This is the title of a paper written in 1821 by M Salazar (alas, I do not know who he was, or even whether the 'M' stands for 'Monsieur' or 'Michel', 'Maurice' &c). He says he had 20 years' experience in all ranks of the army - but one suspects he was a French or Spanish Emigre in British service, like Ternay and Suasso - who each both wrote 'tactical insights' in the 1820s. But perhaps readers can help identify Salazar more closely? Was he perhaps Spanish?). A copy was given to Wellington, apparently, and the whole thing eventually found its way to the Public Record Office in London, which is where I read it (Ref FO 95 / 645). It claims to indicate the 'veritable' causes of Napoleon's success - which immediately reminds me of the Loire. If you follow that great river all the way uphill to the Gerbier du Jonc in the Ardeche department, you will find it has both a 'veritable' and an 'authentic' source: it is left to the gullible tourist to decide between them!
The chief cause of Napoleon's success identified by Salazar is the 'incapacity' (both civilian and military) of France's enemies. He goes on to claim that this allowed a completely new art of war to be established - although the cynical modern critic might conclude that it was precisely the incapacity of France's enemies that prevented a novel art of war from emerging (If there was no new challenge, there was no need for a new response).
The remainder of the essay consists of a pretty standard list of the usual things associated with Napoleon's armies:- eg the rapidity of marches, the ensemble of higher manoeuvres, the Corps system, inter-unit intercom, leadership from the front by generals (and dismounted leadership by Captains). Staffwork and the use of intelligent couriers were seen as key methods of establishing the all-important intercom and operational articulation. 'Voltigeurs' (does this mean scouts or foragers?) went ahead of the columns to panic the enemy and help the army live off the land. The generals used both coup d'oeil and new ways of building morale. The campaigns of 1805-6 are traced as especially striking examples of how the Boulogne Camp drill skills could be used in action (This reinforces my belief that 1805-6 must be seen as the 'classic' Napoleonic era - not 1813). Not allowing men to leave the ranks to help the wounded was - perhaps surprisingly - identified as an especially important key to tactical success.
An even more surprising assertion is that the French army in its prime had no shouts in the ranks - 'elle ne fit du bruit qu'avec la poudre". This image of disciplined, calm and collected legions contrasts still more violently with the widelyreported British perception of French excitability than does the 'line' formation claimed by Colin as the norm (as opposed to Oman's faith in the column). Who are we to believe? Personally I can accept that both silence and the line were widespread in the 'Boulogne' army of 1805-6; but that noise and the column gradually grew in favour as the armies degenerated and the gruelling wars dragged on and on. But maybe readers can help cast some additional light on these prejudices?
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