Petre in Napoleon's Campaign in Poland, 1806-7 p.52 [1] quotes Napoleon as jokingly saying: "In Poland, I have discovered a new element - mud." Mud and the Campaign in Poland, 1806-7 Petre goes on to describe the Polish theater of operations as: "The general features of this country were plains of sand, or of mud in wet weather, intermixed with heaths, bogs, forests, lakes, and morasses. "Across these areas there passed no metalled roads; the best of the communications were mere banks of earth, not even revetted except where their passage across marshes rendered it impossible to maintain them without artificial support. By the droughts of summer or the frost of winter, these so-called roads were hardened to a consistency which allowed of the passage of artillery with as much ease as is ever possible where unmetalled roads have to be used. When soaked with rain, or dissolved by thaws, they became almost impassable .... In wet weather the slush attained a depth to be measured in feet not in inches. In December, 1806, the infantry sank to their knees, often deeper, in the soft roads; the horses to their hocks; the guns to their axles--sometimes even guns absolutely disappeared in the clayed mire. Double and quadruple teams could not drag them along as fast as the 1 1/4 miles an hour which the infantry with infinite labour could cover. "The best of roads were such as described, the worst were mere tracks leading from one village to another. " Then Petre, to substantiate his claims, quotes primary sources who were writers that took part in the campaign: (1) Bernadotte, writing of the operations toward Soldau in December, says: "The roads were frightful; the artillery could no, follow, and one marched all day to cover three or four leagues." (7 1/2 miles) [report on Ist Corps Arch. Hist.] (2) "The field on which we were about to fight, was converted into a lake of mud, where soldiers and horses could scarcely march." [Lannes' report on Pultusk, Arch. Hist.] (3) "The country over which we passed (25th December) was clayed and marshy, the road, were frightful. Horsemen, infantry and artillery could only get over them in the face of insurmountable difficulties. It took two hours to march a short league." (2 1/2 miles) [Davout, p 132] The practical effect of such extremely poor roads which were covered by a sea of mud during the spring or autumn (or even in winter during thaw) was to slow down troop movements to crawl, to greatly impair the artillery mobility, and to stop wheeled traffic, rendering the transportation of basic food supplies almost impossible. Through the Fall campaign such difficulties ard constantly reported by Petre and other authors. In case of retreat, the effect of mud could be disastrous. During the retreat to Pultusk and Golymin, in December 1806, the Russians had to abandon 70 to 80 guns that were stuck in the mud. The French were not much more successful at that time in carrying along their guns. However, as they were advancing, they were able to recover those they left behind, while the abandoned Russian guns fell into French hands. The 1814 Campaign in France There is a great deal of similarity - concerning mud - between some parts of the 1814 Campaign in France (especially during the so-called Six Days Campaign extending from February 9 to 14) and the Campaign in Poland in 1806-7. This similarity is well explained by the following examples: (1) During the march toward Champaubert: "...He (Napoleon) immediately left Nogent escorted by the service squadrons and slept in Sezanne. It had been raining steadily for five days, transforming into quagmires the roads from Nogent to Sezanne and also the ones by which Blucher was traveling from Vertus to Montmirail. "The road from Villauxe to Sezanne had been already used by Marmont's troops. Consequently it was a foot deep in mud. Some of the Grumblers and voltigeurs left their shoes behind at every step. The dragoons and horse grenadiers and all the cavalry traveled on foot, pulling their mounts out of the mire by their muzzles. As for the artillery, Dulauloy, Griois and Leroy had to get the help of the horses in Barbonne and of the enthusiastic local population to pull through their guns and caissons. On that evening the horse and foot guard finally reached Sezanne where it camped in soaked miserable bivouacs. Some of the Guard artillery was still bogged down in the Saint-Gond marshes. (Anatomy of Glory.) (2) At Champaubert: "Ricard followed the road and Lagrange still progressed on the left. The enemy position was the most accessible on that side and the first French attack took place. However, the Russians had deployed there 24 guns which crushed La Grange. No French artillery had yet come up and La Grange's Division broke off in disorder. Napoleon and Ney appeared with the numerous Guard artillery, rallied Lagrange and stopped the Russians." De Segur, Du Rhin a Fontainebleau. According to de Segur in Du Rhin Fontainebleau, p. 173, "Marmont told Napoleon that his troops were understrength, exhausted, hungry, discouraged and the ground rotten in which guns and horses were stuck, unable to move." (3) During Sacken's retreat toward Chateau-Thierry De Segur, p. 193, reports: "...following a wood ... 50 Guards (of Honor) from the 3rd and Captain Carabene ... sighted a Russian battalion escorting 7 guns and a large number of caissons stuck in the mud.... charging... they took everything. " Sacken's Russians were not better off: "...Our troops retired in order to Vifort, wading through mud which was so deep and thick that many of the men were obliged to cast off their shoes .... Vassiltchikof was ordered to cover the retreat, and give the artillery every possible facility for retiring through the woods and morasses, which were almost impassable. The cavalry fastened long lines to the field- pieces, and the hussars and dragoons, fifty men to each gun, dragged then forward, and after a night of severe labour, reached Vifort at day-break" [A.Mikhailofsky-Danialefsky History of the Campaign in France in the year 1814, p. 112.] (4) At Vauchamps: "...... The able Grouchy found a road running parallel to the Prussian line of retreat and managed to get ahead of the hard pressed Allied squares. The Prussians appeared hopelessly trapped. However, the Prussians were saved by the mud as Grouchy's charges could not get momentum and were not supported by his horse artillery which because o the mud, had not been able to join him on time.." (5) Napoleon moving south after Vauchamps: After the victory of Vauchamps Napoleon decided to move south to fall on the Austrian right flank: "What road to choose? .... The most direct from Champaubert, the one toward Sezanne ... was only 15 leagues long (about 35 miles) but it was completely impracticable because of the mud ... ..." Consequently, Napoleon had to take the longer road via Meaux and Sampuis which was a metalled road in excellent condition (bien ferree). Note that some of the very same facts are reported by Chandler in The Campaigns of Napoleon. (6) Roads, mud and the Russian infantry at Marchais: When preparing my trip to the 1814 battlefields I got maps [2] and looked for all the possible information I could get. I finally prepared a plan to take pictures as I wrote the article pertinent to the Battle of Montmirail Marchais, and I started to wonder why the Russians were not supported by their artillery. After all, the Russian artillery was always credited to be well equipped and had as well excellent teams. Yet, I found that Major-General Heidenreich, who had occupied Marchais with the Pskoski, Vladimirski, Tambovski and Kotromski infantry regiments, two companies of the 11th Jaeger, and the Don Cossacks of Colonel Loukovkin (a total of 2,360 men) could not bring up his six light guns (6-lb.) to Marchais and had to leave them at L'Epine-au-Bois. Let us say that Marchais and the areas around Marchais La Haute-Epine and L'Epine-au-Bois have changed very little since 1814 (as a matter of fact, the population has declined in these villages). Then, map in hand, I went there and saw what I had suspected after studying the pertinent map. There are not now and there were then no direct roads from La Haute-Epine or L'Epine-auBois to Marchais but simple field tracks used only by the local farmers to work in their fields. These tracks can not handle any heavy or ordinary traffic and become impractical as soon as heavy rains fall. This impassable condition remains until these tracks are either dried up or frozen. On February 11, 1814, these field tracks were soaked by the heavy rain that had been falling for a week and, consequently, were complete] impracticable to even light 6-lb. artillery. Let us not forget that an artillery battery was far from limited to the guns but included the caissons and other support vehicles, i.e., some 30 vehicles and perhaps 140 horses. In addition, a 6-lb. was not a light load. A Russian 6-lb. weighed with limber over 2,500 pounds and an ammunition wagon about the same. So, during the Six Days Campaign, i.e., if part of the 1814 Campaign in which the Battles ( Champaubert, Montmirail-Marchais, Chateau-Thierry and Vauchamps took place, the reports (Russian as well as French), mention the same story: artillery and even infantry and cavalry have considerable difficulties moving on the road which had been transformed into a quagmire by week of heavy rain. Some other examples on the effect of rain an mud on military operations (1) Campaign of 1809: The early Campaign of 1809 in Germany somewhat similar to the Six Days Campaign 1814. As in 1814, it had been raining steadily and greatly impaired Davout's retreat from Ratisbonne to Abensberg. Jim Arnold in Crisis on the Danube, p. 83 reports: "There was only one good road. It ran parallel to the Danube from Ratisbonne to Abensberg. The wagons and the baggage train would have to follow it. The progress regulated the rate at which the entire corps could advance... the baggage train trundle slowly along the rain-soaked road toward Saal.' Some other well known instances are: (2) Waterloo 1815: Let us not forget the handicap that mud was on maneuvering at Waterloo. In addition, the French artillery round shots did not ricochet but became stuck in the mud. (3) Brunswick and the Battle of Valmy (September 1792): One the main reasons Marshal Brunswick, one of the most brilliant generals of the early Napoleonic period, failed in his attempt to invade France was because, at Valmy, his army was in poor shape. Because of the advanced season and the resulting poor road conditions, his supply train had been unable to follow closely and his troops were starving. That starvation caused a severe dysentery among his troops. The present article does not intend to be an exhaustive study on the effects of roads and/or mud on Napoleonic military operations but to show that roads and mud significantly affected military operations during that period, which brings us to examine the infrastructure of roads in France during the Napoleonic era. The Roads of France The Romans knew the strategic importance of good roads to quickly move their legions from one point of the Empire to another. One of the first things the Romans did in their new conquests was to build roads for their military needs. After the fall of the Roman Empire the need for moving Legions quickly disappeared. Most of the Western Europe economy reverted mainly to very local, almost separate economies or economic regions which more or less were self sufficient. Hence for lack of need, the concept of a good road system simply disappeared. It took several hundred years before the nations at the dawn of the Industrial Revolution and the era of increased trade became conscious of the importance of good roads. However, roads were expensive to build and to maintain. As a matter of fact, few nations had the resources to build good, surfaced roads, often called "high roads." "High roads" linked different economic regions and always accounted for much less traffic than the "low roads" (or local roads) which covered the needs of regular everyday needs. So, it can be seen that the "low roads" were, in most cases, much more important to the local economies than the "high roads." Hence the local residents were inclined to spend some of their limited resources on their vital "low roads" and completely ignore the "high roads." We have to wait for the eighteenth century to see France, which had 22 million inhabitants and was one of the richest countries of Europe, starting to build a system of Royal roads (high roads) which was incomplete in 1789. Around the 1760s, the French state embarked on a task that would always exceed its resources if not its intentions. Many of these Royal roads were of extremely high standard for the time. In any case, by the Napoleonic period, the network was still far from covering the country. Fernand Baudel in The Identity of France provides us with some valuable information not only about France but also about the reasons for the existence of roads. A great part of the above information on French roads was taken from this outstanding work. One should not forget that at this time roads were still very fragile affairs, sometimes mere strips of presumed solid carriageway in which vehicles often became embedded. They often needed repairs. For instance, in 1794, the road from Paris to Brest, an important trunk road, was described as being generally viable. There is no record of having been impassable in recent years, but it is very hard going for wheeled traffic as one approaches Rennes in wet weather. Between Gravelle and Vitre, "the ground is solid, but the surface rough, imperfect and damaged. Only a third of the funds necessary for repair are available." From Vitre to Chateaubourg, "the base is solid but the road surface imperfect and much damaged for repairs." Between Chateaubourg and Rennes "the foundations are of very poor quality, the paving uneven and very far from perfect. There is a short stretch which is very bad across the Clusary heath. Repairs are being carried out." Of more than 30 miles of roads in these three sectors, only 6 were surfaced. This example illustrates the general reality of the roads. One can imagine how such roads would be after the passage of an army in bad weather! The official map of Royal roads indicates a good coverage of the country in 1820. But in reality, even if they had been finished, they were interrupted by gaps, by dirt roads, more or less passable according to the seasons, or by sectors needing repair or rebuilding. Bernard Lepetit, author of Chemins de terre et voies d'eau, has drawn a revised map of the Royal roads -- the good ones indicated by a thick line, the unfinished ones by a thin line -- which is certainly less optimistic than the official version. It reveals considerable deficiencies. That map was used to prepare the map presented here showing the state of the "High roads" for the Campaign of 1814. Such a map is most interesting. It clearly shows our points of interest for the Campaign of France in 1814. The surfaced roads, i.e., the ones that were actually built and carriageable, are marked in dark gray. The light gray lines mark those roads which had gaps and were much less carriageable, especially in bad weather. So, now we are in a position to outline which roads in 1814 were surfaced and which one we not. It appears that the road from Chalons to La Ferte-sous-Jouarre was not completely surface and completely surfaced only between Montmirail and La Ferte while the rest of the road from Montmirail to Chalons hindered Blucher's movements. In addition, the road from Sezanne Epernay (and Reims) was not surfaced which explains the difficulties encountered by Marmont and Napoleon as reported in some of the above examples. On the other hand, the road from Meaux to Melun which passes through Guignes was surfaced and confirms de Segur's claims that the road was metalled and in good condition. In addition, it explains the reason why Napoleon chose to move his Guard quickly to the south preference to the more direct route via Sezanne which had been completely broken up a week earlier by a combination of heavy rain and the passage of Marmont's Corps, of the Guard, and the numerous artillery. Conclusions As it has been seen above and will be seen our series in the next four issues, mud was a significant factor in the Six Days Campaign of 1814. That was not limited to the Campaign of 1814. Rain and mud were most significant factors in most military operations and had a great deal of influence on the outcome of a campaign. It is quite unfortunate that, at the present time, I have no data at hand to cover the other continental European nations. Any takers? Footnotes [1] Napoleon's Campaign in Poland, 1806-7 first published in London 1901. The quotations presented here are taken from a 1975 reprint by Hippocrene Books, Inc. New York. [2] I got the maps of the Institute Geographic National 107, rue de la Boetie, 75008 Paris (near the Champs-Elysees). These maps of the "Serie Bleue" are very precise military maps , 1:25,000 scale (1 cm = 250 meters) which reproduce all the ground features and indicate , well most if not all the local names of wood farms, etc. I used these maps when I was in the French Army. More Mud Large Map (slow: 115K) Jumbo Map (very slow: 275K) Back to Empire, Eagles, & Lions Table of Contents Vol. 2 No. 7 Back to EEL List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1994 by Emperor's Headquarters This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com