Title: Napoleon's Last Victory and the Emergence of Modern War Author: Robert M. Epstein Pages: 215 Illustrations: None Maps: 16 (4 strategic, 12 grand tactical down to division level; 12 of these maps were previously published in color in A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars by Esposito and Elting, published in 1964 by the U.S. Military Academy at West Point) Footnotes: 276 (10 pages) Appendices: 4 (7 pages) Bibliography: 1 manuscript collection, 12 published primary sources, 86 secondary sources Index: 500 listings (9 pages) Publisher: University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas Publication Date: 1994 Binding: Cloth (hardbound) Price: $29.95 ISBN: 0-7006-0664-5 Summary: This is an important new work on Napoleonic warfare. Epstein argues persuasively that the true origins of modern war can be found in the Franco-Austrian War of 1809. The Battle of Aspern-Essling on May 21, 1809, has been considered Napoleon's first defeat. One traditional belief about the 1809 campaign is that Napoleon's powers of command started to decline at this time, and that he made more mistakes than in all his previous campaigns. Author Epstein wants us to reconsider this accepted orthodoxy. Rather than focus on personalities, he says it is more important to analyze the new trends emerging in the process of war. Epstein feels that the real story is that the Austrian army had reformed since their 1805 debacle, and so the context of warfare changed. And if the context changed, then Napoleon's actions as a commander have to be reinterpreted. This was the first time the Austrian army was organized in corps like the French army. Not only was the corps a more effective structure for handling large masses of troops, it also had structural resiliencyÄcorps were difficult to destroy in single engagements, and gave their side the ability to recover from defeat and continue fighting. It took a series of battles to destroy an army organized into corps. Another significant new interpretation of the 1809 campaign by Epstein includes the observation that it was the first time that two states confronted each other on the battlefield with armies created by large-scale conscription, coordinated along two major theaters of operation (Danubian and Italian). As a result, the French and Austrians were forced into "distributed maneuvers" that produced broad operational fronts in which battles became both sequential and simultaneous, but ultimately indecisive. Robert M. Epstein is professor of history at the School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the author of Prince Eugene at War: 1809. Despite the technical and scholarly approach, this is a surprisingly easy read. Appendices include definitions of the terms used in the text, orders of battle to corps level, and notes on the ranks of general officers. Napoleon's Last Victory has received numerous accolades, including: "A major contribution to our understanding not only of Napoleonic but also Moltkean warfare." - Gunther E. Rothenberg, author of The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon. "A must for any collection on the Napoleonic Wars." - Dennis E. Showalter, author of Tannenberg: Clash of Empires. "An important, thought-provoking study that provides valuable insights into the changing nature of warfare during the Napoleonic period." Donald D. Horward, Director, Institute on Napoleon and the French Revolution, Florida State University. "Epstein's reasoning is sound, his documentation is excellent, and his conclusions convincing." - John G. Gallaher, author of Napoleon's Irish Legion. Book Review: Red Coats and Grey Jackets Back to Empire, Eagles, & Lions Table of Contents Vol. 2 No. 9 Back to EEL List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1994 by Emperor's Headquarters This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com