On Columns Advancing At Non-Deployment Distances or What the Rulesmiths May Have Been Thinking Most, if not all, Napoleonic game systems allow a line of battalions in column to attack in squashed together masses that would never have room to deploy into line. A number of rules systems give great advantages to this "massed attack", causing players use it as their "bread and butter" standard formation, and naturally accept it as the historically accurate use of their troops. It is my opinion - supported by historical data - that, when in an attack mode, in almost all circumstances, a line of columns operated at deployment distances. Why do rulesmiths give bonus to unhistorical attacks carried by massive columns at non-deployment distances? Furthermore, why do they allow such attacks at all? Are these authors readers of history? Have they simply regurgitated a prior rulesmith's judgement? Perhaps his rules are intended to be a game and not a historical simulation! Pretend if you will, that EE&L never existed to clear up the many myths and misconceptions of combat in the wars of the French Revolution and Empire. I will present all the potential advantages and disadvantages to operating at non-deployment distances that I can think of. Perhaps my 20th century thoughts will reveal the thoughts of our 20th century rulesmiths. Then I'll inform you of how our club handles such situations. For all of the following, envision a three battalion regiment, attacking or maneuvering very close to the enemy. These 6 company battalions are in columns of divisions, (or attack columns) with a company or half company distance between each battalion. (see diagram) Jean Lochet and the EE&L staff have written numerous excellent articles on d'Erlon's formation [1] at Waterloo and Macdonald's formation at Wagram and termed these formations, "massive columns" but these formations were exception rather than the rule. As a matter of facts, Macdonald's formation at Wagram was not even a column but a three sided square. [2] Macdonald's formation at Wagrarn is worth describing. We have been told by Oman [3], that at Wagram Macdonald formed a monstrous column with some 23 battalions at very reduced strength formed by 8 battalions in double line, 4 battalion in columns of battalion, one behind the other on the left, and 8 battalions in columns of battalion one behind the other on the right. The rear consisted of 3 battalions side by side. In his memoirs, Macdonald [4] claims that he adopted such formation for his attack because he feared an attack by the Austrian cavalry. Following is what Macdonald says in his Marshal Macdonald's Recollections, p.338: "...I therefore ordered four battalions, followed by four others which I deployed in two lines, to advance at the double; and while my artillery opened fire, and that of the Guard took position (which the Emperor called the hundred gun battery), my two divisions formed themselves into attacking columns. The enemy, who were still advancing, halted, and, redoubling their fire, caused us terrible damage. However, in proportion as my lines became unserviceable, I drew them up closer together, and made them dress as at drill. While I was doing this, I saw the enemy cavalry preparing to charge, [emphasis mine, Bill Jessop] and had ,barely time to close my second line on the first one; they were flanked by the two divisions still in columns, and the square was completed by a portion of General Nansouty's cavalry that had been put under my orders since the morning... " I ordered my famous battery mowing down the cavalry. My hot fire broke them just as they were preparing to charge; many men and horses fell pierced by our bayonets. The smoke rising disclosed to me the enemy in the utmost disorder, which was increased by their attempt to retreat. I ordered an advance with leveled bayonets, after previously commanding Nansouty to charge, at the same time desiring the cavalry officers whom I saw behind me do likewise. Unfortunately, they were not under my orders, and the Emperor was not there to give any. The enemy were in extreme disorder; but their fire during their retreat did us much harm." Macdonald's Formation at Wagram' [5] as it can be seen, it is a huge 3 sided square. So, here we have it, straight form the horse mouth! Macdonald intended to form a square to repulse a feared Austrian cavalry charge, which materialized shortly after. Here we are far from Oman's tale. Note that the Austrian artillery caused fearful damages to Macdonald's formation, which for our discussion will be considered as a massive column, a point that we'll develop later. I feel my topic is different, so to prevent confusion, I shall refer to my "non-deployment distance line of columns" as N.D.D.L Columns. POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES OF "N.D.D.L" COLUMNS ON THE ATTACK Morale Benefit Similar to the moral benefit of being in column, the soldiers of each battalion may feel safer having such close support. Due to their proximity, the battalions might feed off each other's blood lust and attempt to out perform each other. Command Control The closed up battalions of a regiment may be more easily controlled by their commander. Orders would not have to travel as far, and the commander and his staff could more easily intervene as necessary. Maneuver Benefit Due to their proximity, the battalions may have more easily maintained their alignment. If our line of columns had to change its line of advance (say by 45 degrees or less) the outer-most battalion would have to travel less distance than it would at normal deployment intervals, producing quicker maneuvers. If the N.D.D.L. Columns achieve a quick bloodless victory, they could then fan out, thus being more efficient at exploiting their good fortunes (this is a favorite tactic in a number of rule systems). Combat Benefit Massed battalions may cause increased fear in the section of the enemy line threatened by its menacing bulk. The massed columns would nearly have as much firepower as their opponents defending in line, and as mentioned in G.H. Hughes' FIREPOWER, the columns would be able to replace their front line casualties from the rear. One of the primary reasons to attack in column is the increased weight of the impact. (actually the threat of impact) Perhaps the more columns in a small area the stronger the threat of "impact". This additional weight may have been most felt in occasional close actions that involved bayonet fighting. Historically these close actions involved fortifications or heavy terrain and very seldom in open terrain. POTENTIAL DISADVANTAGES OF "N.D.D.L: COLUMNS ON THE ATTACK: Artillery Target Artillerymen fire upon the most profitable targets that meet the parameters of their fire plan. Our constricted line of columns is an extremely profitable target; as misses on the middle battalion still have a chance of being hits on the outer ones. Not only would their be a higher percentage of damage causing hits, but batteries may take more long range shots than upon an attack at deployment distance. The battery commander may increase the pace of fire due to the shear profitability of the target and could also save time in the relaying of the guns. Morale Problems Being hit by a larger volume of artillery may cause our regiment some increased discomfort. If one of the battalions looses heart and breaks it might be more likely that his close partners will retreat as well. Command Control If our attacking mass suffers a major defeat or routs, it may be more difficult to rally the inter-mixed masses as they flee to the rear. Perhaps the proximity of other battalions could cause confusion as to which orders/drum rolls soldiers were to obey. Maneuver Problems A line of columns packed together at non-deploying distances cannot deploy, (form line). We all know that line was always preferred in defense as well as a viable attack formation. In how many situations would a Napoleonic commander have been completely assured that he would not have to form line? The squares formed by N.D.D.L Columns (assuming they can easily form square), may not have adequate distance between them to provide mutual fire support, creating potential musketry dead-zones. N.D.D.L Columns may have problems with drastic changes of front, including movements to the rear. Their close proximity may cause problems when navigating terrain obstacles, and more importantly could cause chaos when passing through other friendly troops. Combat Problems Unless our sample troops had strong flank support and are very close together, they should have inferior firepower. Of course if we intend to engage in a firefight our greatest combat weakness is that we cannot form line. Flanks which would not be vulnerable at deployment distance may now be tactically, "In The Air". Considering the maneuver and artillery sections above, one could reason that our mass may be more vulnerable to combined arms counter attacks. Grand Tactics With all the above maneuver and combat problems, it may be safe to say that N.D.D.L Columns are tactically inflexible. The defenders may be able to predict the attacker's objective and thus respond earlier. Most full-blown battles involved relatively even forces. An attacker who crams his troops together may be putting too many of his eggs in one basket, which the defender could exploit. In other words, why send 3 battalions to do the work of one? CONCLUSIONS It is a fact that troops arriving at the field almost always deployed into their battle formations at deployment distances. But did they remain that way? I'm very surprised that there isn't a manual on regimental maneuvers addressing this topic; perhaps it's absence answers this question? EE&L has produced many documented examples of divisions beginning their attacks/advances in column, but due to a change in the situation ultimately fighting in line. The previously mentioned tactical inflexibility makes this formation unable to respond to the mysteries ahead in the smoke. Some of the advantages postulated above are advantages only as long as the troops are doing unhistorical things. These same advantages (and their original sources) have been refuted in past issues of EE&L. If a line of columns at non-deployment distance has a purpose on the battlefield, I feel it is limited in scope. It may have a role for low morale troops, and it may have a role for fortified / heavy terrain combats. (The combats that result in complete disorder.) N.D.D.L troops if used, better be attacking a poorly supported point on the battle line of a defender who is back on his heels. If the advance makes it in all the way, and the defender is not scared away, I can't even guess as to who would have a better chance in the close action. One of the documented references of such an attack is in G.H. Hughes' FIREPOWER, pp. 115-125, at the battle of Albuera. The closely packed French columns were defeated. EE&L Rules: We feel that most rule systems grossly mishandle this issue. In our club games the rules - based on historical evidence - clearly state that: "You Should always Maintain Deployment Distance Between Your Battalions". If you don't, our rules penalize columns attacking at non-deployment distance in the following ways: RULE 7.47: Troops attacking in massive columns or attacking in columns at less than deploying intervals. Important Note: Attacking a line with massive columns is a common practice used by many wargamers in order to simply overwhelm the enemy with numbers. As rules do not penalize that unhistorical practice, in a wargame, such attacks are almost always successful. However, historical data does not support success by attacking with massive columns! When ever massive columns were used they were always defeated. The following rule is an attempt to put attack with massive columns in their proper perspective. DEFINITION OF MASSIVE COLUMNS A massive columns is defined as: (1) A mass or a line of any type of columns of battalion at less than deploying distances. (2) A succession of lines more than 2 lines deep (i.e. like d'Erlon's columns at Waterloo. (3) A massive square like that of Macdonald at Wagram. (4) Troops attacking in square(s). (5) Any combination of the above. (6) Any formation fitting the spirit of the rule. General Procedure: As a general rule, only the fighting value (CV) of the first rank is taken in consideration. So, the CV value for different types of columns is only a percentage of the battalion CV: Column of Companies Column of Divisions Square Succession Lines 4 6 4 6 25% 16% 50% 30% 25% CV Value of Front Line Formations not covered above are handled as per the "General Procedure" ADDITIONAL LIMITATIONS Massive columns were for a number of reasons very difficult to handle: (1) They could not deploy, (2) Formations other than squares could not form squares if attacked by cavalry. (3) Because of disorders caused by artillery fire, massive columns became mixed and their ranks intermingled. (4) Because of their confused state, orders were hard to transmit . (5) Once launched an attack by a massive columns can not be cancelled. (6) A massive columns can only move straight forward. (7) Artillery fire efficiency is increased (see RULE 4.35). (8) Massive columns in an attempt to keep alignment, move slower like a line. Important: If the front line is defeated, the all massive column is defeated as per RULE 7.17. Perhaps the most important point on the above rule is to drastically increase the artillery fire. That too is supported by historical evidence. Take a look at Macdonald's comments on his formation at Wagram. Twice he mentions that the Austrian artillery did fearful damages to his command. It has been estimated that Macdonald command as he formed his massive column/square was about 6000 and was reduced to some 1,500 at the end of the combat. [6] Endnotes [1] EE&L 78 and 79 (Volume 1). [6] Swords Around the Throne, Colonel Elting, The Free Press, New York, 1988, p. 537. [6] Oman Studies in the Napoleonic Wars. [6] The Campaigns of Napoleon, Chandler, David G. MacMilllan Co. New York, 1965, p. 346 and 35 1. [6] Diagram from A Precis of Modern Tactics, Home, Colonel R., London, 1882. [6] Napoleon and the Archduke Charles, Petre, F. Lorraine, 1976 reprint by Arms and Armour Press, London, p. 374.  Back to Empire, Eagles, & Lions Table of Contents Vol. 2 No. 3 Back to EEL List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1993 by Emperor's Headquarters This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com