Question W-8-1 How should I represent and use Freiwillige Jagers of the Prussian Army on the wargame table, or should I bother? Were they used exclusively as skirmishers by their attached regiments, or did they also fight in line of battle? Is there any documentation of any action they were involved in, and how effective were they? - Dr. Mark Ashby, London, England. ANSWER TO W-8- 1 by Marc Raiff I presume that Dr. Ashby is referring to the Freiwillige (volunteer) Jager detachments of the Prussian Army during the "Wars of Liberation" 1813-1815. They are a most interesting subject for study. Taking advantage of the growing German national patriotic sentiment, and wishing to train cadre for future units, the Prussians issued a decree on February 3, 1813, calling for volunteers between the ages of seventeen and twenty-four to join the regiment of their choice for the duration of the war. Each Jager was to provide his own uniform and equipment with the promise of future service as an officer or NCO in the line as an incentive. These young men were organized into company- and squadron-size detachments attached to the various regiments. These Jager detachments varied greatly in size. For example, the Freiwillige JagerDetachement (FJD) of the 3rd East Prussian Infantry Regiment numbered only about forty men, while the FJD of the 1st Guards Foot Regiment numbered almost 600 men divided into three companies. These strengths are as of mid-August, 1813. The average detachment, if there could be said to be such a thing, numbered around 150-200 men for the infantry FJD, and about 120-180 men for the cavalry detachments. Most regular units of infantry and cavalry had a FJD, while the reserve infantry had a smaller percentage, and the landwehr units had only a handful of these detachments. Representing them on the wargame table is a function of the game scale and the rules used, as well as personal preference. Given that most FJDs were only a company or a squadron in strength, you can increase the size of the regiments which included a Freiwillige Jager Detachement. With respect to their combat service as skirmishers or as formed troops, I believe they performed both roles on the battlefield, although this varied from unit to unit. Further research on this subject is required. I have an account of the FJD with the Fusilier-Bataillon of the 1. Pommersches Infanterie-Regiment. Do any readers have additional information they can share on this subject? ONE RULESMITH RESPONDS TO BILL JESSOP'S CRITICISM IN EE&L #3by Matt DeLaMater While I agree with most of the points Bill Jessop raises in his astute article "On Columns Advancing At Non-Deployment Distances, or What the Rulesmiths May Have Been Thinking" in EE&L #3, I'd like to take the time to point out why our Legacy of Glory rules are very similar to the ones Bill has outlined. I guess I'm taking exception to his remark: "Most, if not all, Napoleonic game systems allow a line of battalions in column to attack in squashed together masses that would never have room to deploy into line. A number of rules systems give great advantages to this 'messed attack'...." Bill Jessop's observations about "squashed" deployments are quite accurate. In fact, my own observations of the same phenomena of games played at conventions encouraged me to design a simulation that looked more like a Napoleonic battle. After all, if it doesn't look like the real thing, how could it be a worthwhile simulation? In Legacy of Glory, accurate deployment is critical, and the system goes to great lengths not to reward players for using unhistorical and ill-conceived tactics. In fact, players that do so will find that their units will suffer much greater casualties from artillery fire, will be unable to deploy when they become engaged in firefights, and will be prone to disorder and confusion. Clausewitz put the whole matter most concisely: "The order in very deep masses is certainly the most injudicious. In the later wars of Napoleon, twelve battalions were sometimes deployed and closed one upon the other, forming thirty-six ranks closely packed together. Such masses are greatly exposed to the destructive effects of artillery, their mobility and impulsion are diminished, while their strength is not increased. The use of such masses at Waterloo was one cause of the French being defeated. Macdonald's column was more fortunate at Wagram, but at a great sacrifice of life; and it is not probable that this column would have been victorious had it not been for the successes of Davout and Oudinot on the left of the arch- duke's line." Special Rules for "massive infantry columns" were spelled out in our first newsletter (summer, 1991), and they read much as EE&L's own rule does. I am an avid reader of EE&L, and I would have been remiss indeed in my duty as a "rulesmith" if I didn't insist upon historically proper and realistic deployment rules. In fact, Legacy of Glory does more than just "insist" on proper deployments, it shows you why such deployments actually work much better than "wargamer" formations. It was one of the fundamental design principles of LoG that history should triumph over gamesmanship, and that the system should inherently reward tactics and deployments that were historically successful. Forgive me for taking the time to point this out. Mr. Jessop can hardly be faulted for not knowing the nature of our rules. Yet, despite such kind reviews as the one published in EE&L #1, a considerable amount of misconception exists about Legacy of Glory. This rules systemis innovative and evolutionary, and, whatever its short-comings, we made every effort to overcome the "common myths" perpetuated by other commercial rules sets. I take peevish exception whenever LoG is lumped together and categorized with other games. After all, Legacy of Glory exists because of our radical disagreement with those design philosophies that allow and reward a wargamer's "massed serum attack formation." Whether you like Legacy of Glory or not, the rules are markedly different from its "competitors. " The rest of Mr. Jessop's article in EE&L #3 is quite fine, and his rules suggestions seem reasonable and accurate. He also gave a fine presentation at Historicon which gave this "rulesmith" even more material to consider. I would be interested in seeing more discussion concerning those times when troops deployed without maintaining proper deployment distances, or when columns tended to close up due to terrain: considerations or convergence upon an objective. This is a far different case than the deliberate massive assault columns employed by D'Erlon and Macdonald. Lastly, a key part of our design philosophy is to have the flexibility to modify or alter the rules system in the light of new historical evidence. As a part of this pursuit, we have put out three newsletters with rules updates, new ratings, clarifications, and errata. A RESPONSE FROM THE EDITOR We are quite aware that Legacy of Glory was an exception in allowing massive formations to be used as the typical attack by most wargamers (there are other rules systems that also penalize this tactic). This is why Bill Jessop was careful to say: "Most, if not all, Napoleonic game systems allow a line of battalions in column to attack in squashed together masses that would never have room to deploy into line. A number of rules systems give great advantages to this . 'massed attack'...." Back to Empire, Eagles, & Lions Table of Contents Vol. 2 No. 8 Back to EEL List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1994 by Emperor's Headquarters This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com