The Armies of the Revolution and the Divisional System
The armies of the Revolution kept the Divisional organization and
consequently the brigade subdivision. On January 1st, 1791. a new regulation
reorganized the French army. [1]
The regiments of all arms, infantry, cavalry, artillery, etc., gave up
their old names and took a number, which reflected their seniority. (1. The
line regiments had 2 battalions each, 8 fusilier and 1 grenadier companies.)
The elimination of the traditional Provinces which were replaced by 89
departments forced a reorganization of the Military governments siege of the
Permanent Divisions. The old military governments based on the Provincial
organization were disbanded on February 25, 1791 and replaced by 23 Divisions
Militaires. each including entire departments. The changes were territorial
rather than organizational. Each new Division Militaire was still under the
command of a lieutenant-general assisted by 2 or 4 marechaux de camps.
[2] (2. Belhomme, Vol.111, pp. 456-7)
The headquarters of these Divisions were located at: 1st, Lille; 2nd,
Chalons; 3rd. Metz: 4th, Nancy: 5th, Strasbourg: 6th, BesanQon; 7th Grenoble;
8th Marseille: 9th, Montpellier; 10th, Toulouse; 11th.. Bordeaux; 12th,
Nantes; 13th, Rennes; 14th, Caen; 15th Rouen; 16th, Arras; 17th, Paris; 18th,
Dijon*, 19th, Lyon, 20th, Angouleme; 20th, 21st, Bourges. 22nd, Tours: and
23rd, Ajaccio (in Corsica). That new organization recognized that the borders
with Spain and Sardinia were as secure as they had been in the past. So was
Britanny, etc. The defensive priorities remained the same. Any major threat
would come from the North-East border. Consequently on that frontier 2 large
military commands were organized plus one in Normandy, to be under a Marshal
of France like in the previous organization of 1787. The 14th (Caen) and 15th
(Rouen) Military Divisions were under the command of Marshal de Mailly; 2st
(Lille) and 16th (Arras): Marshal de Rochambeau; 2nd, (Chalons) 3rd (Metz) and
4th (Nancy): Marshal de Bouille.
The Assembly on March 3, 1791, disbanded all the Provincial troops [3] (3. Traditionally the Provincial troops had
been the army reserve in case of war. Belhomme. p.457) with the exception of
the Provincial Corsican Regiment. [4] (4.
Corsica previously considered as a Province was reorganized as a single
department. However, that regiment was also disbanded on June 3, 1791 and his
effective used to form a Division of gendarmes now in charge of the service on
that island.) In spite of the menace of war, that measure had been adopted by
the Assembly purely on a political basis but effectively reduced by 132
battalions the effective force of the country! [5] (5. That mass of trained soldiers and cadres was the main source of
manpower for the volunteers of the 1st ban. )
In the mind of the Assembly, the Provincial troops were replaced by the
National Guard (Garde Nationale) which had formed spontaneously everywhere in
France after the events of July 14, 1789. [6]
(6. The National Guard was legalized by the Assembly. The recruitment of that
militia was organized by a decree of April 28, 1791. The National Guard is not
to be confused with the volunteers of the 2nd ban. Belhomme p. 459.)
The Decrees of June 13 and 21, and of July 3, 1791 are at the origin of
the National Guard volunteer battalions. Already (49. Belhomme p.465), before
June 13, some patriots had begin to organize a few units to reinforce the
frontier, one was organized on May 27, at Dijon and another one on June 3, at
St.Amand. [7] (7. These were the National
Guard volunteers of the 1st ban.) In agreement with the decree, the first
battalions of volunteers were composed of 10 companies at 50 men each. On
October 1st, 1791, a total of 84 battalions joined the army. They were only to
serve until December 1, 1792.
Revolutionary France prepared for war after Austria and Prussia declared
they were ready to join other Powers to restore the authority of the French
monarchy. Consequently a decree of December 14, 1791, organized three armies
for the defense of the northern and eastern frontiers. They were: Army of the
North (Armee du Nord), Army of the Centre (Armee du Gentre and Army of Rhine (Armee du
Rhin). These armies were composed of regiments of the old regular army
transferred from different parts of France in order to face the potential
foreign threats. Consequently, the permanent Divisions were short of effective
and their brigades had to be reorganized. Already, on February 4, 1791, the
Assembly had taken measures to forward the Divisions on the North and Eastern
frontiers some 30 infantry regiments on war footing completed to an effective
of 750 men per battalion. In addition, the arsenals were ordered to furnish
some 97,913 muskets to arm the National Guard of that border.
The morale and organization of the regular army regiments were strongly
undermined by the political clubs advocating open rebellion against any kind
of previously established authority. 'Phis brought virtual anarchy in many
regiments. The desertion rate increased. That disorganization, in June, 1791,
combined the development of the political events occasioned by the flight of
Louis the XVIth (the King was arrested at Varennes) was the cause of the
emigration of many aristocratic officers. For instance, all the officers of
the 1st of the Line in garrison at Dunkerque emigrated taking with them the
regiment flags. However, many nobles more or less accepted the Revolution
remained in the army [8] (8. We find
numerous nobles in the ranks of the army like Lafayette, the members of the
military committee, etc. willing to serve and remain the army, but the
increase suspicion forced many of them to emigrate.) but the net result was a
shortage of cadres [9] which was going to
affect the army for years to come. (9. The shortage of first lieutenant was
considerable and filled by NCOs.)
In addition, since some 33% of the recruits had traditionally come from
Paris and its suburbs and higher pay was offered in the volunteers units, the
recruiting for the regular army fell to insignificant levels. The army's
ranks were short of some 67,000 men, consequently many regiments were
understrength.
The Assembly was now forced by the events to raise a total of 169
National Guard battalions. The irony of the situation is that many ex-
Provincial militiamen became part of these new National Guard battalions.
[10] (10. It would have been simpler to
keep that organized militia and simply change its name. But political reasons
had already taken precedent on logic.) But these new National Guard
battalions feel short of the ex-Provincial militia standards. As these new
battalions elected their cadres, they were initially undisciplined. They
could keep order in France but were far to be trained and organized as a
regular army.
The Assembly on July 22, 1791 decreed that the effective of the
National Guard of the frontier departments would be increased to 97,000 in
addition to the 26,000 that have been previously mobilized.
[11] (11. Belhomme p. 466-7.) These
National Guards were to garrison all the fortresses on the frontiers in
order to relieve the regular army from that duty.
To add to the turmoil [12] (12. see
Belhomme P.464.) caused by these events, the Assembly on July 21, 1791,
decreed that the foreign regiments (German, Irish, and Waloon) were not
integral part of the French army. Only the Swiss regiments were now
considered as foreign troops.
The Preparation of the Army for War of 1792
The Wars of the Revolution started on April 20, 1792 after the French
Assembly declared war on Austria. However the French army, which had been
disorganized by the revolutionary and above lacked homogeneity and cadres, was
a shadow of what it had been only 3 years back. The effective and the officers
cadres [13] (13. That was due to the
resignation of a number of officers and the emigration of many others) of the
regular armies were well below normal strength. Nevertheless, in spite of the
emigration, lack of trust, constant harassment from the Convention, etc. it
is the loyal officers of the ex-Royal army that held the army more or less
together during the first battles against the Austrians and Prussians. [14] (14. Colonel Elting, p. 29)
In an attempt to correct the effective situation, the Assembly voted the
raising of more Volunteers [15] (15. Many
English language authors, like Colonel Rodgers in Napoleon's Army, do not
distinguish the difference between the volunteers of the 1st ban and that of
the 2nd ban, and claim that all were untrained and undisciplined mobs;
frequently gallant, but liable to dissolve in panic-stricken flight." (Rogers,
p. 9.)
The volunteers of the 1st ban were not untrained and undisciplined mob
that we are led to believe. They had been well drilled as per the Reglement of
1791, but for the lack of trained cadres, lacked homogeneity. It is true that
in January 1792 most volunteers battalions of the first ban were undisciplined
but so where many battalions of the regular army. However, by the time of
Jemappes and Fleurus that was no longer the case. Even at Valmy, Kellerman's
regulars and volunteers of the first ban had recovered from their earlier
undiscipline and were steady troops. However, Rogers' comments are applicable
to the volunteers of the 2nd band until they were amalgamed.)
The Divisions and the Brigades in the Early Armies of the
Revolution
The War Minister returning from an inspection trip along the North-East
border reported the situation to the Assembly on January 11, 1792. 240
battalions were concentrated between Dunkerque and Besangon; but as it was
necessary to keep 88 of them to garrison the fortresses, only 172 battalions
remained to organize the armies and with a strength of only 75,000 men because
most of these battalions had an average of only 500.
As early as January 16, 1792, the minister presented his recommendations
to the Assembly. The volunteer battalions were a constant source of
undiscipline mostly because of the election of their commander. As the
effective of the regular army decreased every day, the minister recommended
that in order to obtain a solid and effective army, the only possible solution
was to incorporate the battalions of volunteers into the regular army. That
proposition raised an intense and passionate discussion which showed that the
majority of the Assembly was hostile to the army and was thinking more on
disbanding it rather than increasing it! [16]
(16. Belhomme p. 485).
Carnot declared in the name of the military Committee, that it was
mandatory to accelerate the time when the Line troops would intermix with the
volunteers. Aubert-Dubayet suggested to brigade the line battalions with that
of the volunteers, that is to place them side by side without incorporating
them. That means was rejected by the Assembly which closed the debate on
January 22 by voting that the Line troops could never be recruited among the
volunteers.
Nevertheless, the War Minister fully realizing the needs of the army,
discarded the Assembly vote prohibiting the integration of the volunteers into
the regular army. He took back Aubert-Dubayet's idea when the volunteers were
brigaded with the Line battalions and placed under the command of the
colonels. These colonels were given the power to remove from command the
incompetent officers of the volunteers battalions. It was a step in the right
direction. [17] (17. Kellerman before the
Battle of Valmy, had decided to brigade one regular battalion with 2
batailions of volunteers.)
Already on July, 3, 1791, a decree had put all the regiments on war
footing by increasing the effective of each battalion to 750 men.
Unfortunately the effective of the French army were some 67,000 men short.
[18] (18. Belhomme p. 466)
The Line regiments were unable to send 2 battalions on war footing to
the armies because of severe shortage of effective. The minister on March 15, 1792
decided that each regiment would send its 1st battalion and the grenadier
company of the 2nd battalion increased to full war footing with the men of
the second battalion which was to remain in garrison as a depot company and
train new recruits.
A new decree of May 5, 1792 decided that 31 new battalions of
volunteers would be raised and that the 74 existing battalions would be
increased by 124 men, to 698 men. But a new decree dated May 14 increased the
effective of these battalions to 800 men. The departments were responsible to
furnish the necessary manpower to increase the effective of these battalions.
But the war was on since April...
On June 27, the Minister reported to the Assembly, that only 19,315 men
were missing to bring the Line infantry to full strength. However, the
volunteers battalions were short of some 79,274 men and none of the volunteer
battalions had yet reached the 800 effective called for by the decree. In
addition 30 battalions had not yet been formed.
In 1792, in the different new armies, the brigades were organized as
much as possible with 2 line battalions and 2 battalions of volunteers [19] (19. These were volunteers of the first ban.
Most of them came from the disbanded Provincial regiments and already had some
military training and quickly became valuable troops. They should not be
confused with the rabble of the second ban. [20] (20. Belhomme, Vol III, p. 495.) Each line battalion of volunteers was
brigaded with one of the line and the colonel of the regiment commanded both
battalions. The battalion of grenadiers of the brigade had 6 companies, 4 of
the line and 2 of the volunteers. [21] (21.
The battalions of volunteers were only 574 strong, their effective reduced by
the grenadiers and the gunners, were considerable less than the line
battalions. Consequently, to occupy the same frontage, they deployed on 2
ranks, while the line battalions and the grenadiers deployed on 3 ranks. Then,
as soon as the volunteers battalions were increased to 800 men, they deployed
on 3 ranks. [22] (22. Belhomme, Vol. III,p. 495.)
The War of 1792
The Wars of the Revolution started on April 20, 1792 after the French
assembly declared war on Austria. The campaign was to be open by the invasion
of Belgium. The operation was badly organized with forces much too weak with
too many volunteers battalions still poorly trained and with too few trained
cadres. On April 29, 1792, two columns starting from Lille and Valenciennes
panicked at the view of the enemy and routed. [23] (23. Belhomme p.490)
Phipps, in his very reliable The Armies of the French Revolution, [24] (24. Vol. 1, p. 91, Phipps was quoting a
multitude of French sources.) relates the routing of the 3rd columns:
"...Stopping short of Mons, Biron decided to retire.... Then a panic
occurred amongst Biron's cavalry and on the 30th April at Qievrian his troops
broke and fled for Valenciennes. In neither his cases nor that of Dillion, had
the enemy been in presence of the affrighted troops."
Note that the route was initiated by a panic that developed in the
cavalry part of the regular army! After that event the Degrave, the War
Minister resigned and was replaced on May 9 by Colonel Servan.
It is interesting to note that the old Marshal Rochambeau, the well
known commander of the French expeditionary force during the War of the
American Revolution, had disagreed on an offensive on the ground that his
troops mostly regulars - were too green and unsteady for such operations. He
recommended to remain on the defensive until the troops were more battle ready.
The Divisions and Brigades in the Early Armies of the Revolution
The new early Revolutionary armies, i.e. 1792-3, were far from as
organized as that of the old regime. These armies, beside
undiscipline, suffered from chronic disorganization from top
to bottom because of the shortage
of cadres, (the losses of officers due to the emigration had not yet been
compensated for) chronic lack of supply. The emigration and removal of numer-
ous senior officers among which were no less than 593 generals, had ruined the
old staff system. Their replacement (some 700 officers) lacked the necessary
training and were unable to cope with the emergency. So, when the war came in
April 1792, the 3 armies were completely lacking the necessary co-ordination
and leadership to be successful. Since there was no generalisso [25] (25. The
Constitution of 1793 reflected that point of view and was to plague the Revo-
lutionary armies until Bonaparte's Consulate.) these 3 armies operated inde-
pendently by "remote control" from the Committee of Salut Public in Paris. So,
the army commanders did not cooperate during the first months of the war with
the exception of Dumouriez commander of the Army of the North assisting Kellerman
commander of the Army of the Center in stopping Brunswick advance at
Valmy. [26] (26. see EE&L 2)
It would be hard to recognize in these 3 armies the old permanent
Division organization with fixed, well trained effective, which does mean
that the organization by Divisions and brigades was given up. On the
contrary we witness a clear will to stick to the Divisional system. The only
difference is that the effective and the composition of these
brigades/Divisions were in constant fluctuation and numbered a great many
volunteers.
It would take a book to cover accurately the pertinent changes that took
place in the French army organization since 1789. Surprisingly, in spite of
what has been written in many English language sources [27] (27. For instance see Rogers Napoleon Army.)
at the beginning of the Campaign of 1792, the volunteers of the 1st ban were
not untrained. They had from 8 months to year of training according to the
Reglement of 1791 and, when properly commanded and supported by regular troops
and artillery [28] (28. The artillery in
which the majority of the cadres were of humble origin was largely untouched
by the Revolution and did not have to absorb large numbers of volunteers.)
they were fairly good troops. They were even capable of deploying - under fire
- from columns to line at the Battle of Jemmapes [29] (29. See Nafziger, p. 136. In addition the Battle of Jemmapes is
extensively covered by Jonquieres La Bataille de Jemmapes and Colin.) and hold their
own. It is true that on many occasions the volunteers - as well as some
battalions (or cavalry regiments) of the regular army
[30] - would bolt at the first volley.
Nafziger, p. 139 resume the situation very well: (30. The overall quality of
the cadres had greatly diminished. Time was necessary to reach the standards
of the old royal army and train the new officers and NCOs..)
..."It is not the military instructions or knowledge of the theory of
maneuvers, but the unit's cohesion or collective courage that permits a unit
to face enemy fire. The year of 1793 was a year of training for the new French
army and by 1794 they were capable of engaging in sustained fire fights."
[31] (31. The Volunteers of the 1st ban
had been drafted for only a year and from the end of 1792, and after the
Battle of Jemmapes, complete companies and battalions went home greatly
reducing the number of trained soldiers in the 3 armies.)
The tragedy was that the volunteers of the 1st ban were required to
serve only for a single campaign. Consequently, these volunteers considered
themselves in December 1792 free and whole companies and battalions simply
went home. In October 1792 there had been 100,000 French in Belgium and in
December only 45,000 remained.
The highly patriotic volunteers of the 2nd ban were not as good material as
those of the 1st ban. [32] (32. Kellerman
said "They may be lions, but they run like sheeps. Phipps.)
But anarchy can last for so long and the need to go back to the old
disciplined ways became apparent even to the Committee of Salut Public. The
French army had become a of regulars, volunteers, federals, legionary and free
corps units differing in everything from uniform to organization, etc. The
first amalgame in late 1793 early 1794 combining the remaining veterans of the
old army with the recruits and volunteers into new regiments now called demi
brigades [33] took care of that. It had been
ordered by a Decree of January 28, 1794 but it had already begun in 1793 as we
have seen above. At first one regular battalion was "amalgamed" with two
volunteer battalions to form a 3battalion demi-brigade. These demi-brigades were
classified as line (ligne) or 1egere (light) depending on the origin of its regular
battalion. [33]
All men were to have the same uniform, identical pay, etc. all the
recruits were sent to the demi-brigades instead of forming new units. The legions and
free corps were to be disbanded and their troops incorporated into the light
infantry, and their cavalry into the light cavalry. As they more volunteer
battalions than regular battalions, some 14 demi-brigades were formed with
volunteers only. Each demi-brigade was to have a 6 4-pdr gun company manned by
specially trained infantrymen. The demi-brigade legeres had no artillerv. [34] (34. Elting,
p. 33, Belhomme, Vol. IV. p. 68 etc.)
Approximately starting in July 1794, it can be said that the army of the
Revolution instead of being composed of a number of incongrous units, now
possesied regiments and ressembled in organization the armies of other nations
(35. Phipps, Vol.II, p. 180.) That is well illustrated by Jomini [35] (35. Jomini, Vol. VI. p. 36) referring to the
Battle of the Roer "..the Republicans offered the spectacle of an army of
100,000 men, manoeuvering with as much order and precision, and ready to
charge the enemy."
At the same time the Divisional system was formally reinforced. As
before, [36] one or more brigades with
artillery and cavalry formed a Division on a much more permanent basis.
(36. The composition of the Divisions varied as will see later.)
Several Divisions formed a field army [37]. In 1794, there were 11 such armies. (37. These
field armies included also a variable number of Divisions in function of their
mission. Carnot devised army and Divisional staffs on a regular pattern,
allocating varying numbers of Adjudants-Generals (staff officers) to command-
ers according to their grade and size of their armies. For instance, a Divi-
sional General was allocated 5 Adjudants-Generals and 5 ADCs or assistants.)
The Convention had to put down revolts in several parts of France [38] (38. see
EE&L 3 for the uprising in the Vendee. so it needed troops everywhere in the
interior of France. The Directory that followed the Convention did not feel
anymore secure and always kept for its safety considerable effective back in
France, just in case.
Some Armies and Divisional Organization in 1794
The Year 1794 saw a rebuilding of the French army by the amalgame or
consolidation of army whih had become a jumble of regular, volunteers,
federal legions and free corps units. All wearing differing in uniforms and
unit organization. [39] (39. Elting p. 33, Belhomme, etc.)
There were 11 field armies as well as an army of the interior. The 3
largest armies were concentrated in the North and North-East. The largest was
the Army of the North, which in theory numbered 245,822 a figure far from
that on September 1st, 1794 (after it was broken down to form the famous
Arw6e de Sambre-et-Meuse, with additional elements from Ardennes and
Moselle). That of the Moselle 102,323 and that of the Rhin (Rhine) 98.930. The remaining
armies, Alpes, Ardennes, Italy, Pyrenees, and Cotes ( of the Coast ) had a
paper strength varying between 22,000 and 60,000 men.
Let us take a look at the organization of the Army of the North as
of September 1st, 1794. [40] (40.
Phipps Vol.1, p. 324 and notes from French archives.)
As we'll see later, the above organization of an armly is typical. An
army was formed of several Divisions, with the Divisional strengths varying
significantly. However, all the Divisions were a mixture of infantry, cavalry
and artillery. The strength of 68,868 is that of 2 to 3 average corps in
Napoleon's army. In 1794, we find several armies operating on or between the
Dunkerque and Switzerland, Nord, Ardennes, Moselle and Sambre-et-Meuse. New
armies could be formed in function of strategic or political considerations.
In addition, armies could change name. For instance Sambre-et-Meuse, as seen
above was formed of detachments from Nord, Ardennes and Moselle. That new army
under Jordan was forcing the Austrians over the Rhine, after it had defeated
the Austrians at Fleurus [41] on June 24,
1795. (41. See EF&L 7, pp.17-25. Actually Jordan's new Sambre-et-Meuse army at
Fleurus was, as seen above, made from forces from Nord, Moselle and Ardennes.
The order of battle in EE&L 7 gives the compositions of these forces.)
In taking a look at the French order of battle at Fleurus [42] (42. See EE&L 47.) on is surprised to find
out that the some of the brigade included some cavalry, which was not
operating per cavalry brigades as one could believe. In addition, some
brigades still included some volunteer battalions.
In 1795, 2 French armies were in the Rhine area, Sambre-et-Meuse, still
under Jourdan was operating around Coblenz and Rhin-et-Moselle under Pichegru
in Alsace.
The Armies and Divisions Organization in Other Campaigns
The 1st Amalgame or Amalgamation ordered under Robespierre's
dictatorship had been somewhat mishandled. There were approximately 209 line
and 42 16g&re demi-brigade and the losses due to desertion, combat, sickness,
lack of replacements, etc. had reduced many of then from their original 2400
effective to 300 or even below that figure. Only the newly formed demi-brigade
were close to full strength. Consequently, in early 1796, the Directoire
ordered another amalgamation to consolidate their forces. The 2nd amalgamation
was not fully completed until 1799. The infantry was reduced to 110 line and
30 legere demi-brigades and the strength of each battalion increased to 1.067
officers and men. The demi-brigade artillery company was reduced to 2 or 3
guns. [43] (43. Elting, p.39, Belhomme, etc.)
The composition and armies as well as that of Divisions varied greatly and was in a constant state of fluctuation to face various threats and imperatives during the Wars of the Revolution. But the basic Division remained the same. As seen previously, it consisted of 2 or more) infantry brigades, each consisting of 2 demi-brigades [44] (44. In some cases infantry brigades included 3 infantry regiments.), one or two regiment of cavalry, artillery...
The Division strength varied greatly as it will be seen below. In 1796, Massena's Division of the army of Italy numbered 13,000 men while in 1800, Pully's Division in the Grisons numbered only 3,035. Perhaps, the greatest variation can be found in Jourdan's command during the Campaign of 1799. The Directoire became conscious that War with Austria, once more had become inevitable. An ambitious strategic plan was developed by the Directory and Jordan involving the "Army of Italy" [45] (45. The Directory used 116,000 men in Italy, the active army "Italy" being 62,000, with 20,000 in the fortresses and 34,000 in Rome, Ancona and Naples. Why bury 34,000 troops in the southern part of Italy to conquer Rome and Naples while the fate of the country was going to be decided in the north? Phipps, Vol.V. p.22.) Jourdan was to be the spearhead to operate in the north in Germany.
The Directory had promised Jourdan some 48,000 men and assured him that the offensive would
have 100,000 men provided with a park of artillery, magazine of provisions etc. His left flank was to be protected with an army of observation under Bernadotte of some 38,000, while Massena with some 24,000 men was to operate in Switzerland and protect his right. But at the opening of the campaign, Jourdan's command included only 36,994 men and the army of observation under Bernadotte supposed to protect his left flank was only 10,000 and much too weak to do anything significant but demonstrations. [46] (46. 38,000 troops under Bernadotte would have forced the Austrians to detach an important part of their force and given Jourdan a chance to succeed.)
Jourdan should have resigned but what concern us here is the composition of his army. A quick look at the Jourdan's Army of the Danube [47] (47. Etat de Situation de l'Armee du Danube, 1er. Mars 1799, traceable to the French archives. Jomini, Vol.XI, p. 96.) composition on March 1st, 1799, i.e. at the beginning of the campaign, shows a total of 4 Divisions, 1 flanking brigade (under Vandamme) and a Cavalry Reserve of 3,265 (under d'Hautepoul).
From this, it's easy to see that Jourdan's Divisions were a shadow of
what a Division should have been ( compare the above strengths with that of the
Army of the North in 1794). A Division was to include at least 2 infantry
brigade each at 2 demi-brigades. Hence it should have at least 4 demi-brigades
per Divisions. His infantry numbered only 20,494! Approximately the infantry
effective of a large French Corps of 1805-1806. If the inept Directory had
kept his promises to provide Jourdan with 48,000 troops most of these Divisions
should have had at least an additional infantry brigade or the infantry
battalions brought up to strength. No wonder that Jourdan was overwhelmed.
Similar weak strengths are unfortunately found in other armies like the
Army of Italy. The result was in 1799, failure in critical areas like Italy
and Germany. The inept Directory had simply failed to keep the army up to the
task of defending France efficiently. [48]
(48. See Phipps, vol V., final Chapter called "Brumaire".)
The Earlier Attempts to Organize Army Corps
The first attempt to organize army Corps was made by Moreau in May 1796,
when he took command of Rhin-et-Moselle in replacement of Pichegru. Prior to
that date, an army consisted in a number of Divisions never grouped to operate
together except for some special mission. Moreau began to reorganize his army
in three Corps and a small reserve. The right wing now included 2 Divisions
under Ferino (20,366 men), the center under Desaix, which was going to become
the left wing, was 17,334 strong also included 2 Divisions, that of Desaix and
Delmas, and the left wing, which was going to become the center, was under
Saint-Cyr (Saint-Cyr, Taponier and Duhesme Divisions) and included 19,939 men.
The reserve included a small infantry force and a "reserve cavalry"
Forest's heavy cavalry, 7,464 strong [49]
(49. Only the heavy cavalry regiments were grouped, the rest, Hussars,
Chasseurs and Dragoons were distributed among the Divisions. Phipps, Vol. II, pp. 272-273.) Rhin-et-Moselle had a field strength of 65,103, not including a force at
Philippsburg, and the garrisons of Strasbourg and other fortresses, which
numbered and additional 12,120.
For the Campaign of Germany in 1797, Hoche reorganized his army of
Sambreet-Meuse on the same basis after receiving reinforcements
[5] (50. His reinforcements included
8,000 men from the troops used for the invasion of Ireland and 2 Divisions
from the AMY of the North, that of Macdonald 10, 704, and Watrin 9,403.) By
ADril 1797, his army had an effective strength of 78,000 present under arms
[51] (51. The nominal strength was about
103,000, but 8,700 were in hospital, and 3,000 were prisoners in the hands of
the enemy.) and organized the 6 fighting Divisions in 3 formations (left,
center and right) that we can call army Corps. [52] (52. Phipps, Vol.II, pp.413-4) Lefebvre commanded the right wing
which included his own and Lemoine's Divisions with the Chasseurs A cheval
Division of Richepanse, totalling 19,191 men. Grenier commanded the center
consisting of his own and Olivier's Divisions, with Ney's Hussar Divisions in
all 16,596 men. The left was under Championnet who had his own beside
Bonnard's Division and Klein's Dragoons totalling 18,564 men. The cavalry
reserve and the whole cavalry was under D'Hautpoul. Watrin commanded the
infantry reserve and Colaud the 2 Divisions that of Macdonald and Watrin,
totaling 20,107 men. [53] (53. Phipps, Vol.II,
p.413-4)
In the above examples, we are not yet speaking of a true Napoleonic
army Corps, since these early corps organization was somewhat different: (1)
each Division included a significant force of cavalry and (2) Each Corps had
not his own commander with his own staff and hence was less flexible than the
later Corps. The commanders of these early corps retained charge of their own
Division, the senior general of brigade replacing them at the command of the
Division when necessary [54] (54. Phipps, VoI.II.
p.414).
Phipps (Vol. II, p.273 and also Jomini) points out that: "... not only the
jibbing Saint-Cyr, but Desaix and Ferino also, were horrified at the idea of
commanding anything except their divisions, and they remonstrated. Moreau held
firm, and the advantages of the system were soon too manifest even for the
scruples of Saint-Cyr to last."
We could point out here that the importance of the Division subdivision
in an army Corps was not grasped by the Austrians in 1809. They failed to
provide their Division commanders with a staff comparable to that of the French army.
Conclusion of Part II
We have seen how the permanent Divisions already incorporated the 3 arms
(infantry, cavalry and artillery) under a single command led to the embryonic
sort of "army corps" of Moreau and Hoche and that the organization of armies
like Rhin-et-Moselle, Sambre-et-Mbuse already strongly suggested the
organization of the Grande Arw6e into army Corps [55] with its cavalry reserve, etc. (55. According to Chandler,
(Dictionary of Napoleonic Wars, p. 108) the army Corps system had proved to be
"a preeminent executive instrument of French conquest and military success.")
Slides
PART 1: THE DIVISIONAL SYSTEM FROM THE SEVEN YEARS WAR THROUGH THE
EARLY REVOLUTION (1795)
The Seven Years War was one of the most fertile periods for drastic
organizational and tactical changes concerning the conduct of warfare.
During the Seven Years War, on the battlefield, armies were usually
deployed in two lines each consisting of two deployed lines of infantry with
the cavalry covering both flanks.
The system was plagued with problems among which was the lengthy deployment
of an army from several columns.
Frederick's army had attained such rapidity and precision that it could
deploy from several columns by simultaneous wheels in a relatively short time.
That precision and speed of movement had allowed Frederick to use his
famous oblique order at Prague, Leuthen and Rossbach etc.
The Development of the Divisional System
The French, like the other Europeans, were at a serious disadvantage
when facing the Prussians.
To compensate, the French began to multiply the number of troop columns
entering the battlefield in order to reduce the time and distance for their
deployment.
The famous Bourcet organized the French army to move along several
parallel axis.
The successful operation led to the full development of the Divisional
system, the first attempt at organizing an anny into permanent Divisions of
all arms, which was introduced in the French Army in 1759.
The system was set up by the famous instructions given by Marshal de
Broglie before the Campaign of 1760. In these instructions, de Broglie
stipulated that the army will be divided into 4 Divisions during the campaign.
Each Division would be composed of a quarter of the brigades. Each Division
would be commanded by a lieutenant-general appointed for the complete campaign
who will have other generals under him.
The cavalry protecting each wing became part of the Divisions.
Each Division was subdivided into at least 2 brigades each formed of 2 regiments.
Thus, the army now marched in 6 columns (1 per Division) instead of the
previous 2 or 3 columns of the old system. It resulted in a much faster
deployment and the system was retained throughout the campaign. We should not
forget that the Divisional system was an attempt to compensate for the
mediocrity and slowness of the French in deployment.
The creation of the permanent Divisional system is one of the
greatest innovations in the history of warfare.
The next logical development was a separate body of men that acted
tactically on its own during the battle. That, of course, provided far greater
tactical flexibility to the line of battle which was previously so rigid.
Further Developments of the Divisional system after the Seven Years
War
The Divisional system became the basic permanent organization of the
French army after that war. Marshal de Broglie became its chief advocate.
The Divisional system was officially sanctioned by the Ordinance of March
25, 1775. Belhomme reports:
"All the troops were formed in permanent Divisions, each one commanded by
a "lieutenant-general" and several "marechaux de camps". The lieutenant-
general was expected to be with his Division in April and May and again in
September and October. He had to review his troops in September. The
marechaux de camps served by semester, half from January 1 to June 30 and
half from July 1 to December 31; they had to review their commands twice
during their semester.
The troops were organized into 16 Divisions each consisting of
infantry regiments, cavalry and dragoons. That organization was very good
since it provided direct contact between the generals and their troops."
The Effects of the War of the American Revolution
A new Reglement was introduced in the French army on June 1st, 1776 which
introduced many of Guibert's ideas including the close column (colonne serree)
as the only formation to maneuver.
During the Seven Years War, the great debate between the partisans of the
ordre mince (thin linear order) led by Guibert and the ordre profond (columns) led by
Mesnil-Durand and supported by de Broglie, intensified.
After the war, Mesnil-Durand and his partisans attributed the numerous
defeats suffered by the French army to the ordre mince and the dependence on
firepower. They claimed that with the ordre profond these defeats would not have taken place.
The trials of Mesnil-Durand's system took place at the Camps de Vaussieux
in Normandy between Bayeux and Courcelles-sur-Mer following the entry of
France into the American Revolutionary War early in 1778. An army had been
assembled there not only to defend the province but also to threaten an
invasion of Great Britain if the Franco-Spanish fleets proved successful.
Some 44 battalions of infantry organized in 11 brigades, 6 regiments of
dragoons in 4 brigades, and a large train of artillery were assembled there
under the command of Marshal de Broglie.
The troops were drilled according to the Mesnil-Durand
System.
The inherent deployment problems of Mesnil-Durand's system quickly became
apparent in the series of trials conducted at Vaussieux and the system lost
the support of most officers. There, after all the details had been taken care
of, de Broglie had divided the troops into 2 commands that maneuvered against
each other. De Broglie's command executed the maneuvers as per Mesnil-Durand's
drill and the command under Lieutenant-General de Luckner executed its
maneuvers as per the Reglement of 1776 (i.e. that of Guibert). Luckner's
command always had the advantage.
At Vaussieux, both Mesnil-Durand and Guibert were present at the maneuvers
which led to the rejection of Mesnil-Durand's system by general agreement with
the notable exception of de Broglie. However, Mesnil-Durand's column of
attack, i.e. the column on the middle, which had been neglected by Guibert,
was added the R6glement of 1776.
The result of the Vaussieux trials was the triumph of Guibert's
ideas.
Thus, the argument between the supporters of the ordre profond and the ordre
mince was temporarily settled but the controversy did not stop there.
Further Development of the Permanent Division System
Marshal de Segur became Minister of War in 1781 and should be credited
with the creation of the organized Light Infantry.
De Segur found the French army poorly trained and began a methodic
reorganization. He gave Gribeauval a free hand to modernize further the
artillery's equipment.
De Segur should also be credited with the creation of the first peace time
staff corps. At the close of the War of the American Revolution, the War
Minister feared that the dissolution of the army would lead to the loss of
many experienced staff officers. To avoid that loss, he offered peacetime
employment to 68 officers, among whom was Berthier who had served with
Rochambeau's army in America.
These officers studied military subjects. The Revolution recognized the
potential of the Staff Corps and drew from its members in an attempt to
provide each field army with a trained chief of staff (chef d'etat-major).
De Brienne, the new War Minister continued de Segur's reform of the army.
On October 9, 1787, he created a permanent organization for the administration of war known under the name of conseil de la guerre (War Council hereafter).
The War Council was formed of 8 generals and I Colonel-Secretary. The duty of the Council was to originate all reforms, ordinances and reorganizations of the army. It was to be in session every year from November 1st to May 1st so that members could actively serve in the army during the summer months.
Among the work of the War Council was the Ordinance of March 17, 1787 which officially created the Light Infantry by definitely separating the 6 battalions of Chasseurs A Pieds (foot chasseurs) from the regiments of Chasseurs A Cheval and increasing their number from 6 to 12 battalions by using the soldiers from 3 disbanded infantry regiments (Roval-Italian, Royal Corse and Montreal).
In addition, the War Council reduced the enormously swollen commissioned ranks which included some 36,000 officers, of whom only 13,000 were actually on duty, to 9,578 with the active military units.
A further achievement of the War Council was to expand the Divisional System by the Ordinance
of March 17, 1788.
France was divided into 17 Divisional districts corresponding to the number of permanent Divisions. All the infantry regiments were incorporated in brigades, each of 2 regiments, commanded by a marechal de camps to be present with his brigade from August 1st to October 15. The Guards, the artillery and the chasseur battalions were not incorporated in the 52 brigades of infantry.
The first 40 brigades were organized with the French regiments and the remaining 12 with the foreign regiments.
Basically, a Division included two or more infantry brigades, each of which had 2 infantry regiments each of 2 battalions. The grenadier and chasseur companies were stripped from the battalions and formed into a converged battalion. Consequently an infantry brigade included 5 battalions plus the regimental artillery of 8 4-pdrs (2 per battalion).
The main object of the reorganization of the permanent Divisions was to place the French army on a permanent war footing.
For that reason, the Ordinance of March 17, 1787 organized the French provinces into 17 commands-in-chief or Divisional districts. The first three commands-located in critical border areas were considered as the most important and for that reason each was commanded by a Marshal of France. The others were commanded by a lieutenant-general.
These measures had been taken so "that the troops will be always ready to
take the field and that they'll be organized, equipped and provided with all
the equipment of campaign required by war, in such a way that peace be for
them a constant school of discipline and instruction and for the generals a
school of command.
Capitaine Latreille in L'armee et la nation a la fin de l'ancien regime, (p. 322-323.)
evaluates the achievement of the War Council:
"In organizing the Divisions during peacetime and brigading together the
horse troops, the War Council had achieved a very significant improvement. If
one looks at the following map, where the location of each Divisions is shown
as of 1789, one is stricken by the heavy concentration of the troops near the
borders which are the most vulnerable, that of the North and East borders. Of
the 20 Divisions stationed in continental France, 7 were on the first line
between Dunkirk and Bitche, 2 others, the ones of Artois and Picardy make up a
second line behind the ones of Flanders, Hainaut and Champagne, entrusted with
the defense of the border with the low countries. On the eastern front (
Alsace and Franche-Comte), where the border is covered by the Rhine and by
Switzerland, a power that many centuries of friendship tied up with France, 3
Divisions are deployed between the North and the South. The total amount of
the forces deployed between the North Sea and the lake of Geneva was 94
battalions and 134 squadrons in the first line and a grand total of 118
battalions and 158 squadrons, if the second line Divisions are included. That
is one half of the infantry and three-quarters of the Cavalry.
The artillery regiments were not part of the brigades, but 6 of the 7 of
these regiments were located at short distances from the North-East border, at
Douai, La F6re, Strasbourg, Metz, Auxonne and Besangon; the corps of the
Miners (Mineurs) was garrisoned in Verdun.
A series of fortresses of primary importance - the iron belt (ceinture de
fer.) of Vauban, as quoted by Carnot - such as Lille, Metz and Strasbourg
complete that defensive system.
If war suddenly took place, the King had at his immediate disposal over
100,000 men, which would allow him to concentrate without too much apparent
difficulties, the elements of 2 armies of 60,000 to 80,000 each, one facing
the Low Countries and the other behind the line of the Rhine."
The camps of Vaussieux in 1778 had been very successful. Hence, the
practice was brought back to life and 2 camps of instructions were formed from
September 1st to 24th. The first one took place at St. Omer and was under the
command of the Prince de Cond6 and included 37 battalions and 32 squadrons;
the second at Montigny near Metz, commanded by the Marshal de Broglie,
concentrated 25 battalions and 64 squadrons. The troops were exercised to
maneuver by brigades and by Divisions.
The eventual attribution of the artillery had been already covered in
details by the Ordinance of October 3, 1774:
"During a campaign, each infantry brigade was to be provided with a
definite
amount of artillery. Each brigade was to have 8 guns (2 per battalion) manned
by a company of gunners; the guns of the artillery park were organized in
divisions of 8 guns each (of the same caliber) to be manned by a company of
gunners. In addition, 2 companies of each artillery brigade were assigned to
serve 2 infantry Divisions and the 2 remaining companies were assigned to
serve as 2 Reserve Divisions. The companies of sappers were to be placed with
or near the artillery. The companies of bombardiers were assigned to the
howitzer and mortar batteries, the siege park used in the fortresses.
In addition, the Ordinance of 1774 also assigned the reserve troops from
the so-called Provincial units to the Reserve Divisions and artillery, and in
each army, some Provincial battalions were assigned to the artillery their
companies being distributed among the Reserve Divisions and the artillery, the
grand park, and the bridging corps (equipage de pontons). In the Reserve
Divisions, each company of gunners manning a 12-pdr section was to receive 56
soldiers and that serving a 8-pdr received 32 soldiers. The bridges were to be
built by the companies of workers with the help of the companies on Miners
part of the parc.
The reforms made by the War Council were extensive and much too numerous to
cover here, but they basically set up the organization of the Divisions, the
artillery, the cavalry, and the miners that we find in the Wars of the
Revolution and of the Empire.
Another significant contribution of the War Council was the publishing of the provisional infantry
Reglement of 1788. Two members of the War Council, the Comte de Puysegur and the Duc de Guines
were given the task of drawing a new ordinance for the infantry. Both were partisans of the ordre profond.
Regiments were assigned to them, to experiment with the proposed maneuvers as they were being formulated.
The complete instruction was issued on May 20, 1788. The way in which it was organized shows that it was primarily designed with the training of the troops in mind. It was divided into schools and into lessons with specific instructions on how to do it. The pattern was followed by the Reglement of 1791.
The new Reglement incorporated all the changes and improvements since the Seven Years War. The new Reglement went back for inspiration to that of 1769 for Light Troops, drawn by Guibert's father. A great innovation was the possible passage from three lines to two.
Guibert was no more the editor of that Reglement than he was of the preceding ones. However, his influence was very strong and his tactics were adopted and became official with that ordinance.
The Early Events of 1789-1791, the Two Reglements of 1791
The new Reglement of 1788 was never really implemented for the events of 1789 put an end
to the proceedings.
In addition, Marshal de Broglie became the Minister of War on July 12, 1789. He had become an
enemy of Guibert and of the War Council. He immediately disbanded the War Council, the Divisions and the brigades, all the monumental work that had been achieved in a few short years.
The new Reglement fell into oblivion. There was hardly any attention given to tactics during the next two years, and only the threat of invasion in 1791 turned attention back to it.
The Estates General summoned in 1789 by Louis XVIIIth transformed themselves into a Constituent Assembly (Assembly hereafter) which, backed by a huge citizen militia, forced the reluctant king to accept the Constitution of 1791 that drastically reduced the royal power. Effectively, a ministry now responsible to the Assembly which - and not the king - ruled Paris.
During that troubled period which was more or less a period of disorganization in the French army, one would think that little changes would take place.
Nothing is further from that. When the National Guard was raised in 1789, it was not drilled
according to the Reglement of 1788. Instead the Reglement of 1776 was reedited but soon it became apparent that it was too complicated and could not satisfy the needs of an improvised militia.
The new Military Committee took over the task of preparing many reforms. Two new Reglements
were to take effect in 1791 and both were a step in the direction of the ordre profond, yet recognizing the importance of the ordre mince.
The Viscomte de Noailles, head of the Military Committee was charged with drawing up a simpler instructions for the National Guard. Most of the Committee members were partisans of the ordre profond but 9 displayed in spite of the introduction to the Reglement of January 1st, 1793 a remarkable restraint and applied Guibert's method of movements and some of his principles. In fact, the new Reglement was a compromise between the ordre profond and the ordre mince.
Although the authors of the new Reglement for the National Guard were formally partisans of the attack of the ordre profond, they kept Guibert's methods of evolution and covered extensively evolutions in line, certainly because of the miserable failure of Mesnil-Durand's columns called plesions at the Camps of Vaussieux. They added to the new Reglement the column of attack on the center formed with only 1 battalion, which was almost identical to that of the Reglement of 1766.
The work of the Military Committee continued with the drawing of the famous Reglement of
August 1st, 1791, which, although contested by many, was one of the most important of 18th century infantry regulations.
It remained in force throughout the Wars of the French Revolution and of the Empire was not
replaced until 1831.
Contrary to some erroneous opinions, it was not the work of the partisans of the ordre mince or that of Guibert.
The Reglement of August 1791 was the culmination of all the intellectual debates that took place in France during the XVIIIth century. Colin was saying:
"the Reglement of 1791 presented the greatest analogy with the Reglements of 1788 and
January 1789 for the National Guard, while differing profoundly from that of 1776."
Conclusion on Part I
We have somewhat digressed away from the main subject at the end by
covering the two infantry Reglements of 1791, the first one for the National
Guard and the second for the regular army, but we feel that it was necessary
to better understand what took place during the Wars of the Revolution and of
the Empire. In our next issue we'll cover the evolution of the French army
through the Revolution and how, in spite of the turmoil that army went through
in which almost everything was contested, the permanent Divisonal system was
never rejected.
One should not conclude from the extensive debates that took place in
France during the XVIIIth century between the partisans of the ordre profond
and of the ordre mince were meaningless. One must not forget that the
Reglement did not provide exclusively a source of tactics to the generals of
the French Revolution and of the Empire. As we'll see in a future article,
these generals also applied some of the methods of Folard and Mesnil-Durand.
New Regulations 1/1/1791
Disbandment of Provincial troops
Formation of Garde
Nationale
Armies readied for
war
Increase in the Garde Nationale
State of the Army
Call for volunteers of the 1st
ban
172 battalions in the field totaling only 75,000 men
Proposal to incorporate volunteers into regular army
Shortage of mobilized
manpower
Brigades
Retention of Divisional
system
Enlistment of 1st ban volunteers
expires
Need for
discipline
Reaffirmation of Divisional
organization
Examples
2nd Amalgame
Basic Division remains constant
Jourdan's Army of the Danube, 1799
This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web.(33 (both). The name of regiment for political reasons was replaced by
that of "demi-brigade". That change points out the will to keep the brigade
organization of 2 regiment now called "demi-brigade". The change was ordered
by Carmot in 1793.)
DIVISIONS INFANTRY CAVALRY ARTILLERY GUNS/HOWITZERS MORTARS 1st Souhant 14,813 3,436 1,311 60 9 2nd Moreau 11,053 1,026 577 39 - 3rd Legaire 11,255 1,118 595 35 3 4th Desaix 5,432 647 283 16 - 5th Bonnaud 9,103 1,558 658 34 5 6th Delaas 4,481 380 941 16 2 Artillery Park - 901 51 22 10 TOTAL 56,137 8,165 4,566 162 29 GRAND TOTAL 68,868 Transparencies
THE ARMIES OF THE REVOLUTION AND THE
DIVISIONAL SYSTEM
ARMY PREPARATION FOR WAR IN
1792
Most consisted of 2 battalions each of regulars and volunteers
THE WAR IN 1792
DIVISIONS AND BRIGADES IN THE EARLY ARMIES OF THE REVOLUTION
DIVISIONS AND BRIGADES IN THE EARLY ARMIES OF
THE REVOLUTION
EVOLUTION FROM 1796-1799
209 line and 42 light demi-brigades
Effective strength from 300 to 2400
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