The question of the accuracy and effectiveness of musketry from the Seven Years War through the Civil War has been subject to considerable debate within various communities for years. There is, however, little empirical data upon which to work. Period descriptions of "massive" casualties, inflicted by a single volley are seldom if ever supported by a precise "body count" and have generally resulted in rather wild speculation as to the actual impact of a single volley of musketry fired by a formed body of infantry. There is some data that can be used for the purpose of developing some idea of what might have been the true impact of a volley of musketry and, in an effort to minimize subjective arguments, I will take as empirical an approach as possible. [1] The first numbers to be examined are the notorious Prussian musketry trials. The Prussian General Scharnhorst ran a series of trials before 1813 where they formed a company of grenadiers and blazed away at a canvas sheet at varying distances. The target approximated the size of a company of "enemy" infantry. In performing this test the Prussians used six different types of muskets, which is why the following contains six sets of data. Range in Yds 0 80 160 240 320 450 Number of Hits 200 92 64 64 42 0 200 150 100 68 42 0 200 145 97 56 67 0 200 153 113 70 42 0 200 151 99 53 55 0 200 94 116 175 55 0 Total Hits 1200 785 589 386 303 0 % of shots Hitting Target 100% 65% 49% 32% 25% 0% Two artificial data points were added. The first is based on the assumption that at point blank range (0 yards) none of the 200 shots would have missed. The second is that 450 yards is beyond the effective range of the period musket and none of the hits, if any occurred, would have been sufficient to, on the average, cause any serious damage. These points were necessary from the mathematical perspective and permit the preparation of a curvo-linear regression analysis of the average results of an infantry company firing under ideal conditions. Chart I is the results of that test plotted with the line of "best fit" plus indicating the original test data. A regression analysis, using the SAS procedure NLIN, generated the following formula from the Prussian test data: 1.5+/-0.23 % of hits = 100(1- distance/450)  The uncertainty quoted in the formula is the standard error. Using this formula, and rounding the exponential to 1.5, the following percentage of hits was generated: Range in Yards Percentage of Hits Range in Yards Percentage of Hits Range in Yards Percentage of Hits 0 100% 150 54 300 19 25 92 175 48 325 15 50 84 200 41 350 10 75 75 225 35 375 7 100 69 250 30 400 4 125 61 275 24 425 1 - - - - 450 0% However, this table is based on a volley being fired by a steady line of infantry, not under fire or in combat and suffering the intendant "jitters". They are firing clean weapons, and their target is a sheet. It needs to be remembered that a hit in the sheet is not necessary a hit on a man. The second step is to make some modification from these ideal test figures that will permit them to relate to battlefield conditions. Such information is not common but such information does exist for one volley fired at the Battle of Gohrde. This battle was fought on 16 September 1813, between Wallmoden's Corps and a brigade under General Pecheux in northern Germany. The Bremen-Verden Battalion, a Hanoverian militia battalion took a single volley from 66 muskets at a range of 60-80 paces [2] and suffered 27 casualties. [3] The casualty reports indicate that a total of 30 casualties were suffered, and a second volley was reportedly fired at the battalion as it collapsed. This adds some doubt to the validity of the casualty count of the first volley, but then that number is far lower than the Prussian tests indicates they should have been. The French were conscripts with several months service, but this was their first engagement of any note. Though not hardened veterans, they were certainly well trained and drilled in the use of their muskets. Figuring an initial volley was fired at a range of approximately 70 yards with a second volley being fired at a close, unspecified range. This indicates a reasonable level of discipline. The result is that there are historical records indicating that the actual number of hits was 27, or 41 %. The Prussian tests would have indicated a 75- 81% hit ratio - about twice the field returns. It is desirable to have more such "real" examples of the effectiveness of firepower, but, alas, they don't exist or are not available. Efforts to repeat the mathematical analysis done on the Prussian tests by correcting all data points using this ratio did not prove satisfactory, so instead it was decided that it was preferable to use the three data points 100% - 0 yards, 41% - 70 yards and 0% - 450 yards, and allow the computer's curve smoothing process to generate an approximation of musketry effectiveness under battle conditions. The curve is as follows. The third step in the process is to march a battalion against the firing line, firing 2 - 2 1/2 volleys every minute (to a maximum of 30, which was normal allowance of ammunition), assuming the attacking infantry was marching at it's "charge pace" through the field of fire. For a variety of reasons, including a desire to get a moderate hit figure, a rate of fire of two rounds per minute will be used hereafter. The various "charge paces" for the principal combatants in the period were: Nation Name of Pace Paces Per Minute Rate of advance in Feet/minute France Pas de charge 120 260 England Quick Pace 108 270 Prussia Geschwindschritt 108 225 Russia Skoryi Szag 100-110 250-275 Austria Geschwindschritt 90-98 188-198 Combining the percentage of hits and the rate of advance with the rate of volley's discharged we can generate a single table that will predict the number of casualties that could be inflicted by a line of infantry on an advancing column of attacking infantry. It should be noted that only two thirds (80 men) of the unit could fire. The only thing that remains to be determined is the distance at which the defending infantry would begin to fire. Valentini states, "geschlosmuss nie weiter als auf dreihundert Schritt feuern." "Closed infantry must never fire at distances greater than 300 paces." [4] Assuming that a period general officer is as good a source as one could hope to find, the analysis will start with the first volley being fired at that distance. It is assumed that a pace will equate to a yard, allowing for the imprecision of an officer's ability to precisely estimate with his eyes 300 paces and the approximation of a pace equaling a yard. Using the Gohrde curve and manually reading the percentage hits at a given range, the following table of casualties to be inflicted by a line of infantry firing on an attacking line of infantry. The following assumptions were made in producing this table: a.) Two rounds per minute are fired b.) The attacking infantry marches exactly at it's regulated rate. c.) The results of the Gohrde volley are typical and average. d.) The first volley was fired exactly as the attacker arrived within 300 yards of the defender. e.) The terrain is perfectly flat and without cover. English Column Under fire Range of Volley Projected Casualties French or Russian Column Under fire Range of Volley Projected Casualties Prussian Column Under fire Range of Volley Projected Casualties Austrian Column Under fire Range of Volley Projected Casualties 30 yards 62% 39 yards 53% 75 yards 40% 44 yards 50% 120 28 126 26 150 22 100 33 210 14 213 13 225 12 175 17 300 8 300 8 300 8 235 11 - - - - - - 300 7 Total 111% Total 100% Total 82% Total 119% The first thing that this chart indicates is that the slow marching speed of the Austrians guarantees a higher level of casualties will be inflicted on them. That a slower unit would suffer more volleys is not a surprise. The Austrians will receive four volleys to the three received by the other nations. It is, however, questionable, if the Prussians would receive that fourth volley, as the length of time for them to cover the distance from the third volley is exactly that required to load and fire the muskets a fourth time. One could argue that they would receive it because the defenders would move faster and faster the closer the attacking columns came. However, one can also argue that the attackers might push harder to close before that last volley arrived. The key is if the attacking unit was "staggered" by.the various volleys. My opinion is that there are more variables that favor a fourth volley being delivered. The truly significant results of this table are that in every instance, theoretically, a defending line of infantry should be able to obliterate any equal force of attacking infantry. Yet we know historically that this did not occur. Indeed, it would appear that infantry was regularly able to close and bring to melee enemy infantry that stood and fired volley after volley into (probably over) them. What is therefore, the effectivity of early 19th Century musketry? First, one must recognize that the variability of musketry was incredibly wide. There is, obviously, a band of results, rather than a single line. This single Gohrde volley broke the first line of advancing Hanoverians. It would appear to be in a region that one might term the "upper limit" of the anticipated results of a good volley. On the other hand, similar volleys were delivered that inflicted so few hits that the attacking infantry ignored them and closed with bayonets. The second consideration is a combination of ammunition supplies and knowledge of the lack of effectiveness of musketry by the officers controlling the fire. It as known that the defending officers would conserve their fire to save their limited supply of ammunition and that they would also try to hold their volleys to the point where it would be most effective. In the same battle of Gohrde a second French Battalion allowed the Bennigsen Battalion to advance to within 10 paces before they fired. It would appear, however, that many of the front rank of the French lost their nerve, threw down their guns, and pushed back through their line. The French battalion collapsed and turned to the rear, withdrawing. The Bennigsen Battalion did not break and lost only 16 men during the battle. It is not clear if they lost them in this single volley, however broken, or if they were cumulative of this and subsequent actions. All this suggests that it may have been the general practice to fire one volley, or at most two volleys, at an attacking infantry formation. The remainder of the infantry fire would, therefore, appear to have been between lines of infantry blasting away ineffectively at longer ranges and stationary targets. This does not, however, resolve the question of musketry accuracy and effectiveness under combat conditions. Nor, do I think it can reasonably be predicted by test results or a single battlefield incident. There are simply too many unknowns and too many variables. Zone A is that area between the curve produced by the Prussian tests and an artificially drawn mid-point line between the Prussian results and the Gohrde volley. The Gohrde volley was selected as a lower limit because the troops were conscripts with less than 6 few months of service firing under conditions. I would define Zone A as the "Perfect Conditions Zone" (crack troops, clean muskets, no fear and no enemy fire at them to unsettle them). The probability of a volley occurring in Zone A under battlefield conditions must be considered an act of divine intervention. Zone B is a region in which one would expect to find the normal results of veteran troops firing their first volley on a battlefield. Successive volleys would, necessarily, decline in effectiveness as the weapons fouled. Zone C is an artificial zone, drawn by eyeball estimate more than anything, of the region where the musket, as a piece of equipment, ceases to be a determining factor in effectiveness and the morale, or lack thereof, of the infantry play a greater role in the effectivity of the volley. Footnotes [1]Various documents on firing muskets in this period have indicated that it was necessary to point a musket at the feet of a target at close ranges because the kick of the musket threw the barrel up, causing the ball to arc up, which would, if the barrel not aimed lower, cause the ball to pass over the target. This increase in the number of hits at a longer range clearly indicates that the muskets were pointed, not aimed, and that the kick of the musket threw the balls up in an arc whose optimal effectiveness when fired with the musket level to the ground at a man sized target was somewhere between 90 and 160 yards. That of the other muskets was somewhat below 80 yards. [2]Hereafter the average estimated range of 70 yards will be used. [3]von Quistorp, b. Die Kaiserlich Russisch-Deutsch Legion, Carl Heymann, Berlin, 1860, pg 99. [4]Generalmajor Freiherm von Valentini's Abhandlung uber den Kleinen Krieg und uber den Gebrauch der leichten Truppen, Commissioned by A.G. Leibeskind, Leipzig, 1820, pg 67. Back to Empire, Eagles, & Lions Table of Contents Vol. 2 No. 6 Back to EEL List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1994 by Emperor's Headquarters This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. 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