It has been stated in many past issues of EEL that the archival truth is the ultimate objective and on many occasions, EEL, in spite of much falsehood certainly involuntarily perpetuated by some historians, has been able to set the record straight. Unfortunately, there are many cases in which the best and the most reliable historians are at a loss to come up with the "truth" simply because the data to establish that truth does not exist. Such is the case for at least a typical event at Kolin. The discrepancy raised here came to mind very recently when I visited the Kolin battlefield with a group of friends. Christopher Duffy's Frederick the Great, A Military Life was our guide and after the visit, I once more read the description of that battle. I compared in my mind what I had also read (and could remember at that time) about that battle in Home's A Precis of Modern Tactics, London, 1882. I remembered a basic point on which Home had commented. It was the reason for the failure of the oblique order during the battle which he attributed to the early, involuntary wheeling of the Prussian infantry during the flank march. According to Home, the involuntary wheeling was caused by the reaction to the fire of the Austrian light infantry, the famed Croats. I am not going to expand this discussion any further since what Home wrote on that battle has been used by Marc Raiff in his article, Frederick's Oblique Order, found elsewhere in this issue. It is important for the readership to realize that the points presented here are not to prove Marc wrong or anybody else for that matter, but to show how difficult the task of the historian (professional or not) is to come up with the simple truth. If Marc is wrong in his presentation of Kolin, he is in good company since Napoleon and Jornini commented on the battle of Kolin as commented by Home! It can be further argued that if Home reported the battle of Kolin the way he did, he must have had good reasons to do so. It is possible that the version of the battle he reported was the official accepted version of the battle of Kolin. After all, Napoleon and Jomini had commented on that very version. The questionable point I have raised in my mind becomes evident when one compares Home with the following quotation from Christopher Duffy's book [1] ,p. 125: "The extraordinary complexities of the battle of Kolin was never convincingly unraveled until Hoen [2] wrote on the subject in 1911. In outline, however, we shall describe two phases in combat namely: (a) when the intended flanking attack of the Prussians was converted, by Frederick's last minute change of mind, into a frontal one, and (b) when the Prussians repeatedly opened potential breaches in the enemy line, only to fail in face of the tenacity and superior numbers of the Austrians." In our discussion, only point (a) is of immediate interest since it is apparently in flagrant disagreement with Home whom attributes the change in the attack plan, to a different event: "While this was being done, the main body of the army on its march along the front of the Austrian position was much disturbed by the Austrian light troops, which continually attacked their right flank. A battalion leader being much pressed, ordered his battalion to wheel to his right. By deploying his battalion to defend itself against the pressing Austrian light troops, the Prussian battalion leader did not intend to trigger what followed. He had not realized that wheeling his battalion to the right was the order to form line. It was taken up by the whole army in the rear, who wheeled into line also and attacked the Austrians near Chotzemitz while the leading portion of the main body continued its march. A large gap was thus left in the long columns and the general commanding the first portion of the main body, hearing the firing, looked back, saw the remainder of the army in action, wheeled to his right and also attacked. Thus, instead of forming the line "XX ", the Prussian army made four disconnected attacks along the front. The Prussians fought well, and renewed their attack five or six times, but were unable to carry any of the Austrian positions, and also were forced to retreat with heavy looses of 12,090 casualties while the Austrians suffered 8,000 casualties. Of course, Home could be wrong since his book was published in 1882 and that is much before Hoen wrote about the battle of Kolin in 1911. But there is a possibility that both are actually right. Let me explain. It is quite possible that effectively, the events related by Home took place and that part of the Prussian army wheeled into line prematurely. Then Frederick witnessing the event and conscious of the disorder and confusion taking place, simply ordered his army to make a frontal attack instead of the planned flank attack. There is little doubt that, somehow, Frederick had a hand in ordering a front attack. The last point could be substantiated by another quotation from Frederick the Great, A Military Life, pp. 126: Prince Moritz was determined to adhere to the original scheme of marching all the way to the ridge in columns, and over Frederick's shouted protests he ordered the troops to continue on their way: For the third time Frederick called out: 'Prinz Moritz, form into line!' The Prince repeated: 'Forwards, Forwards!'. At this the king galloped up and halted with the muzzle of his horse against the prince's saddle. 'For god's sake', he shouted, form front when I tell you to do so!' The Prince at last gave the appropriate order in a sorrowful tone of voice, and he commented... 'Now the battle is lost!' (quoted in Duncker, 1876, 76) Then, Christopher Duffy continues on page 127 with the following comments on the reasons that made Frederick change his battle plans: "Why did Frederick change his mind yet again, abandoning the last elements of his flank march in favour of a frontal attack? Hoen concludes (1911, 380-6) that the king had become belatedly aware of the clouds of dust which betokened the shift of Austrian reserves to the east. He therefore decided not to move behind the advance guard, but to bring the leading battalions of the main army up to Hilsen's right and sweep the Krzeczhorz Hill by a concerted push." We have asked Christopher Duffy to comment on the above and give us his point of view. Note that even if Home was wrong, the points and conclusions presented in Marc's article on Frederick's oblique order are still pertinent. ENDNOTES: [1] We are using the paperback version of Frederick the Great, A Military Life, Routledge, New York, 1990. [2] Hoen, "Die Schlacht bei Kolin am 18 Juni, 1757", Streffleurs Militlirische Zeitschrift, Vienna, 1911. Duffy's Answer and Another Note on the Oblique Order Back to Empire, Eagles, & Lions Table of Contents Vol. 2 No. 4 Back to EEL List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1994 by Emperor's Headquarters This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com