In Napoleon Conquers Austria, p. 197, James Arnold makes a statement: "The Austrian Campaign of 1809 marks a turning point in the history of warfare. It was the world's last campaign in which cavalry shock action had decisive tactical importance." There is a great deal of truth in the above statement, but we don't entirely agree, with it. we also disagree with another part of the continuing statement claiming that after 1812. The slaughter on that field (at Borodino, JAL), the ruinous loss of homes during the winter retreat, and the large number of guns and howitzers employed by all combatants during the subsequent campaigns involving continental armies thereafter relegated cavalry to a secondary importance." We further disagree with another statement saying: "There will be one only one more field on which cavalry had close to the same tactical impact: Borodino, the fearfully bloody battle of attrition that decided the Russian campaign of 1812. The decline of cavalry as a decisive tactical tool began much before 1809. As far back as the Middle ages, the cavalry which until then had played a dominant role on the battlefield was slowly relegated to a secondary role by the progress of the firearms and of the infantry tactics. By the 1500s the cavalry had definitely lost its ascendancy on the battlefield which does not mean that under the right conditions it could not win a battle. The decisiveness of the cavalry on the battlefield was further reduced by the introduction of the bayonet and the invention of the flintlock.. What was Cavalry? Since the 1700s, there were 3 main types of cavalry: Heavy, i.e. the true Battle Cavalry (simply called Cavalry in French service), Dragoons and Light Cavalry. Each type of cavalry had its own specific mission. In the early 1700s, practically, most of the cavalry consisted of Heavy cavalry, practically none of Dragoons, and of a few Light Cavalry regiments, the Hussars, of Hungarian origin. A study of the baftles of the French Revolution and of the Empire show that the French tactics and strategy, did not consider cavalry as being the dominant factor in battles, but did not relegate the cavalry to a secondary role either. During these wars, the cavalry, except in some rare cases--like at Marengo--could not obtain some of the decisive results it had achieved during the Wars of the linear period---like at Rosbach. The generahzation of the army Corps system, and because of the advance of larger armies on wider areas-starting with the Campaign of 1805--because of the need for extended reconnaissances, screening and the like, the role of cavalry expanded to a unknown degree until then. The role of Light Cavalry was becoming a vital factor of increasing importance by the new system of warfare imposed to Europe. The French army with the new tactics of the so called "impulse system" set up new tactical and strategic standards, including the army Corps system, that were progressively adopted by the continental armies from 1805 on. The tactics of the army Corps system were based on the cooperation between the 3 arms and did not place any special emphasis on cavalry as being a decisive arm or on shock action by cavalry. Quite the contrary, until the cavalry reforms of 1803 finalized in 1805, we see a steady decrease of the number of Cavalry regiments -- i.e. the Battle Cavalry -- which was reduced from 44 regiments prior to 1791 to 14 in 1805. That was the continuation of a trend that was started by the Royal Ordinances of 1776, 1788 and 1791. The new system of warfare required the increase of Light Cavalry and of the Dragoons at the detriment of the Heavy Cavalry. In 1776, the royal army had already increased the Dragoons regiments from 17 to 24 by converting the Cavalry regiments Chartres, Conde, Bourbon-Conti, la Marche, Penthievres and Noailles. Then, from 1776 on, with the introduction of the permanent Divisions in the French army the need for more Light Cavalry became obvious. The Light Cavalry regiments were increased by the raising of the Chasseurs a Cheval regiments to complement the 6 Hussar regiments. In 1791, the Light Cavalry still numbered only 6 regiments of Hussars and 12 of Chasseurs, the Dragoons 18 regiments, but the Heavy Cavalry had been reduced to 26 including 2 of Carabiniers. The new army Corps system generalized in 1804, required more Light Cavalry as each Corps was to receive a regiment, a brigade or, in some cases, a Division of Light Cavalry. The Dragoons and the new Heavies, the Cuirassiers were never part of an army Corps. They formed brigades and Divisions but the 3 types of cavalry were never mixed together. In 1815, that system was even more accentuated. Not only Divisions were so organized but entire Cavalry Corps. Initially, in 1805, the Reserve Cavalry was commanded by Grouchy, the Corps of Light Cavalry by Pajol, the Corps of Dragoons by Excelmans and the 2 Corps of Currassiers by Milhaud and Kellermann. Most of these cavalry Divisions became part of the Reserve Cavalry, which functioned as a pool of cavalry. The excess Light Cavalry was also incorporated in the Reserve Cavalry. All or part of the Reserve Cavalry could be allocated to a Corps or an ad hoc formation to fulfill specific missions. The need for more Light Cavalry and Dragoons is reflected by the Decree of 1st Vendemaire Year XII (September 24, 1805) which definitely set the composition of the French cavalry to 88 regiments: Heavy cavalry (grosse cavalerie): 14 regiments Dragoons: 36 regiments Light cavalry: 26 regiments Actually, the 3 different kinds of cavalry were 3 different arms--Napoleon most definitely forbade to mix them together. They had different missions which were clearly defined by Napoleon. Missions Only a small portion of the 88 cavalry regiments, the 14 Heavy Cavalry regiments of the Reserve Cavalry were to be kept for the serious efforts and the decisive moments. That was the ultimate weapon that at a given moment was expected to break the enemy's attack or its final defense. It is very precisely the type of cavalry weapon Napoleon lacked at Lutzen and Bautzen. The Light Cavalry was well suited for all kinds of independent missions, vanguard, reconnaissance, etc. because it was the most mobile and its scattering was the least damaging to the common objective. Napoleon wrote: "The Light Cavalry must scout for the army considerably ahead of it, it's necessary at the vanguard, at the rear-guard and on the flanks... If the Light Cavalry is to form vanguards, it is imperative to organize it in brigades and Divisions so it can maneuver. Maneuvering here is not to change formation but to advance, withdraw, threaten, hide and also take the necessary steps to send reconnaissance parties, harass and slow down the enemy's column... It is also to push some quick probes and to harshly pursue the defeated enemy." Which does not mean that Light Cavalry was not used as Battle Cavalry when necessary. The Dragoon, genuine line cavalry, were capable in emergency to perform the task of the other two cavalries. In addition: (1) the Dragoons had the mobility to follow the Light Cavalry to support it and back it up if necessary. (2) On many occasions the Dragoons became the Reserve Cavalry. (3) Finally it had the training to escort the infantry and if necessary to replace it momentarily. Napoleon wrote: "The Dragoons are necessary to support the Light Cavalry at the vanguard, rearguard and on the flanks... A Division of 2000 Dragoons that move quickly to a given target with 1500 Light Cavalrymen can dismount to defend a bridge, a defile, a wood, a height, etc. and await the infantry. That arm is also invaluable in a retreat." So was the trend set by Napoleon in 1805 when the rest of Europe was still clinging to the previous system. We have an excellent example in 1806. Under Seidlitz and other great cavalry leaders of the Seven Years' War, Frederick's cavalry had acquired a reputation that it still enjoyed in 1806 when the Prussian cavalry, still considered by its leader to be irresistible, failed to break Davout's squares at Auerstadt. What Had Happened? Let us take a look at the reasons behind the decline of the battle cavalry shock action as a tool of decisive importance. Cavalry not only faced enemy cavalry but also much more often enemy infantry. It is precisely the progress of infantry tactics that changed the relative value of cavalry on the battlefield much more than the introduction of new cavalry tactics by the French and the increase number of guns it had to face. But these changes did not relegate the cavalry to a secondary status. It simply changed its mission to other equally important missions while still keeping the occasional shock action as a possibility. (1) Firepower: There is little doubt that the increase in infantry firepower and its close support by artillery had a great deal to do with what took place at Auerstadt. That firepower was to be further increased by the growing number of guns used on the battlefields, a trend that started in 1807 at Friedland. (2) New Tactics: But we should not ignore the influence and importance of the new infantry tactics introduced by the Wars of the French Revolution and of the Empire when compared to that of the linear warfare battles. That was a major decisive factor in the relative decline of the importance of cavalry as a shock weapon. The introduction of the impulse tactics in which small battalion size columns were used to move on the battlefield and form flexible battle lines -- and capable of quickly forming squares from the column rather than the line -- were in sharp contrast with the relatively rigid lines of the linear warfare, in which it was customary to receive a cavalry charge still deployed in line. That is not to say that squares were never formed during the linear period but, during the linear period, the square was considered a formation of last resort, and, usually, the fact of forming square was to admit that something went wrong or that the enemy had achieved local superiority. In addition, the process of forming square from a line or redeploying from square to line was a much lengthier process than forming square from a column, etc. (The formation of battalion square from a line took several minutes while the formation of a square from a column took only 30 seconds.) Hence, the introduction of the "impulse system" and the use of battalion squares against cavalry was a decisive improvement. The act of forming battalion squares from a regiment or a brigade using the methods prescribed by the infantry regulation like the French Reglement of 1791 placed the squares on a single axis.: "This meant that the left and right angle sides of each squares were directly facing the neighbouring square on that side. Unfortunately, this also meant that, whenever they delivered fire this other square was in harm's way, while they, in turn, would be on the receiving end of the fire from the other square." At the Battle of Fuentes de Onoro several battalions of British infantry when attacked by French cavalry simply formed battalion squares and retreated that way unscathed for several miles. Another example took place near Ciudad Rodrigo, when General Craufurd's command, 6 squadrons strong encountered a French foraging party of about 200 infantry. The 6 squadrons charged but were repulsed by the French after forming square and with admirable coolness waited until their would-be assailants were within ten paces before delivering a series of lethal volleys. The British cavalry withdrew and the French rejoined the fortress. At Waterloo, the French cavalry was completely unsuccessful against the unshaken British infantry. All these encounters in which cavalry was successfully repulsed by infantry in square gave the infantrymen of all nations a considerable morale boost when they faced cavalry in subsequent combats. It can be said that fresh, steady, and well trained infantry deployed in square had little to fear from cavalry alone and was likely to emerge triumphant from any engagement. Of course there were some rare exceptions -- such as Garcia Hernandez in 1812 were square were broken by unsupported cavalry. Which does not mean that cavalry could not attack successfully infantry, if the tactical conditions were right. It is very precisely what von Bismark, an experienced Wurttemburg cavalry commander who had considerable experience during the Wars of the French Revolution and of the Empire, wrote in his authoritative: Tactique de la Cavalerie, p. 64 (i.e. Cavalry Tactics.): "The most difficult part of the cavalry combats is the art of attacking infantry successfully. Theobald wants us to wait that it present some weak spots in offering some opening or disorder ... With the progress of the modem tactic, it becomes every day more difficult to attack it with success. That new infantry tactic consists in the quick formation of masses (squares, JAL) and in the destructive effect of a well kept fire... when the infantry has its morale intact, a charge... rarely succeed... Here we can recommend: (1) the use of artillery fire (canister) prior to a cavalry charge... (2) to avoid attacking infantry when fresh, well posted and of apparent good morale... It is much better if the cavalry await the opportunity to catch the infantry at a disadvantage during a maneuver or while marching... when the infantry has received a shock strong enough to damage its morale, for instances the steady rain at Dresden or Grossbeeren in August 1813, etc. ... in these cases, the cavalry has only to present itself to obtain the results... in the others cases against fresh infantry one must weigh the price of success against the losses that may occur and balance the success..." Von Bismark's remarks are very pertinent and points out the importance of morale as well as firepower in repulsing cavalry. It is precisely what took place at the Battle of Dresden mentioned by von Bismark. The Austrian infantry took a serious thrashing very precisely because it lacked firepower--the steady, heavy rain prevented the muskets from firing--and, consequently, it could not repulse the French cavalry attacks. Following is what General Sir Evelyn Wood wrote pp. 92-3 in Achievements of Cavalry, about the last phase of the Battle of Dresden, when, defeated the Austrians were retreating: "..Pounded by artillery, charged by cavalry from the South-west and North, and threatened by the approaching infantry columns from the East, many of the Austrians were cut down, but the larger portion surrendered, while a few fled towards Pesterwitz. This action gave rise to several remarkable scenes. General Bordesoule confronted a brigade of Aloys Lichtenstein's division, formed in square. The French commander, riding to the front, summoned the Austrians to surrender, saying. "Your muskets won't go off!" To which their leaders replied, "Surrender! Never! If our muskets won't go off, your horses cannot charge in mud to their hocks." "That is right," replied Bordesoule; "but I will blow you to atoms with my guns." "You have got none up with you," replied the Austrian. "Yes, I have," was the reply, and a battery of horse artillery trotting up, unlimbered within 100 yards of the square. The Austrians, seeing the French gunners standing with lighted port fires in hand, realized the impossibility of further resistance, and surrendered." And then pages 94-95" "A brigade of Latour-Maubourg's command... found themselves in the front of an Austrian battery, flanked on either by two large squares... The French cavalry now advanced on the squares, and the battery, abandoning the infantry, limbered up, and drove off. Twice the attack, which was made at a walk, failed, the Austrians standing firm in ranks three deep, and presenting an unbroken front of bayonets. Latour-Maubourg, who was present, then sent for his personal escort, which consisted of a half squadron of Lancers, and having placed these at the head of the column, sent the mass forward. The Lancers speared the front rank of the Austrian infantry, and then the squares were practically annihilated!" These examples are to the point, and proves the importance of musket fire for the infantry to resist a cavalry charge. Hence our conclusion that infantry unable to fire could not resist a cavalry charge, especially when facing lancers. General Wood points out some a very pertinent point to further substantiate our argument about cavalry unable to achieve decisive tactical importance when he mentions p. 82: "The battles of Lutzen and Bautzen were necessarily barren in results, since Napoleon had an insufficient number of horsemen to reap the fruits of the victories won by the infantry; and after that of Bautzen, where the ground was admirably suited for the operation of mounted troops, Napoleon must have felt acutely the weakness of these Arms when he exclaimed, "What! No guns, no prisoners--after all this slaughter!" Very precisely Lutzen and Bautzen would have been decisive victories, and the results of Campaign of 1813 would have been completely different most likely ending with a French victory and if Napoleon had had at his disposal the cavalry he had lost in Russia. In both battles the French pursuit was ineffective for lack of cavalry. And that is a point on which most historians agree. Chandler in The Campaign of Napoleon makes some very pertinent remarks: "(1) (At Lutzen, p.887) "The crippling shortage of French cavalry again made itself felt, for no pursuit A l'outrance was feasible..." (2) (At Bautzen. p. 897) "Each side lost approximately 20,000 casualties during the two-day struggle-but in term of morale the Allies had come off by far the worst, and it was fortunate for them that the French pursuit was so relatively slow and ineffective. (3) (On the state of the Allies before the armistice, p. 899.) "The Allies, too, were in a desperate situation. They had suffered two heavy defeats, their numbers were steadily sinking.... and the French had all unknowingly been within sight of complete victory when they occupied Breslau, thus turning the line of the Katzbach..." Von Bismark in his thoughts resuming the feeling of the cavalry commanders of the period mentions that cavalry has to await a favorable moment to attack infantry. That condition was met when a defeated army was retreating as there many units were disordered or even in some complete state of dissolution--that by the way was not limited to infantry. It is our contention that an effective cavalry pursuit--providing that Napoleon had such cavalry--would have been the last blow that would have tilted the balance in his favor and end up the Campaign of 1813 right there in favor of Napoleon. So, a decisive outcome by cavalry shock action would have been achieved in these two battles, but only at the end of the baffles when the enemy infantry had been shaken. In that case, cavalry would have had a decisive effect, certainly not on the scale of that of the Campaign of 1806, but nevertheless decisive. Contrary to what is suggested by James Arnold, after the disastrous Campaign of 1812, the French did not relegate cavalry to a secondary role by a planned, deliberate attempt, but were forced to do so by circumstances as not enough replacement men and horses could be trained quickly enough to participate to the campaigns of 1813 and 1814. During the spring campaign in Germany in 1813, Napoleon was fully aware of his cavalry shortage that was depriving him of decisive victories. His army simply could not operate decisively without cavalry! The need to rebuilt the cavalry was the reasons behind his seeking of an armistice. In Correspondance 20398, on June 2, 1813, Napoleon said: " " ... Two considerations have made up my mind: my shortage of cavalry, which prevents me from striking great blows, and the hostile attitude of Austria." He told Caulincourt that he needed at least 3 months to rebuild his cavalry. These facts fully support that Napoleon did not consider cavalry of secondary importance! The French cavalry never recovered from the destruction of its 15 heavy cavalry regiments during the Campaign of Russia. After 1812, the newly raised French cuirassiers regiments were a shadow of what they had been between 1805 and 1812, and never regained the high standards of their glory years. For instance at Waterloo some of the French cuirassiers were outweighed by the British heavy horses, something that would not have taken place with the pre-1813 French cuirassiers. In a series of 2 lectures we gave at Historicon 95, we presented the battle tactics of the French cavalry brigades, Divisions and Corps. These tactics which assured the French cavalry superiority in most baffles involving charges by brigades, Divisions or even entire cavalry Corps, according to preset tactics, were used in a number of battles such as Austerlitz, Eylau, Eckmohl, Friedland, Aspern-Essling, Wagram, Borodino, Dresden, Leipzig, Montmirail, Vauchamps, Quatre Bras, Waterloo, etc. A survey of the major battles of the Empire shows that in only 3 battles-Eylau, Aspem- Essling and Wagram--the cavalry was used as a stop gap to gain time and/or to plug holes in the defensive lines simply because no infantry was available at the time. Indeed the massed battery at Wagram and Borodino inflicted terrible casualties on cavalry, but that did not prevent the use of massive cavalry charges in subsequent battles like at the Katzbach, Grossbeeren, Leipzig, or Vauchamps or Waterloo, just to name, a few. Some of these charges against infantry at brigade, Division or even Corps level achieved results by shock action. The only difference--with the exception of Waterloo--was that the cavalry commanders (in agreement with von Bismark's recommendations) awaited for the right opportunity to charge a shaken infantry. We should not forget the Battle of Waterloo, in which the charge of the Union brigade simply eliminated for practical purposes, d'Erlon's Corps from the picture and certainly did achieve significant tactical results, but only after the infantry had been shaken by the infantry and was unable to form squares. The Battle of Vauchamps; (February 14, 1814) was preceded by that of Champaubert, Montmirail, and Chateau-Thierry. In these 3 battles, the cavalry played a significant tactical role in defeating the Allies, but at Vauchamps the cavalry, supported by artillery, played a decisive role and defeated Blucher's command practically by itself. Vauchamps is a battle in which the cavalry--part of which was the Guard cavalry achieved decisive results--by shock actions practically alone beside artillery support. Note that, beside an initial loss of 3,000, most of Blucher's infantry formed in square retreated some 10 miles in that formation but was finally overwhelmed by cavalry charges supported by artillery. A similar action took place a few days later near Guignes where Pahlen was surprised with his command consisting of 2000 horses and 4000 infantry supported by 12 guns. Charged by cavalry, Pahlen formed his infantry in squares and withdrew. Unfortunately, 36 guns of the Guard blasted his command and, after his squadrons were decimated by the artillery, the squares were finally charged by the cavalry and his command was completely destroyed or taken prisoner, and the artillery captured. Pahlen was able to escape to Nangis with his depleted squadrons. Once more cavalry had achieved--by shock actions--decisive, results, after the infantry had been shaken by artillery. Line of Communications We have not covered another critical mission of cavalry which was a mission for both the Light Cavalry and the Dragoons. That is the protection of the communications and of the supply lines. That was particularly acute in 1813 as Napoleon's communications were through the campaign constantly harassed by the operations of partisans and cavalry (mostly Cossacks; and Landwehr) who displayed the greatest activity and aggressivity. So serious the problem and the loss had become that drastic measures had to be taken. On September 8, the Emperor told Pire to carefully scout around Bautzen and clear the Cossacks that were disturbing the communications around that city. On September 11, Lefebvre- Desnouettes was ordered to clear the Cossacks and others enemy cavalry. He was reinforced at Freiberg by 4,000 sabers from generals Pire's and Valin's brigades where he was on the 11th. He was further reinforced by 1,500 infantry and 2,000 cavalry under Lorge which were withdrawn from Ney. A Division of Victor's II Corps was also ordered to Freiberg. The cavalry was to sweep the all country west of the Elbe in the rear of the army. Margeron, the governor of Leipzig was to also help. Finally, Augereau on September 17, was ordered to march with his IX Corps, less one Division reassigned to the I Corps, from Wurzburg by Coburg to Jena to keep open the crossing over the River Saale and protect the rear of the army. Thielmann and Mensdorf, after the Allies were informed of the unprotected state of the French communications, were sent to operate on the Saale and between Leipzig and Erfurt, that is deep in the French rear, against the French convoys and reinforcements. On September 12, Thielmann was at Weissenfels were he captured 1,000 prisoners and 26 guns, and seized the defile of Kosen. On the 18th he took Merseburg and 2,000 prisoners. Mensdorf acted with the same activity, cutting off convoys, etc. It was against these two that Lefebvre-Desnouettes was sent. The Allies free corps were reinforced by 7 regiments of Cossacks under Platov. These, on September 28, with Thielmann, attacked Lefebvre-Desnouettes at Altenburg, defeated him and captured 1,000 prisoners from his command. Another raid was made again Kassel, in the north by Czemitchew who, with 2,300 Cossacks and other cavalry and 6 guns, crossed the Elbe. He dispersed 2,000 French infantry, took 6 guns, and convinced the garrison of Kassel to surrender, effectively ending the Kingdom of Westphalia. The sad fact was that the lack of cavalry prevented Napoleon from securing his communications and prevented vital supplies to reach the Grande Armee causing unsustainable rates of strategic consumption. Simply more cavalry was necessary to protect the communications and cavalry had certainly not been relegated to a secondary role. Once more it is its unavailability that created the problems. CONCLUSION We have covered considerable data. We agree that Wagram marked the rise of the artillery arm to a level unknown until then, but we disagree that Wagram marked the end of the domination of cavalry on the battlefield although we agree that cavalry shock actions were in steady decline during the Napoleonic period. In fact it had been so since the emergence of the firearms. Shock actions still played-on occasions-considerable roles when the cavalry was judiciously and more carefully employed and could still play a decisive tactical role at Vauchamps. In fact battles like Lautzen and Bautzen could not bear their fruits--and become decisive--for lack of cavalry. We have also proved that the decline of the cavalry as a pure shock weapon had begun much before the Wars of the French Revolution and of the Empire because of the infantry in massed firepower and better infantry tactics. But in spite of the artillery, the action of cavalry versus cavalry remained unchanged for many years. We have also seen that the importance of Light Cavalry increased during the Napoleonic period and show that there were other missions in which cavalry was irreplaceable. Hence cavalry was not relegated to secondary importance until much later. During the warsof the French Revolutiona nd Empire, we don't agree that battles were won by the systematic domination of one specific arm, but by the close co-operation of the three arms. In such battles, cavalry could play a decisive role only if used at the right time against a defeated or shaken foe and in the right conditions. It was practically useless against fresh trained infantry. It was also invaluable in pursuing a defeat enemy and the lack of cavalry--like at Lutzen and Bautzen--could be disastrous by preventing the winner to change a victorious action into a decisive victory. Of course, the further progress of artillery and fast firing rifles finally decreased the importance of cavalry and finally eliminated it from the battlefield. And there we fully agree with Jim Arnold. SOURCES Von Bismark, General, Tactique de la cavalerie, Paris, 1821. Aubier A., Lt.Colonel La cavalerie napoleonienne peut-elle encore servir de modele, Paris 1802. Bonie, General T., Cavalerie au combat, Paris, 1887. Chandler, David, The Campaigns of Napoleon, Mac Milan, New York, 1966. Duffy, Christopher, Austerlitz, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1973. Duffy, Christopher, Borodino, Seeley Service & Co. London, 1977. Davout, Journal du 3eme Corps, Gates, David, The Spanish Ulcer, W. W. Norton & Co. New York, London, 1986. Nafziger, George, A Guide to Napoleonic Warfare, privately published by the author, P.O. box 1522, W. Chester, OH 45069-1522. Napoleon's Correspondence, La correspondance de Napoleon, 32 volumes, Paris 1858-70. Nosworthy, Brent, The Anatomy of Victory, Battle Tactics 1689-1763, Hippocrene Books, New York, 1990. Nosworthy, Brent, With Musket, Cannon and Sword, Saperdon, New York, 1996. Petre, F. Loraine Petre, Napoleon Last Campaign in Germany, Reprint, New York, 1974. Petre, F. Loraine Petre, Napoleon's Conquest of Prussia - 1806, Reprint, New York, 1977. Thiry, Baron Jean, Leipzig, Berger-Levrault, Paris, 1972. Woods, General Sir Evelyn, Cavalry in the Waterloo Campaign, Boston, 1896. Woods, General Sir Evelyn, Achievements of Cavalry, London, 1897. Tactical and Simulation Problems by the EE&L Staff Problem: (One of our readers asked our opinion on a precise situation) Some infantry battalions in square advanced against a position held by cavalry, fired against the cavalry and charged it. The referee did not allow that maneuver to take place. Answer: We have here a compound question which, in our opinion, is due to an unrealistic tactical situation which had little to do with what took place on a Napoleonic battlefield. Consequently, we'll approach the problem not with a wargame rule view but what took place on a Napoleonic battlefield: (1) On a Napoleonic battlefield, cavalry did not occupy ground. Cavalry was essentially an offensive arm dependent on shock action with blades or lances. It was completely unsuited for static defensive actions and needed space to successfully charge infantry, artillery or other cavalry. Consequently, cavalry commanders placed their cavalry in a position suitable to launch a charge and awaited favorable conditions to do so. (2) In addition, cavalry commanders were particularly careful in shielding their cavalry from enemy fire, be it musketry or artillery and tried to place their units in sheltered positions out of enemy fire. That is a point very often ignored by wargamers and well covered by some historians. (That is well pointed out by historians like Unger, von Bismark, or cavalry leaders like de Brake etc.) (3) After a charge, cavalry did not occupy ground, but withdrew to reform to be ready to charge again. Hence, the problem boils down to the application of real Napoleonic tactics and grand tactics to a wargame if a group really desires to recreate true Napoleonic battle situations. A quotation from Unger's Historique critiques des exploits et vicissitudes de la cavalerie, p. 221 illustrate the above and following is an translation of what he says: "When infantry launches an attack... and forward movement comes to a halt... it engages in a firefight... Between running away and victory there is an intermediate state, which is also that of the enemy; from such a situation both sides can expect a decisive victory, which is often achieved by simple perseverance. In the case of an attack by cavalry that is a completely different matter. To leave a regiment of cavalry stationary under the fire of a body of infantry, recognized too strong to be successfully charged, (Unshaken infantry in square is such a formation, since good, unshaken infantry in square is practically invulnerable to a cavalry charge. ) would not be a praiseworthy perseverance; that would be a sign of folly capable of completely ruining the cavalry, without any compensating damage to the enemy since cavalry can only riposte to volley fire with some musketoon and pistol shots. Any decent cavalryman, anyone who has some notions on the capability and effect of our weapons, can understand these points with out any effort or difficult calculation. Cavalry must vanquish quickly or give up, and that has been since the very beginning of time. As soon as the horse does not have the impulse and shock on its side, it becomes a burden, and a man is stronger standing on his two feet that sifting on a motionless horse." Thus, cavalry either defeats its adversary immediately or withdraws. After a charge, it withdrew to reform. Standing holding ground was not an option and that principle should be strictly enforced. Note that if the principle is applied, the situation described in the question simply does not develop and it can not occur. Note that in the rare documented cases in which infantry charged cavalry, it appears that the cavalry was surprised, had lost its momentum or was at the end of a charge (which is the same thing). Hence, as Unger tells us, it was at a disadvantage against infantry. Of further importance and an essential consideration in interpreting an attack on cavalry by infantry is the fact that any decent commander of a cavalry unit having lost its momentum and coming in contact with steady and unshaken infantry, would immediately order his command to withdraw and reform. Note that such an action in itself could be interpreted and reported by the infantry as "victoriously repelling cavalry". In our rules, after many years of trying different solutions to prevent cavalry from standing immobile under enemy fire, we have come up with a very specific rule: "If fired upon, cavalry must either charge in the next segment or withdraw out of enemy fire." We believe that this achieves the desired results (and conforms to reality since cavalry did stand under fire). (That rule is simply the application of a historically based fact (see above) that cavalry did not stand under fire without either charging or taking cover.) We are all aware of another principle. In most battles, victory was achieved by the successful cooperation between the three arms, infantry, artillery and cavalry. So, let us apply that known principle to the situation described in the original question. Let us support the attacking infantry with artillery. Most likely, the artillery is going to fire against the enemy position, the opposing cavalry, prior to the infantry attack. Then, if applying our charge or withdraw rule, the enemy cavalry would have to either charge or get out of the way. There is another significant aspect of Napoleonic battles. A survey of battles shows that battles were very often fluctuations resulting from attacks, charges, counterattacks and countercharges. In an issue of EE&L, Vol. 1 we have documented that fact and, furthermore, shown that charges or attacks originated out of artillery range, usually about 800 to 1000 yards from the enemy position (or closer when a suitable closer position sheltered from artillery fire was available). Consequently, infantry was not constantly standing in the open (unlike as it is so often done in wargames) unless it was defending a position or could not do otherwise. Prior to an attack, that attacking commander sheltered his forces (infantry or cavalry) from enemy fire to minimize his losses (and hence increasing his chances of success with stronger forces). Then, only, after an artillery preparation to soften the enemy, the attack took place. To further illustrate our point, we'll be reprinting that article in our next issue. Back to EEL List of Issues and List of Lochet's Lectures Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1995 by Jean Lochet This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com