We have received a number of letters commenting on the new EE&L, some of which asked for specific questions that require too much space to be answered in the Question and Answers section. Therefore, such questions will be covered in the Reader's Forum section. The following is an example of such a question.
QUESTION FROM MR. GARY KENT:
In the army Corps of 1805, 1806 and 1809, the French infantry regiments are two to three field battalions strong. In 1809, during the Campaign against Austria, the newly raised 4th battalions were segregated in Oudinot's Corps and in Demont's Division. Then, for the invasion of Russia in 1812, we find most of the French infantry regiments in the Grand Armee with 4 to 5 field battalions. The Decree of April 23, 1811 even raised a 6th battalion for some regiments. In 1813, Nafziger in Napoleon's Invasion of Russia, p. 14, mentions, that "...At least one regiment had eight battalions." Could you elaborate on the reasons for raising so many battalions per regiment? Would it have been easier to raise new and smaller regiments?
In addition, it seems logical to assume that too many battalions in a given regiment increases the tactical burden of the Colonel commanding the regiment to a point that may decrease the tactical flexibility of such a large formation. Can you elaborate on the tactical handling of such large formations?
- ANSWER BY THE EE&L STAFF:
On the enlarging of existing infantry regiments:
The above questions are not easy to answer completely. However, General Jean Regnault, the author of the authoritative Les Aigles Imperiales, gives us an idea of Napoleon's dilemma when he wished to increase the effective strength of the Grand Armee in 1811. Reading between the lines suggests that Napoleon had somewhat of a public relations problem in 1811 by openly raising new regiments as suggested by the following quotation from General Jean Regnault's work, page 129:
- ... In 1808, by the Decree of July Ist, the Emperor had formed Line infantry regiments numbered from 114 to 120 and one Light infantry regiment, the 33rd from 16 provisoires [1] regiments previously formed. On January Ist, 1809, two new Line regiments, the 121 st and 122nd, were raised on the same fashion. The incorporation of Holland in the Empire had, by the Decree of August 18, 1810, formed the 123rd, 124th, 125th, 126th Line infantry regiments and the 33rd Light regiment from the disbanded Dutch regiments. Then, in February 1811, after the addition to the Empire of the Hanseatic Cities, the 127th, 128th and 129th of the Line were organized while in Spain, the 130th of the Line and 34th Lager were organized from provisoires regiments.
In January 1811, Napoleon ordered the reactivation of the twentyeight regiments of the Line and Light regiments that had disappeared during the Directoire and the Consulat with three battalions each.
The colonels had been appointed, the location of their depots and bases selected and a certain amount of publicity given to these new measures, but the Emperor preferred to add quietly a sixth battalion to the existing regiments.
Only the 11th and 29th Legers were effectively organized in 1811.
So, there is little doubt that Napoleon was facing a public opinion problem by constantly increasing the number of infantry regiments in the French army. Instead he choose to increase quietly the number of battalions in the existing regiments. Let us not forget that a financial question could have also been at the origin of the problem as it could have been cheaper to add battalions to existing regiments rather than fully staffing new ones. Fighting a war in the Peninsula and maintaining a large army to face Russia was a heavy financial burden that was swallowing more and more money every day.
In 1813, we are facing different problems. A regiment may have had 8 battalions but a look at the different orders of battle show that battalions of any given regiment were seldom, if ever, fielded together. Many 4th, 5th and 6th battalions were organized in provisional regiments or brigade with battalions coming from different regiments. [2]
On the tactical Handling of large regiments
There is little doubt that the tactical handling of a 5 or 6 battalion regiment was a heavy burden for a colonel. The difficulty was resolved by considering such large regiments as brigades, hence, effectively putting the regiment under the command of a general de brigade. Such an organization is reflected in the orders of battles of the Grand Armee for the invasion of Russia in 1812 which can be found in George Nafziger's Napoleon's Invasion of Russia. [3] The organization of Davout's I Corps, 4th and 5th Divisions that participated at the Battle of Saltanovka is typical:
5th Division: General de Division Compans 1st brigade: General de brigade Duppelin 25th Line Rgt. (5 battalions + artil. co) (4 3pdrs) (68/2,004) 2nd brigade: General de brigade Teste 57th Line Rgt. (5 battalions + artil. co) (4 3pdrs) (97/3,575) 3rd brigade: General de brigade Guyardet 61st Line Rgt. (5 battalions + artil. co) (4 3pdrs) (101/3,570) 111th Line Rgt. (5 battalions + artil. co) (4 3 pdrs) 85/3,762) Division artillery, etc. A quick look at the Battle of Saltanovka which occurred on July 24, 1812, at the beginning of the Campaign of Russia provides a very clear picture of the tactical handling of large regiments. The following is a direct translation of Davout's report [4] on that battle and gives us a good idea on how the battle was handled by Davout.
At that time, I only had at Mohilev the 57th, 61 st and 111th infantry regiments of Compans' Division - the 25th had been left with Pajol's brigade and the 1st Chasseurs, on the Berezina to cover Minsk - the 85th and 108th of Desaix's Division, Valence's Division and the 3rd Chasseurs.
It was necessary to choose a narrow position that could minimize the enemy's superiority in cavalry and artillery.
On the 23rd, at 7:30 A.M., I received reports that the outposts were under attack. At 8:30 A.M., I found the 85th under heavy attack. General Fredericks, who commanded the regiment, had made good dispositions, and during the entire day had shown calm and a great deal of intrepidity.
The artillery of the Division and that of the 85th had been deployed on the day before. Their fire was very deadly and, after one hour of combat, there were already over 500 dead Russians. Twelve to fifteen Russian artillery pieces came out from the woods and were deployed on the plateau near the mill of which the bridge had been destroyed. Some Russian infantry regiments were formed, one battalion of the 108th was sent to support the companies of the 85th that were engaged at that point. A few artillery pieces were opposed to that of the Russians. The combat became very intense on that spot. The enemy's forces increased constantly. The battalion of the 108th that had pushed back the Russians was forced to withdraw. General Guyardet, with two battalions of the 61st, stopped the pursuit of the enemy and forced the Russians to cross back over the ravine they had crossed while pursuing the battalion of the 108th.
While these events were taking place on the right, I ordered General Fredericks, who had defended the opening on the main road with great ardor, to move across the defile one battalion of the 108th and a few companies of the 85th, and to charge the enemy's pieces, That movement was executed with great celerity and directed by Colonel Achard of the 108th and had a great influence on the movements on the enemy's left, which was forced to fall back.
The battalion commanded by Colonel Achard had taken prisoner one enemy battalion, which was later set free. The colonel was wounded in the arm by a bullet, and was unable to hold the heights he had occupied.
The enemy had sent forward a considerable mass of troops formed in closed columns to renew its attack to force the bridge; the enemy's force was within range of the Chef d'escadron Polinier, who stopped it by a murderous fire and did great damage to it. The number of enemy deaths, which was on that point already considerable, was doubled.
The action was still strong on both sides and with a great inferiority of numbers on our side.
The other troops were in reserve on our right, where we had expected the enemy to put his main pressure, especially with his numerous cavalry. Around 6 in the evening, all my patrols on the right having not seen any enemies, the troops that were in reserve, especially the I I I th regiment, were sent toward the main road, General Fredericks received the order to renew his attack. One battalion of the 85th, which on the day before had been placed on the extreme right, and one of the 61 st, attacked the enemy's left. These two attacks were successful; the enemy withdrew his artillery. The troops followed that movement on all the points.
The 111th and the 61 st of the 5th Division, under General Compans, were given the responsibility of pursuing the enemy up to Novosielki. Nightfall stopped the pursuit on that locality, where considerable forces were formed to protect the retreat of the 12th Russian infantry regiment which had been very badly mauled. Davout's report only covers the main events of the battle of Saltanovka (Saltonovska in Davout's report) but it is to the point and very clearly discusses what concerns us. In addition to Davout's report, we are also fortunate to have a Russian narrative of the battle [5] , which, while confirming Davout's report, shades a little more light on the details of the French deployment. In addition, that source provides a very useful map which was used to draw a map on which the position and movements of the troops are outlined. The deployment of Davout's troops according to the Russian account reads as follows:
"Lieutenant-General Raevski is ordered to occupy Moguilev. On July 10,[6] his 7th Infantry Corps (16,000 and 72 guns) is at Datchkovka. Saltanovka is occupied by Davout's troops, the village and even the bridge are readied for defense. On the French right wing; 108th of the Line (5 battalions) and 85th Line (1 battalion). On the left, near Saltanovka: 85th Line (3 batt.) and one company of voltigeurs. Behind the right wing, between Fatova and Seletz; 61 th Line (4 batt.) is in reserve. The general reserve is near Seletz: 61th Line (1 batt.), 85th Line (1 batt.), heavy cavalry Division under Valence, Light cavalry Division under Chastel, rest of 3rd Chasseurs a cheval (from Brigade Bordessoule). Total 28,000.
An analysis of the above documents on the Battle of Saltanovka [7] is most informative. Only 2 brigades of Davout's 4th Division were effectively deployed to face the Russian attack (see above order of battle). They were the 2nd brigade under Fredericks (85th Line) and 3rd brigade under Legay (108th Line). In reserve we find a brigade from the 5th Division, the 3rd brigade under Guillardet (61st and 111th Line Rgts, the latter not mentioned in the Russian account).
Brigade integrity was not respected and defacto task forces were formed and changed during the course of the battle according to the tactical development. At the beginning of the battle we find:
Hence, the initial French deployment is a classical deployment - in depth - on two lines, which gives the defender a defense in depth. The most important point to our discussion is that the brigades of the 4th and 5th Divisions are simply broken up and organized in ad hoc formations to fit the tactical situation. Such formations are changed during the course of the battle for counterattacks, etc.. For instance, during the course of the battle, a task force is formed with 1 battalion of the 108th and a few companies of the 85th and placed under Colonel Achard (commanding the 108th). This force executes a very successful attack.
At the end of battle, Davout's report mentions the pursuit under orders of the retreating Russians:
So, as a conclusion, we can safely say that the large 5 battalion regiments of Davout's command at Saltanovka did not affect the tactical handling or tactical flexibility of the battle, typical of the French army of the period. Every one of the large regiments were broken up at one time or another during the course of the battle and organized in ad hoc formations and placed under the command of what ever general officer or colonel available. What is most remarkable is that all these movements were made under the Chain of Command!
[1] i.e. temporary or provisional regiments.
4th Division: General de Division Desaix 1st brigade: General de brigade Barbanegre 33rd Leger (4 battalions + artil. co) (4 3pdrs) (66/2,470) 2nd brigade: G6n6ral de brigade Fredericks 85th Line Rgt. (5 battalions + artil. co) (4 3pdrs) (109/3,930) 3rd brigade: General de brigade Legay 108th Line Rgt. (5 battalions + artil. co) (4 3pdrs) (103/3,647) Division artillery, etc.
All the reports mention the arrival of Prince Bagration at Novoi-Bekhov and his movement toward Mohilev, apparently willing to give battle in order to enter it. One evaluated his forces to be 4 Divisions of Platov's corps and several cavalry Divisions.
The position at Saltonovska, of which I am sending a sketch to your Highness, appeared to fit that purpose. During the night of the 22nd, I had the bridge that is on the main road barricaded and the inn vis-a-vis crenelated. The bridge near the mill was cut off by my companies of sappers and the houses near by crenelated. The 85th was ordered to defend these posts and to hold them if attacked to give time to the other troops spread out between that position and Mohilev, Claparede's Division and the troops detached with General Pajol, to arrive.
(1) a first task force (apparently under Fredericks) including the 5 battalions of the 108th Line and 1 battalion of the 85th.
(2) a second task force defending Saltanovka including 3 battalions of the 85th and one company of voltigeurs of unspecified origin.
(3) a third reserve task force between Fatova and Seletz consisting of 4 battalions of the 61st Line.
(4) a fourth reserve task force consisting of I battalion of the 61 st and I battalion of the 85th is located behind Seletz."The 111th and the 61st of the 5th Division, under General Compans, were given the responsibility of pursuing the enemy up to Novosielki. Nightfall stopped
the pursuit on that locality . .....
Endnotes:
[2] 2. See orders of battle in Scott Bowden, Napoleon's Grande Armee of 1813, The Emperor's Press, and/or George Nafziger, Lutzen and Bautzen, The Emperor's Press.
[3] Napoleon's Invasion of Russia, 1988, Presidio, Press, 31 Pamaron Way, Novato, CA 904949.
[4] Note on the Battle of Saltanovka: The above narrative is based on a primary source which is Davout's report on the battle. J.Lochet first found Davout's report at Vincennes in Fabry's La Campagne de Russie, Chapelot, Paris 1900-1903, Tome 2, pp. 143-5, then in the Archives Nationales in the "Cartons" dealing with the Marshal's correspondences. Davout's report was written on July 24, 1812 at 1 A.M., i.e. immediately after the battle. The Archives Nationales are located in Paris. As far as I know, the Archives Nationales (and Archives Guerre, at Vincennes) do not do research by mail. According to French laws on the matter, anyone can do personal research, but these institutions won't do the research for you. A maximum of 5 "cartons" (i.e. boxes about 26x10x 15) can be consulted in any given day. (I overcame the difficulty by taking my younger nephew with me).
[5] Our source is Zweguintov l'Armee Russe, Paris 1978.
[6] The Russian were using the Julian calendar which is 14 days late when compared with the dates from the Gregorian calendar using by the Western countries. Hence July 10 and July I I reported in the Russian account are respectively July 23 and 24 in Davout's report.
[7] A good, complete account of the Battle of Saltanovka can be found in George Nafziger Napoleon's Invasion of Russia, pp. 124 and 125 or Empires, Eagles and Lions, vol. I # 114.
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