The Genesis of the Campaign of Yorktown
In 1780 and early 1781, the war was not going well for the United States. The southern states, starting with Virginia, had been invaded by the British. The taking of Charleston, effectively placed most of the South below the Chesapeake Bay under British control. The other area of British control was centered around New York. Communications between the two areas depended wholly upon the sea since New Jersey and Pennsylvania were under American control.
Lafayette had been sent to Virginia in the hope of capturing Benedict Arnold. To prevent Arnold from receiving reinforcements and supplies or escaping by sea, it was mandatory to achieve control of the Chesapeake Bay. A joint operation was decided upon using the small French squadron at Newport, Rhode Island, now under Commodore Destouches. [1]
After an encounter with the British, New York squadron off the Virginia Cape on March 16, Destouches, in spite of showing greater skill 'in the engagement, could not assure command of the sea, and was obliged to return to Newport. [2]
Hence, British reinforcements could be sent freely from New York. By March 26, 1781, a total of seven
thousand soldiers had reached Arnold and Cornwallis. Something drastic had to be done to change the deteriorating military situation.
Washington and Rochambeau request the help of de Grasse's fleet
The above events prompted Rochambeau, [3] at Washington's
request, to call upon de Grasse. [4]
Three letters from Rochambeau awaited de Grasse when he arrived in Cap Frangais.
[5] The first one, written on May 28, explained the delicate situation in Virginia, Washington's desire to attack New York and the presence of Graves's fleet of seven ships of the line in New York. [6] Its content can be summed up in these terms:
Rochambeau then left the choice between New York and the Chesapeake to de Grasse (with a personal preference for the Chesapeake). The postscript reiterated the need to bring more troops since the combined American forces would have been only marginally stronger.
Rochambeau's second letter was an appeal for money to pay his troops beyond August 2... otherwise the French war chest would be empty.
The third letter told de Grasse of Washington's four previous letters urging Rochambeau to bring his troops to the Hudson. [7] He further told de Grasse:
So, in fact, Rochambeau's letters unquestionably made de Grasse the person chiefly responsible for the direction taken by the subsequent course of events. Basically, the French and American commanders in the most pressing manner implored him to bring three things to their assistance, all of them difficult to come by and fill of risks to be taken upon his own responsibility.
First there must be a fleet sufficiency powerful to insure the command of the sea on the North American coast against any British fleet that Rodney and Graves could assemble. The second requirement was a body of regular troops strong enough to make up for Rochambeau's missing second Division and to fill the alarming gaps in Washington's depleted army. Finally, he had to bring with him a very large sum of money to replenish the depleted allied war chests and thereby raising the morale of men whose pay, in the American army at least, had been too long in arrears. [8]
De Grasse felt he had no choice and was quick to make up his mind. He chose the Chesapeake. In his letter of July 28, sent to Newport by the frigate Concorde he said: the point which appears to be indicated by you, Monsieur le Comte de Rochambeau, and by Messieurs Washington, de la Lucerne and de Barras, as the one from which the advantages you propose may be most certainly attained. [9]
De Grasse's strategic vision was quite remarkable for the period for he grasped and exemplified in the highest degree one of the great principles of victory in war: achieving a concentration superior to the enemy at the right time and place. That was a principle that was constantly applied by Napoleon so successfully.
De Grasse decides to go to the Chesapeake: organization of his moves:
De Grasse informed Rochambeau that he would set sail for the Chesapeake by August 3. That was a very short time to organize such a concentration of forces and means to meet 0 the imperatives of a decisive campaign. [10]
Raising the one million two hundred thousand livres in cash requested by Rochambeau to keep the Allies war machine going was not by far the easiest task awaiting de Grasse. In spite of great difficulties, de Grasse was able to arrange a loan from the Spanish government in Cuba. The frigate Aigrette was sent to get the funds and was to rejoin his fleet off the Cuban coast.
The question of troops was the easiest to resolve. The Marquis de St. Simon would let de Grasse
"borrow" three infantry regiments, one hundred dragoons and three hundred artillerists from his command until the end of October, providing St. Domingue would be protected by a Spanish squadron. The transportation of the troops, their equipment, horses and ten pieces of field artillery was a bigger problem. It required no less than fifteen merchantmen escorted by frigates. [11]
According to his original orders, only part of his fleet could be used for service off the American coast, and then only if the Spaniards did not have any immediate plan and would not lift a finger to come north. They were only too happy to loan the requested money to de Grasse and to provide a Spanish squadron to protect Saint Domingue and the French commerce. They felt off the hook, so they agreed to de Grasse's plan. De Grasse was now completely free to take his entire fleet on his own responsibility to the Chesapeake, to the aid of the Americans. Nevertheless, de Grasse was taking a huge risk and a magnificent gamble.
[12]
When de Grasse arrived in Cap Frangais he found the 6 ships of the line left there by de Guichen and the 4 of de Monteil's squadron just returning from a campaign with the Spaniards against Pensacola.
[13]
Everything was ready-and almost on schedule-to achieve the largest and most decisive strategic concentration of forces achieved to date. But in order for the operation to succeed, several events had to take place:
The troops boarded the transports from August 3 to August 5. On the 5th, de Grasse's fleet numbering the impressive number of 26 ships of the line, divided into 3 squadrons commanded by de Monteil, de Grasse and de Bougainville, and 15 merchantmen, set sail for Cuba. Two more
74s, the Bourgogne and the Hector were delayed and would rejoin the fleet on August 7.
[14]
Going by the normal channels was out of the question since the enemy would have been informed of de
Grasse's departure and could have reached the Chesapeake ahead of him. To avoid detection, the Admiral
decided to use the old Bahamas Channel, a much less frequented route where no French fleet had ever
passed before. The passage was dangerous but, on the 9th, the French fleet picked up Spanish pilots at the
small port of Bracoa and the passage went well. On the 17th the frigate Aigrette rejoined the fleet with its
cargo of money which was divided among the ships of the fleet. [15]
Chance was on de Grasse's side. He completely escaped detection and on August 29, he anchored safely
in Lynnhaven Bay, at the entrance of the Chesapeake. Barras had set sail for the Chesapeake three days
earlier, on the 27th, after being 'informed by a frigate of de Grasse's departure. Barras took a wide circuitous
route to avoid detection. Meanwhile, Rochambeau's and Washington's forces had crossed the Hudson on
August 24 also heading for the Chesapeake.
Admiral Hood had realized that something was in the air and, after learning that de Grasse had left Cap
Francais, decided to go north as quickly as possible. He did so diligently that he arrived at the Chesapeake
on the 25th, two days before the French. Finding the bay empty and without news of de Grasse's
whereabouts, he decided to go to New York and join forces with Grave. [16]
The strength of the British fleet in the oncoming
confrontation
The British were aware of de Grasse's project to come north, but the secret was the size of the fleet he
would bring. [17]
That was to be the most decisive factor at the Chesapeake. The process of evaluating de Grasse's fleet
strength for his coming to the American coast was entirely based on speculations. To aggravate the problem,
most of the speculations were made in England. Lord Sandwich, the First Lord of the Admiralty, always
insisted that he had sent enough ships of the line across the Atlantic to cope with the French, and that only
a series of unfortunate accidents could account for the British defeat. According to Admiralty calculations,
the squadrons of New York and of the West Indies combined with that of Digby's small escort on the way,
amounted in all to thirty one ships of the line.
The French they figured had only 8 ships under Barras at Newport and de Grasse although he may have
had as many as 28 *in the West Indies, had to take care of the summer trade convoy to Europe and detach
some ships for that purpose. Surely he could not take more than half of his fleet to reinforce Barras.
Consequently, according to these speculations, the Royal Navy in the West Indies combined with that
of New York could muster twenty five ships of the line or more!
Sandwich's speculations did not take into consideration the severe battle damages suffered during the
several prior combats with the French. So the deduction from the Sandwich initial paper strength started. The
Russell, a 74, which had been severely damaged during the combat at
Martinique April 29, 1781, was now in need of an overhaul and had to be laid in Antigua for repairs for the
rest of the year. The Sandwich, a three decker of 90 guns, Rodney's flagship at St. Eustatius was in such bad
shape she was sent with a convoy to Jamaica to undergo extensive repairs.
Then Rodney himself contributed to the weakening of the Royal Navy even further. He sent to Jamaica
with convoy, already escorted by the Sandwich, the Torbay, a 74, and the Prince Williams, a 64. Vice
Admiral Parker, the commander of the Jamaica station was ordered not to detain them a single moment. In
addition, Rodney urged him to add to their force by sending to North America every ship of the line you can
possibly spare from your station.
But Parker did not understand Rodney's plea or did not take him seriously. He detained the 2 ships line
until a convoy for New York was ready to sail. Consequently, these 2 ships did not reach New York until
October 13, some five weeks after the decisive battle and less than a week before Cornwallis surrendered at
Yorktown.
In addition, Rodney was seriously criticized for conning home on the Gibraltar, an 80 gun ship. But
according to him that ship also was *in need of repair. So were the Triumph, 74,and the Panther 60 that he
took along with him. All three described by Rodney as invalids like myself
After all the above deductions, Hood's combined force was reduced by exactly one third, i.e. from 21 to
14. That was the number that Admiral Hood commanded when he sailed north from Antigua on August 10.
[18]
Hood Sails North
On August 10, de Grasse had not yet been spotted and Hood did not know his whereabouts. With his
faster ships, [19] he arrived at the Chesapeake first, on August 25.
Finding nothing there, on the same day, after sending a message to Graves, he resumed his voyage to New
York and left the Chesapeake. On the evening of the 26th, one of Hood's grand guard ships spoke with a brig
from Jamaica who relayed that de Grasse had been known to still be in Cap Fran~ais on July 27, with all his
fleet. That was the first specific news that Hood had on de Grasse. Hood arrived in Sandy Hook on August
28 expecting to find Graves's squadron ready to set sail.
[20]
But Graves was not ready. Hood learned that Graves had gone to Long Island to confer with Sir Henry
Clinton. Hood also went to Long Island to meet Graves and Clinton who were deliberating upon a plan to
destroy the French squadron and forces at Newport. Both expressed great surprise in seeing him.
Apparently, Graves was not as prepared and disposed to take the news of de Grasse movement north as
seriously as Hood did. [21]
The news, that arrived on the 28th, relating that Count de Barras had sailed from Newport on August 25,
apparently shook Clinton. (The latter thought that one of the great opportunities of the war had been lost. )
[22]
Hood and Graves Combine Their Fleets and Sail for the
Chesapeake
Despite the need for haste called for by Hood, Graves spent three days to prepare his
squadron. Once more the assumption of the British Admiralty were to be proven too optimistic.
Graves had only 5 serviceable ships of the line instead of the 10 expected originally by Hood.
Graves finally set sail from New York on September 1. On joining the impatient Hood off
Sandy Hook, the two admirals and the combined fleet of nineteen ships of the line put to sea at
7pm under the command of Graves. [23]
The winds were favorable and the fleet proceeded under press of sail.
On the third day of sailing, the Terrible (74) made the distress signal. It was found that the
Terrible had come from the Leeward Islands with five pumps at work. But that was not all. It was
further discovered that Hood's Ajax (74) was, in Graves' words "but little better, the" Montagu
(74), "a leaking thing, some of the rest had mast sprung, and several were short of bread" These
members of Hood's squadron in Graves' eyes "were the shadow of ships rather than the
substance."
Graves was understandably annoyed by such news, since Hood had assured him that his
squadron was fit for sea for a month. In addition, one of Graves' ship, the Europe, was also in
poor condition and orders had been given to her captain to fall to the rear if unable to keep his
position in the line of battle which would be assumed by the Adamant.
It was not until the morning of September 5, that the British fleet reached the entrance of the
Chesapeake. The scouting frigate Solebay, which had been sent ahead to look into the
Chesapeake for signs of the enemy, came back and signaled at 9:30 am that she had encountered
some hostile ships in Lynnhaven Bay, then about ten to twelve miles distant. At first they were
taken for the 8 warships of de Barras' squadron, clearly no match for the British 19.
[24]
De Grasse's Activities in the Chesapeake Until the Arrival of the
British Fleet
De Grasse had completely avoided detection and achieved complete surprise when, late on
August 29, he anchored his fleet on the banks outside of the Chesapeake Bay some five leagues
from land. Graves and Hood did not learn about de Grasse entering the Chesapeake until the
morning of the battle. The next morning the whole fleet had entered the bay and anchored again in
three columns in the roadstead of Lynnhaven within the Horse Shoe bank. The British frigate
Loyalist (26) was captured by the Glorious after pursuit and the frigate Guadeloupe managed to
take refuge under the guns of Yorktown. [25]
De Grasse immediately gave the order to disembark Saint-Simon's troops at Jamestown so
they could make their junction with Lafayette's troops encamped in the north near the river York.
The lengthy operation was covered by the frigates Experiment and Andromaque, in which ninety
officers and one thousand eight hundred sailors of the fleet took part. Several ships were
dispatched to blockade the York and James rivers.
[26]
Three other ships of the line were on the point of going up the bay when the frigate Aigrette spotted the British off the Chesapeake and reported to de Grasse the arrival of the British fleet.
For a brief period de Grasse believed that the incoming vessels were those of Barras. Curiously enough, both admirals had mistaken each other for a third party who was not present.
[27]
De Grasse ordered the fleet to be ready to set sail and recalled as many sailors as possible. However, only a few boats were close enough to see the signal and many ships had to engage the enemy with a reduced crew. It was reported that each ship had at least one hundred men in the boats. For instance, the Citoyen of 74 guns was short of five officers and two hundred men so the upper deck could not be manned.
De Grasse was informed that it was indeed an enemy fleet comprising twenty ships of the line (the Adamant of 50 guns was included) that had been spotted. [28]
Graves Discovers the Strength of the French Fleet and Clears for Action
Graves was also about to be disillusioned as he came closer to the Chesapeake. When he was still far from Cape Henry, the French were seen from the Bedford to number at least fifteen to sixteen sails. By 2pm, to the extreme astonishment of Graves, the count of "very large ships" had risen to the dismaying number of 24!
The British were inferior in number by five, and in aggregate firepower by about four hundred guns, having one thousand four hundred and ten guns versus one thousand seven hundred and ninety four. Besides five or six of their ships were in doubtful condition to do battle. However, they were in battle formation and the French were not. The wind was very favorable blowing from the rear 'in the windward position. Although Graves was outnumbered, he ordered an immediate attack, i.e. in the true tradition of the Royal Navy to attack from the windward position without undue regard for numerical odds againist him. Graves made the preparative signal to clear for action at 10am. [29]
De Grasse had two options, to wait for the British attack at anchor or to come out of the Chesapeake and fight the enemy in the open sea. The latter solution was chosen.
Immediately, the Ville de Paris [31] de Grasse's flagship, came alive with signal flags. The French admiral showed no more hesitation than Graves in giving the order to his captains. They were to clear their ships for action and to slip their cables attaching their anchors to buoys.
The clear order was carried out at 11:30am and the heavy ships of the line covered themselves with canvas. The captains were to form a line of battle according to speed without regard to particular stations and in reverse order. This placed Commodore de Bougainville's blue squadron, normally in the rear, in the van as the fleet slowly emerged [32]
The French fleet with 24 of its 27 ships at
anchor in three irregular lines, was placed in a most difficult initial situation. It was faced with the difficult task of coming out of the bay against an inflowing tide from a lee shore and around Cape Henry on a tack opposite to that of the British fleet. Since ships of the line could not go against the wind, the French ships had to tack a lengthy and difficult maneuver in order to extirpate themselves from the bay and form a line of battle in the open sea. [33]
In fact, de Grasse's orders invited a pell-mell race for position. In the process, de Bougainville's squadron extended itself toward the open sea well ahead of the center and rear thus depriving itself of their support. At that point between 2 and 3:15pm, the French fleet unformed, was 'in very poor order. Only four ships of the leading squadrons were in line, tile Pluton, Bourgogne, Marseillais and Diademe, all 74s. They were followed at half a league by the Reflechi (64), and Caton (64), hence opening a dangerous gap in the line.
Fortunately for the French, Graves did not take advantage of the situation by attacking the isolated French van.
The morning breeze was fresh from the north-northeast. Since Graves had formed his line of battle in the east-west alignment at two cables length, [34] he was in the most favorable position to attack with his fleet, which like the French was also formed in three squadrons.
[35]
The leading (white) squadron was commanded by Hood aboard the Barfleur (98), Graves was in the center leading the red squadron from the London (98) and the blue (or rear) squadron was commanded from the Princessa (70) by Admiral Sir Francis Drake.
At 12:45, Graves made the signal for line ahead at one cable length. That signal was followed at 1pm by that East-West Line at the same intervals.
At 2:05pm, Graves seeing his leading ship, the Alfred (74), coming dangerously close to the Middle Ground shoal, made the signal for all ships to wear. In that maneuver each ship pivots *in its place in the line. Hence, Graves had now formed his fleet (like that of the French) in reverse order and Hood became the rear squadron and Drake the van squadron. [36]
The British fleet was, like the French, heading for the open sea in almost a parallel course with de Grasse's fleet, which was at a distance of four to five miles.
Graves' choice to make contact with the French was to edge down toward the French and to maintain a straight bowsprit-t-stem line while doing so. Signals were sent at 2.52pm and again at 3:09pm to Lead more on starboard or toward the enemy.
At 3:45pm, Graves signaled for a line ahead at 1 cable length, then issued another signal to reduce the interval to half a cable length. [37] The two opposing vans and the centers were now roughly on parallel course but the vans were much closer to one another than the centers and the rear squadrons were still miles apart. At 4pm both fleets were about to start the battle.
Graves, in the windward position, decided to fight and hoisted the signal the ships to bear down and engage close and bore down on the London which was the 10th ship, i.e. exactly in the center of the British line. But, he had not lowered his previous signal for line ahead. The two signals were contradictory and confused his captains as to his real intention.
The method of attack chosen by Graves condemned the British ships to arrive piecemeal and at a given angle which prevented their broadside to bear upon the enemy and gave all the advantages to the French by allowing them to enfilade or fire diagonally through their entire length until they resumed a parallel course to the French.
At about 4:15pm, the leading ships of both vans being within musket range, opened fire with great spirit on both sides. At musket range one hundred fifty yards or less the damage and carnage caused by the first broadside thirty to forty guns firing simultaneously was fearful.
The engaged British ships suffered heavy damages as did the French, The gap between the French van and the main battle line had not been completely closed, and the four French leading ships were almost cut off and engaged by seven or eight ships at close quarters. They were finally helped by some other French men of war which finally had closed the gap. That was the result of de Grasse's signal, which at 3:45pm seeing the gap in the French line, had ordered Bougainville's van to bear away so as to reestablish and close the line of battle.
The action between the two vans continued furiously until about 5pm as both center and rear squadrons came up within range. [38] At that time the wind shifted four points toward the eastnortheast and de Grasse ordered Bougainville to go more freely against the wind by about two points. [39]
At 5:15pm, the wind became very light and variable from east to northeast. De Grasse seeing
Hood coming in contact prepared to tack his whole fleet together, bearing north-northeast. That maneuver would have invariably thrown the English fleet into confusion but Admiral Graves anticipated the maneuver and signaled the whole fleet to keep the wind. Consequently, tile two fleets gradually fell off and the fire ceased between the vans at 6:30pm. The contact was kept in the center for a half hour longer. Both admirals insisted that they were determined to renew the engagement next morning and both reformed their lines. [40]
The Assessment of the Damages by Both Sides [41]
Both admirals had sent frigates with orders for the night which was to hold their line and begin to repair the battle damages.
Then Graves received a series of bad news. At 9pm, the Montagu hailed the flagship and informed the admiral that she was in imminent danger of losing her masts and could no longer hold the line. At 10pm, Graves was informed that the Shrewsbury, Intrepid and Princessa had suffered extensive damages. He also knew that the Terrible and the Ajax had very leaky hulls and that his own London needed repairs. He noted that the French had not the appearance of near so much damage as we have sustained. It began to seem doubtful that any renewal of attack upon the French in the morning would be feasible. His initial shortage of 5 ships had now doubled by the partial crippling of at least 5 more.
What was the situation of the French? Like the British, the damage was limited to the van. The Pluton had a damaged mast and its rigging was in bad shape but only the Diademe and the Caton had received significant damage.
The next morning, at 5:30am, the Diademe signaled that she could no longer keep her place in the line of battle. Then, at 7:30am, the Caton requested help. Apparently, these three vessels were able to make repairs at sea so effectively that they appeared to have received very little damage in the action. [42]
Maneuvers Over the Next Few Days
Thee next day, at 5:45am, Graves ordered his fleet to form a line of battle at half cable length holding the wind on a course west-east, but holding the windward position and hence the initiative. He did not show any desire to renew the combat that day. The French held a similar formation in a course parallel to the British fleet. Being at the leeward de Grasse could not renew the battle.
On the next day the sea was still calm but at 7am the wind shifted to south-southwest. It became possible for the French to begin jockeying for the windward position, but not much was achieved that day either, as both fleets were in sight of each other at a distance of six to seven miles.
On the morning of September 8, the weather changed and according to Graves the wind was blowing; pretty fresh with thunder and lightning. The French had gained the windward position. At 11am, the Terrible made the distress signal and two frigates were sent to her assistance. Not much took place during that morning either. During the night the Intrepid informed Graves that her main top mast was gone over the side and they expected the fore yard would go at any minute. Graves assessed the situation:
It was very clear that Graves' fleet was in no shape to renew the battle.
On September 9, both fleets lost sight of each other. In the evening de Grasse ordered the French fleet to
return to the Chesapeake. De Grasse had thought of the possibility of the British fleet attempting to go to the Chesapeake.
By pressing on all possible canvas, the French fleet got back in sight of Cape Henry on September 10, by 11am. High masts of ships of the line were spotted. They were at anchor, close to the entrance of the bay, some 20 vessels of good size, approximately the number of Graves' fleet. Immediately orders were given to clear for action. A frigate had been sent ahead, and the signal agreed upon was unfurled by de Barras' squadron from Newport. De Barras had eluded the British by going far out at sea. On September 5 he was unable to distinguish the ships engaged. He played safe and maneuvered to preserve his precious convoy and gain the anchorage before nightfall. Finding the Chesapeake empty, he entered with his ships of the line
and his convoy carrying the essential and precious siege artillery train. [43]
De Grasse's command now included thirty six ships of the line, a truly respectable force indeed. The disembarkment of the troops interrupted by the battle, resumed.
Graves Actions After September 9
On September 9, at about 9pm, Graves ordered his fleet to turn back toward the Chesapeake and sent the frigate Medea ahead to reconnoiter the bay. The frigate rejoined Graves' fleet on September 13 and reported that de Grasse was back at his anchorage in the Chesapeake. The frigate Medea did not report the exact number of de Grasse's fleet. Consequently, Graves and Hood persisted in their mistaken belief that on September 8, they had fought the combined fleets of de Grasse and Barras, i.e. eight ships from Barras and sixteen brought by de Grasse from the West Indies. This gave continuing substance to Graves: he could achieve equal force with de Grasse, after he received the reinforcements brought from England by Digby. On September 13 it was decided to go back to New York to repair the fleet and await reinforcements from
England. [44]
The land actions against Cornwallis in Yorktown
The concentration of American and French forces around Yorktown had been set in motion in August 1781. Rochambeau with the French'expeditionary forces had departed from Rhode Island long before that date and made his junction with Washington's forces in White Plains on July 6. From there Washington and Rochambeau began their journey toward the Chesapeake. By September 6, i.e. after the Battle of the Chesapeake, they had reached Chester in Pennsylvania. Around Yorktown, only Lafayette's small army of five thousands, in want of everything, was in contact with Cornwallis. [45]
The marquis de Saint-Simon's force numbering thirty one hundred with eight cannons could be landed immediately. De Grasse added some eighteen hundred sailors. Lafayette realized that a frontal assault with ten thousand men against a fortified town defended by nine thousand was
a very risky business and would be very costly in human lives. He decided to wait for Washington and Rochambeau. However, with Saint-Simon's forces, he could make a land ring around Yorktown strong enough to hold Cornwallis. [46]
The news of the French victory at the Chesapeake reached Washington and Rochambeau on September 14. The morale of the combined army was immediately boosted. Finally the long awaited decisive battle to end the long struggle for independence was at hand, but the allied forces were still far from Yorktown. Not enough shipping was available to transport the allied troops and the bulk of the troops had to move by land. These troops slowly joined Lafayette and Saint-Simon's forces while the siege of Yorktown began.
Soon after arriving at Williamsburg, Washington had asked for an interview with de Grasse. The meeting took place on de Grasse's flagship, the massive Ville de Paris on September 18, 1781. The French fleet had broken flags, dressed shrouds and tops for the occasion. Washington was ceremoniously received in pure French tradition with a thirteen gun salute. [47]
After a sumptuous dinner, lengthy discussions took place. The generals were told once more that the French fleet could not stay one day beyond the end of October.
On the very next day, the allied armies began to invest Yorktown. It had been decided that the town was going to be reduced by a formal siege using the purely scientific methods developed by Vauban, which avoided costly frontal assault by infantry and permitted slowly advancing batteries of siege artillery to do the work. The siege was under the direction of MM. de Vernon and de Menonville, chief engineer and designer of the trenches respectively. Soon, American and French soldiers were busy making gabions, fascmies and saucissons to protect the hundreds of diggers preparing the battery and trenc locations.
The first move against Cornwallis took place during the night of October 6, by the opening of the first parallel (or trench) at a distance of eight hundred yards from Yorktown. The defenders opened fire with not much effect. On the afternoon of October 9 the first French battery on the extreme left began fining and was soon joined by an American battery on the extreme right. These batteries set afire the small ship of the line Sharon and 3 merchantmen in the river York.
So, reducing Yorktown was now mainly the task of the superb French siege guns brought by de Barras' squadron and of some American guns hauled over land from West Point. Four additional batteries joined in on October 10. So great was the effect of the bombardment upon the British redoubts that Washington deemed it possible to open the second parallel about half way between the first parallel and the British lines. [4]
By October 11, fifty two allied siege guns were firing and are said to have hurled fifteen shells into Yorktown. Cornwallis wrote to Clinton:
To complete the second parallel, the allies had to storm British redoubts 9 and 10. During the night of October 14, a French infantry body captured redoubt 9 and an American Light infantry contingent took
redoubt 10. [48]
By next morning both redoubts were part of the second parallel and batteries were being constructed for the final assault. Cornwallis now was quite concerned. He wrote to Clinton: My situation now becomes very critical, we dare not show a gun to their old batteries, and I expect the new ones will open tomorrow morning.
Experience has shown that our fresh earthen works do not resist their powerful artillery, so that we shall be exposed to an assault in ruining works, in a bad position, and with a weakened numbers. The safety of the place is, therefore, so precarious that I cannot recommend that the fleet and army should run any great risk in endeavoring to save us. [49]
A besieged general to save his reputation was obliged to make at least one sortie. Cornwallis made it during the night of October 15 with four hundred men. Their mission was to spike the guns of the new batteries. They were able to spike four French and three American guns, but all seven were back in action some six hours later. Cornwallis reported: "We at this time could not fire a single gun, I therefore proposed to capitulate." At least a week earlier than the allies had projected, Cornwallis had been bombarded enough.
[50]
The next day a British drummer mounted on a parapet and beat a "Parley". After a day of negotiations, conducted by Major Ross for Lord Cornwallis, Yorktown surrendered.
[51]
On October 18, at 11am, Cornwallis signed the official surrendering document. The British came out of Yorktown playing The World Turned Upside Down and marched between two rows of troops facing each other over a mile long.
[52]
On one side:
A mile of ten full regiments of French, a Legion of cavalry and a Corps of Royal Engineers, with white uniforms and facings in yellow, and violet, and crimson, and green, and pink, with the Fleur de Lys proudly emblazoned on the white regimental standards, with glittering stars and badges on their officers breasts, and with dazzling gold and silver laces liveries of their private servants. Opposite them, the American 'regulars: if we have had anything that could be called regulars, clad in their old Continental uniforms in passable condition, shoes out at the toes, in some cases, no coats, no shoes at all. [53]
The allied generals Washington, Lafayette and Rochambeau ahead of their troops were waiting for their British counterparts. Cornwallis pled an indisposition, sending his sword by General O'Hara who tried to find General Rochambeau in order not to surrender to an American. He was however guided to Washington. So ended the siege of Yorktown. [54]
Clinton, Graves and Hood: too little, too late
On September 13, Graves and Hood had headed back to New York to repair the fleet and await
reinforcements. As soon as the fleet arrived, on September 20, ten of the vessels went to the dockyard for much needed repairs.
At that time, General Clinton, Admiral Graves and Hood had every reason to think that the British loss of control of the sea was only temporary. They were still under the impression that Graves had fought the combined fleets of de Grasse and Barras on September 5.
It was not until September 23, that Clinton became aware of the actual strength of de Grasse's fleet. That catastrophic news completely changed the possibility of rescuing Cornwallis. France had concentrated in the Chesapeake about 10 more ships of the line than Great Britain could summon in the immediate future, i.e.
before the land campaign was over in Yorktown.
On September 24, it was decided to go head with the rescue operation anyway, with as many ships of the line as possible and some five thousand troops. These forces were expected to be ready in ten days, but that was much too optimistic. Rear Admiral Digby arrived in New York on September 24 with three ships of the line.
The fleet was finally ready on October 17 and some seven thousand men were embarked on the fleet by October 18 and, on October 19, the fleet still under the command of Graves numbering 25 ships of the line finally sailed. [55]
That was the day of Cornwallis' surrender. Of course Clinton and Graves were in ignorance of this devastating development.
Graves sailed south. On October 24, Graves learned that Cornwallis had surrendered. When Graves reached the mouth of the Chesapeake, he found de Grasse's and de Barras' armada of 36 ships of the line arranged in a crescent in front of him, in an excellent defensive position described by Graves:
Graves, claims that
On October 29, the decision was made to return to New York and the fleet arrived there on November 28 and the troops were immediately disembarked.
Conclusion
The battle of the Chesapeake was a relatively mild engagement. Ile British Terrible suffered so much damage during the battle that it had to be sunk. That was the only ship lost as a result of that battle. The loss in men was relatively light. The British suffered a total of three hundred thirty six casualties (ninety killed and two hundred forty six wounded) while the French had two hundred and nine. The main damage for the British was in speed of sailing and maneuverability, thanks to the French gunners' customary skill in disabling masts and rigging.
The real outcome of the battle, however, was that the whole strategic situation of the war had definitely swung in favor of the Americans and the French. Thus, the battle was one of the most decisive battles of the world as it sealed the fate of Cornwallis at Yorktown and practically ended the War of the American Revolution. To quote Mahan (p. 173):
That point is further confirmed by Michael Lewis, the author of The History of the British Navy:
Let us not forget that without the victory of the Chesapeake the reducing of Yorktown would not have been possible. The historian Morrison, says: Without de Grasse's victory, it is not the surrender of Cornwallis, but that of Washington that history would have registered at Yorktown.
[56]
The reducing of Yorktown by itself was not a costly operation in human lives as the work had been done by the siege artillery, most of which was French and had been brought by de Barras' squadron. The American losses were ten officers and two hundred sixty men wounded or killed. The French casualties were ninety two killed and two hundred and seven wounded, a total of two hundred ninety nine. The British lost
thirty officers and six hundred men in wounded and killed. [57]
What is most remarkable in those days of relatively poor communications is that the strategic concentration that rendered the Yorktown victory possible went on so smoothly with practically no major problems. It even appears that the British cooperated to the success of the operation! Hood was instrumental in opening the Chesapeake to de Grasse by arriving there a few days ahead of him and, after finding the bay empty, sailing to New York where Graves had not taken seriously the request to be ready to sail with Hood as soon as he arrived there.
What about the loan of one million two hundred thousand French livres that de Grasse was able to arrange with the Spanish in Cuba.
Harold A.Larrabee Decision at the Chesapeake, Bramhall House, New York, 1964. An excellent sources highly reliable and recommended for English only readers. Use extensively and carefully primary sources. The work checks closely with, Ander, and Caron.
[1] Chevalier de Ternay, commanding the French squadron at
Newport, died while on station there in December 1780. He was buried in the cemetery of the Trinity Church in Newport Destouches assumed temporary command of the squadron until Chevalier de Barras de Saint-Laurent replaced him. Destouches' fleet included seven ships of the line, one heavy frigate (44) and the British fleet also included seven ships of the line, one of which was a three-decker, and one 50 gun ship and one heavy frigate (44). ref Verger's Journal printed in its entirety in volume 1, The American Campaign of Rochambeau's Army, Vol. 1, 125. and also Berthiers Journal (same work) Vol.1, 244.
This is a state of affairs and the very crisis in which America, and especially the states of the South, finds herself at this particular time. The arrival of the Comte de Grasse would save this situation; all the means in our hands are not enough without his cooperation and the sea superiority which he is able to command.
I must not conceal from you, Monsieur, that the Americans are at the end of their
resources.
(1) De Grasse had to escape the British surveillance in order to reach the Chesapeake undetected.
(2) Rocharnbeau. and Washington's troops had to be concentrated in time around the Chesapeake.
(3) Barras and his small squadron presently in Newport which had to escort the very important French siege artillery train carried in eighteen transports had to first escape from Newport without being discovered or intercepted by the Royal Navy.
The Battle of the Chesapeake [30]
These repeated misfortunes in sight of a superior enemy who kept us all extended and in
motion, filled the mind with anxiety and put us in a condition not to be envied.
We have lost about 70 men, and many of our works are considerably damaged, with such
works, on disadvantageous ground, against such a powerful an attack we cannot hope to make a
very long resistance.
Our ships must have had the disadvantage of banks, shoals and tide, to limit and obstruct
their operations. However, we stood close into the back of the sands, to offer them battle for two successive days.
he would have been happy to have tried the fortune of another action in free water.... but the French showed no disposition to come out.
With this disaster the hope of subduing the colonies died in England. The conflict flickered through a year longer, but no serious operations were undertaken.
The Battle of the Chesapeake was one of the decisive battles of the world. Before it, the
creation of the United States of America was possible; after it was certain.
Sources
Ander, Jean Jacques L'amiral de Grasse, Plon, Paris, 1965
Mordal, Jacques 25 Centuries of Sea Warfare, Bramhall House, New York, 1965
Caron, Francois, Capitaine de vaisseau, La victoire volee, Service historique de la marine, Paris, 1989. The work use extensively data from French archives, which tied up very precisely with Ander and Larrabee.
Warner, Oliver, Great Sea Battles, The Hamlyn Publishing Group Ltd., New York, 1968
Mahan, Alfred Thayer, The Influence of Seapower Upon History, 1660-1805, Prentice Hall,
Edgewood Cliff, N.J. 1980.
The American Campaign of Rochambeau's Army, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, and Brown University Press, Providence, Rhode Island, 1972. The work can be considered as a primary source since it reproduces verbatim the journals of Clennont, Crevecoeur, Verger and Berthier, all eyewitnesses of Rocharnbeau's campaign.
Boudriot, Jean, The Seventy Four Gun Ship, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 1986. An outstanding massive work by a true expert on the French Navy in the War of the American Revolution.
Lavery, Briian, The Ship of the Line, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1984. Lavery, is among Britain's leading authority on the sailing ships of the line.
Numerous notes from the French Navy Archives at Vincennes and Archives Nationales in Paris, where we carefully checked many of the quoted sources against original archival material.
Footnotes
[2] Verger's Journal, 1, 127, 128. Berthier's Journal 1, 244.
[3] Generad Rochambeau was commanding the French field
forces in Newport which was one Division strong. A second Division was planned but never sent. Berthier's Journal, Vol.1, 221-223.
[4] De Grasse was the admiral commanding the French fleet in the West Indies.
[5] Cap Frangais is now Cap Haitien in independent Haiti.
[6] Washington and Rochambeau.
had met on May 21. They decided that the deterioration military situation
demanded that the effort of de Grasse's fleet should be directed against New
York or the Chesapeake. This was the basic tenor of the dispatches awaiting
de Grasse at Cap Frangais. ref. Correspondence de George Washington et F. J.
de Grasse. French Institute of Washington D.C. quoted in L'Amiral de
Grasse, heros de l'independence americaine, pp. 192-197. Also quoted by
Larrabee, Decision at the Chesapeake. pp. 150-153. Also Caron, pp. 388-390,
etc. (documents quoted traceable to Carton B4 192, Archives Nationales,
Marine, Paris).
[7] In these letters, Washington urged Rochambeau to bring his corps to the Hudson, a course he decided to follow and from there to attempt to menace New York with him in order to make a diversion in favor of Virginia, Larrabee p. 153, etc. (All documents traceable to French archives.)
[8] The amount requested was no less than one million two
hundred thousand French livres. Larrabee, pp. 155-156, Antier pp. 195-196, 203-205, Caron pp. 392. Funds being short, de Grasse did not hesitate to pay for that part of the expedition out of his own pocket! Larrabee, p. 156. Antier p. 205.
[9] Letter from de Grasse to Rochambeau quoted in Larabee, p. 154, etc.
[10] Letter dated July 28, 1781, from de
Grasse to Rochambeau, Antier, pp. 204-205.
[11] Larrabee, p. 157, Antier, pp. 203-204.
[12] According to his orders, de Grasse's first obligation, (an obligations, which Washington was not fully aware), was to provide protection to French and Spanish interests in the West Indies. No wonder that Lafayette wrote to Luzerne after the French fleet arrived in the Chesapeake: The Spanish have behaved like and Larrabee p. 156. etc. However, one should not conclude that de Grasse's orders forbad him to use his fleet on the American coasts. Dc Castries direct orders to de Grasse were very clear (letter dated March 3, 1782, Archives Nationales, Marine, B4 206), beside helping the Spaniards and protecting the Franco-Spanish interests, the Minister of the Navy was convinced that the war could be only won by a decisive action of the French fleet on the American coasts. He further stated that point in a series of letters to Vergennes (6 and 11 March 178 1,) and to Bouilld (18 March 178 1). These letters are to be found in Carton I B4 206, in the Archives rationales, Marine, in Vincennes.
[13] Larrabee, p. 156, Caron, p. 188.
[14] Larrabee, p. 157, Antier, p. 213.
[15] Larrabee, p. 158, Antier, p. 214, Caron, p. 40 1.
[16] Larrabee, p. 180, Antier, p. 215.
[17] The British were more or less aware of the plan but did not know when or where the French were heading (was it New York or the Chesapeake?) nor the number of ships de Grasse would be able to bring north. Larrabee, Antier, ctc.
[18] Lord Sandwich's papers quoted by Larrabee, pp. 177-178. Admiral Digby's coming to New York is confirmed by a letter from de Castries (the French Navy Minister) to Ban-as dated June 21, 1781 (Archives rationales, Marine, B4 216).
[19] Hood, after receiving a dispatch from Graves, decided to rush his departure for the Chesapeake. ref. Caron, p. 402. In addition the British ships of the line were copper lined hence faster than de Grasse's ships which were not, ref. Lavery, Vol. II, pp. 116-121, Antier, p. 233. Furthermore, Hood had not to set speed on any slower merchantman. In contrast de Grasse had to escort a large convoy of slow merchantmen.
[20] Larrabee, pp. 181-183.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Graves was the senior officer and
hence assunied command.
[24] Antier, p. 230, Caron p. 407.
[25] Antier, p. 215
[26] They were 3 of the line and two popgun ships.
[27]de Grasse's flagship, came alive with signal flags. The French Antier, pp. 229
[28]60 to 64 guns were the minimum gun requirement for a ship to be considered a ship of the line and to be part of a line of battle. The 50 gun ship was considered too weak.
[29] Laffabee, p. 188.
[30] Our account of the Battle of the Chesapeake is a careful composite of several sources: Laffabee, Antier, Caron. Mahan and notes from the French archives.
[31] The Ville de Paris was a huge three decker carrying some 104 guns. With its 2400 tons (4300 fully loaded fitted for six months) with a crew of eleven hundred, it was one of the largest ship afloat. It carried 36 pounders (equivalent to 42 British pounds) in its lower battery, 24 pounders in its middle deck. In comparison the London, Graves flag ship, also a three decker, was much smaller with its 1894 tons and carried 32 pounders in its lower battery and 18 pounders in his middle deck. ref. The seventy four gun ship pp. 259-260. (Jean Baudriot) and French archives, Marine: Le vaisseau "La Ville de Paris".
[32] A fleet was divided in three parts known as squadrons. In the French Navy, The first squadron was commanded by the commander-in-chief and known as the white squadron, the second squadron, the white blue squadron, by the second command and the third squadron, the blue squadron, by the third flag of ricer. A fleet normally traveled in three parallel divisions, the Admiral was ahead of the center line with the white squadron. The blue squadron was on right and the blue white squadron on the left. A large fleet each squadron was further divided into divisions (usually three divisions per squadrons) and, thus, included three squadrons and nine divisions. It was common to designate the squadrons by their color. The command of each squadron was determined by the seniority of the officers. Each squadron flied its distinctive color markings, the first at the main mast, the second at the foremast and the third at the mizzen mast. As a rule, a fleet in normal order was fighting in line and had the white squadron in the middle, the white blue in front called the van, and the blue in the rear. The commander of each squadron was normally in the center of each squadron so his signals could be easily seen by the all squadron. At the Battle of the Chesapeake, de Grasse's fleet was in reverse order, i.e. the blue squadron ahead, which was commanded by Bougainville. Baudriot, Vol. IV, 272-277.
[33] As ship of the line, at best, could sail only five to six points into the wind, i.e. 60 to 70 degrees. Baudriot Vol. IV, pp. 202
[34] That had for effect to extend the British ships over a distance of some five miles.
[35] The Royal Navy also used the three squadrons organization and distinguished its squadrons as white, red and blue squadrons. This distinction was extended to the national flag, which were white, red or blue with a union in the canton. Baudriot, Vol. IV, p. 272.
[36] Drake's squadron which was going to bear the brunt of the fighting did not include any three deckers in its line of battle, that of Hood and Graves but included two ships in poor condition for combat, the Terrible and Ajax. and hence was the weaker squadron. ref. Larrabee, p. 196. See Larrabee's Orders of battle of the two fleets pp. 183-184 identical to the documents of that of the Service historiquc de la Marine in Vincennes.
[37] The distance between two ships was expressed by cable
lengths (1 cable length = 120 meters or about 130 yards) 1/2 cable length was the usual distance for ships in line of battle while 2 cable lengths was the preferred distance in convoys. Boudriot, Vol. IV. p. 272.
[38] Julian S. Corbett, in Signals and Instructions. 1776-1794. London, 1908, quoted by Larrabee, p. 203, says: The British van was cut to pieces before Graves got into action at all, and that in spite of the fact that in the early part of the battle the British outnumbered the French almost two to one.
[39] That wind shift deprived the British of some of their
windward advantage but it affected even the French since it placed their van still further toward the windward of their center. Hood's Barfleur came in contact with the French at around 5:45pm.
[40] Hood had suggested to Graves to attempt of
entering the Chesapeake before the French.