great difficulty had been encountered in procuring the great number of horses required to rebuild the line cavalry. Many of the traditional remount sources in Prussia and central Germany, because of the events, were progressively shut up for the French army. However, some 7,000 to 8,000 saddle horses were directly purchased on the markets. In addition 5,200 horses were provided for the Cuirassiers, 2,400 for the Dragoons and 14,000 for the Light Cavalry. Despite the great efforts only 12,000 replacement horses could be raised in Poland and Hanover. Some 3,000 more were provided by the depots in France, 22,000 were donated by local authorities and an additional 15,000 bought in different places. All other sources were tapped. An additional 4,000 horses were transferred from the gendarmerie. Finally a grand total of 64,000 was reached by requisition. The big problem was that only the 3,000 horses provided by the gendarmerie had been properly trained as well as very few horses from the depots. The equipment, saddles, etc. to equip all these new regiments was also slow to arrive. In addition some of that new equipment was of low quality as the produced quantity was increased by some manufacturers at the detriment of quality. In addition, a large number of conscripts had never seen a horse and in addition to learning how to become efficient horsemen and the basic of drills and survival, they also had to learn how to take care of their mounts. The result was that, at the beginning of the campaign in April, when came the imperative and urgent need to field all available cavalry as the new Grande Armee was about to take the field, most of Napoleon's new line cavalry regiments, which had been only in existence for a few short weeks, could only send an understrength squadron. [5] As it can be seen, the effective of the line cavalry ready to take the field were far below the reasonable cavalry needs of any army. Indeed that newly formed cavalry was a shadow of what it had been prior to 1813! CAVALRY EFFECTIVE IN APRIL 1813 1. CAVALRY OF THE IMPERIAL GUARD Units : Squadrons : Effective 1st Guard Cavalry Division: General Lefebve-Desnouettes 1st Polish Lancers 3 531 2nd Red Lancers 4 706 Lancers of Berg 1 185 Total 8 1422 2nd Guard Cavalry Division: General Walther Chasseurs a Cheval 4 745 Grenadiers a Cheval 3 545 Dragoons 3 507 Gendarme d'e1ite 1/2 53 Total 10 1/2 1850 II. ARMY OF THE MAIN Marshal Soult, Duke of Dalmatia III CORPS: Cavalry brigade: General Lariboissiere 10th Hussars, 1st, 2nd, 3rd squadrons 3 717 Baden Light Dragoons, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th squadrons 4 500 Total 7 1217 IV CORPS: Cavalry brigade ? [6] 2nd Napolitan Chasseurs a Cheval 1st-4th squadrons 4 965 VI CORPS: No cavalry had yet joined the Corps IMPERIAL GUARD (see details above) 181/2 3272 Total 291/2 5454 III. ARMY OF THE ELBE: Prince Eugene de Beauhamais, Viceroy of Italy V CORPS: No cavalry yet available. XI CORPS: Cavalry brigade ? 4th Italian Chasseurs a Cheval, 1st squadron 1 139 Wurzburg Chevau-legers, 1 squadron 1 139 Total 2 278 IMPERIAL GUARD DIVISION: Italian Guard Cavalry Tuscan Guards of Honor 1/2 53 Turin Guards of Honor 1/2 67 Italian Guards of Honor 1/2 23 Italian Guard Dragoons 1/2 69 Total 2 212 IV. I RESERVE CAVALRY CORPS: General Latour-Maubourg 1st Light Cavalry Division: General Bruye'res 1st Brigade: ? 7th Hussars 1 116 9th Chasseurs (Lancers) 22 8th Hussars 1 99 7th Lancers 28 16th Chasseurs a Cheval 1 125 2nd Brigade: General Cambares 1st Lancers 1 129 3rd Lancers 1/2 60 5th Lancers 23 8th Lancers ? ? 2nd Light Cavalry Division: General Chastel 1st Brigade: General Van Merlen 6th Chasseurs a Cheval 1 151 25th Chasseurs a Cheval 1 109 6th Hussars 2 168 8th Chasseurs a Cheval 1 83 Portuguese Legion Chasseurs a Cheval 1/2 71 2nd Brigade: General ? 9th and 19th Chasseurs a Cheval detached 2nd & 3rd Italian Chasseurs a Cheval 1 93 1st Chasseurs a Cheval 1 121 2nd Chasseurs a Cheval 1 88 3rd Chasseurs a Cheval 1/2 47 1st Cuirassiers Division: General Burdesoulle 1st Brigade: General Berkheim 2nd Cuirassiers 1 151 3rd Cuirassiers 1 110 6th Cuirassiers 1 105 2nd Brigade: General Quinette, 9th Cuirassiers 1 173 11th Cuirassiers 1 135 12th Cuirassiers 1/2 82 3rd Cuirassiers Division: General Doumerc 1st Brigade: General Thouard 4th Cuirassiers 1/2 43 7th Cuirassiers 1/2 56 14th (Dutch) Cuirassiers - 26 2nd Brigade: General ? 7th Dragoons 1 119 23rd Dragoons 1 125 28th Dragoons 1 119 The Armistice The armistice provided for both sides much needed time to reorganize their armies. As planned Napoleon greatly increased his forces and especially his cavalry. On August 15, the Grande Armee aligned a field force total of 473,277 men under arms and 1262 guns (559 battalions and 400 squadrons). The cavalry had been considerably increased and as of August 15, represented 15.7% of the field army effective. A sharp increase over the small 6.5% shown by the Grande Arm6e returns of April 25. The I, II, III, IV, V and Vbis Cavalry Reserve Corps were now operational. Their effective present under arms were: 1st Reserve Cavalry Corps 18,440 2nd Reserve Cavalry Corps 10,898 3rd Reserve Cavalry Corps 7,663 4th Reserve Cavalry Corps 4,249 5th Reserve Cavalry Corps 5,503 5th bis Reserve Cavalry Corps 3,841 Total 50,594 Guard Cavalry 14,049 Grand total 64,643 The cavalry of the Corps was much weaker and consisted of: 1st Corps 835 2nd Corps 781 3rd Corps 1,659 4th Corps 763 5th Corps none 6th Corps 907 7th Corps 1,521 8th Corps 1,182 9th Corps none 11th Corps 1,165 12th Corps 1,187 14th Corps 2,231 Total 12,231 The grand total of the Grande Armee cavalry under arms was 76,874 horsemen A great deal of nonsense has been written about the French Grande Armee cavalry of 1813 considering all its regiments as untrained cavalry. Nothing is further from the truth. In fact, on August 15, you'll find 2 types of cavalry, the recently re-raised regiments (which often had the problems on the battlefields) and the veteran cavalry (Chasseurs, Hussars and Dragoons) recently withdrawn from Spain. We find the veteran cavalry mostly in the III, IV, V and Vbis Reserve Cavalry Corps, while the I and II Reserve Cavalry Corps were mostly formed of newly raised squadrons (in different state of training) among which were the re-raised Cuirassiers and Carabiniers. The IV Reserve cavalry Corps was made exclusively of Polish troops. The artillery also considerably increased its strength and practically provided each Corps with the ideal 2 artillery foot companies per Division. [7] Each cavalry Division was also provided with a horse battery. The effective of the Guard had also been significantly increased. The Old Guard cavalry was reinforced by the newly raised Young Guard squadrons, which, of course, were not as good as those of the Old Guard, but were very well trained, as they had very good cadres and were able to make brigade maneuvers. However the 5,037 Guards of Honor were practically useless. [8] The Operations after the Armistice The hostilities resumed on August 15. Austria had declared war on August 12 and now Napoleon had to face 155,000 Russians, 180,000 Prussians, 25,000 Swedes, 30,000 Germans and 130,000 Austrians as the armistice had allowed the Allies to considerably increase their effective which were approximately: Nation Total effective Cavalry Austrians 132,000 22,000 Russians 168,000 44,500 Prussians 182,000 29,000 Swedes 24,000 5,000 Total 506,000 100,500 Napoleon had also considerably increased his effective but was to face the Allies with less numerous troops, i.e. a deficiency of 160,000 infantry, and 40,000 cavalry. In addition Beningsen in Poland was organizing a reserve army some 80,000 strong. In spite of considerable efforts, Napoleon had not been able to increase his supply trains to the necessary level. That fact alone was heavy of consequences as it led to an unsustainable rate of strategic consumption. Simply Napoleon soldiers operating among hostile population and a devastated country were not properly fed. That shortage of transport was aggravated by the fact that the French cavalry, like during the spring campaign, was still unable to protect the Grande Armee's communications. The Allies adopted the Trachenberg plan which recommended: (1) to avoid engagements with Napoleon unless very advantageous circumstances (2) and instead to concentrate on Corps commanded by Napoleon's subordinates. That strategy did not prevent the Allies to get a sound trashing at Dresden on August 26 and 27 in which the French cavalry was particularly efficient in pursuing the defeated Austrians left. However, Trachenberg plan worked well soon after with the disaster of Milm, Ney's defeat at Dennewitz, Macdonald on the Katzbach, and Oudinot at Gross Beeren. The Grande Armee was starving as the bread ration was constantly decreased and further decreased. Battle losses compounded with the high rate of strategic consumption were eviscerating the Grande Armee Napoleon lost an average of 1000 men a day to non-battle during the second half of month of September. October was even worse since the losses to strategic consumption rose to 1,700 a day! During the 30 days preceding the Battle of Leipzig, the Grande Armee lost in excess of 40,000 men in non-combat. The operations continued for the next 3 weeks. The Allied strategy of refusing to fight him when ever he was present while keeping pressure on his unenthusiastic subordinates was paying dividends. Napoleon had to cancel his plans and compelled to rush from one sector to another to help his marshals. These maneuvers were exhausting his underfed troops and achieving very little beside increasing his losses through strategic consumption. The military situation had deteriorated so much and became so severe because of the lack of adequate food supplies that Napoleon realized that he had to contract his front. [9] He decided to contract his front and withdraw the troops west of the Elbe, keeping only 7 strong bridgeheads. [10] But by doing so he gave up his main advantage over the Allies: his superior maneuvering. The Emperor still expected to defeat the Allies in detail as he expected the contraction of his front to led the Allies to make some kind of a mistake which he would take immediate advantage. In his mind, a victory could still change everything. On September 2 Napoleon decided in moving north to defeat Blucher and Bernadotte and to change in base of operation to Leipzig. He decided to leave St. Cyr's XIV Corps with Lobau I Corps at Dresden. So far Napoleon had lost in one way or another some 150,000 men and 300 guns. After deducting the garrison of Dresden, he still had some 260,000 men and an important artillery of 784 cannons, but his army was ill fed and that fact was taking a terrible toll! The Allies effective, far superior to his, increased daily while his dwindled daily in a greater proportion. [11] Napoleon's communications were through the fall campaign constantly harassed by the operations of partisans who displayed the greatest activity. So serious the problem and the loss had become that drastic measures had to be taken. On September 8, the Emperor told Pire to careful scout around Bautzen and clear the Cossacks that were disturbing the communications around that city. On September 11, Lefebvre-Desnoui~ttes [12] was ordered to clear the Cossacks and others. He was reinforced at Freiberg by 4,000 sabers from generals Pire's and Valin's brigades where he was on the 14th . [13] He was further reinforced by 1,500 infantry and 2,000 cavalry under Lorge which were withdrawn from Ney. A Division of Victor's II Corps was also ordered to Freiberg. The cavalry was to sweep the all country west of the Elbe in the rear of the army. Margeron, the governor of Leipzig was to also help. Finally, Augereau on September 17, was ordered to march with his IX Corps, less one Division reassigned to the I Corps, from Wurzburg by Coburg to Jena to keep open the crossing over the River Saale and protect the rear of the army. [14] Thielmann and Mensdorf, after the Allies were informed of the unprotected state of the French communications, were sent to operate on the Saale and between Leipzig and Erfurt, that is deep in the French rear, against the French convoys and reinforcements. Their force consisted mainly of Cossacks. On September 12, Thielmann was at Weissenfels were he captured 1,000 prisoners and 26 guns, and seized the defile of Kosen. On the 18th he took Merseburg and 2,000 prisoners. Mensdorf acted with the same activity, cutting off convoys, etc. It was against these two that Lefebvre-Desnouettes was sent. The Allies free corps were reinforced by 7 regiments of Cossacks under Platov. These, on September 28, with Thielmann, attacked Lefebvre-Desnouettes at Altenburg, defeated him and captured 1,000 prisoners from his command. Another raid was made again Kassel, in the north by Czernitchew who, with 2,300 Cossacks and other cavalry and 6 guns, crossed the Elbe. He dispersed 2,000 French infantry took 6 guns and convinced the garrison of Kassel to surrender, effectively ending the Kingdom of Westphalia. We can go on and on with such examples. [15] Then Napoleon concentrated his maneuvering army around Leipzig. Originally he never had the intention of fighting a decisive battle at Leipzig but had planned a drive against Schwarzenberg main army after he had defeat Bernadotte and Blocher in the north. The battle of Leipzig was preceded by the combat of Lieberwolkwitz (13/14 October) between Murat's command (IV Corps, and I and III Reserve Cavalry Corps). It was an indecisive combat. The result was the battle of Leipzig in which the outnumbered French cavalry behaved brilliantly. It consisted of: Guard 7,159 1st Reserve Cavalry Corps 8,000 2nd Reserve Cavalry Corps 6,000 3rd Reserve Cavalry Corps 4,000 4th Reserve Cavalry Corps 2,250 5th Reserve Cavalry Corps 5,160 Total 32,569 I have been unable to come with an exact figure on the Allies cavalry effective at Leipzig but evaluated that cavalry to double that of the French. However, by October 18, after three days of furious combats, Napoleon had contained the efforts of the Allies, and inflicted them greater casualties than he had suffered. On the eve of October 18, at 7pm, Generals Sorbier and Dulauloy commanding the artillery of the Guard and of the Grande Armee, reported the consumption of ammunition during the day to Napoleon: some 95,000 shots had been fired, the reserves were exhausted and only 16,000 shots remained, that was approximately two hours of fire. In five days, the Grande Armee had fired 220,000 shots and the ammunition supply could only be replenished at either Magdeburg or Erfurt. For the first time the Grande Armee's artillery had not enough ammunition. [16] Therefore, it had become imperative to get the army close to one of these magazine. [17] With his artillery ammunition virtually exhausted, Napoleon had not the means to continue the battle of attrition against increasing Allied forces on such a restricted front. His effective was reduced to less than 200,000 troops with no reinforcement in sight--and he had to face the Allies armies numbering at least 300,000 and which were constantly receiving fresh troops. [18] The only possible solution was to withdraw from Leipzig. Napoleon opted to retreat via Erfurt. The resulting retreat from Leipzig was another disaster and the Grande Armee could not stand at Erfurt. During the retreat the remaining cavalry was very active in securing the army retreat. The Guard cavalry played a significant role at the Battle of Hanau. Napoleon had lost Germany. Some 150,000 soldiers retreated from Leipzig. Approximately 115,000 reached the Rhine and were further decimated by the typhus. Conclusion In 2 months, Napoleon had lost another Grande Armee and Germany. There is little doubt that the lack of sufficient cavalry during the spring campaign prevented Napoleon to achieve decisive results destroy his enemies after his victories of Lutzen and Bautzen. The Campaign of 1813 could have ended right there! As a matter of facts, after these battles the Allies were almost to the point of total collapse. Napoleon was forced at that point to accept an armistice in order to reorganize his army and significantly increase his cavalry. However he failed by far to reach parity in cavalry with the Allies and like in the spring campaign could not protect his communications. In the spring the supply system, combined with the lack of cavalry, was completely unable to supply the Grande Armee with ammunitions and sufficient food and that led to a very high strategic consumption rate. The situation did not improve during the fall campaign and that single fact caused Napoleon's defeat. The Grande Armee dreadful strategic consumption forced Napoleon to reduce his front, hence giving up his main trump: his superior maneuvering. Once that advantage could no longer be a factor, it was only a matter of time before the Allies effective superiority would trap and simply overwhelm the French army in a decisive battle. That took place at Leipzig. The 1813 Campaign was characterized by extensive incursions by large bodies of cavalry in the French rear, which was a rarity during the Napoleonic wars. These raids were rendered possible by the help the sympathetic populations gave the raiders in the form of foods and information. The invading Allies could not continue that practice during their invasion of France precisely because of the hostility of the French population. Footnotes [1] The rebuilding of the French Grande Armee for the Campaign of 1813, is remarkably covered by Scott Bowden in Napoleon's Grande Armee of 1813, EHQ, 1990. [2]Bowden, Napoleon's Grande Armee of 1813, Emperor Press, 1990, pp. 18-19. [3]Marbot's brought back from Russia some 693 horsemen of all ranks. Marbot's The Memoirs of Baron de Marbot, Longinans, Green and Co, London, 1893, p. 604. Marbot's figures are confirmed by French archives documents. [4] That weakness was never remedied, and Chandler, p. 868, estimates that "no small part of Napoleon's eventual failure in 1813 was due to his understrength cavalry force. It [5] Most of these newly raised regiments could only field a single weak squadron well below strength in April 1813. Napoleon began the spring campaign with only 53 1/2 squadrons and 8520 horsemen. [6] As of April 25, the other cavalry regiments to be part of the IV Corps were still organizing along the Elbe River. [7] The regulations called for a Corps artillery reserve consisting of 2 foot batteries of 12pdr and 1 horse battery of 6-pdr. Each foot battery consisted of 6 6-pdr guns and 2 5 1/2in. howitzers plus at least a Reserve foot company of 6 12-pdr and 2 5 V2in. (or 6 in.) howitzers. [8] That was the opinion of Generals Ornano and Nansouty. The newly raised Guards of Honor were, in August 15, considered as raw recruits. [9]See Chandler, pp.915-6. [10] Some depots were also sent back further to the rear, closer to the French border. The general cavalry depot was ordered to relocate towards Fulda. It consisted of 8,000 men, 6,000 horses and a large amount of equipment. That large column extending for miles was further enlarged by the inclusion of convoys of sick and wounded. It attracted bands of lawless deserters who attacked the drivers, stole the equipment and horses and sell them to people in the countryside. General Noirot, without gendarmes and proper escort was powerless to control the situation and stop these abuses. He bitterly complained in a letter to Berthier dated September 20. Archives Historiques. [11] The decision to leave a garrison at Dresden immobilized a substantial number of troops whose presence on the northern battlefields could have been invaluable and perhaps decisive. Anyhow, the substantial part of his already weakened forces left at Dresden reduced his force of maneuver to a little more than 260,000. Perhaps at Leipzig that additional force would have made a difference. [12] Correspondance 20,543. [13] Correspondance 20,562. [14] Correspondance 20,576. [15] Some are related by Napoleon himself in Correspondance 20,595, prescribing increased precautions against surprise attacks. [16] There is little doubt that the lack of adequate transportation played a role in that shortage. [17] Correspondancc No.20 830, Bulletin de la Grande Armee, Erfurt October 24, 1813. [18] Chandler, p. 924, etc. Back to EEL List of Issues and List of Lochet's Lectures Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1995 by Jean Lochet This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com